Indian Penal Code
Arun v. State of Maharashtra, 2009
Vol II, Cr.L.J., 2065 (S.C.)
Dr. Pushpinder Kaur
B.com LL.B (Hons.)
This project has been made for the purpose of covering a part of
the syllabus of the Indian Penal Code as prescribed by Panjab
I hereby, acknowledge my mentor, Dr. Pushpinder Kaur, for her
expert guidance and views in each and every aspect.
Without her help, making of this project would never have been
B.com LL.B (hons.)
Table of Cases
Facts and Circumstances
Supreme Court Proceedings
Gudda @ Dwarikendra vs State,
Darshan Singh Vs State Of Punjab
Table of Cases
Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 391)
Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612)
Butta Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1991 SC 1316)
James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004 (2) SCC 203),
Gudda @ Dwarikendra vs State Of M.P.,(2013 SCC 1566-1567)
Darshan Singh Vs State Of Punjab & Anr.(2002 SCC 1057)
The case is the appeal in the Supreme Court of India to challenge
the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court,
Aurangabad Bench for the conviction of the appellant for offence
punishable under Sections302, 324, 342 and 454 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (referred as ‘IPC’). Different punishments under different sections
were provided to him as follows:
Section 302: sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 500/with default stipulation.
Section 324: sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year and a fine of Rs. 250/-.
Section342: sentence to undergo RI for three months and a fine of Rs.
100/- with default stipulation.
Section 454: sentence to suffer RI for a period of one year and to pay a
fine of Rs. 250/- with default stipulation.
The other two co-accused were also acquitted by the trial court of
all the charges. The appeals had been filed both by the appellant and
the State and the State’s appeal was directed was against the acquittal
of accused Nos. 2 and 3 and the same was dismissed at the admission
Therefore the said case was firstly appealed in the high Court against
the decision of the trial court and when the High Court dismissed the
appeal, the appeal was made in the Supreme Court.
Appellant Arun and the deceased Sampatro Gopal Khanderkar
were real brothers with two more brothers named Haribhau and
Indakar. The deceased and the brothers were separate in residence and
a partition had came into effect between the brothers, which had
resulted a dispute among the deceased and two of the brothers, the
present appellant Arun and Indakar since the terms were not
acceptable to the brothers of the deceased.
Sampatrao and wife Mangalabai had filed Regular Suit No.285 of
1996 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division at Kaij for a
declaration of title and injunction in respect of five lands which were
the suit property in that suit. The suit was filed against two brothers i.e.
the present appellant and Indakar as well as some other members of
their family. In the suit, the deceased and his wife filed an application
for grant of interim injunction, on 31st October 1996, and the interim
injunction application was allowed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Kaij 4th November, 1996.
Even after the grant of injunction, the disputes remained, because
the cotton crops were allegedly stolen by accused No.1 Arun, acquitted
accused No.3 Indakar and their family members and in this regard a
police complaint was filed by Mangalabai, wife of deceased against the
present appellant and Indrakar and their family members. She had
prayed for strict police action against the persons named in the
complaint. All these facts were relevant to show that the relations
between family of deceased Sampatrao and the families of his two real
brothers were strained and inimical.
The incident in question took place on 22nd December, 1996.Prior to
the incident, the deceased had engaged a laborer named Bhanu Anna
Khose for three months to work in his fields and a naukarnama had also
been executed regarding the same. The agreement was to come in
effect from 21st December, 1996 and regarding the same they had
decided to meet at village Neknoor and then leave for village Kolhewadi
On the morning of 22nd December, 1996, the deceased took
Bhairu to his fields and then to the school of whom he was the founder.
They both went to the office in the school and were sitting when the
accused no.1 and the present appellant Arun came and latched the
door of the office from outside. Arun was one of the peons of the said
school and warned Bhanu from the window to leave the office if he
wanted to save his life. Taking the bold stand, Sampatrao refused on
Bhairu’s behalf and locked the door of the office from inside, shutting
Arun outside. Arun then climbed the roof of the office which was a tin
sheet and bend the tin. Through the opening created by him, he
jumped in the office and threw chilly powder in the eyes of the
deceased Sampatrao and then picked up an iron hammer and with the
help of the hammer and a brick which had been stored in the room
with other bricks, he hit Sampatrao pressing his neck and giving him
eight blows on his head.
