Caso polonia


Published on

Gestión Pública.

Published in: News & Politics
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Caso polonia

  1. 1. Boguslawa Dobek-OstrowskaUniversity of WroclawPoland PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POLISH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS - COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE In a slow but visible way, the process of election campaigns professionalisation beganafter 1989 in Poland, similarly as it happened in the other countries of Central and WesternEurope. The methods and techniques of political marketing drawn from election campaignsorganised in Western Europe and the United States become an inherent component of electioncampaigns. Analysis of subsequent presidential election campaigns run in 1990, 1995 and2000 clearly reveals that they underwent metamorphosis from being chaotic and amateurevents into professionally organised election campaigns which was accompanied by theevolution of political marketing. Presidential election campaign - 1990 r. Background. In 1990 Poland was in the initial phase of transition to democracy. Afterparliamentary elections in June 1989 fundamental political changes took place. Seriouseconomic transformation was launched aiming at market economy. Wojciech Jaruzelski waselected President by the newly chosen Parliament. In the autumn of 1989 the first non-communist government, lead by a non-communist Prime Minister- T. Mazowiecki wasformed in this region of Europe. Snowballing effect1 reached one by one soviet-dependantcountries – Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria,where difficult and long-lasting democratisation processes was initiated. 2 Along with implementation of the new political system, governing post-Solidarity elitebegan to demand from General Jaruzelski- the ancient regime symbol- resigning of his post.In September 1990 the Seym decided to shorten the tenure of contemporary President and toelect a new one in general, direct elections. The elections were run in two rounds. Sixcandidates participated in the first round of the elections (on 25th of November 1990) andachieved the following results: 1. Lech Walesa 39,66 % of the votes 2. S. Tyminski 23,10 % 3. T. Mazowiecki 18,08 % 4. W. Cimoszewicz 9, 21 % 5. R. Bartoszcze 7,15 %1 S. Huntington (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman &London:University of Oklahoma Press, pp.100-106.2 B. Dobek-Ostrowska (1997) Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodowo-Wschodniej – przeslanki i przebieg. [in]A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds) Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej.Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press, pp.15-17. 1
  2. 2. 6. L. Moczulski 2,50 %.Two candidates, Lech Walesa and S. Tyminski managed to make it to the second round thattook place on the 9th of December 1990. They received respectively 74,25 % and 25,75 % percent of the votes. Voting attendance was poor –only 53,39 % of the electorate took part in theelections. In this period Polish political market was characterised by chaos. Huge number of smallparties, devoid of social roots and supporters existed on the political market. There wereplenty of leaders that had huge political ambitions but serious social force was standingbehind them. The political system and the parties were in the initial phase of development. Inthe Parliament intensive rotation of club members took place. The political stability andsecurity were lacking, which is typical of transition period and new political structuresbuilding phase. Market research. In 1990 only a narrow part of Polish political market was researchedfor the sake of the campaign. Only two election teams of Lech Walesa and Tadeusz.Mazowiecki ordered professional market research. The other candidates did not organise anyresearch. Private PBS agency was entrusted with preparing market analysis for Walesaelection team. Polls were comprehensive and provided exhaustive information. Theymeasured support for the candidate and his main rival – Mazowiecki3 in various regions andthe way voters’ preferences changed. Election team of Mazowiecki ordered two types ofresearch. Private agency SMG/KRC Poland conducted qualitative sociological polls usingfocus group method that concentrated on general situation in Poland and approachingpresidential campaign. Members of promotion team (which was a part of election team)prepared another type of polls, and its practical implementation was entrusted toDEMOSKOP agency. Research results were immediately sent to Election Committee. Theresults suggested univocally that candidate’s popularity was decreasing in almost every socialgroup. The election team underestimated the conclusions and did not make any use of them.The members of election team were certain of Mazowiecki victory. The internal conflictbetween two election team structures- management and promotion team- made the situationeven worse. In consequence, the promotion team was dismissed. The results of marketresearch influenced both candidates’ election strategy and neither candidates nor theiradvisors made any professional use of them. Hence the polls did not fulfil their basic function. Apart from opinion polls prepared for election teams of Walesa and Mazowiecki,research of political scene and public opinion polls were conducted by two state-ownedinstitutions: OBOP- belonging to Radiokomitet structures and CBOS- a state owned agency.Results of their research had enormous importance during the