8. Religion and some manifestations Causeways 1500-300 BCE Deposits in waterways Shrines 400 BCE-43 CE Often connected with later Romano-British temples Druids
13. Development of a ShrinePhases – Hayling Island Phase I: Two enclosures and pit ~50 BCE Association with Belgae and Commius? Phase II Temple: Circular structure surrounds pit ~0-25 CE Roman Temple ~60 CE
20. Lindow man: death Probable cause of death: 2 blows to the head with a heavy object; also strangulation by a thin cord; throat cut Motive: Religious sacrifice?
21. Druids Repository of traditional knowledge Gods Tribal Law Administration of justice. Supervision of sacrifices. Used lunar calendar.
33. Government of provinces given to high officials whose offices arose from wealth not ability. Officers of senatorial or equestrian rank.
34.
35. Invasion – 55 BCE Legio VII Claudia Legio X Equestris
36. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE From CAESAR’S INVASION OF BRITAIN NS 293, U of ILLINOIS, NROTC Capt M. T. Carson, MOI Captain M. A. Boccolucci, U of San Diego Major Pfiester, Marquette University Major Darin Clay U of Wisconsin Captain Howell, University of Kansas
37. Significant Points In the first invasion, the Romans must fight ashore, actually fighting it out in the surf. The campaigns, taken together, give a good example of how Caesar learned from his mistakes the first time out. i.e. specialized landing craft, larger force. Capt. Carson, UIUC
38. Caesar, Veniti and Britain Threat to trade Veniti attack Roman fleet High, sturdy sailing vessels Roman fleet Oared vessels Use hooks to cut rigging
47. Political Aspects Excitement of crossing the ‘Ocean’ Keeps Caesar before the eyes of Rome Letter to the Senate Commentaries
48. Intelligence Shortcomings Campaigns preceded by poor intelligence Possible Sources Merchants – not forthcoming; warn Britons Volusenus fails to find Richborough Envoy, Commius, had influence with Atrebati but not tribes in the area of invasion Campaigns work as intelligence gathering – not as conquest Rose Mary Sheldon (2002): “Caesar, Intelligence, and Ancient Britain,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 15:1, 77-100
49. First Landing August 55 B.C. Embarks two Veteran Legions [VII, X] and some cavalry. Launches following a “reconnaissance in force” Could not land since force was too small and had been observed Caesar sails from Boulogne to the Dover area. Sees British are there in force, so sails north for better beach He is tracked by British in chariots Capt. Carson, UIUC
51. First Landing (Cont) Finds a better beach by Deal Must fight ashore Romans reluctant to leave ships Hand to hand fighting in the surf Transport ships cruise parallel to the shore delivering supporting fire Romans finally secure a foot hold on dry land After three weeks, Caesar re-embarks and leaves, accomplishing little Capt. Carson, UIUC
54. The Fighting “Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the same vigor and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground.” Caesar ordered …”the enemy to be beaten off and driven away, with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men “ “All the Britains, indeed, dye themselves with woad, which occasions a bluish color, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight.
57. Aftermath – First Invasion Envoys from enemy promise hostages Commius returns, reporting ill treatment Only two kingdoms provide hostages
58. Preparations: 2nd Invasion After building special flat-bottom, low freeboard, minimum draft landing craft, Caesar attacks again 5 legions (including veteran VII, X), plus 2,000 cavalry, for a total of about 22,000 troops A total of 800 ships to include 28 warships Capt. Carson, UIUC
59. Opposing forces 2,000 war chariots Horses suitable for chariots but not cavalry Briefly united tribes Some knowledge of Roman tactics “Indirect warfare”
60. Second Invasion, July 54 B.C. Lands at the same beach Lands unopposed; (Britons seeing the size of the force decide not to oppose) Caesar immediately marches inland 12 miles, catching Britons off guard. 7th Legion attacks, hit with flank attack, but the veterans withstand, improvise and take position Britons united under Cassivellaunus Storm damages Roman fleet. Not separate Naval commander hurts repair effort. Lose 10 days. Capt. Carson, UIUC
63. The Land Campaign Cassivellaunus divides force to attack base camp and to get main body to pursue Cassivellaunus sees Caesar’s extreme sensitivity to the security of base camp Realizes even with chariots, cannot win pitched fight Caesar pursues, conducts masterful forced crossing of Thames, sends cavalry around flanks, brings up supporting fires and conducts frontal assault Capt. Carson, UIUC
