An application of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) concepts to a school context

1. Design
Violence
Out of
Schools
Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Texas Tech University

2. CPTED in Schools
CrimePreventionThroughEnvironmentalDesign
General School Making it
Concepts Applications Happen

3. CPTED in Schools
General
Concepts

4. Greater perceived risk of getting caught…
(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)
decreases anti- shifts the location of
social activity anti-social activity

5. Research predominantly supports the pro-
CPTED premise
(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)
decreases anti- shifts the location of
social activity anti-social activity

6. Educational CPTED is important either way
(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)
decreases anti- shifts the location of
social activity anti-social activity

7. Perceived risk of
being caught is
based upon SAT
scores…

8. S urveillance
(Will I be seen?)
A ccess
(Who can get in and out)?
T erritoriality
(Does anyone care what
happens here?)

9. S urveillance
(Will I be seen?)

10. “burglarized
houses had
less visual
access to
immediately
neighboring
houses than
did non-
burglarized
houses”
Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and
residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

11. Most burglary
entries do not
occur through
the front door,
often because
of natural
surveillance

12. Open access
to side or
rear entry
points where
there is no
natural
surveillance
make for
more
attractive
burglary
entrances

13. “Convenience stores
experienced mean
annual robbery rate
reductions after
installation of CCTV
systems (-23%);
installation of video
cameras with monitors
(-54%)”
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative
Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110

14. Office beverages
available with
payment on an
“honor” system.
Picture above
payment
instructions
rotated weekly.
Payments were
higher when
picture of eyes
was posted.
M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cues
of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-
world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.

15. Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each
person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to
share any of it with another (anonymous) participant?
A B
K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity
in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256

16. Normal Eyes Screen
Screen
Not
Sharing
12%
Not
Sharing
45%
Sharing
55%
Sharing
88%
K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity
in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256

17. In London double-decker buses, far more
vandalism to seats farther away from high
traffic stairwell areas and driver
Sturman, A., (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In Clarke R., and Mayhew, P.
(Eds.) Designing out crime (31-38). London: Her Majasty’s Stationery Office.

18. What natural surveillance issue best
predicted convenience store robberies?
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110

19. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
Visibility from outside the store to inside
the store was the most important sight line

20. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
Visibility from outside the store to inside the store
was a more significant predictor of convenience s
robberies than the number of clerks or the proxim
to drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing

21. A ccess
(Who can get in and out)?

22. “Burglarized houses had fewer
fences and locked gates
surrounding the yard than did
non-burglarized houses”
Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality,
defensible space and residential burglary:
an environmental analysis, Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

23. Preventing access by adding chain link fencing
and lighting to lower levels of this parking
garage led to 50% drop in reported crime
Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), &
Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of
Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal of
Performance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.

24. Cul-de-sacs may limit access and
make visiting cars more noticeable
Helpful in a law-abiding community, but
Harmful in a gang-controlled community

25. T erritoriality
(Does anyone care
what happens here?)

26. “burglarized houses had fewer symbolic
barriers characteristic of primary
territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting
the identity of the territory owners)”
Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and
residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

27. “Broken windows”
theory:
signs of disorder like
broken windows, litter,
and graffiti induce
other types of
disorder and
petty
crime

28. Visible violation of
graffiti prohibition
led to violating
litter prohibition
where Dutch
experimenters
posted bicycle
fliers and added
graffiti
K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685
Published by AAAS

29. When letter with money was hanging out
of a post office box theft occurred 13%
normally but 27% if box had graffiti
K Keizer et al. Science
2008;322:1681-1685
Published by AAAS

30. In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one
significant difference between robbed and non-
robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti
S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case-
control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004

31. No maintenance
implies no one
cares what
happens there

32. Better to
remove it, than
leave it
vandalized

33. All three CPTED
principles must
work together

34. Access barriers
alone can be
overcome
Surveillance +
Access +
Territoriality
work together

35. Territoriality impacts Access
If no one cares what happens here, is it
less risky to try opening the door with
a crowbar or bolt cutter?

