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Horngrenima14e ch10

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  • 1. Introduction to Management Accounting
  • 2. Management Control in Decentralized Organizations Introduction to Management Accounting Chapter 10
  • 3.
    • From 1986 companies revenues increased from $1 billion to over $15 billion
    • During same period foreign earnings increased from 25% to 63%
    • What are the keys to success when a company goes global?
    • Nike decided to delegate decision making to the local market level
    • One result of this decision was the signing of race car driver Michael Schumacher in Germany
    • Chapter focuses on management control systems in decentralized organizations
  • 4. Decentralization The delegation of freedom to make decisions is called decentralization. The lower in the organization that this freedom exists, the greater the decentralization. Learning Objective 1 The process by which decision making is concentrated within a particular location or group is called centralization.
  • 5. Costs and Benefits Benefits of decentralization: Lower-level managers have the best information concerning local conditions. It promotes management skills which, in turn, helps ensure leadership continuity. Managers enjoy higher status from being independent and thus are better motivated.
  • 6. Costs and Benefits Costs of decentralization: Managers may make decisions that are not in the organization’s best interests. Managers also tend to duplicate services that might be less expensive if centralized. Costs of accumulating and processing information frequently rise.
  • 7. Costs and Benefits Managers in decentralized units may waste time negotiating with other units about goods or services one unit provides to the other.
  • 8. Middle Ground Many companies find that decentralization works best in part of the company, while centralization works better in other parts. Decentralization is most successful when an organization’s segments are relatively independent of one another.
  • 9. Segment Autonomy If management has decided in favor of heavy decentralization, segment autonomy, the delegation of decision- making power to managers of segments of an organization, is also crucial.
  • 10. Responsibility Centers and Decentralization Design of a management control system should consider two separate dimensions of control: Learning Objective 2 Responsibilities 1 Autonomy 2
  • 11. Responsibility Centers and Decentralization Profit centers Decentralizatio n These are entirely separate concepts and one can exist without the other.
  • 12. Responsibility Centers and Decentralization All control systems are imperfect. The choice among systems should be based on which one will bring more of the actions top management seeks.
  • 13. Motivation, Performance, and Rewards Criteria and Choices when Designing a Management Control System Goal Congruence Feedback Motivational criteria Feedback Choice of Responsibility Centers and Incentives Learning Objective 3 Actions Performance Measures Rewards Managerial Effort
  • 14. Motivation, Performance, and Rewards Incentives. . . Performance-based rewards that enhance managerial effort toward organizational goals. Rewards Motivational Criteria
  • 15. Motivation, Performance, and Rewards You get what you measure! Therefore, accounting measures, which provide relatively objective evaluations of performance, are important.
  • 16. Agency Theory, Performance, Rewards, and Risks Agency theory deals with contracting between an organization and the managers that it hires to make decisions on its behalf. Incentive Risk Cost of measuring performance 3 Factors:
  • 17. Measures of Profitability Profitability does not mean the same thing to all people. Is it net income? Income before taxes? Net income percentage based on revenue? Is it an absolute amount? A percentage? Learning Objective 4
  • 18. Return on Investment ROI = Income ÷ Investment ROI = Income Revenue × Revenue Investment
  • 19. Return on Investment Division A ROI: = Income ÷ Investment $200,000 ÷ $500,000 = 40% Division B ROI: = Income ÷ Investment $150,000 ÷ $250,000 = 60%
  • 20. Residual Income Capital charge is the cost of capital multiplied by the amount of investment . RI tells you how much a company’s after-tax operating income exceeds what it is paying for capital. RI is defined as after-tax net operating income less a capital charge.
  • 21. Economic Value Added Economic value added (EVA) = Adjusted after-tax operating income – Cost of invested capital (%) × Adjusted average invested capital
  • 22. ROI or Residual Income? Why do some companies prefer economic profit (or EVA) to ROI? Under ROI, the message is go forth and maximize your rate of return, a percentage. Under EVA, the message is go forth and maximize economic profit, an absolute dollar amount.
