Russian assessment of missile threat


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Presentation of the Russian Ministry of Defence assessing the challenges of missile technology proliferation

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Russian assessment of missile threat

  1. 1. Missile Threat Assessment Russia’s MOD View
  2. 2. Слайд 2 Missile threats and challenges 2 Nation’s missile capabilities Using rocket technologies to make missiles Missile challengeMilitary and political intentionsof a nation to deliver a missile strike Missile threats
  3. 3. Слайд 2 Strategic BM arsenals reduction 3 Strategic nuclear warheads reductionShorter and intermediate range missile reduction
  4. 4. Слайд 3 Activities required to build ICBMs 4 - having all necessary resourcesavailable at the national level whileestablishing adequate R&D, productionand testing capacity -manufacturing key high-tech ICBM components and integrating them into a single operational product - carrying out a number of comprehensive tests of each individual system and the product as a whole
  5. 5. Activities required to produce ICBMs based on Слайд 4 5 space launch vehicles - developing a new missile flight control system that would guarantee delivery of a high-precision warhead to intended surface targets by ballistic trajectory; - ensuring conditions for high operational readiness;- providing long-term warranty period operation;- ensuring HDBT conditions for ICBMs;- securing ICBMs from unauthorized launch.
  6. 6. Proliferation of liquid-propellant missile technologies 5 Слайд 6 to south-east Game-changing designs are not visible Obsolete missiles are upscaled and upgraded
  7. 7. Factors impacting military and political intentions ofСлайд 6 south- 7 east nations - war potential of these nations significantly yields to that of states and nationcoalitions, which they may view as potential adversaries; - relatively low level of economic self-sufficiency and capacity to hold onunder economic sanctions in case missile challenges turn into a missile threat; - self-reliance in national security, often times in the conditions of relativeinternational isolation; - inevitability of “retaliation strike” in case of self-started missile attack; - lack of sufficient resource base enabling them to withstand a “retaliationstrike”; - participation in key WMD non-proliferation regimes (NPT Treaty, Conventionon Prohibition of Chemical and Biological weapons etc). Incentives for a self-started missile attack on the territory of Europe are absent
  8. 8. Summary of comprehensive assessment of present Слайд 6 8 missile threats• At present it is shorter-range and tactical missiles that are mostly spread around the world.• For some countries missile systems primarily mean assets to win international recognition or to achieve supremacy over neighbors.• A direct missile attack threat to leading states of the world including NATO member-states look very insignificant.• At this stage the problem of missile proliferation can and should be addressed not solely by the use of force and not through building expensive BMD assets, that are not always adequate to existing missile threats, but by engaging preventive diplomacy and strengthening arms control and non-proliferation regimes as well as reducing weapon systems.
  9. 9. Слайд 6 Elimination of potential missile threats 9Priority – to employ political and diplomatic methods