Ireland's Public Debt Crisis
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Ireland's Public Debt Crisis Ireland's Public Debt Crisis Presentation Transcript

  • Ireland’s Public Debt Crisis
    Why Prof. Morgan Kelly is wrong (this time)
    SEAMUS COFFEY
  • December 2006
    It is not implausible that prices could fall - relative to income - by 40-50 per cent.
    We could see a collapse of Government revenue and unemployment back above 15 per cent.Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 28th December 2006
    Primetime 17 April 2007 Kelly vs Power 4:30 11:30
  • October 2008
    Irish banks were facing potential losses on their property lending of the order of €10 billion to €20 billion. Thanks to Brian Lenihan's master stroke it looks as if it will be you, rather than bank shareholders, who will be taking the loss.
    Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 2nd October 2008
    Primetime 30 September 2007 Kelly vs Keenan 1:30 8:49
  • February 2009
    To see what would happen to Ireland if foreign lenders suddenly pull the plug, we only need to look at what happened in Latvia last December. We would be forced to seek an international bailout, with the International Monetary Fund and European Union playing bad cop and good cop.
    Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 17th February 2009
  • July 2009
    Brian Lenihan’s largesse to bond holders could cost you and me €50 to €70 billion. The drift into national bankruptcy looks increasingly unstoppable.
    Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 3rd July 2009
  • May 2010
    Between developers, businesses, and personal loans, Irish banks are on track to lose nearly €50 billion if we are optimistic (and more likely closer to €70 billion), which translates into a bill for the taxpayer of over 30 per cent of GDP. M Kelly Bank Loan Loss Spreadsheet May 2010
    Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 22nd May 2010
  • November 2010
    Where the first round of the banking crisis centred on a few dozen large developers, the next round will involve hundreds of thousands of families with mortgages.
    If one family defaults on its mortgage, they are pariahs: if 200,000 default they are a powerful political constituency.
    From here on, for better or worse, we can only rely on the kindness of strangers.
    Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 8th November 2010
  • May 2011
    Irish insolvency is now less a matter of economics than of arithmetic. If everything goes according to plan, as it always does, Ireland’s government debt will top €190 billion by 2014, with another €45 billion in Nama and €35 billion in bank recapitalisation, for a total of €270 billion, plus whatever losses the Irish Central Bank has made on its emergency lending.
    Subtracting off the likely value of the banks and Nama assets, Namawinelake (by far the best source on the Irish economy) reckons our final debt will be about €220 billion, and I think it will be closer to €250 billion.
    Prof. Morgan Kelly, Irish Times, 7th May 2011
  • Namawinelake
    So general govt debt of €148bn in 2010
    + €43bn deficit 2011-2014
    + additional capital for banks (€35bn earmarked of which €25bn is described as a contingency)
    + debt redemption nil (rollover)
    + NAMA €45bn (€40bn bonds including pyt for sub-€20m exposures and €5bn development debt)
    + swapping of ECB/CBI ELA for national debt x,
    So €271bn + x for ECB/CBI ELA swap for general government debt.
    Obviously NAMA will have some value as will ELA and we start off with some funds in the NTMA/NPRF so the net will be less than that , but I would have said €220bn as a rough ballpark.
    www.namawinelake.wordpress.com, 8th February 2011
  • Reaction
    “There are grounds for believing that Kelly’s estimate is wrong to the extent of between €50 and €60 billion and that the real figure will be closer to €190 billion.”
    Antoin Murphy, Sunday Business Post, 15th May
    “For undisclosed reasons, he feels the resulting figure is too optimistic and adds a further €30 billion as a contingency provision. This brings his projection of the gross GGD to €250 billion at the end of 2014.
    Kelly’s inclusion of €35 billion under this heading is double counting.”
    Tony Leddin and Brendan Walsh, Irish Times, 20th May
  • What is the reality?
    General Government Debt:
    START: 2006 = €44 Billion
    MIDDLE: 2010 = €148 Billion
    END: 2014 = €??? Billion
  • 2007 to 2010: From €44bn to €148bn
    Three reasons:
    1. Annual Deficits: €52 billion
    2. Increase in Cash Balances: €12 billion
    3. Banks & Promissory Notes: €40 billion
    2006 GGD of €44 billion plus this €104 billion
    2010 General Government Debt = €148bn
  • 2011 to 2014: From €148 bn to ???
    What’s remaining?
    1. Projected Annual Deficits: €48 billion
    2. Further Bank Recapitalisation: €10 billion
    3. Interest on Promissory Notes: €4 billion
    2010 GGD of €148 billion plus this €64 billion
    2014 General Government Debt = €210bn
  • 2014 Government Debt
  • Breakdown of this €210 Billion Debt
    2006 Pre-Crisis Debt: €40 billion
    2007 to 2014 Deficits: €100 billion
    Bank Related Debt: €54 billion
    Cash Reserves: €16 billion
    By 2014, the bailout of the banks will be responsible for around 25% of our gross debt.
  • Domestic Uncertainties
    On the asset side:
    1. Value of remaining €5 billion in the NPRF
    2. Resale Value of the Banks = €? Billion
    3. Lower interest rate on bailout funds
    4. Burning of senior bank bondholders
  • Bank Bondholders
  • Domestic Uncertainties
    On the liability side:
    1. Slippage in the annual deficits above €48 billion
    2. Potential Losses on €30 billion of NAMA loans
    3. Further losses in the banks
    4. €130 billion of Central Bank Liquidity
  • Annual Deficits
  • Our Bust Banks are Covered
    Losses Accounted For = €105 billion
    1. NAMA: €42 billion
    2. Stress Tests: €53 billion
    3. Stock Provisions: €10 billion
    Money Provided to meet losses = €105 billion
    1. The State: €66 billion
    2. Equity & Reserves: €25 billion
    3. Junior Bondholders: €14 billion
  • Our Bust Banks are Covered
  • Our Bust Banks are Covered
  • Our Bust Banks are Covered
  • Can we even get to 2014?
    How much do we need? Where can we get it?
    Outstanding Government Bonds
  • Maturity Profiles
  • Maturity Profiles
  • Endgame
    Morgan Kelly's Ultimate Warning