A Quick
   Review of
     CPTED
   Strategies
(Crime Prevention
     Through
  Environmental
     Design)
By: Russell Jame...
Research
Surveillance
   (Will I be seen?)
“burglarized
houses had
less visual
access to
immediately
neighboring
houses than
did non-
burglarized
houses”

Brown, B. ...
“Convenience stores
experienced mean
annual robbery rate
reductions after
installation of CCTV
systems (-23%);
installatio...
Office beverages
available with
payment on an
“honor” system.
Picture above
payment
instructions
rotated weekly.
Payments ...
Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each
person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to
share any of it with...
Normal                                   Eyes Screen
              Screen
                                                ...
Research
Access
   (Can I get in and out)?
“Burglarized houses had fewer
fences and locked gates
surrounding the yard than did
non-burglarized houses.”




         ...
Preventing access by adding chain link fencing
and lighting to lower levels of this parking
garage led to 50% drop in repo...
Research
Territoriality
(Does anyone care
what happens
here?)
“burglarized houses had fewer symbolic
                barriers characteristic of primary
                territories (i.e...
In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one
     significant difference between robbed and non-
     robbed stores ...
S
urveillance
      (Will I be seen?)


A   ccess
      (Can I get in and out)?


T   erritoriality
      (Does anyone car...
Will I be seen?
Surveillance: FAIL
Can I get in and out?
Access: FAIL
Does anyone care what happens here?
Territoriality: FAIL
Does anyone care what happens here?

         Territoriality: FAIL
Can I get in and out?

    Access: FAIL
Does anyone care what happens here?
Territoriality: FAIL
Access: Can I get in and out?
Territoriality impacts Access




If no one cares what happens here, is it
less risky to try opening the door with
a crowb...
ACCESS: Does the fence make it harder to
           get in and out?
SURVEILLANCE: Does the fence make it less
likely I will be seen when attempting to break in
                through a back...
Surveillance + Access + Territoriality may impact
                  each other.
Does anyone care what happens here?
The fence says “Maybe”.
Everything else says “No”
Does anyone care what happens here?
TERRITORIALITY:
High level maintenance. Defined borders.
Short decorative fencing can enhance
territoriality inside the fence without
disconnecting from the surrounding
neighborho...
Short decorative fencing can enhance
territoriality inside the fence without
disconnecting from the surrounding
neighborho...
Short fencing,
 even if solid,
  creates no
 surveillance
  problems.
As fences get higher, the access barrier
increases, but the risk of visually disconnecting
      from the neighborhood als...
Does anyone care
what happens here
INSIDE the fence?
Does anyone care
what happens here
OUTSIDE the fence?
High fences may
diminish territoriality
outside the fence
High solid fences

• Indicates lack of
  territoriality
Can anyonewalls what
  outside of see
happens outside the fence?
•...
High solid fences

• Indicates lack of
  territoriality
  outside of walls
Does anyone care what
happens outside the fence...
High solid fences

• Indicates lack of
  territoriality
  outside of walls
High solid fences may
create spaces with little...
Some high fences
control access, but
fail the S.A.T. by
(1) Blocking
      surveillance
(2) Sending a clear
      message ...
Making the chain link fence opaque blocks
surveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack
of external territoriality.
With proper design
  and maintenance,
   high fences can
limit access without
      damaging
   surveillance or
     terri...
A high fence blocking access without
damaging surveillance or territoriality
Spikes can add a visceral
element of access
reduction that is still
decorative and residential
Of course, you
can go too far
with anything!
Window bars limit access, but may also send a
    negative territoriality message about
           neighborhood safety.
Glass block can create
security similar to window
bars but without the stigma
Most burglary
entries do not
occur through
the front door,
often because
of natural
surveillance.
Open access
to side or
rear entry
points where
there is no
natural
surveillance
make for
more
attractive
burglary
entrance...
Access barriers to
side or rear entrance
can reduce the risk
A very short barrier may provide
   insufficient access control
As barriers rise, access
             is reduced
Tall opaque barriers
limit access, but may
also eliminate natural
surveillance
The line of sight for entry points is critical.
Am I visible to outsiders here?
Am I visible to outsiders here?
Am I visible to outsiders here?
Am I visible to outsiders here?
Consider the
sight-lines in
this aerial shot
of a new group
of duplexes
Front
                     Entrance /
                     Windows


             Side
           Windows




            ...
10
                  residences
What are the      have sight
sight lines for     lines to
the potential      the rear
entr...
16
                  residences
What are the       have sight
sight lines for   lines to the
the potential     front entry...
11
                  residences
What are the      have sight
sight lines for     lines to
the potential         side
entry...
Rear Entrance /   Side Entrance/
                    Windows            Windows




                                      ...
2
                  residences
What are the      have sight
sight lines for     lines to
the potential         rear
entry ...
0
                  residences
                  have sight
What are the        lines to
sight lines for       side
the po...
Zone outside
                    residence
                   where sight
What are the         lines are
sight lines for  ...
Which residence
has better SAT
scores?
What natural surveillance issue best
    predicted convenience store robberies?