36. Some high fences
control access, but
(1) Blocking
surveillance
(2) Sending a
territoriality
message that
the area is
dangerous and
no one cares
what happens
outside the wall

37. An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillance
and permits graffiti showing a lack of external
territoriality

38. With proper design
and maintenance,
high fences can
limit access without
damaging
surveillance or
territoriality

39. A high fence blocking access without
damaging surveillance or territoriality

40. Stark window bars limit access, but may
also send a negative territoriality message
about neighborhood safety

41. Glass block can create
security similar to window
bars but without the stigma

42. Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance
and easy access for both entry and escape

43. Combined with territoriality deficiencies,
stairwells can create CPTED problem areas

44. Design solutions
can improve the
natural
surveillance for
stairwells

45. Open stairwells
have strong
natural
surveillance
properties

46. CPTED in Schools
School
Applications

47. School CPTED concepts
are the same…
S urveillance
(Will I be seen?)
A ccess
(Who can get in and out)?
T erritoriality
(Does anyone care what happens here?)

48. S urveillance
(Will I be seen?)

49. A study of five
Midwestern high
schools found of
166 violent
incidents, none
took place when
adults were present
Astor RA, Meyer HA, Behre WJ. 1999. Unowned places and
times: Maps and interviews about violence in high schools.
Am Educ Res J 36:3–42.

50. Adding openings or windows in solid walls
Photo examples from:
Florida Department of
Education (2003) Florida
Safe School Design
Guidelines: Strategies to
Enhance Security and
Reduce Vandalism;
available online at
http://www.fldoe.org/edf
acil/safe_schools.asp

51. Blocking access to
hidden areas
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

52. convex mirrors
for visibility
around corners

54. Electronic surveillance
Photo examples from: Florida
Department of Education (2003)
Florida Safe School Design
Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism;
available online at
http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe
_schools.asp

55. Promote surveillance and prevent hiding by
keeping bushes below 1.5 feet and tree
limbs above 8 feet
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

56. Design signage to prevent concealment
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

57. “replacing bathroom entrance doors
with right-angle entrances permit the
warning sounds of crime to travel more
freely and reduce the sense of isolation”
Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

58. Bathroom
areas
allowing
sound and
smoke to
transmit
to hallway
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

59. 45 degree
tapered
angles
allow
seeing
around
blind
corners
and
expanding
scope of
vision
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

60. moving the staff lunch area
or office locations
Photo examples
from: Florida
Department of
Education (2003)
Florida Safe
School Design
Guidelines:
Strategies to
Enhance Security
and Reduce
Vandalism;
available online
at
http://www.fldo
e.org/edfacil/saf
e_schools.asp

61. A
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education
(2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies
to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available
online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

62. Photo examples
from: Florida
Department of
Education
(2003) Florida
Safe School
Design
Guidelines:
Strategies to
Enhance
Security and
Reduce
Vandalism;
available online
at
http://www.fldo
e.org/edfacil/saf
e_schools.asp
coaches’ offices should have direct
visual and auditory surveillance

63. A ccess
(Who can get in and out)?

64. Effective
and subtle
Too much
obvious
access
control can
undermine
school
environment

65. Attractive window
grates or separated
small windows
prevent access

66. Converting most exterior
doors to emergency exits
improves access control

67. Avoid pull down
ladders or utility
boxes that allow
roof access

68. Territoriality
(Does anyone care what
happens here?)

70. Gangs use graffiti to establish their
territory; schools take it back
through repainting, following up
with ongoing, vigilant maintenance

71. Any generally neglected exterior area will
also seem ideal for misbehavior

72. Landscape buffers may
reduce access to
graffiti prone walls

73. Consider
the use of
inspirational
or student-
created
artwork
Photo examples
from: Florida
Department of
Education (2003)
Florida Safe
School Design
Guidelines:
Strategies to
Enhance Security
and Reduce
Vandalism;
available online
at
http://www.fldoe
.org/edfacil/safe
_schools.asp

74. In progress
results from my
fMRI research
shows greater
fear reduction
from public art
than from visible
security cameras