Bhairu was asked not to interfere between the brothers and was
caught hold by Accused no. 2 from the window. Arun was carrying a
wire in his waist which he used to beat Sampatrao and also hit Bhairu
with a brick. Bhairu acted to be dead, but however, Arun asked him to
shift the table to place below the opening in the shed and made Bhairu
keep a chair on the table and he and Bhairu both came out of the office
through the damaged tin. The accused nos. 1 to 3 left the place and
Bhairu went in for lodging a complaint in the Police Station.
The complaint was registered under CR. No.257 of 1996, for
offences punishable under Sections 302, 342 read with Section 34 IPC.
Bhairu’s blood stained clothes were seized under Panchnama and
he was referred to the government Hospital for medical treatment.
Investigation was taken up, pictures were clicked of the place of the
incident, articles were seized and a panchnama was made accordingly.
On the very same day, Arun was arrested and his blood stained clothes
were also taken into custody under panchnama and he was also
referred to the hospital due to injuries on his person.
The medical certificates of both Bhairu and Arun stated that they
received simple injuries caused by hard and blunt substance. The
charge sheet was filed and the trial took place.
A total of about 19 witnesses were examined and two students
were held to be eye witnesses of the incident who were staying in the
hostel of the school. The trial Court found the evidence against the
accused to be clear, credible and cogent and recorded the conviction so
far as the present appellant is concerned.
The appeal put forward to the High Court proclaimed that the
appellant had gone unarmed and alone to the school to persuade the
deceased to put an end to the argument but the deceased instead to
resolving the dispute, abused him and pushed him outside and insulted
him. When he saw that the appellant was not going outside, the
deceased picked up a hammer and gave two or more blows on the
head of the appellant and when the appellant was in a state of reason
to belief that he would be killed, then in order to save himself, he might
have injured the deceased. It was also stated in the appeal that the
stand of throwing of chilly powder was false and the chilly powder was
subsequently planted at the scene of the offence.
The State’s stand was that the view of the accepted position of
the accused regarding his presence and role was duly described by the
eye witness and therefore there is no scope for interference with the
well judgment of the trial court. The high Court had accepted the stand
and dismissed the appeal.
Supreme Court Proceedings
Learned Counsel for the appellant:
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that there was an earlier FIR which was suppressed and after
deliberation report was lodged which was treated as a FIR. It was the
deceased who was the aggressor and the appellant was exercising his
right of private defence. According to him, the deceased gave four
blows on his head and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court is
clearly unsustainable and unacceptable.
Learned Counsel for the respondent State:
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted
that the FIR was promptly lodged. The injuries stated to have been
sustained by the accused are simple in nature with no threat to life. The
evidences given by the eye witnesses are clear, cogent and credible
and, therefore, there is no scope for any interference.
Question under consideration by the division bench:
The question which was needed to be considered was the alleged exercise of the right
to private defence. Stress had been laid down on the exception of private defence mentioned in
Section 96 of IPC which says that “nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of private
defence.” Various questions were to be considered, like
whether the legitimate exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be
determined on the facts and circumstances of each case or;
whether the number of injuries justifies the use of this defence or;
whether the right to private defence has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt or not;
on whom is burden of proof to justify the use of private defence
can in the absence of proof, whether it is possible for the Court to presume the truth of
the plea of the self-defence;
whether the situation has to be judged through a subjective point of view or through a
microscopic point of view;
The Supreme Court division bench consisting of Justice Dr. Arijit Prasad and Justice Asok
Kumar Ganguly explained the exercise of right of private defence under the consideration of
the above questions and after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, held that
the appeal of the appellant for the acceptance of the right to private defence to be dismissed.
Explaining when can the right to private defence be exercised , the Court said that it is
not necessary for the accused taking the plea of the right of private defence to necessary call
for evidence, provided he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances indicated in the
prosecution evidence itself. Quoted observation in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 391)
was a follows:
“It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not
as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt
and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by
laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing
Referring to fact that whether the number of injuries is enough to justify the act in
favour of private defence, the SC held that the number of injuries is not always a safe criterion
for determining who the culprit was since it cannot be accepted as a universal rule that a
presumption should be taken that the number of injuries on the accused person is due to the
exercise of private defence. The defence has to establish that the injuries so caused were due
to the exercise of right to private defence.
In the situation where the accused is not able to explain the nature of the injuries, it is
given a serious consideration and contrary to it, if the prosecution is unable to explain the
injuries caused to the accused, then that may or may not affect the prosecution process. This
principle is mainly taken into account when the injuries attained by the accused are minor,
superficial or exaggerated or where the evidence is so clear and cogent that it outweighs the
effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries.