64. The Land Campaign (Cont) Romans unable to force the Britons into a pitched battle Roman base camp attacked, attack is beaten off, but commander sends word to Caesar that he expects to be attacked again Caesar leaves main body, rushes back, surveys situation and decides to abandon campaign Caesar withdraws after receiving few hostages, and a promise of tribute Capt. Carson, UIUC
65. Strategic Considerations Virtually no strategic thought, at least for the first invasion. Land and take over. Little planning. Was the first invasion a reconnaissance in force, or a true attempt to invade For second invasion, Caesar comes to play, 5 legions a substantial force Capt. Carson, UIUC
66. Operational Considerations First invasion hindered by lack of plan Few supplies, few troops, no landing craft Intelligence: recon force too small; no beach survey Deal chosen because looked good upon arrival No attempt at surprise Second invasion; planned. Larger fleet, larger force Landing craft, faster debarkation, close to beach. Uses same beach, brings supplies. Capt. Carson, UIUC
67. Tactical Considerations First landing, no landing plan, fight in the surf Good fire support in the first landing, brought the heavy stuff along on the cargo vessels. Once fight is joined and Romans are organized, their superior training and fighting skills are apparent and they prevail. The Britons chariots a factor until Romans learn how to counter Capt. Carson, UIUC
68. Tactical Considerations (Cont) Shortage of cavalry adequate recon and force screening difficult for Romans Cassivellaunus conducts a textbook guerrilla fight Avoids decisive engagement Harasses foraging parties Strikes at the beachhead with a sufficient force to cause alarm Capt. Carson, UIUC
69. Technical Consideratons First time, no landing craft, rectified the second time out. Returned with the gunships, not as critical the second invasion. Good use of heavy artillery in crossing the Thames. Capt. Carson, UIUC
70. Conclusions Security of beachhead and LOC to Gaul, primary concerns for Caesar. Britons conduct guerrilla campaign, Cassivellaunus able to recognize that he cannot conventionally defeat Romans. Wins without winning a battle. Caesar commands both land and sea. Caused problems in 54 after the storm Good naval gunfire support, earliest known example Capt. Carson, UIUC
72. Conclusions (Cont) Somehow, Caesar’s reputation is not damaged. Flexibility of Cassivellaunus - exploited Roman sensitivity to base camp Crossing of Thames excellent example of supporting arms. As veteran troops gain familiarity with new weapons(chariots in this case), they adapt tactics to cope or overcome the new system. The new weapon then loses most of its impact. Capt. Carson, UIUC
73. Conclusions (Cont) Romans aware of the pitfalls of invasion Opportunity for Roman and Romanized merchants British leaders adopt aspects of Roman culture British policy reflects events in Rome “…a Celtic-Gallic midget called Asterix (fix meant "king" in Celtic… for about 20 years has been beating up on Romans all over the place-to the delight of citizens who have never quite forgotten, or forgiven, Caesar” Dora Jane Hamblin. Smithsonian, May 1993
74. An Opposing View Purpose was only Caesar’s greed Loss of troops and ships Leaving Gaul might have threatened Italy Failure to find wealth (silver, gold, pearls?) Britain’s only asset – barbarous slaves who can neither write poetry or music
75. After Caesar leaves Conflict in Gaul Troops disbanded to winter quarters however Approach of fall Enough supplies to overwinter Uprisings in 53 and 52 in Gaul prevent return
76. Evaluations Success 55 reconnaissance in force; 54 police action Trading patterns established Loyal allies cultivated 90 years of peace
77. Evaluation Failure No occupation for enforcement Did not successfully counteract chariot guerilla warfare Did not gain access to mineral resources Did not learn about agriculture, industry
78. Effects On Britain Subject to tribute Roman ‘technical assistance’ leads to improved coinage. Those who aided Rome benefit economically Those who opposed Rome wait their chances.
79. “British” Reaction A kind of conquest Caesar made here; but made not here his brag Of 'came, and saw, and overcame.' With shame- The first that ever touch'd him- he was carried From off our coast, twice beaten; and his shipping- Poor ignorant baubles!- on our terrible seas, Like egg-shells mov'd upon their surges, crack'd As easily 'gainst our rocks Queen, Cymbeline Act III, Scene 1
Editor's Notes
The term ‘shrine’ is used loosely as it is not clear what specific ritual functions may have taken place, but these sites were probably the focus of activities involving communication with the supernatural.