election campaign. The resultsof opinion polls were published in the media. The polls were subject to wide public discussionand both the electorate and election teams had access to them. Electoral market opinion polls conducted in 1990 must be described as having a narrowscope. No polling packages, tracking polls or direct response polls were run. Only in one casefocus group method was used. Out of six candidates only two incorporated scheduled researchof political market in their campaigns. Numerous studies, containing precious informationwere prepared, yet their content was hardly exploited. The results did not become the basis ofpreparing election strategies or organising election team activities. The polls had merelyprognostic function in spite of their reliability. The election teams were not able to utilisethese polls which resulted from the fact that they did not comprehend the importance ofmarket analysis and necessity of their influencing candidates and election teams behaviour.This aspect of all candidates’ activities must be evaluated as amateur and remote fromprofessionalism.3 Until the I round it was assumed that Mazowiecki will be his main rival 2
  3. 3. Segmentation and targeting. A candidate, who did not focus on any particular socialgroup, in other words on any specific electorate segment but addressed his appeal to generalpublic, won the elections. Analysing his tour and marketing communication in the mediareveals that he was unaware of geographical distribution of his electorate and did not makeany conscious effort to reach them. The behaviour of post-communist party candidate was anexception since he was trying to select target segments of the electorate and address a suitablemessage to them. Generally, the candidates did not execute political market segmentation,which was later confirmed by characteristics of specific candidates’ electorate. Basic mistakeswere made in targeting activities, which is illustrated by tour plans (or lack of them), andcandidates’ meetings with general public. Candidates positioning and image shaping. Candidates were trying to create images ofthemselves that they perceived as appropriate. But this process was not executed correctly.The opinion polls results concerning candidate and his opponents were not taken intoconsideration. If any effects such as displaying fundamental differences on the basis of whichthe voters should support a specific candidate were achieved, it was due to intuitional actionsof campaign organisers rather than to knowledge accompanied by marker research.Candidates positioning consisted mainly in displaying opponents’ disadvantages. Mazowieckirun negative campaign attacking Lech Walesa. Similar situation took place in case ofWalesa’s campaign who in the first round turned against Mazowiecki and in the secondagainst Tyminski. The candidates were not aware of the fact that attacking other candidatesinfluenced their own image and not necessarily in a way desired by them. Fundamentally,professional activities and strategies used for shaping of candidates’ image were lacking inthis campaign. It was Walesa’s election team that paid most attention to candidate’s image.Nevertheless the specialists’ impact was significantly limited. Their advice was not able tochange Walesa’s behaviour who was convinced of his infallibility. Election strategy and campaign management. Generally, all candidates were lackingelection strategies. Each of the candidates possessed an election team, but their organisationand content-related knowledge awoke many doubts. Election teams were poorly prepared.The politicians organised their campaigns in amateur way, lacking skills, qualifications andexperience. It should be reminded that these were the first direct presidential elections in thehistory of Poland. 4 The election team of Walesa was organised in the best way. Still, theposition of experts and consultants was weak in all election teams. People managing thecampaign ignored their conclusions and suggestions. Limited role of political managers andconsultants was not contributing to campaign’s professionalisation. A new element ofpresidential campaign in 1990 was hiring advertising agencies (by S. Tyminski) and foundingthe campaign upon paid staff. Mass –media in campaign. For the first time mass media were incorporated intocampaign on such a big scale. Public radio and television transmitted party politicalbroadcasts whose rank was increased by banning paid commercials. For the first time thepress was free to report and comment on the campaign. This was accompanied by profoundchanges of the press market, which on the one hand experienced a press boom, since manyindependent newspapers appeared and on the other witnessed privatising of many state-ownedtitles. It was the first time that results of public opinion polls were published. Mass mediabecame participator of election campaign having impact both on the candidates and on theelectorate. Even though formally independent, media were in fact biased and in the ruthlessway attacked one of the candidates (Tyminski). These practices were unethical. The mediawere not able to report on campaign course in a reliable way and to supply sufficient4 Before the President was chosen by Parliament . 3