It has been stated in this case that a plea of right of private defence cannot be based on
surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to
an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury
on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an
accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting.
As to the fact whether the accused has to prove the existence of the right beyond
reasonable doubt, the court held that it was not necessary. Merely able to prove that the
probabilities were such where there was immediate threat to person or property was enough
to prove existence of such right.
Explaining the essentials for claiming this defence, the division bench referring to
Sections 96 to 106 of IPC held that:
“To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must
show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that
either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that
he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death.”
Therefore, it was concluded that the right commences, as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the property or person arises from an attempt, or threat, to commit
the offence, whether or not the offence has been completed and the right lasts as long as the
reasonable apprehension to the body continues.
Referring to the judgment given in Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was
observed that as soon as the cause of reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat no
longer exists, there can be no occasion to exercise such right of private defence.
Therefore, it was concluded that in order to evaluate whether the right to private
defence will be available or not, the following factors have to be considered, namely,
the injuries received by the accused;
the imminence of threat to his safety;
the injuries caused by the accused; and
the circumstances whether the accused had the time to recourse to public authorities.
Considering the question whether the facts have to be viewed with a narrow
perspective or a with a broad one, the SC relying on the decision of Butta Singh v. State of
Bihar (AIR 1991 SC 1316) that since in moments of excitement and disturbed mental
equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use exactly only
so much force which is necessary as compared with the danger apprehended to him where
assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the
right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent.
SC in the above case held that “Such situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not
with high-powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping.
Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in
considering what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal
human reaction and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if
the fact situation shows that in the guise of self- preservation, what really has been done is to
assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has
disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court
dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is
essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.”
In the instant case, when the factual scenario was examined in the background of the
principles set out in James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004 (2) SCC 203), the inevitable
conclusion was that the appeal was without merit and hence was dismissed.
Gudda @ Dwarikendra
State Of M.P.,
SC CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1566-1567 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos.1195-1196 of 2012)
The facts of the case are that the accused (also the appellant), Gudda on being
suspicious about his wife’s illicit relation with the deceased Sunil Gupta, called him with his
family for lunch at his home which he had taken on rent. His intentions were to murder the
deceased Sunil Gupta on the very day when Sunil would come to his house for lunch. So on 27th
May, 2007, when the deceased Sunil Gupta came with his pregnant wife and son to the
appellant’s home, the appellant brutally murdered Sunil with a katar (a sharp edged weapon).
In fear of being caught and charged for murder, the appellant very brutally murdered the
pregnant wife of the deceased and also his small son and ran from his rented house on his bike.
The accused on denying the above facts told that when he returned from his office, he
heard his wife crying for help from inside the house, whereas the deceased’s wife and son were
sitting on the terrace outside the house and when he went inside, he saw that the deceased
Sunil was trying to rape his wife and in order to save his wife’s sanctity, he stopped Sunil and
when Sunil attacked him back, he had no other option other than killing him to save their own
lives. Referring to the murder of the deceased’s wife and child, he said that when he attacked
the deceases, the deceased’s wife and son came to rescue him and in that process they got hurt
but not due to his own intentions.
The trial court after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and all the
witnesses and details in FIR, came to the conclusion that the accuser’s statement was false and
was made in order to fool the legal system and he had murdered the family brutally on the
suspicion that the deceased Sunil Gupta and his own wife had some illicit relationship. The trial
held that it would be so, the deceased would have never dared to enter the accuser’s house
and therefore the accused will be guilty under 302 of IPC and since it was one of the “rarest of
the rare cases”, the accused will be given death penalty and no punishment will be given to the
wife of the accuser.
The appellant and the State both filed their petitions in the High Court, the appellant for
dismissing the death penalty and for accepting the defence of private defence and the State for
proving the wife a partner in the crime. The High Court rejected the pleas and said that the trial
court had not committed any error while deciding for the case.
The appeal was then made by the appellant to Supreme Court, where SC looked in the
matter considering it to be as two major issues, namely, conviction and sentencing.
