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A transformational approach to joint warfighting hinging on the leveraging of warfighting culture as a means of stimulating desired emergent behaviors, enhancing joint combat effectiveness.

A transformational approach to joint warfighting hinging on the leveraging of warfighting culture as a means of stimulating desired emergent behaviors, enhancing joint combat effectiveness.

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  • The problem set for the US military will grow in the near future, and will require a change in the military paradigm to address this growth. The threat will now be from many other directions than what is thought traditional, but the old threat from hostile nation-states will not disappear; this requires that the military be ready to engage an enemy who possesses a classic mechanized force, or the newer enemy who hides in the “dark places” and does not respect the old rules of war. The problem set for the engagement of the new non-state, non-traditional threat can be stated fairly easily. The growing population of the 3 rd world, who are for the most part trapped under incompetent and brutal governments and who are unable to achieve the standard of living of the 1 st world (due to numerous factors). Coupled with their awareness of Western “luxury”, due to worldwide media distribution, this will cause friction between the haves and have-nots, just as it has throughout human history. Their states will be collapsing under the load of the population and will be unable to provide even basic services; they will require ever-increasing resources to provide for their growing numbers but will be mired in increasing poverty due to a lack of resource extraction and distribution capabilities. This will exacerbate any religious/ethnic/tribal schisms within the population, and will increase jealousy and hatred of the 1 st world for perceived interference or manipulation of their conditions, or for not “sharing the wealth”.
  • Both the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) acknowledge that we cannot and will not know precisely where and when America’s interests will be threatened or when America will come under attack. We can predict trends, but cannot predict events. We can identify threats, but cannot know where or when America or its allies will be attacked. We should try to avoid surprise, but also learn to expect it. Adapting to surprise – adapting quickly and decisively- must therefore be a capability we will incorporate throughout our National Defense Strategy. 1 An objective of the QDR was to shift the basis of defense planning from the old “threat-based” model to a “capabilities – based” model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than on whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. “ These capabilities are likely to include terrorism, cyber warfare, advanced surface-to-air missile defense systems, anti-space weapons and weapons of mass destruction, among others. Their use is likely to have as its aim delaying, disrupting, damaging or destroying the military capabilities of the U.S. , its allies or friends.” 2 The U.S. must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve the objectives. These new capabilities are in addition to retaining key current capabilities, such as the capabilities to fight large conventional wars in distant theaters. 1 QDR report, Sept. 30, 2001, pg iii 2 Defense Planning Guidance FY 2003-2007, dated Aug 2001(UNCLAS paragraph)
  • This is a transition slide. Transition from describing what HAS changed to what NEEDS to change. The old or current warfighting paradigm must adapt and change to the new environment and threats.

Jow Without Images Maltz Presentation Transcript

  • 1. Joint Operational Warfighting Joint Operating Concept
  • 2. Agenda
    • Introduction
      • The Environment
      • The Threat
      • The Paradigm
    • The Concept
      • The Culture
      • The Cornerstones
      • Emergent Qualities
    • Summary and Conclusion
  • 3. The Environment Introduction
  • 4. The Environment
    • Evolving conditions, challenges, and threats
    • The nature of war and warfighters has not chang-ed, but the conditions of war are always changing
    • Increasing appreciation of complexity of conflict
    • Increasing diversity of conditions & challenges:
      • Growing trans-nationalism and extra-nationalism: tribal/ethnic/sectarian conflicts, terrorism, et cetera.
      • Proliferation of advanced technologies and WMD
      • Increasing urbanization, globalization, networking
  • 5. The Environment
    • Illuminated battlefield
    • Evolving challenges of sensor combat
    • Increased lethality of weapons: accuracy, speed, range, and engagement intensity
    • Paradox of “empty but crowded” battlespace
  • 6. The Threat Introduction
  • 7. The Threat
    • “… Uncertain enemy and unpredictable attacks…”
    • New Warrior Class: different rules…different values
    • Potential CBRNE weapons employment
    • Emergent “niche” technologies
    • Conventional threat remains:
      • Professional militaries
      • Force-on-force, attrition-based
    • Unconventional (4 th Gen.) warfare threat increases:
      • Guerilla
      • Asymmetrical (avoidance of force-on-force)
      • Population and time
  • 8. The Paradigm Introduction
  • 9. The conditions of war and of the battlespace, and the forms of the adversaries, have changed... Like creatures in nature, we must adapt to the new environment if we are to continue to dominate... Evolving Threat EstablishedThreat Current Paradigm Proposed Paradigm The Paradigm
  • 10.
