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Haiti Earthquake HADR Scenario
 

Haiti Earthquake HADR Scenario

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The Haiti 2010 earthquake scenario from the Connections 2010 Game Lab.

The Haiti 2010 earthquake scenario from the Connections 2010 Game Lab.

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  • At 1653 on Tuesday, 12 January 2010 a devastating Magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the impoverished country of Haiti. Between 100,000 and 300,00 people died in the quake and its aftermath, a quarter of a million buildings were destroyed, and over 1 million were made homeless. that haiti was already a very poor country with weak government capacity only compounded the problem.
  • At 1653 on Tuesday, 12 January 2010 a devastating Magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the impoverished country of Haiti. Between 100,000 and 300,00 people died in the quake and its aftermath, a quarter of a million buildings were destroyed, and over 1 million were made homeless. that haiti was already a very poor country with weak government capacity only compounded the problem.
  • Scrounging is not the same as looting, although the press called it that. Very little looting. Very little crime, at first. Typical for disasters. But fear of breakdown in Haiti was very high. Some areas got lots of help, some got little. Cynics attributed it to location and profile of the zone. Attention driven. Unlike some NGOS, US military is able to support itself, but in doing so, takes up space on the runway or port that might be used for “real relief.” Some Latin foreign militaries discovered they could not support themselves. Never deployed outside of their country without UN support as UN peacekeeper troops.Military created certain expectations – “82 Airborne effect.” Lot of NGO and UN resistance at first, great suspicion at US takeover of disaster. Early on, “dueling org charts phenomenom.” Later, really just trying to chart what was already happening on the ground.
  • NGOs saw the disaster-affected count climbing unstoppably, reaching 2 million. Everyone knew that was too many, but no one could come up with a way to sort out the duplicates. (Visit camp at 5am, tear down the empty tents – was seen as too brutal.) Some camps shrank as people saw that NGOs were ignoring them. (Out of sight, poor access) Some moved to worse locations, but got attention at least. Issue of unequal services, goods, and even unequal pay was a problem in many ways. Some NGOs expect camp occupants to clean their own areas, others pay people to do it.
  • This was the first disaster where I had ever experienced this to this degree. Live TV coverage drove incessant requests for information from DC and other capitals, and required inordinate amounts of time to respond to whatever immediate problem appeared on the screens in the US. Journalists were constantly looking to find something that was not working well and expose it “so it could be fixed.” That is their job. However, it also meant that senior leadership (US Ambassador, etc) was constantly fielding a barrage of orders to “do something,” rather than being able to focus on the overall effort.

Haiti Earthquake HADR Scenario Haiti Earthquake HADR Scenario Presentation Transcript