  4. 4. information allowing voters to make a decision. For this reason they did not fulfil the functionwhich is ascribed to mass media in democracy. 5 Conclusions from 1990 campaign. Analysis of presidential campaign of 1990 exposesits amateurish character expressed in several ways: in candidates’ lack of knowledgeconcerning mechanisms of election process, in politicians and members of election teamslacking subject-matter knowledge; in ignoring or absence of the experts, consultants,specialised agencies and institutions. Media bias and lack of political culture of electorate didnot promote processes of political communication. Nevertheless, it should be reminded thatthis was the first free and general election on a national scale in Poland, just at the beginningof political system democratisation that took place after more than fifty years of communismrule in Poland (a year after bringing down the communism). From a theoretical perspectivepresidential campaign of 1990 may be described as pre-modern campaign of the type that D.M. Farrell describes as labour intensive campaign, 6 and which he considers typical of westerndemocracies in the sixties and seventies. As inherent features of these campaigns heenumerates: spontaneity, lack of preparations and strategy, poor conducting, high level ofdecentralisation, low level of control possessed by party central structures and concentrationon candidate’s contact with voter.7 Most of these features might be spotted in elections of1990. Presidential election campaign - 5. 11. 1995 and 19. 11.1995 Background. The campaign that was run five years later took place in differentpolitical, social and legal circumstances. In 1992 the Parliament adopted so called ‘Smallconstitution’, a legal act specifying relations between executive and legislative, President’sauthority included. Two Parliamentary election campaigns were run in 1991 and 1993 prior topresidential elections. In comparison to the situation of five years earlier certain dose ofconsolidation of political market took place and some balance of political powers was shaped.Political parties though still being weak, which was especially true of right-wing parties wereslowly finding their place on the political scene. It could be called it a relative stabilisation ofthe political system. As a result of 1993 elections the coalition of left wing, post-communistparties took over the rule. The right wing parties were divided and conflicted. In most casesthey were unable to get into Parliament and these that managed to do so were divided andcould not reach a compromise. Such political situation lasted unchanged until 1995. Thepresidency of Lech Walesa was evaluated negatively by public opinion. He was blamed forbeing a conflictive person; not keeping the promises made during election campaign andcriticised for lacking skills necessary to the President. In spite o his indisputable successes on fthe international scene low percentage of respondents declared the intention to vote for him inapproaching elections. Electoral committee registered 17 candidates, 4 of which resigned before election date.Consequently, in the first round (on the 11th of November 1995) at voting attendance of 64,69% of citizens entitled to vote, 13 candidates fought for the votes. Most votes were won by: 1. A. Kwasniewski 35,11 % 2. Lech Walesa 33,11 % 3. J. Kuron 9,22 % 4. J. Olszewski 6,86 %5 B. McNair (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge, pp21-22.6 D.M. Farrell (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris (eds). ComparingDemocracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage, pp.169.7 Ibidem, p. 169. 4
  5. 5. The rest of the candidates did not pass the threshold of 5 % of the votes. Their participation incampaign was marginal. Two candidates took part in the second round (on the 19th ofNovember 1995) Kwasniewski, that received 51,72 % of the votes and fought previousPresident, Walesa (48,28 % of the votes), at voting attendance of 68,23 %, Market research. Election teams definitely paid more attention to political marketresearch. Apart from the polls ordered at professional, private companies, many of whichappeared after 1990, the teams were conducting their own surveys and polls. This researchstarted to be important already at the stage of nominating the candidates by political parties.L. Kolarska-Bobinska believes that the polls were „a substitute of internal partymechanisms”.8 Opinion polls conducted in 1995 had different functions: they allowed toforesee election results, influenced the process of candidates image building, determinedcampaigns appeal by specifying position of the candidate and his opponents on the politicalscene. For the first time the election teams were collecting information about other candidates,often in order to use it against them. Still, the primary effect of the research was that itinfluenced making strategic decisions. The polls were widely present in the campaign. Theywere organised and used on a very broad scale, which never happened before. The pollsbecame an effective marketing tool providing reliable and precise information. Manyresearchers believe that surveys and public opinion polls that were published and thereforeavailable to the general public influenced the final result of the elections in a profound way.Firstly, they were shaping public opinion and influenced citizens’ preferences, secondly theydetermined the decisions of election teams. Segmentation and targeting. Effective segmentation and targeting done by election teamsof two candidates Walesa and Kwasniewski, allowed them to reach target segments ofpotential voters and allowed them to achieve positive elections result on the election day.