    • A concept for how the
    • future joint, interagency,
    • and coalition force will
    • fight in the next decade.
    Joint Operational Warfighting
  • 11.
    • Shaped by an appreciation of military theory , complexity science , and human and organizational productivity theory
    • Framed by a new warfighting culture
    • Employs new systemic approaches to the supporting concepts of the Unified Battlespace, Adaptive Command, and Distributed Operations
    • Designed to stimulate the emergent qualities of increased synergy, adaptability, and opportunism
    Joint Operational Warfighting
  • 12. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
  • 13. Warfighting Culture The Concept
  • 14. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command Warfighting Culture
  • 15.
    • Shared values and beliefs
    • that shape appreciation
    • of the battlespace and
    • facilitate adaptive command
    • and distributed operations.
    Warfighting Culture
  • 16.
    • The term used to describe a proposed philosophy and paradigm of joint warfighting
    • Constantly evolving throughout history; is influenced by history, politics, economy, civil culture, et cetera.
    • Provides the animating force behind doctrine, organization, training, and all other aspects of warfighting
    Warfighting Culture
  • 17.
    • Mechanistic
    • Reductionist
    • Linear
    • Contiguous
    • Massed
    • Patterned
    • Effects-aware
    • Methodical
    • Military-Centric
    • Confrontation
    • Synchronized
    • Industrial
    • Hierarchical
    • Centralized
    • Analytical
    • Complex
    • Systemic
    • Non-linear
    • Non-contiguous
    • Distributed
    • Unpredictable
    • Effects-focused
    • Opportunistic
    • All elements of power
    • Dislocation
    • Synergized
    • Information
    • Non-hierarchical
    • Decentralized
    • Intuitive
    Traditional Proposed Warfighting Culture A Shift in Bias Along a Sliding Scale:
  • 18.
    • Mechanistic
    • Reductionist
    • Linear
    • Contiguous
    • Massed
    • Patterned
    • Effects-aware
    • Methodical
    • Military-Centric
    • Confrontation
    • Synchronized
    • Industrial
    • Hierarchical
    • Centralized
    • Analytical
    • Complex
    • Systemic
    • Non-linear
    • Non-contiguous
    • Distributed
    • Unpredictable
    • Effects-focused
    • Opportunistic
    • All elements of power
    • Dislocation
    • Synergized
    • Information
    • Non-hierarchical
    • Decentralized
    • Intuitive
    Traditional Proposed Warfighting Culture A Shift in Bias Along a Sliding Scale:
  • 19. The Cornerstones of JOW The Concept
  • 20. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
  • 21. Unified Battlespace “ I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.” – Carl von Clausewitz
  • 22. Unified Battlespace A concept for understanding the operating environment, in its totality
  • 23.
    • Full breadth and depth of the battlespace
    • Comprehensive Connectivity
    • Interdependence
    • A system of nodes and networks
    Unified Battlespace Characteristics:
  • 24. Unified Battlespace
    • The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply power, protect the force, and complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, information, and cognitive domains, and the adversary, friendly, and other forces and entities residing or operating therein.
    • A single, integrated and complex whole comprised of adversary, friendly, and other “systems of systems” that interact dynamically, and usually violently.
    • A system of adversary, friendly, and other networks comprised of infrastructures, nodes, links, and elements.
    • The strategic battlespace is global (and beyond), but there will always be defined areas of concentrated focus and engagement.
  • 25. Unified Battlespace
    • Includes full breadth, depth, and height of the Air, Land, Sea, Space, Information, and cognitive domains
    • The levels of war are merging.
    • Technology is “compressing space and expanding time”.
    • Key nodes will lead directly to operational results.
    • The roles of the Joint Forces Commander and staff
    • Evolution from Deep Operations Theory, AirLand Battle, Forward from the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, & Global Engagement
    Full breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace
  • 26. Unified Battlespace
    • Comprehensive connectivity is the foundation:
    • Electronic connectivity
    • Shared awareness
    • Culture/paradigm
    • Doctrine
    • Training/education
    • Leadership
    • Organization
    • Adversary
    • Et cetera
    Comprehensive Connectivity and Interdependence Connection Integration Interdependence increased synergy
  • 27. Unified Battlespace Tactical Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat D I M E P E M S I I Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat Strategic Operational A system of nodes and networks
  • 28. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
  • 29. “ War is the realm of uncertainty; Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” – Carl von Clausewitz Adaptive Command
  • 30. A concept for commanding forces within the complex and uncertain environment of the Battlespace, in order to lead Distributed Operations. Adaptive Command
  • 31. Adaptive Command
    • Commanders Intent provides guidance
    • Effects-focused
    • Feedback with appropriate MOEs key to control
    • Connectivity
    • Opportunistic
    • Reduced latency in Sense/Plan/Decide/Act cycle
    • Proliferation of Decision Makers
    • Emergent self-synchronization
    • Collaborative
    • Flexible
    Characteristics:
  • 32.
