API Security & Federation Patterns - Francois Lascelles, Chief Architect, Layer 7 @ QCon SF

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API Security & Federation Patterns - Francois Lascelles, Chief Architect, Layer 7 @ QCon SF

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The adoption of Mobile and Cloud applications drives API traffic across domains. OAuth 2.0 is being implemented in complex enterprise environments where new authorization endpoints are combined......

The adoption of Mobile and Cloud applications drives API traffic across domains. OAuth 2.0 is being implemented in complex enterprise environments where new authorization endpoints are combined with various existing identity components, in various configurations.

Handshakes are federated to help provide a single sign-on experience across applications and enhance adoption. Mediation between tokens at the edge of each domain helps extend existing data to new channels. Core grant types, extension grant types, custom schemes, standards, patterns and use cases – let us count the ways in which API access control is applied.

This presentation will examine the role of API management infrastructure in API Security, API Access Control and API Federation and its interaction with enterprise infrastructure, social identity and application developers.

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  • Think M2M
  • 12.30
  • This is very similar to saml web browsersso except that there is no complex saml to parse and digital signatures to validate
  • 25m
  • Show a domain of apps sharing a auth context in the form of a JWT issued from an openid connect handshake, then each app getting its own access token based on thatWeb->domain cookieMobile apps -> a JWT stored in a shared keychain-> ‘Mobile SSO’, ‘Layer 7 MAG”
  • 37.30