(More than 30 % of votes). Other candidates who were trying to win the support of onestrictly specified electorate segment, like farmers or citizens possessing a degree weredefeated. The concept that turned out to be successful was choosing wide segment of socalled middle class which already is, or is becoming a dominant social group in stable anddemocratic societies. Effective positioning and targeting strategy combined withcommunication strategy played an important role in this campaign. The candidates werecombining mass communication with interpersonal and interactive communication. Theywere travelling around Poland and meeting the electorate. According to dominant opinion thiswas a best channel to reach the voting public, especially in case when media were hostiletowards the candidate (which happened in case of A. Kwasniewski ). High level of professionalism of Kwasniewski campaign must be mentioned in thisregard. He took part in biggest amount of meetings out of all candidates. He travelled 23 000kilometres far, visited more than 120 towns and villages. The meetings had various character-starting with cameral meetings up to public rallies. The scenery of rallies was modelled onAmerican campaigns: artistic setting, mixing with the crowd, shaking by-passers hands, andvisiting popular clubs and pubs. Similarly as it was in case of Clinton’s campaignKwasniewski was travelling by bus, which was an element of outdoor publicity. This choiceallowed the candidate to reach even the most remote places and made his figure outstandingin comparison to other candidates travelling by posh limousines. Before the second round ofelections the strategy consisted in retaining the support in these regions of the country wherethe candidate won the first round. It was definitely the campaign in American style with popmusic, balloons, gadgets and snacks. Kwasniewski turned out to be a born rally politician.During his tour a hired film crew accompanied him and the recorded material was later usedfor production of political broadcasts. Election results show that thanks to using this technique8 L. Kolarska – Bobinska (1997). Polityczna rola sondazy w kampanii wyborczej 1995 r. [in] L. Kolarska-Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95. Warszawa, p. 167. 5
  6. 6. Kwasniewski won the biggest share of young people’s votes (aged 18-49), coming from smalltowns and villages. L. Walesa campaign was prepared worse in comparison to the campaign ofKwasniewski and was lacking professionalism. It was not orchestrated according to anymarketing plan. The candidate addressed his appeal to wide range of voters that werecharacterised by anticommunist attitude. Walesa had no tour schedule and simply visitedplaces that he was invited to. He attended 80 meetings in 30 different cities, most of whichwas of the same type (rally, the Holy mass, laying flowers at monuments etc. Candidates positioning and image shaping. Two main opponents - Walesa andKwasniewski represented extreme personalities, had contrasting appearance, ideology andprogram conceptions. In contrast to the previous elections in 1995 election campaigncandidates’ images were consciously shaped. To achieve positive effects the results of opinionpolls and surveys were analysed in the respect of candidates’ perception by the public. Thecandidates were positioned against their opponents, their advantages were exposed anddisadvantages concealed. Other candidates’ faults were eagerly brought to light. Kwasniewski’s image was shaped in a very professional way. He was presented as aneducated, competent and dynamic person having good leadership qualities and the man ofsuccess. His negotiation skills were underlined along with the ability to compromise, lack ofprejudices and being open to new phenomena and situations. Unlike Walesa he was able tospeak exquisite Polish. His young age and good appearance were emphasised (for campaign’ssake he lost several kilograms, wore contact lenses and dressed in elegant manner), whichcontrasted sharply with the image of his main rival. Walesa was perceived as a personcreating conflicts, possessing no education, speaking bad Polish and devoid of elegance. Thecampaign of Walesa focused on changing negative perception of contemporary president andreshaping his image. The role of candidates’ image was enormous in this campaign. A winnerbecame this politician who conducted positioning on the political market process in aprofessional, consequent and skilful way according to marketing rules. He was able to presentthe program and image better fitted to the social expectations. Election strategy and campaign managing. At this stage of analysis attention must bebrought again to Kwasniewski’s campaign. As far as the marketing strategy is concerned hiselection team was best aware of the rules and requirements of political marketing and theircontent- related knowledge necessary to orchestrate the election campaign was the greatest.His managers intended this campaign to be a modern and professional campaign dissimilar toother candidates’ actions. Therefore it resembled advertising campaign. In the course ofcampaign managers made use of experts’ advice, distributed competence and met strategicassumptions. Generally, election campaign of 1995 was characterised by much betterorganisation level than it was in 1990. The teams were better prepared thanks to theirexperience stemming from organising previous presidential and parliamentary electioncampaigns. Experts and consultants- including foreign ones- became a common element ofthe election scene. They were of great importance since they were supplying advice andcreating the concepts of election campaigns. Their presence was a source of inspiration fornew ideas and evidently influenced campaign professionalisation process. Election team ofKwasniewski hired French advertising agency EuroRSCG from Paris and Jacques Séguel,political consultant who previously was responsible for F. Mitterrand presidential campaign.Other candidates also had their consultants. Compared to the year 1990 great progress in thefield of using advertising techniques was made.Mass media in campaign. Public relations and media relations were organised in a moreconscious mode. Organising media events grew on importance. These activities were yet notfully professional due to insufficient supply of PR experts in election teams. Candidates hadunpaid airtime at their disposal. For the first time paid political broadcasts were transmitted 6