C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA)...
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) in re...
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) in re...
At night, surveillance depends on lighting.
Of course, surveillance can
be blocked by both darkness
and solid barriers.
• line of site; access out




Lighting alone may not
overcome natural barriers to
surveillance
Lighting can also
be important
during the day,
especially where
lines of sight are
limited
What signals do
 you get that
 territoriality
appears weak
    here?
Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance
   and easy access for both entry and escape
Combined with territoriality deficiencies,
stairwells can create CPTED problem areas.
Design solutions
can improve the
     natural
surveillance for
   stairwells
Open stairwells
 have strong
   natural
 surveillance
  properties
All ranges of
     natural
  surveillance
    levels are
  possible for
    stairwells
depending upon
   the design
soluti...
“replacing bathroom entrance doors
        with right-angle entrances permit the
        warning sounds of crime to travel...
Cul-de-sacs may limit access,
making visiting cars more noticeable
Cul-de-sacs make automobile
escape more problematic as
there is only one exit route
Street closures can provide
   similar access results
Pedestrian traffic
can also be limited
with street closures
High rise buildings
   provide weaker
    surveillance of
 street level activity
      because of
      structural
separat...
Mid rise balconies create stronger surveillance and
territoriality, connecting residents with street level.
Mid-rise balcony
 neighborhoods
   create safer
street level areas
 with high levels
   of perceived
surveillance and
    ...
Presentation by Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D.,
Asst. Professor, Dept. of Housing &
Consumer Economics, University of
Geor...
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
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CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)