Over 150 years later when a dyke was being cleaned, a series of posts were found together with an early to mid Iron Age sword. Subsequent excavations in 1981 revealed the posts to be a wooden causeway which dendrologists dated to a period between 457 and 300 BC. It appeared to have been repaired and added to every eighteen years or so during that period and the construction and maintenance of a walkway on such a scale at that time would have been a major feat of engineering. Hundreds of artifacts were also found around the causeway, including eleven spears, six swords, woodworking and metalworking tools, as well as part of a human skull which had a crescent-shaped chop mark, probably inflicted by a sword; this injury is unlikely to have killed the man.[4]Twenty years later in further excavations more sections of the causeway were dug out, some of them containing posts several metres long, plus a complete spear, a currency bar, a sword, a dagger and some bronze fittings, all of which appeared to have been deliberately damaged before their burial.[5] The most important discovery was two votive Iron Age boats. One of these boats as well as other artifacts can be seen at The Collection in Lincoln.The pre-Roman Iron Age wooden causeway at Fiskerton was excavated in part in 1981 (Field and ParkerPearson 2003). Associated with the causeway are ferrous weapons, tools and other artefacts, and finds ofbronze, pottery, stone, bone, jet and amber. The causeway appears to run from the site of the modern village ofFiskerton (five miles east of the city of Lincoln), down to the now canalised River Witham. Dendrochronologyhas dated the causeway to have been in use from at least 457 to 321 BC, although its precise function has not yetbeen established
The boat was apparently a votive deposit. It looks as if it had never been run on to a beach and was wedged into place with the back end actually pegged into place.
Wide enough for two carts. Hazel and ash. 3-3.5 m. 148 bc. Fragments that might have come from a cart.
Phase I Three main elements formed the focus of the ritual ensemble:an enclosure (c. 25 x 25 m) with its entrance aligned to the east, aninner enclosure, also with an eastern entrance, and a pit set on thewestern margin of the inner enclosure.o The outer enclosure was defined by a narrow square-shaped slotthat was widened at intervals by semicircular post-holes. This onlysurvived well just to the south of the entrance where it had not beendestroyed by the phase II enclosure ditch. In form, it was probably a fence of upright posts with planking or wattles in between. There areindications that the enclosure had a double or multiple boundary, asreflected in the parallel traces of ditches for part of the boundary.o The inner enclosure was much better preserved, taking the form ofa deep slot with preserved plank impressions in places, andsubstantial square post-holes at the corners and at intervals tosupport what must have been a plank-built fence. It was bestpreserved on its southern and eastern sides, showing clear evidencefor an inturned entrance in the middle of the eastern side. Becauseof later structures little survived of the western side, except for ashallow beam slot to the north of the pit that interrupted thealignment on this side. The distance between the east and west sidesof the enclosure is 8.60 m, which may conform to 28 units of amodule of 307 mm. This is close to the modules of 310 mm atManching and 304.2 mm at Mont Beuvray (Schubert and Schubert1993; Schubert 1994), and may indicate use of a metrical unit inlaying out the enclosure. Subsidiary measurements of the innerenclosure suggest that the module was used for some of the detailsof the layout (further analysis of which is proceeding). The innerenclosure was also probably laid out so that the east-west to northsouthratio was c. 4:5.o The pit appears to have been an integral part of this phase, sincethe entrances appear to have been aligned on it, and the beam-slotreferred to above respects its position. It was c. 2.5 x 1.7 m, and 0.65m deep, but since the fill dates to phase II, it is possible that the pitcould have been smaller in phase I, but subsequently enlarged. o APhase II The significant change was the probable round-house-likebuilding that replaced the inner enclosure. As discussed above, thisresembles a domestic structure in plan, and as such, can be regarded asa 'house' for the deity. The motivation for this phase of apparenttectonisation is not entirely clear: was it a dim reflection of the Graeco-Roman practice of building temples for the gods (Brunaux 1988:32;King 1990:223), or a 'domestication' of the deity arising out of localcultural changes and preferences, or merely the desire to build a shelterfor valuable votive offerings that needed to be placed near the ritualfocus?
