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Pascual Imec06 Pascual Imec06 Presentation Transcript

  • Optimization of Inspection Decisions of Safety Related Systems Rodrigo Pascual, Ph.D. Department of Mechanical Engineering Universidad de Chile Pressure vessel lu 1 lu 2 pt 1 pt 2 pt 3 v 1 v 2
  • Motivation
    • Safety
      • Humans
      • Environment
      • Downstream equipment
    Dormant systems Systems in storage Spares Weapons Standby equipment Safety systems
  • Moubray (1997)
    • “ If RCM is correctly applied… it is not unusual to find that up to 40% of failure modes fall into the hidden category … up to 80% of these failure modes require failure finding , so up to one third of the tasks generated by comprehensive, correctly applied maintenance strategy development programs are failure finding tasks …”
  • Motivation Medical Expose dose control in radiotherapy systems Air transport Flight-by-wire control systems Automotive Airbags Antilock brake systems Process Emergency shutdown systems Military/Law enforcement Gas detectors Railway Automatic train stop systems Applications
  • Motivation Safety Systems in Process Industry (34 incidents) Source: Bell (2003) http://www.iee.org/Oncomms/pn/emc/Paper03.pdf Conception Design Implementation Operation & maintenance
  • Balance Unavailability Inspection frequency Overall Unknown Known (inspections, repairs, replacements) Costs Reliability model
  • IEC 61508 (2004) Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems
    • Life-cycle centered
    • Umbrella for other standards
    4 3 1 1,E-05 1,E-04 1,E-03 1,E-02 1,E-01 2 Probability of failure on demand Safety integrity level IEC 61508 (2004) Nuclear IEC 61513 (2001) Machinery 62061 (2005) API 670 (2000) Generic ISO 14224 (2004) Railway EN 50126 (1999) EN 50128 (2001) Process IEC 61511 (2003) ANSI 84.01 (2004 )
  • Aim at the in-service phase
    • Quantify the reliability of safety systems
      • Estimate
        • Optimal inspection and overhaul intervals
      • Assess
        • Safety systems architecture and component selection
        • Overhaul and repair actions
    Conception Design Implementation Operation & maintenance
  • Model considerations
    • Different failure modes
      • Independent
      • Dependent
        • Common cause failures
    • Automatic self-tests
    • Non detectable failures
    • Redundancy/Voting logic
    • Imperfect repairs
    • Easy to use
    • Compliant with IEC 61508
    Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 Logic 1 Logic 2 2/3 1/2 1/2 Actuator 1 Actuator 2 Pressure Temperature Leak … Valve Break Fire extinguisher … Electronic unit Valve spring …
  • Epochs for functional assessment
    • Manual
    • Random detection
    • Automatic
    • On demand
  • Failures of safety systems IEC 61508 Detected at inspections Not detected at inspections Failure “ Random” Systematic Aging (component) Stress (subsystem) Design (specification) Interaction (human error)
  • Imperfect inspections
    • “… many assume these tests (inspections) to be perfect, 100% test coverage... the best tests are probably more like 90% effective. Many are more like 60% effective…”
    Goble, W.M., Periodic inspection and test: requirements and benefits, Hydrocarbon Processing, 81(6), 117, 2002.
  • Partial and full inspections instantaneous
  • Overall availability & safety availability * ✔ ✔ ? ? ? ✔
  • Simplified model Overall availability Partial inspections Full inspections Probability of failure on demand Safety availability overall safety
  • Practical consideration Component failure rate (standard databases) Safety system level failure rate (plant information system) Complex System model One component model Conception Design Implementation Operation & maintenance
  • Scheme
  • Redundancy and common cause failures
      • Design deficiency
      • Material deficiency
    Common cause Independent
    • Installation error
    • Maintenance error
    • Harsh environment
    1- β 1- β β Comp. 1 Comp. 2    Conception Design Implementation Operation & maintenance
  • Example 2 out of 3 Pressure vessel lu 1 lu 2 pt 1 pt 2 pt 3 v 1 v 2
  • Example single component safety system
    • Full inspection
      • 5% MTBF
    • Inspection coverage
      • 50%
    • Sensitivity analysis
      •   =partial inspection time/full inspection time
     Time Instantaneous availability Partial insp. Partial insp. Full inspection Overall Availability 0 2 4 6 8 10 No. of partial inspections before renewal
  • Complex system Failure rate (  10 6 hours) Common Cause Factor From:Hauge, S., et al., Reliability Prediction Method for safety Instrumented Systems; PDS Method Handbook, 2006 Edition.,SINTEF, Trondheim, Norway, 2006
  • Reliability blocks diagram
  • Results Safety availability Partial coverage Full coverage  =0.7  =1.0
  • Number of partial inspections in a renewal cycle N
  • Sensitivity analysis Nr of partial inspections Period between Partial inspections Optimal overall availability Attained safety availability
  • Review
    • Estimate
      • maintenance
        • optimal partial/full inspection intervals
    • Assess
      • Design
        • safety systems architecture and component selection
      • Maintenance
        • Replacement and repair actions
    Conception Design Implementation Operation & maintenance