  1. 1. A Quick Review of CPTED Strategies (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) By: Russell James, J.D., Ph.D., Asst. Professor, Dept. of Housing & Consumer Economics, University of Georgia
  2. 2. Research Surveillance (Will I be seen?)
  3. 3. “burglarized houses had less visual access to immediately neighboring houses than did non- burglarized houses” Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  4. 4. “Convenience stores experienced mean annual robbery rate reductions after installation of CCTV systems (-23%); installation of video cameras with monitors (-54%)” C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  5. 5. Office beverages available with payment on an “honor” system. Picture above payment instructions rotated weekly. Payments were higher when picture of eyes was posted. M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real- world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  6. 6. Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to share any of it with another (anonymous) participant? A B K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  7. 7. Normal Eyes Screen Screen Not Sharing 12% Not Sharing 45% Sharing 55% Sharing 88% K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  8. 8. Research Access (Can I get in and out)?
  9. 9. “Burglarized houses had fewer fences and locked gates surrounding the yard than did non-burglarized houses.” Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  10. 10. Preventing access by adding chain link fencing and lighting to lower levels of this parking garage led to 50% drop in reported crime. Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), & Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.
  11. 11. Research Territoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  12. 12. “burglarized houses had fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting the identity of the territory owners)” Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  13. 13. In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one significant difference between robbed and non- robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case- control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004
  14. 14. S urveillance (Will I be seen?) A ccess (Can I get in and out)? T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  15. 15. Will I be seen?
  16. 16. Surveillance: FAIL
  17. 17. Can I get in and out?
  18. 18. Access: FAIL
  19. 19. Does anyone care what happens here?
  20. 20. Territoriality: FAIL
  21. 21. Does anyone care what happens here? Territoriality: FAIL
  22. 22. Can I get in and out? Access: FAIL
  23. 23. Does anyone care what happens here?
  24. 24. Territoriality: FAIL
  25. 25. Access: Can I get in and out?
  26. 26. Territoriality impacts Access If no one cares what happens here, is it less risky to try opening the door with a crowbar or bolt cutter?
  27. 27. ACCESS: Does the fence make it harder to get in and out?
  28. 28. SURVEILLANCE: Does the fence make it less likely I will be seen when attempting to break in through a back door?
  29. 29. Surveillance + Access + Territoriality may impact each other.
  30. 30. Does anyone care what happens here?
  31. 31. The fence says “Maybe”. Everything else says “No”
  32. 32. Does anyone care what happens here?
  33. 33. TERRITORIALITY: High level maintenance. Defined borders.
  34. 34. Short decorative fencing can enhance territoriality inside the fence without disconnecting from the surrounding neighborhood
  35. 35. Short decorative fencing can enhance territoriality inside the fence without disconnecting from the surrounding neighborhood
  36. 36. Short fencing, even if solid, creates no surveillance problems.
  37. 37. As fences get higher, the access barrier increases, but the risk of visually disconnecting from the neighborhood also grows
  38. 38. Does anyone care what happens here INSIDE the fence?
  39. 39. Does anyone care what happens here OUTSIDE the fence?
  40. 40. High fences may diminish territoriality outside the fence
  41. 41. High solid fences • Indicates lack of territoriality Can anyonewalls what outside of see happens outside the fence? • Reduces natural surveillance
  42. 42. High solid fences • Indicates lack of territoriality outside of walls Does anyone care what happens outside the fence? • Reduces natural surveillance
  43. 43. High solid fences • Indicates lack of territoriality outside of walls High solid fences may create spaces with little • Reduces natural surveillance or territoriality surveillance
  44. 44. Some high fences control access, but fail the S.A.T. by (1) Blocking surveillance (2) Sending a clear message that the area is dangerous, crime is accepted, and no one cares what happens outside the wall
  45. 45. Making the chain link fence opaque blocks surveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack of external territoriality.
  46. 46. With proper design and maintenance, high fences can limit access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
  47. 47. A high fence blocking access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
  48. 48. Spikes can add a visceral element of access reduction that is still decorative and residential
  49. 49. Of course, you can go too far with anything!
  50. 50. Window bars limit access, but may also send a negative territoriality message about neighborhood safety.
  51. 51. Glass block can create security similar to window bars but without the stigma
  52. 52. Most burglary entries do not occur through the front door, often because of natural surveillance.
  53. 53. Open access to side or rear entry points where there is no natural surveillance make for more attractive burglary entrances.
  54. 54. Access barriers to side or rear entrance can reduce the risk
  55. 55. A very short barrier may provide insufficient access control
  56. 56. As barriers rise, access is reduced
  57. 57. Tall opaque barriers limit access, but may also eliminate natural surveillance
  58. 58. The line of sight for entry points is critical.
  59. 59. Am I visible to outsiders here?
  60. 60. Am I visible to outsiders here?
  61. 61. Am I visible to outsiders here?
  62. 62. Am I visible to outsiders here?
  63. 63. Consider the sight-lines in this aerial shot of a new group of duplexes
  64. 64. Front Entrance / Windows Side Windows Rear Entrance / Windows What are the sight lines for the potential entry points in this unit?
  65. 65. 10 residences What are the have sight sight lines for lines to the potential the rear entry points in entry this unit?
  66. 66. 16 residences What are the have sight sight lines for lines to the the potential front entry entry points in this unit?
  67. 67. 11 residences What are the have sight sight lines for lines to the potential side entry points in window this unit?
  68. 68. Rear Entrance / Side Entrance/ Windows Windows Front Entrance / Windows What are the sight lines for the potential entry points in this unit?
  69. 69. 2 residences What are the have sight sight lines for lines to the potential rear entry points in entrance this unit?
  70. 70. 0 residences have sight What are the lines to sight lines for side the potential window entry points in this unit?
  71. 71. Zone outside residence where sight What are the lines are sight lines for covered by the potential wooded area entry points in with link to this unit? walking trail
  72. 72. Which residence has better SAT scores?
  73. 73. What natural surveillance issue best predicted convenience store robberies? C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  74. 74. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110 Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was the most important sight line
  75. 75. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110 Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was a more significant predictor of convenience store robberies than the number of clerks or the proximity to drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing.
  76. 76. At night, surveillance depends on lighting.
  77. 77. Of course, surveillance can be blocked by both darkness and solid barriers.
  78. 78. • line of site; access out Lighting alone may not overcome natural barriers to surveillance
  79. 79. Lighting can also be important during the day, especially where lines of sight are limited
  80. 80. What signals do you get that territoriality appears weak here?
  81. 81. Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance and easy access for both entry and escape
  82. 82. Combined with territoriality deficiencies, stairwells can create CPTED problem areas.
  83. 83. Design solutions can improve the natural surveillance for stairwells
  84. 84. Open stairwells have strong natural surveillance properties
  85. 85. All ranges of natural surveillance levels are possible for stairwells depending upon the design solution chosen
  86. 86. “replacing bathroom entrance doors with right-angle entrances permit the warning sounds of crime to travel more freely and reduce the sense of isolation” Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
  87. 87. Cul-de-sacs may limit access, making visiting cars more noticeable
  88. 88. Cul-de-sacs make automobile escape more problematic as there is only one exit route
  89. 89. Street closures can provide similar access results
  90. 90. Pedestrian traffic can also be limited with street closures
  91. 91. High rise buildings provide weaker surveillance of street level activity because of structural separation, distance separation, and sound separation. This separation also limits the sense of territoriality over street level activities.
  92. 92. Mid rise balconies create stronger surveillance and territoriality, connecting residents with street level.
  93. 93. Mid-rise balcony neighborhoods create safer street level areas with high levels of perceived surveillance and perceived territoriality
  94. 94. Presentation by Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D., Asst. Professor, Dept. of Housing & Consumer Economics, University of Georgia. Dr. James’ research has been published in a variety of housing and design related academic journals including: Environment & Behavior; Housing Policy Debate; Journal of Urban Planning & Development (ASCE); Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities (ASCE); Housing, Theory, and Society; Housing & Society; Journal of the Community Development Society Please feel free to use any of these slides for any non-commercial purposes. All pictures used in this presentation are creative commons licensed, have been purchased with rights to allow this usage, are from MS PowerPoint or are the author’s own photographs. Citations for all creative commons licensed photos are in the notes to each slide.
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