Transcript

  • 1. API Security and Federation Patterns QCon San Francisco - November 13, 2013 Francois Lascelles, Chief Architect, Layer 7 Technologies #qconsf #OAuth @flascelles
  • 2. Agenda  Introduction  API Security Components  Authorization Server Patterns – – – – – Two-way token issuing Redirection-based token issuing Nested handshakes Federated handshakes Other extension handshakes  Vulnerabilities and Mitigation – Fishing attacks – Public vs Confidential clients – Bearer vs MAC token types  Managing API Security 2 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 3. Information fragmentation – Users and organizations interact with IT assets fragmented across an increasing number of service providers, applications and devices Your Org – In isolation, each asset provides limited value 3 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 4. Application-to-application interaction – APIs let providers and applications interact  HTTP  REST  OData  XML/JSON  Web Services 4 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 5. Secure API exchange – These APIs deal with personal and/or sensitive information and need to be secured  Confidentiality  Integrity  Availability  … 5 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 6. Interactions on behalf of users – OAuth lets users and organizations control these interactions  Express consent  Limit scope  Turn on/off 6 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 7. API security logical components IdP User Authorization Server Application Token Server Policy Enforcement Point Resource Server 7 API Security and Federation Patterns API Endpoint
  • 8. Authorization server patterns Let us count the ways… 8 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 9. Two-way handshakes  Limit shared-secret exposure by negotiating temporary token 1. Authenticate with secret, get token 2. Consume API, include token in requests 9 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 10. E.g. OAuth client credentials grant type  In this grant type, the application presents its own credentials to get a token. – No concept of user identity  Alternatives – Present client credentials with every API call (over secure channel) – HMAC signatures for every API call  Only for confidential clients  No refresh token in this case 10 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 11. E.g. OAuth password grant type (ropc)  Resource-owner password credentials – For trusted apps only – For public or confidential clients – Optimal UX on mobile apps 1. App collects user credentials POST /token [Authorization: Basic optional] Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=password&username=franco&password=bl ah Email: _______ Passwd: _______ [Login] 3. App gets back token(s) Content-Type: application/json { "access_token":”foo”, "expires_in":3600, ["refresh_token":”optional”] 11 2. App uses creds in call to token endpoint } API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 12. Redirection-based handshakes 12 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 13. Redirection-based handshakes – Why?  Avoid the password sharing anti-pattern Online statement Pretend to be user Pull statement Please provide your cc account info: • Username • Password This seems wrong 13 Expense system API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 14. RBH – step 1 (Authorization server) Authenticate locally (if needed) Express consent 14 Redirect API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 15. RBH – step 2 - User did not share passwd with app (callback address) Redirect back 15 Receive code API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 16. RBH – step 3 tmp code I can haz token? access token Call API (with token) - Application now accesses Much better… 16 data on behalf of user API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 17. E.g. OAuth 2.0 code, implicit OAuth 2.0 core specifies two variations on a redirection-based handshake 1. Authorization code – As we just described 2. Implicit – No temporary code – App gets token directly through redirect back from authorization server 17 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 18. Social Login  An application delegates user authentication to a social platform – Enhanced user experience – Remove burden of managing shared secrets with users 18 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 19. Social Login – Step 1  User click Login with [Social provider] – Redirected to Social provider’s authorization server  User authenticated, expresses consent Do you authorize app to get basic info about you? Yes [x] No [ ] 19 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 20. Social Login – Step 2  User expresses consent – Redirected back to the application – Application now has OAuth access token to call API on behalf of user ++token 20 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 21. Social Login – Step 3  App calls [Social provider]’s api – User_info endpoint – Discovers identity of user – Attaches it to session between app and user-agent Who was this? [access_token] user_info 21 { ‘sub’: ‘franco’, ‘email’: ‘flascelles@gmail.com’…} API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 22. Social Login -> OpenID Connect  In this case, the API provided is there to enable the federated authentication  This pattern is specified in standard OpenID Connect – Extends OAuth 2.0 – Describes user_info, ID token based on JWT, …  Web-friendly and modern alternative to SAML web browser SSO – No SAML, no XML, no digital signatures,… API Provider -> IdP 22 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 23. Nested handshakes  When users interact with an authorization server, they need to be authenticated  What happens when the API provider wants to delegate authentication to a social login/openid connect provider? Username: _________ Password: _________ [Login] Log in with [Google] [facebook] […] 23 API Security and Federation Patterns Step 1 App wants to consume API on behalf of user, redirects to API provider’s authorization server to get back access token app
  • 24. Nested handshakes Step 2 User redirected to IdP of choice so that the first authorization server gets an access token from the 2nd authorization server app Do you authorize app* to get basic info about you? Yes [x] No [ ] 24 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 25. Nested handshakes Step 3 User redirected back, its identity now known to the first authorization server, expresses consent. Do you authorize app* to [scope] on your behalf? Yes [x] No [ ] 25 API Security and Federation Patterns app
  • 26. Nested handshakes Step 4 User redirected back to app. Nested handshakes complete. Two apps, two access tokens 26 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 27. Federated handshakes  Application already has a ‘proof-of-authentication’, needs to consume API on behalf of user – Login using SAML on a web app – OpenID Connect  No redirection, no credentials <saml> {jwt} 27 ? API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 28. Federated handshakes  SAML Bearer Grant – urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:samXX-bearer <saml> access_token  JWT Bearer Grant – urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer {jwt} access_token 28 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 29. Example: Domain of apps sharing an auth context  A domain of apps on a mobile device share an auth context – OpenID Connect -> JWT  Each app gets its own access token – urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer  Single sign-on experience OpenID Connect JWT Bearer Grant Group KeyChain API Provider Mobile apps 29 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 30. Other ‘extension’ handshakes  Challenge-response grant – One-time passwords – Risk-based, context-based auth – Multi-factor  [Insert Secret] bearer grant – Cookie – … 30 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 31. Threats and Mitigation 31 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 32. Fishing attacks  Risk associated with redirection-based handshakes – Malicious ‘application’ pretends to be legitimate – Inserts its own endpoint in callback address – Gets token  (especially implicit grant) Do you authorize Legitimate app to access API on your behalf? Tricked you [X] Yes [ ] No GET /authorize?response_type=token&client_id=legitimate &redirect_uri=[malicious] 32 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 33. Fishing mitigation 101  Register and validate redirection URIs  Strict validation (not partial)  Never skip consent step (out-of-band) Register Legitimate app Callback=foo foiled Error Invalid callback GET /authorize?response_type=token&client_id=legitimate &redirect_uri=[malicious] 33 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 34. Fishing on mobile  On the web, the user-agent is responsible for redirecting to the callback address – On the web, DNS resolves addresses and HTTPS validates server-side trust  With native mobile apps, each app registers its own URL scheme instead APPLE: “If more than one third-party app registers to handle the same URL scheme, there is currently no process for determining which app will be given that scheme. ” --link 34 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 35. Public vs confidential clients  It’s either confidential, or it isn’t – Don’t ‘hide’ a secret on a public app store or render on a web page (badly hidden witch) 35 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 36. Client confidentiality does strengthen security  Assigned secrets to clients (when appropriate) adds security – E.g. compromised refresh token: 1. Compromised access tokens, refresh foiled tokens 2. Exploit stolen token for x minutes 3. Token expired 4. Attempt to get fresh token (using refresh token) 5. Authentication required 36 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 37. Bearer vs MAC tokens  Bearer  MAC Adoption! Tough choice App developer 37 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 38. Bearer, use responsibly  Bearer tokens are easier but need to be used responsibly – Exchanged and used over a secure channel - Don’t log them. - Forget original (hash them). tokens in query strings App developer API Publisher OAuth Server Impl 38 - Don’t render them where they can be copied from. Store them securely. Server-side trust API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 39. MAC, is it really more secure?  Pros – Better protected against man-in-the-middle – If a request is intercepted, no big deal  Cons – You have to keep two secrets safe on the server side (per client) 39 API Security and Federation Patterns
  • 40. Managing API Security Extend framework to client app Integrate • • • • • Authorization Server Policy Enforcement Point Resource Server ALFW … Protect Configure, not code 40 API Security and Federation Patterns • • • • Web SSO Analytics Dev/User Portal … Decouple
  • 41. Thank you QCon SF 2013 Francois Lascelles, Chief Architect, Layer 7 Technologies