75. Combining
Access Control
and
Natural Surveillance

76. Access Control + Surveillance
A secure
bicycle
rack
Photo examples from: Florida
Department of Education
(2003) Florida Safe School
Design Guidelines: Strategies
to Enhance Security and
Reduce Vandalism; available
online at
http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/
safe_schools.asp

77. Access Control + Surveillance
wrought
iron
fencing
instead
of solid
walls
Photo examples from:
Florida Department of
Education (2003)
Florida Safe School
Design Guidelines:
Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce
Vandalism; available
online at
http://www.fldoe.org
/edfacil/safe_schools.
asp

78. Access Control
+ Surveillance
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003)
Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance
Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at
http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp

79. CPTED in Schools
Making it
Happen

80. The frontal approach
Suggest that the
school hire a CPTED
specialist to
complete an analysis
of campus buildings
and make
recommendations
on improvements

81. Did you just say,
“let’s spend money
so we can create a
need to spend more
money?”

82. The “what I think”
approach
Examine the
buildings and make
recommendations
based on what you
see

83. Why should
we spend
money based
on your
subjective
opinions?

84. What if neither
of these
approaches
work?

85. Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps
Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Texas Tech University
A free Excel template to generate hot spot
maps available at goo.gl/h3KVY
or http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlxs

86. Input three objective scores for each space
1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA)
The total area* from
which a person in the
space can be viewed
2. Student PVA
Typical student population
of the PVA over time
3. Staff PVA
Typical staff population of
the PVA over time
*a more precise model would incorporate a discounting function by multiplying each area block by
1 where, d = meters to the target space if greater than 7, else d=1
k*(1.1d/7) k=2 if area is separated from target space by glass or video, else k=1

87. Hot Spot Type 1: Crimes
of Opportunity (Minor)
High activity/low
supervision reflected by
a high level of
*
Student PVA Percentile
- Staff PVA Percentile *
*percentiles are relative ranking
across all occupied areas

88. Hot Spot Type 2:
Concealed Criminal
Activity (Major)
Low activity/low
supervision reflected by
an accessible area with
low total score of
Student PVA Percentile*
+ Staff PVA Percentile*
*percentiles are relative ranking across all
occupied areas

89. 1. Paste outline into Excel template
Obtain / create a line drawing floor plan (or
campus map) picture with a transparent
background to paste and resize in Excel

90. 2. Insert data into Excel template
Insert number
of blocks visible
from each block
[PVA tab] X the
student
[StudentPVA
tab] or staff
[StaffPVA tab]
population
during target
period in cells
underlying map

91. 3. Results
Color coded
maps with
percentile
rankings for
PVA, PVA-
Student, PVA-
Staff, Hot
Spot Type 1,
and Hot Spot
Type 2

92. Time Series CRAA
Maps
Complete
previous analyses
for each 20
minute block
during a school
day

93. Publish CRAAMaps,
with suggestions for
addressing hot spots
• Physical changes to
increase visibility
• Camera placement
• Staff location
changes
• Access restriction
(for low activity
areas)

94. Prove the
problem
Track exact
location of
campus
conduct
violations
and overlay
against
CRAAMs

95. Prove the solution
Place but not at a
treatment(s) comparison
at one hot hot spot
spot
track violations compared to
in one the other

96. CPTED in Schools
General School Making it
Concepts Applications Happen

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98. Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate
professor in the Department of Applied
and Professional Studies at Texas Tech
University. He is the most frequently
published author in ISI-ranked academic
journals on the topic of residential
satisfaction. His research in residential
satisfaction led to his interest in
environmentally-influenced perceptions
of safety. He has presented his urban
studies related research nationally and
internationally at conferences including
The Environmental Design Research
Association, The Housing Educators Research Association, and
The European Network of Housing Researchers. He worked
briefly in the U.S. Attorneys Office (narcotics division) in
Kansas City and later served over five years as president of
Central Christian College in Moberly, Missouri during which
time several new buildings were constructed. His current
research involves the use of fMRI brain scanning to uncover
neural correlates of financial and environmental satisfaction.