On eof three found at Lindow. Last meal wheat, barley and mistletoe. Lindow Man was a healthy male in his mid-20s. He may have been someone of high status, as his body shows little evidence of heavy or rough work. The nature of his death was violent, perhaps ritualistic; after a last meal of charred bread, Lindow Man was strangled, hit on the head, and his throat was cut. Lindrow woman. Forensics identified the skull as belonging to a woman, probably aged 30–50.[5] On hearing the news of the discovery of the remains Peter Reyn-Bardt, who lived near Lindow Moss, believed it was the body of his wife. MrsReyn-Bardt had disappeared in 1960 and was the subject of an ongoing investigation by police. Peter Reyn-Bardt confessed to the murder of his wife and was tried and convicted.
Cheshire
Aust-on-SevernRomantemple of Henley Wood near Yattonin north Somerset, and of course inour same Bristol Channel Region.This figurine, which must also be assigned tothe end of the Iron Age, is now in theWoodspring Museum, We s t o n - s u p e r- M a re .It is tempting to label bothimages as ‘Venus figurines’because the Roman goddessconnected with love and procreation,who is often portrayedunclothed is so familiar to us.But the subjects of this note arenot directly connected withGraeco-Roman art and they mustrepresent a purely native powerof this region. Although we willprobably never know for certainwhat she was called, the onlylocal goddess known to us byname is Sulis, later equated bythe Romans with Minerva andgiven a temple at Bath. Is itpossible that the Aust on Severn figurineshows Sulis in her pre-Roman guise when shewas, above all, a goddess of fecundity?
Optio –lieutenant to centurion
Caesar writes that the Venetic shipswere much taller than the Roman, making it impossible to attack themwith missiles or to board them even if the Romans had added turrets totheir vessels.15 They were even too stoutly built to allow a ramming attack. So instead, the maneuverable, oared Roman vessels were driven into themiddle of the Gallic ¯ eet and, using sharp hooks attached to long poles,the Romans reached out and cut the halyards that attached the yards tothe masts on the enemy ships, thus destroying their sails and rigging. Thisopened the way to boarding-parties.
Caesar does not make much of this attempton his naval base, but he may have taken it more seriously than he admits.51Here under attack, he then shortly thereafter decides to leave. Caesar himselfrelates that, for two reasons, he had already decided to return to Gaul evenbefore the British overtures for peace were made: the approach of theequinox and the unsettled state of Gaul. Neither excuse should be taken asgenuine. Because he had taken over enough supplies to winter in Britain,the state of the weather in the Channel was irrelevant. And secondly, Gaulwas so quiet on his return that he was able to disperse his troops intowinter quarters. If Commius was used as the go-between, as has beensuggested, then the ® rst overtures to peace may even have come from theRomans.52 The terms of the surrender Caesar negotiated with the Britonswere quite moderate, again suggesting that Caesar was simply anxious toextricate himself from a bad situation.When his British expeditions are examined in detail, they reveal, not the perfect general of latermodern authors like Mommsen, Froude, Rice Holmes, Dodge, White,or Last,53 but rather the ambitious demagogue closer to Fuller’sinterpretation, where he is described as ``a general who could not only winbrilliant victories but also commit dismal blunders’ ’ Ð blunders so costly tohimself that more than half his campaigns were consumed in extricatinghimself from the results of his own mistakes.54 To spend over half a warextricating oneself from di culties created by the enemy may or may notbe good generalship; but to have to do so as a consequence of one’s ownmistakes is incontestably bad generalship, even when the extrications arebrilliant. And dismal military blunders follow from bad intelligencegathering. What these commentaries indicate is that we may never knowexactly what happened in Britain, and Caesar is not telling the wholetruth, for if this account is the best face Caesar can put on his ownactions, then something even less impressive must have happened in Britain.
Caesar did learn some useful things about the Britons. He learned that,unlike the Gauls of his own time, the Britons made use of chariots inwarfare, and he saw how these were handled. Gauls on the mainland nolonger used chariots, so this was a rather old technique, but a ``new’ ’element to Caesar. He describes their tactics with care, and pays hightribute both to the skill with which the chariots were driven and to theire€ ectiveness in battle. Yet the information did not allow him to overcomethe chief tactical problem this presented to the Romans: the di culty ofpursuit. On his reconnaissance in 55, Caesar was without cavalry exceptfor the thirty men of Commius’s bodyguard. Even in his invasion in thefollowing year he was, like all Roman commanders, inadequately furnishedwith cavalry. Consequently, charioteers could always escape him whentheir attack failed