  • The 2010 Haiti Earthquake Scenario
  • 12 January 2010
  • Humanitarian Assistance/DisasterRelief Many local and international NGOs already active in Haiti Substantial UN presence, including 9,000 members of MINUSTAH, plus multilateral agencies Major international relief efforts:  Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (16,000 US military personnel)  Operation HESTIA (2,000 Canadian military personnel)  relief supplies and rescue teams from dozens of countries, NGOs, and UN agencies Efforts of Haitian government, local communities, and people
  • 12 January 2010
  • The Game Lab Challenge Design a game of military and civilian relief operations during the 2010 Haiti earthquake.  The game should cover approximately the first month or two of relief operations. It should address the role of US and Canadian military personnel, UN peacekeepers and agencies, international NGOs, and the Haitians themselves.  The game should be intended for use in professional military education classes dealing with disaster assistance and humanitarian relief operations; for similar use by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations; and in relevant university courses. The game may, or may not, have a commercial ―hobby‖ application.
  • The Game Lab Challenge Conference participants will be divided into three teams, and given about three hours for the task (Thursday 1620- 1900).  We don’t expect a prototype game. Rather, we would ask each group to come up with the basics of a design concept and approach.  The game may, or may not, have a commercial ―hobby‖ application.  Later, the Game Lab Working Group will meet (Wednesday 1410-1700) to prepare a brief-back that examines the various design choices taken by the different groups.  The brief-back will be presented at the end of the conference (Thursday 0910-1000)
  • The Game Lab Challenge Key considerations:  Keep in mind the intended audiences and purposes of the game.  Develop a game system that generates understanding of the capabilities, constraints, and perspectives of each major set of actors.  Highlight key operational priorities and pressing humanitarian needs.  Encourage the development of assessment, coordination, and planning skills that would be useful in future joint humanitarian operations.  Assure that the player(s) do not lose sight of the fact most disaster relief is undertaken by disaster-affected populations themselves.
  • The Game Lab Challenge Resources:  Subject-matter expertise  David Becker (US State Department, retired)  Maj Tyrell Mayfield (USAF)  CPT Joshua Riojas (US Army)  others  Reports, studies, briefings, and maps  Available online at the Wargaming Connection blog: http://wargamingcommunity.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/co nnections-game-lab-2012-haiti-earthquake-scenario/  No wifi in conference room (but some printed copies of the material will be available)
  • The Game Lab Challenge After the conference:  Volunteer group to work out a design, with the intention of having a playable prototype ready for Connections 2013.  possible online collaboration via MMOWGLI
  • Key Issues
  • Key Issues David Becker  Spent three years at the US Embassy in Haiti serving as Stabilization Coordinator and Political Counselor to the US Ambassador, leading an experimental interagency DOD-funded program to restore Haitian government control to ungoverned violent urban slums by integrating security and development programs.  In the aftermath of the earthquake, he served as the Political Advisor to the commander of US military relief efforts in Haiti, encouraging and shaping emergency relief efforts that would benefit Haiti over the long term.  Spent 21 of the last 27 years overseas in some of the worlds most under- developed countries supporting security sector reform and local development efforts, most particularly in Guatemala and Colombia.  Prior to Haiti, he served as the Political Advisor to the 4-star Commander of US Transportation Command from 2004-2006 supporting US forces deployed around the world, including military support for two other major disasters.
  • Key Issues The Decapitation Problem  Haiti was an extreme example, virtually unique... up to now.  Loss of government, loss of UN leadership, loss of communications, electricity, water, roads closed, port and airport closed, etc.  Led to greater than usual confusion, even for a big disaster. Usually the local government is merely overwhelmed—not buried.  This is almost a nuclear attack scenario, not the ―usual‖ natural disaster scenario.
  • Key Issues Is there an adversary in this game? Perhaps it’s us.  Many different viewpoints on needs and priorities.  People are people. Some looting. Hoarding, resale and waste are common.  Local officials may jostle to increase power or position themselves for future elections.  Smaller NGOs may arrive to help without funding or capacity, and needing publicity to generate resources.  Donors need to justify their funding, which leads to concern with publicity and metrics.  Military has its own shortcomings.
  • Key Issues Urban disasters are different.  Many responders had experience in other locations such as Sudan, or Chad, or Congo.  Rural areas often have large camps, with entry controls and registration, approved by host govt.  PAP: camps sprang up everywhere, vacant lots, blocked streets  Camp shopping : People registered early and often, spread survivors out over several sites  NGO shopping: People would move to wherever an NGO was offering better services (free school, solar lights, etc).
  • Key Issues Becker’s Second Law of Disaster Dynamics: For every positive action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.  Emergency response: First responders hire many locals to strengthen their capacity and save lives  Hire skilled people to do the best job – thus undermined the local health system, making it harder to rebuild the local system. More than 30% of local doctors and medical administrators moved to work for NGOs in the month after the quake.  SPHERE standards: Set minimums for refugee/displaced treatment – meters of space, liters of water, etc.  Standards were often higher than what existed before the quake. (Porta potty syndrome)  Encouraged people to move to camps, rather than fix houses
  • Key Issues Those who get aid often need it least.  Women, children, elderly, disabled are often the least able to show up at distribution points, or otherwise are not easy to find.  Should you distribute quickly to those you can see, or distribute slowly but more carefully?
  • Key Issues Assistance potentially undermines stability and development  In PAP, some zones that suffered little destruction were the poorest – they had little to lose, and a tin shack withstands an earthquake better than a cement building. Yet the people there were already desperate, and any disturbance in the economy affects them quickly.  Yet those who had lost homes, family members and possessions feel they have a claim on incoming resources that the others do not. Once lower middle class, they are now impoverished.  This problem increases social tensions in an already tense and unstable society . Misguided aid efforts can lead to a new explosion
  • Key Issues Assistance potentially undermines stability and development  Many poor neighborhoods had local assistance organizations, or resilience networks established long before the quake (school food systems, local self help work parties, local NGOs, leaders with contacts).  First responder NGOs often bypassed those networks  From ignorance  Unwilling to support local patronage systems,  NGO needed publicity (funding) that would not be available by working with locals.  This undermined the networks that in some cases were crucial to maintaining order and stability, as well as providing sustainable social services.
  • Key Issues Migration: a problem or a solution?  One US priority was to prevent Haitian boat departures  Population movement out of PAP was large – 500,000 left in the first 2 weeks. The government and the donors wanted to keep them out of PAP, but never delivered significant support for them to the countryside. Focus was on capital.  People returned over time, when jobs and assistance began to appear in PAP. Probably a lost opportunity.
  • Key Issues Coordination  The cluster coordination system of the UN and HADR NGOs is designed to be suboptimal. It is designed to ensure that even the least NGO will have a seat at the table, regardless of efficiency or effectiveness. In Haiti, it was so unwieldy that separate informal coordination systems were designed to get around the cluster system. Yet it is considered the best system that anyone can devise.  One positive aspect of the military presence was the number of skilled staff officers that were able to contribute by simply being available 24/7. Most NGO and organizations are not staffed to work the 24/7 coordination issues that come UN up, yet the US military was able (despite inexperience, lack of languages, etc) to staff rotating schedules and distribute information regularly.
  • Key Issues The CNN Effect  Live TV looked for and found problems  DC policymakers were watching from their desks  Haitians watch TV too Generated a constant stream of requests for information, demands and orders from DC, at highest levels. Senior civilian staff in Haiti had to respond, rather than focus on overall effort Military did better, Pentagon did not micromanage
  • Design Considerations
  • Design Considerations What requirements and constraints are generated by the game’s (educational) purpose?  content  time and complexity  varied, multiple users Format  Manual? Digital? TERP?  Boardgame? Card game? RPG?
  • Design Considerations Level of analysis.  National? PAP? variable depth? How many players? Who are they? What are they key objectives? Resources? Dilemmas and Trade-offs?  What sectors to represent? (rescue, medical, food, WASH, shelter.. others?)
  • Design Considerations Representing the synergies and the benefits of coordination—in game terms. How does one depict this? Spatially? Abstracted system?  Importance of logistics. Political constraints. Introducing uncertainty. Modeling confusion. Immersion and engagement.