Assessment of missile defence global capabilities

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How serious is the ballistic missile threat?

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Assessment of missile defence global capabilities

  1. 1. Assessment of BMD Global capabilitiesMissile Defence as a Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment International Conference Moscow, 3-4 May 2012 Colonel-General V.V. Gerasimov
  2. 2. Briefing Objectives• Presenting the findings from the assessment of global BMD capabilities• Highlighting the available tech opportunities to respond to missile threats in a joint manner
  3. 3. BMD Information Capabilities
  4. 4. BMD Global Information Capabilities• modernizing the deployed missile warning radars• fielding mobile BMD radars• increasing the capabilities of low orbit satellite grouping• tapping into the information resources held by allies and partners
  5. 5. Deployment of BMD Information Assets
  6. 6. Conclusions• The deployed information subsystem covers the entire territory of the Russian Federation• Impediments are about to emerge and block the employment of Deterrence Forces• Subsystem’s capacities can be further enhanced• Comprehensine applications of the deployed information assets solidly beef up the BMD efficiency
  7. 7. BMD Weapons
  8. 8. Conditions• Missile launch lines feature research purposes• Targets’ positions are hypothetical, though close to reality• BMD assets performances get estimated through processing the available data and running comparative analyses• No use of BMD penetration aids• Calculations are built on computer models developed by the Ministry of Defense experts
  9. 9. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the West
  10. 10. Threats to the Russian StrategicNuclear Force From: the Center
  11. 11. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East
  12. 12. Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East
  13. 13. Conclusions• Concept for a BMD posture is global in character• BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory• BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia• Deployed BMD assets already have the capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles
  14. 14. Capabilities Assessment BMD Assets in Poland
  15. 15. Baseline Data• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios• Launch area – south• Missile range – up to 11000 km• Targeting – east coast of the USA• BMD interceptor positions: – Poland (shooters featuring Phase 3 and 4 capabilities) – Russia (south)
  16. 16. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories appear to be outside of the killingzone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is impossible.
  17. 17. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone forfourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception in possible.
  18. 18. Capabilities That Can Threaten RussiaConclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone forfourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception is possible.
  19. 19. Capabilities Assessment BMD Assets in Romania
  20. 20. Baseline Data• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios• Launch area – south• Missile range – up to 3000 km• Targeting – South and Central Europe• BMD positions: – Romania (shooters featuring third-phase capabilities) – Russia (south)
  21. 21. Conclusion. South Europe-bound trajectories fall within the killing zone forthird-phase BMD interceptors. Interception is possible.
  22. 22. Conclusion. Part of the Western Europe-bound trajectories happen to beoutside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception ispartial.
  23. 23. Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing fourth-phase BMD killing zone. Interception is possible
  24. 24. Conclusions• Romania-based BMD shooters featuring first and second-phase performances will have limited capabilities to assure protection of South Europe against missiles launched from the south• Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the south• Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force• There is room for cooperation aimed at developing an effective European-wide BMD system (development of the joint defense area)

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