    • Feedback from a variety of sensors and sources, including distributed units, will indicate when changes in guidance or degree of directive centralized control is required.
    • Unprecedented connectivity and sensor input will enable both more directive and more self-synchronized operations.
    • Authority to decide, plan, and act should reside at command level with the best situational awareness; at times it may be centralized at a higher HQ, and at other times decentralized to the tactical unit.
    Adaptive Command
  • 33.
    • The necessary wisdom and discipline will need to be forged well before deployment, through leadership doctrine, training, education, and personnel selection and promotion policies that promote:
      • Understanding the realities of the modern battlefield
      • The immutable principles of war and productivity
      • The inculcation of the optimal warfighting culture
      • Recognition of the central role that character plays in leadership, and that information sufficiency plays in decision-making
    Adaptive Command
  • 34.
    • Commanders at every level will use the art and science of war to develop concepts of operations, and will then promulgate guidance focusing on commander’s intent and desired effects.
    • Control will be effected through, and measured by, the achievement of desired effects, specified in commander’s intent, not the performance of directed actions per se’.
    • Desired effects will be achieved by units acting independently and creatively but synergistically, in self-synchronizing actions based upon shared situational awareness, designed to satisfy commander’s intent.
    Adaptive Command
  • 35. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
  • 36. “ Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.” – Sun Tzu Distributed Operations
  • 37. A concept for the employment of full joint capabilities throughout the battlespace, aided by Adaptive Command, and an appreciation of the Unified Battlespace. Distributed Operations
  • 38. Distributed Operations Information Fire Maneuver Component Elements Operations
  • 39.
    • Tailorable
    • Scalable
    • Distributed
    • Dispersed
    • Operational Nodes
    • Agile
    • Dislocation
    • Unpredictable
    • Interdependence
    • Full Battlespace Presence
    • Autonomy
    • Simultaneity
    • Multidimensional
    • Multidirectional
    • Task Organized
    • Combined Arms
    • Increased Surface Area
    • Speed
    Distributed Operations Characteristics:
  • 40. A Distributed System… Distributed Operations
  • 41. Emergent Qualities The Concept
  • 42. Emergent Qualities Enhanced … Synergy Opportunism Adaptability
  • 43. Synergy “ One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.” – Sun Tzu Emergent Qualities
  • 44. Adaptability “ Improvise, Adapt, Overcome.” – Military Adage Emergent Qualities
  • 45. Opportunism “ The victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle.” – Sun Tzu Emergent Qualities
  • 46.
    • Enhanced Synergy yields reduced friction and greater productivity/combat effectiveness
    • Enhanced Adaptability yields greater responsiveness to challenges and opportunities
    • Enhanced Opportunism yields more proactive action and self-synchronization in the battlespace
    • Together, they facilitate a Unified Battlespace, Adaptive Command, and Distributed Operations
    • These yield greater Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Economy of operations
    Emergent Qualities
  • 47. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
  • 48. Summary and Conclusion
    • JOW is a theory … an articulation of first principles
    • JOW is an integrated conceptual system that must be employed coherently as such
  • 49. Summary and Conclusion
    • Joint Operational Warfighting will yield:
    • Enhanced/optimized employment of warfighters
    • Enhanced desired emergent behaviors (synergy, adaptability, and opportunism)
    • Enhanced unified perspective of the battlespace
    • More adaptive leadership and command
    • Enhanced capability for distributed operations
  • 50. Summary and Conclusion
    • Joint Operational Warfighting will yield:
    • An enhanced/optimized warfighting culture
    • Significant changes/enhancemnts to DOTMLPF
    • A vehicle for transformation of the armed forces
    • A potential Revolution in Military Affairs
    • Enhanced effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations broadly
  • 51.
    • Questions?
    • Richard Stuart Maltz
    • 703-587-8423
    • [email_address]
  • 52. Joint Operational Warfighting Joint Operational Warfighting