The conviction part was to judge whether the appellant will be given the right of private
defence and the Court held that the circumstances and witnesses, all uphold that the appellant
had conspired for murdering the deceased Sunil Gupta and hence the right to private defence
cannot be granted to him and he shall be guilty for the murder of the deceased Sunil Gupta and
his family and the court agree to the decision of the earlier Courts for not accepting the plea for
Referring to the sentencing of death penalty to the appellant, the SC held that though
the appellant has been accused for murdering three people in the family, still his act can
neither be considered brutal and nor as one of the rarest of the rare cases.
It was observed that he planned murdered the deceased Sunil Gupta due to suspicion
but he murdered his wife and son without any planning just to ensure that he doesn’t get
caught in the justice system and therefore his act cannot be called brutal.
Also, the court was of the view that since the appellant had no criminal history before
and was of a young age and was not regarded as a social evil, the chances of him to turn out a
better individual were there and therefore his future possibilities of reform cannot be ruled
Therefore, the Court held that the punishment provided by the trial Court and the High
Court was misappropriate to the offence committed by the appellant and therefore dismissed
the capital punishment and imposed the sentence of life imprisonment on the accused.
State Of Punjab & Anr.
SC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1057 of 2002
The case was that the deceased Gurcharan Singh, brother of Bakhtawar Singh and uncle
of Darshan Singh had a dispute over partition of the land attached to the well and due this
dispute, one day during a fight between Gurcharan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh, Gurcharan
Singh died due to attacks by the gandasa of Bakhtawar Singh and gunshots from Darshan Singh.
As per the complainant, Gurdish Singh, son of the deceased, the fight was initiated by
Bakhtawar Singh and as per the accused Bakhtawar Singh and Darshan Singh, the attack was
initiated by the deceased and in the process of exercising self defence, the accused had no
other option than to kill the deceased.
The trial court after considering the statements given by both the parties, and judging all
the evidences, came to the conclusion that the case was in favour of the defendants and the
prosecution was not able to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt and
hence benefit of private defence would be given to the defendants.
The High Court referring to the appeal of the complainants, reversed the decision of the
trial Court without giving any cogent reasons just on the basis that the accused Darshan Singh
was not able to explain the use of the remaining shots.
The Supreme Court stating the High Court’s decision as erroneous and not justified,
allowed the appeal for private defence to the appellants, setting aside the High Court’s
decision. The Court here observed that the trial Court had laid emphasis on all the important
aspects of the case and the decision of the trial Court was appreciating.
The words in the praise of the decision of the trial court were,
“In the instant case after marshalling and scrutinizing the entire prosecution evidence, we are
clearly of the view that the trial court's view is not only the possible or plausible view but it is
based on the correct analysis and evaluation of the entire evidence on record. Rationally
speaking, no other view is legally possible.”
Explaining the concept of private defence with reference to one of the landmark
judgments, Butta Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), the Court in the present case gave some
essentials which are to be considered while accepting the exercise of private defence, which are
Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly recognized by the criminal
jurisprudence of all civilized countries. All free, democratic and civilized countries
recognize the right of private defence within certain reasonable limits.
The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted
with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-creation.
A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self defence into
operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual
commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It is
enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and it is
likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.
The right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension
arises and it is co- terminus with the duration of such apprehension.
It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by
step with any arithmetical exactitude.
In private defence the force used by the accused ought not to be wholly
disproportionate or much greater than necessary for protection of the person or
It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to
consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on record.
The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond
The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful
or wrongful act is an offence.
A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in
exercise of self defence inflict any harm even extending to death on his assailant
either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened.
Taking into consideration the various aspects in which the
exercise of right to private defence can be exercised, I believe that the
Supreme Court in all the three cases has acted justifiably and has taken
into consideration all the relevant facts which were necessary for
evaluating the pros and cons of the case.
So, it can be observed through the previous cases that the right to
private defence can be exceeded to causing even death of a person and
such can be exercised only in the case where there is imminent threat
to the life of the person and in the situations where the imminent
threat to life is not present, the right to private defence does not exist.
The Courts have to study the aspects relating to this defence very
accurately since these days, this right is one of most misused rights and
on the other side, the Courts cannot be too strict with the rules and
regulations regarding the defence, because that would be against the
natural justice system since at the moment of threat to a person, the
person loses the capability to think and observe the situation before
reacting to it and that moment of spur can exceeds his own limit
without knowing the circumstances.
So the conclusion we reach is that, the right to private defence is
a defence which legally grants a person to do an activity in order to
safeguard his person or property from a moment of imminent threat.
Sections 96 to 106 of the IPC deals with the concept of private defence.