  7. 7. but they were used by few candidates and in the marginal way. Apart from unpaid parties’political broadcasts public television9 transmitted its own programmes. It was the first timethat television debates appeared in the course of campaign and were received with interest bythe audience. The opinion polls conducted by OBOP show that A Kwasniewski’sperformance was evaluated as a better one by 70 % of the respondents. Left-wing candidate’selegance, eloquence and intelligence were juxtaposed with impulsiveness, lack of mannersand coarse language of Walesa, and his tendency to provoke conflicts. Some analysts believethat increase of support for Kwasniewski in the last days before second round of the electionswas the result of positive impression that he made in television debate. In comparison with the previous elections mass media were much better prepared to reporton the campaign course and to fulfil their informational mission. Media were guilty of gettinginvolved in competition between the candidates and lacking impartiality, which was revealedby their negative attitude towards left-wing representative. Campaign of 1995 –conclusions. Analysis of election campaign of 1995 clearly revealsthat Polish political market underwent professionalisation, which resulted in transformation oforganisation and course of presidential campaign. From marketing point of view presidentialcampaign of 1995 was totally different to the campaign that took place five years ago.Presidential campaign of A. Kwasniewski received a lot of attention in Polish literaturediscussing this subject. The experts univocally classify it as the first Polish professionallyorganised and orchestrated campaign that brought Poland closer to Western marketing modelof organising political campaigns. The style of the campaign was americanised. According toFarrell’s typology this campaign could be classified as modern capital intensive campaign. 10The attention should be drawn to the following characteristics of this campaign:centralisation of parties’ activities on the national level; growing importance of full-time partystaff; hiring external experts and consultants; increasing role of mass- media, in particular oftelevision and high costs of the campaign (Kwasniewski spend 3,4 million of zloties, Walesa– 2,7 million of zloties). 11 Other candidates’ campaigns did not meet the requirements set bymarketing strategy. They may be classified as labour intensive campaigns. Presidential election campaign - 2000 Background. P. Mancini and D. Swanson list several elements that have impact onthe context of political campaigns, such as: election system, structure of party competition,regulation of campaigning, national political culture and national media system.12 All thesefactors have undergone serious, if not fundamental change in ten year period since the firstpresidential campaign that took place in 1990. In the first place it must be noted that Polandin the year 2000 was in the phase of democracy consolidation, and adopted democraticconstitution in 1997. Poland was already a NATO member and started to negotiate itsmembership in the European Union. Political system underwent stabilisation andconsolidation. Previous elections gave legitimisation to the government and were a testimonyto the fact that society fully accepted democratic rules. Election system, the structure of partycompetition and regulation of campaigning were clearly stated and did not differ from thenorms valid in other stable Western European democracies. New rules regulating financing of9 Public media has exist in Poland from 1994. The radio and television act in 1992 has opened the market forprivate broadcasters10 M. D. Farell, op.cit., p. 168.11 M Mazur (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN, p.231.12 P. Mancini, D. Swanson (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. [in] D. Swanson, P.Mancicni (eds). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London: Praeger, pp. 17-20 7
