International Conference «Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Environment» VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUESChief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RussianFederation – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General N.E.MAKAROV Moscow, 2012
1 Russian Core BMD Guidelines Equal and Solid linkage indivisible Mutual nuclear between strategicsecurity as crucial deterrence is key offensive andfeature of regional to global security defensive and global and stability weapon systems security
2 FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed: to limit their Missile Defense systems; not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system; not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas; not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD systems; not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.
3 US SDI PROGRAM BOOST-PHASE BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE & SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM INTERCEPTOR TRACKING SYSTEM NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM RELAY MIRROR FRONTING MIRROR SPACE-BASED SPACE-BASED LASER SURVERLANCE &TRACKING SYSTEM GRAUND- GRAUND-BASED BASED RADAR HIGH ENDO- INTERCEPTOR ATMOSPHERIC DEFENSEGRAUND- BASED INTERCEPTOR LASER BATTLE MANAGTRThe purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .
ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-s 4Joint US-Russian statement on Joint statement of Presidents of Provision on Standing global protection system the Russian Federation and the Consultative Commission (Washington, 17th of June 1992) United States of America (New-York, 26th of September 1997) regarding Agreement on Ballistic Missile Defense (Helsinki, 21st of March 1997) First agreed statement General understanding to the Second agreed statementregarding Agreement between first agreed statement of 26 regarding Agreement between the USSR and the USA on September 1997 regarding the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems, Agreement between the USSR limitation of ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972 and the USA on limitation of dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997) ABMD systems, dated 26th of (New-York, 26th of September 1997) May 1972 General understanding to the Agreement on confidence- Memorandum of understanding second agreed statement building measures regarding regarding Agreement betweendated 26th of September 1997 systems for fighting Ballistic the USSR and the USA onregarding Agreement between Missiles, which are not strategic limitation of ABMD systems, the USSR and the USA on ballistic missiles dated 26th of May 1972. limitation of ABMD systems, (New-York, 25th of September 1997) (New-York, 26th of September 1997 dated 26th of May 1972.
5PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA Possible trajectories of Russian ICBMs Kozelsk Tatistchevo TPA defense zone Radar ‘s range in Czech Republic
6DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD) Phase I(2011) PhaseII (2011-2015) Phase III (2015-2018) Phase IV (2018-2020) - deployment of MD -deployment of MD base -deployment of MD base - outfitting deployed MD ships with with «Standard-3» with «Standard-3» 2А shooters in Europe with «Standard-3» 1А interceptors 1B in interceptors in Poland. «Standard-3» 2B interceptors in Aegean, Romania. Outfitting deployed MD interceptors. Adriatic and shooters with Mediterranean seas. «Standard-3» 2А interceptors. Protection of South Protection of South and Protection of Protection of European States from South-East European European states from European states from States from shorter range shorter range intermediate range ICBMs missiles missiles missiles
RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH 7 BM trajectories do not cross NATO BMD area of responsibility NATO area of responsibility RUSSIAN AREA OF(NATO BMD assets only) RESPONSIBILITY (RUSSIAN BMD assets only) Territoies of European states (NATO members) covered by Russian BMD, where deployment of NATO BMD challenges Russian Strategic Nuclear Force capabilities NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL (information exchange and target distribution)
8COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE European MD The Russian Federation NATO approach («cooperative Concurrence system element proposal («sectoral system») of views approach») Joint sector wise area Two independent areas Defense area No Responsible for interception NATO responsible for NATO Responsibility of any BM attacking Europe territory, No in its «sector» Russia – for Russian territory Full data sharing on shooter Limited data sharing on missile performances, missile threats, joint exercises Information No threats, target distribution, results assessment All BMs within the area of Only the BM attacking the area of Missile kills responsibility responsibility (including adjacent No area) Decision to National level National level Yes engage Not required (possible Possible ( with NATO and Russian «Buffer» zone outside of Russian BM areas overlapping to embrace No trajectories) Russian territory)
RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS 9 CRITERIA LIST:technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number ofinterceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.),deployment sites,capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminalphases of flight. joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all participants
10 RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION to increase defense of fixed launching sites, to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers, to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms, to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense, to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time, to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets, to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets, to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means).All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATOdeployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.