  • 23. Invested Capital To apply either ROI or residual income, both income and invested capital must be measured and defined.
    • Total assets
    • Total assets employed
    • Total assets less current liabilities
    • Stockholders’ equity
    Learning Objective 5
  • 24. Valuation of Assets Should values be based on historical cost or some version of current value? Practice is overwhelmingly in favor of using net book value based on historical cost. Most companies use net book value in calculating their investment base.
  • 25. Transfer Prices The price that one segment charges another segment of the same organization for a product or service is a transfer price. Learning Objective 6
  • 26. Purpose of Transfer Pricing Why do transfer-pricing systems exist? Management wants to create performance measurement systems. Decisions that maximize a segment’s profit should also maximize the profits of the entire company .
  • 27. Purpose of Transfer Pricing Multinational companies use transfer pricing to minimize their worldwide taxes, duties, and tariffs.
  • 28. Transfer-pricing Systems
    • Market-based transfer prices
    • Cost-based transfer prices
      • Variable Cost
      • Full cost (possibly pus profit)
    • 3. Negotiated transfer prices
  • 29. Market-Based Transfer Prices Using the market price as a transfer price will generally lead to the desired goal congruence and managerial effort. In this case, the market price is equal to the variable cost plus opportunity cost. If a market price exists, use it.
  • 30. Market-Based Transfer Prices Drawbacks Market prices are not always available for items transferred internally. Imperfectly competitive markets exist. When market prices don’t exist, most companies resort to cost-based transfer prices.
  • 31. Variable-Cost Pricing This transfer pricing system is most appropriate when the selling division forgoes no opportunity when it transfers the item internally. Cost-based transfer prices lead to dysfunctional decisions - decisions in conflict with the company’s goals.
  • 32. Full-Cost Pricing This transfer pricing system includes not only variable cost but also an allocation of fixed costs (and, if included, the profit mark-up.) It is implicitly assumed that the allocation is a good approximation of the opportunity cost. Dysfunctional decisions arise with full-cost transfer prices when the selling segment has opportunity costs that differ significantly from the allocation of fixed costs and profit.
  • 33. Negotiated Transfer Prices Companies heavily committed to segment autonomy often allow managers to negotiate transfer prices. Virtually any type of transfer pricing policy can lead to dysfunctional behavior – actions taken in conflict with organizational goals.
  • 34. The Need for Many Transfer Prices The “correct” transfer price depends on the economic and legal circumstances and the decision at hand. Organizations may have to make trade-offs between pricing for congruence and pricing to spur managerial effort. State fair-trade laws and national antitrust acts can also influence transfer pricing.
  • 35. Multinational Transfer Pricing Example A high-end running shoe produced by an Irish Nike division with a 12% income tax rate. It is transferred to a division in Germany with a 40% income tax rate. An import duty equal to 20% of the price of the item is imposed by Germany. Full unit cost is $100, and variable cost is $60 (either transfer price could be chosen). Learning Objective 8
  • 36. Multinational Transfer Pricing Example Which transfer price should be chosen? $100 Why? Tax authorities allow either variable- or full-cost transfer prices.
  • 37. Multinational Transfer Pricing Example Income of the Irish division is $40 higher: 12% × $40 = ($4.80) higher taxes Income of the German division is $40 lower: 40% × $40 = $16 lower taxes Import duty paid by German division: 20% × $40 = ($8)  Net savings = $3.20
  • 38. Management by Objectives MBO describes the joint formulation by a manager and his or her superior of a set of goals and plans for achieving the goals for a forthcoming period. The manager’s performance is then evaluated in relation to these agreed-upon budgeted objectives. Learning Objective 9
  • 39. Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics Many of the troublesome motivational effects of performance evaluation systems can be minimized by the astute use of budgets. The desirability of tailoring a budget to particular managers cannot be overemphasized.
  • 40. Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics Using budgets as performance targets also has its danger. Companies that make meeting a budget too important can motivate unethical behavior.
  • 41. End of Chapter 10 The End