  8. 8. campaigns were introduced which strengthened social control of expenses. Also Polishpolitical culture was a subject to serious, if not fundamental changes. The Poles becamefamiliar with democratic rules and internalised them. They also gained voting experiencewhile taking part in nine election campaigns: two presidential campaigns, four legislativecampaigns and three local election campaigns. All these factors had enormous impact onprofessionalisation of election campaigns 12 candidates took part in the election campaign in 2000,yet only five of them playedsubstantial role in this race. The rest of them was characterised as political folklore and were thonly of marginal importance. The candidates gained the following support (on the 8 October2000): 1. A. Kwasniewski 53,90 % 2. A. Olechowski 17,30 % 3. M. Krzaklewski 15,57 % 4. J. Kalinowski 5,95 % 5. A. Lepper 3,05 %13The elections of 2000 differed from all previous ones in this regard that their result wasdecided in the first round already. As opinion polls correctly predicted left wingrepresentative and contemporary President A. Kwasniewski became a winner. It was nosurprise for any participant of the political market. Political market research. Analysis of the political market became a natural introductionto campaign. The surveys were conducted by hired professional public opinion researchinstitutions. The election team of M. Krzaklewski, right wing candidate ordered sociologicalsurvey. They were expected to find the reason for such an extensive popularity ofKwasniewski (opinion polls conducted during his first presidency were showing that he hadsupport of 70 % of the society) and to discover his weak points. Still, some of the opinionpolls ordered by the candidates did not supply them with all necessary information andsometimes their results were incorrectly interpreted. A good example of it may be the case ofKrzaklewski. The opinion polls conducted even before the election campaign was launchedrevealed that this candidate had a big negative electorate and was lacking sympathy amongsociety. This fact already at the start of the campaign gave him no chance to win the elections.In spite of that his candidacy was put up in the elections. Yet generally, election teams madestrategic decisions concerning segmentation, targeting and positioning on the basis of marketresearch and information about political market. Election strategy and campaign management. If we compare this campaign with theprevious ones greater maturity of marketing strategies may be observed. The campaigns of M.Krzaklewski and A. Kwasniewski distinguished themselves in this regard. They had clearlydefined strategic assumptions that specified the actions aiming at choosing target groups,positioning and the choice of communication techniques. The campaign of A. Olechowskiwas less successful in this aspect. The campaign of A. Kwasniewski was efficiently organised and carefully orchestratedusing many correct marketing techniques. His team included many experienced consultantswith internships completed and higher education degree and job experience acquired in theUnited States and Western Europe. The strategy of President consisted in maintaining theexisting image and high social support. The candidate run an active campaign characterisedby lack of aggression both in the form and in content. There were 2 general objectives thatunderlined M. Krzaklewski campaign – it was changing his image and violent attack on theleft-wing candidate. Conducting negative campaign aimed at Kwasniewski turned out to be anincorrect objective that resulted in more losses than gains. A. Olechowski campaign failed as13 The situation of one of them – A. Lepper, radically changed. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 hispolitical party became the third most powerful party in Poland. 8
  9. 9. far as marketing strategy is concerned. It was lacking clearly defined objectives, direction andactivities. Form and content of political communicating with electorate definitely improved incomparison to previous campaigns. Co-operation of election teams with professionaladvertising or marketing agencies became a common phenomenon. Many managers,consultants and specialists took active part in the campaign. It could be classified as emergingof specialised professions and professional Polish staff that could deal with preparing, stagingand organising of election campaigns. Substantial development of political advertisement, inparticular of political advertisement, took place. Direct forms of communication such asrallies, election conventions, active participation of candidates’ wives in the campaign andusing music and election songs emerged. Mass media in campaign. Media system and the way Polish media reported on thecampaign had only limited influence on its course and results, according to some Polishresearchers.14 Some opinions criticising attitude of public broadcaster were heard. Publicmedia were accused of granting largest coverage to A. Kwasniewski. Yet it did not have anygreater meaning in general evaluation of mass media behaviour since the candidate holdingoffice is always privileged in this respect. Mass media, in particular public television, reportedon the course of the campaign in an increasingly reliable way, aiming at objectivity, eventhough they had several slips. For this reason when comparing three campaigns of 1990,1995 and 2000, it could be stated that definitely the process of mass media professionalisationtook place and complementarily of roles in a political communication system such as thefunction of watchdog, moderator, editorial guide and entertainer developed.15 After havingpractised democratic procedures for ten years Polish mass media started gradually to fulfil thefunctions typical of the media in stable political culture, such as: informing and educating thesociety; being a platform for public political discourse, that enables shaping of public opinion;giving publicity to governmental and political institutions; being a channel for the advocacyof political viewpoints. 16 In contrast to previous election campaign the candidates were fully aware of the mediaimportance for shaping voters choices and preferences. The most significant medium was ofcourse television. Radio was a complementary medium. Each of the candidates had about twohours of unpaid coverage in public radio and television. Additionally election teams of fourprominent candidates bought paid commercial coverage in private and public broadcastmedia. The Internet, besides official sites of the candidates was practically not used. Theexception was the election team of A. Kwasniewski that placed advertisement on„Rzeczpospolita On Line” daily web site and bought e-mailing service from portal. Campaign of 2000- conclusions . In the aspect of professionalism the campaign of 2000was very unequal. On the one hand it witnessed professionally organised and correctly runfrom the marketing point of view campaign of A. Kwasniewski that did not differ fromanalogous campaigns in Western Europe. On the other hand the campaigns of Krzaklewskiand Olechowski even though often clumsy and burdened with serious mistakes were pointingto great progress in the field of adapting political marketing. Finally, there were also amateurcampaigns of the rest of the candidates, lacking content-related preparation of candidates a ndtheir political base, if they had any. Using Farell’s classification it could be stated that thecampaign of 2000 brought Poland to the phase of modern capital intensive campaigns. Summary14 M. Mazur, op.cit., p. 248.15 J. Blumler, M. Gurevitch (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, p.15.16 B. McNair, op.cit., pp.21-22. 9
  10. 10. Summing it up, Polish presidential election campaigns underwent serioustransformation – from totally amateurish campaigns of 1990, through the stage of premorderncampaigns (possessing some elements of capital intensive campaign in case of A.Kwasniewski) in 1995, to capital intensive campaign of 2000. Analysing the pace of changesof the political scene, the way of treating politics by the candidates and political parties andthe evolution of Polish national political culture, as well as dynamic development of massmedia, private broadcasters in particular, the thesis that next election campaign in 2005 willhave features of post-modern campaign seems quite probable. In the period from 1990 to 2000 a deep evolution of Polish election campaigns towardsthe western model took place which was best observed in case of presidential election butwhich concerned all types of campaigns. Such features of modern campaigns that arementioned by Mancini and Swanson,17 as personalization of politics, „scientificization” ofpolitics, detachment of parties from citizens, autonomous structures of communication and theevolution of citizens role from citizens` participation to spectatorship are also noticed inPolish election campaigns.NOTES1 S. Huntington (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman &London:University of Oklahoma Press, pp.100-106.2 B. Dobek-Ostrowska (1997) Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodowo-Wschodniej – przeslanki i przebieg. [in]A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds) Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej.Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press, pp.15-17.3 Until the I round it was assumed that Mazowiecki will be his main rival.4 Before the President was chosen by Parliament.5 B. McNair (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge, pp21-22.6 D.M. Farrell (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris (eds). ComparingDemocracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage, pp.169.7 Ibidem, p. 169.8 L. Kolarska – Bobinska (1997). Polityczna rola sondazy w kampanii wyborczej 1995 r. [in] L. Kolarska-Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95. Warszawa, p. 167.9 Public media has exist in Poland from 1994. The radio and television act in 1992 has opened the market forprivate broadcasters10 M. D. Farell, op.cit., p. 168.11 M Mazur (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN, p.231.12 P. Mancini, D. Swanson (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. [in] D. Swanson, P.Mancicni (eds). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London: Praeger, pp. 17-2013 The situation of one of them – A. Lepper, radically changed. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 hispolitical party became the third most powerful party in Poland.14 M. Mazur, op.cit., p. 248.15 J. Blumler, M. Gurevitch (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, p.15.16 B. McNair, op.cit., pp.21-22.17 P. Mancini, D. Swanson, op.cit., pp.14-17.BIBLIOGRAPHYBlumler, J., Gurevitch, M. (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge.Denton, R., Woodward, G. (1998). Political Communication in America. London: Praeger.17 P. Mancini, D. Swanson, op.cit., pp.14-17. 10
  11. 11. Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (1997). Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej –przeslanki i przebieg. [in] A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds). Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej. Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press.Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press.Farrell, D.M. (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris(eds). Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage.Kolarska-Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds) (1997). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95.Warszawa.Mazur, M. (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN.McNair, B. (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge.Swanson, D., Mancini, P. (eds) (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London:Praeger. 11