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Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
Lecture 10   mistake - cases
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Lecture 10 mistake - cases

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  • 1. MISTAKE CASESCommon MistakeCouterier v Hastie (1856) 5 HL Cas 673Griffith v Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1950) 84 CLR 377Bell v Lever Bros 1932 AC 161Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149Unilateral MistakeSmith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597Webster v Cecil (1861) 30 Beav 62Kings Norton Metal v Edridge Merret (1897) TLR 98Cundy v Lindsey (1878) 3 App Cas 459Phillips v Brooks [1919] 2 KB 243Lake v. Simmons (1927) A.C. 487Mutual MistakeWood v Scarth (1858) 1 F&F 293Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H&C 906Scriven Bros v Hindley [1913] 3 KB 564Foster v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704LEstrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 Page 1 of 10
  • 2. Mistake CasesCOMMON MISTAKECouterier v Hastie (1856) 5 HL Cas 673The plaintiff merchants shipped a cargo of Indian corn and sent the bill of lading to their Londonagent, who employed the defendant to sell the cargo. On 15 May 1848, the defendant sold the cargoto Challender on credit. The vessel had sailed on 23 February but the cargo became so heated andfermented that it was unfit to be carried further and sold. On May 23 Challender gave the plaintiffnotice that he repudiated the contract on the ground that at the time of the sale to him the cargo didnot exist. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant (who was a del credere agent, ie,guaranteed the performance of the contract) to recover the purchase price.Martin B ruled that the contract imported that, at the time of sale, the corn was in existence as suchand capable of delivery, and that, as it had been sold, the plaintiffs could not recover. This judgmentwas affirmed by the House of Lords.Griffith v Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434At 11am on 24 June 1902 the plaintiff had entered into an oral agreement for the hire of a room toview the coronation procession on 26 June. A decision to operate on the King, which rendered theprocession impossible, was taken at 10am on 24 June. Wright J held the contract void. Theagreement was made on a missupposition of facts which went to the whole root of the matter, andthe plaintiff was entitled to recover his £100.Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531Facts: Mr and Mrs Galloway believed that they were lawfully married and they entered a deed ofseparation. In fact, when they married, Mr Galloway‟s first wife was still alive, unbeknown to MrGalloway. When Mr Galloway fell into arrears making payments pursuant to the deed, „MrsGalloway‟ sued him. He argued that the deed was void, as it had been entered on a mistaken belief—that is, that they were lawfully married and that he was obliged to support his wife and threechildren.Held:The deed was void on the ground that the „marriage‟ (the basis or fact on whichthe deed wasmade) never existed. „Mrs Galloway‟ therefore could not sue for paymentunder it, because in law itnever existed. Page 2 of 10
  • 3. McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1950) 84 CLR 377The defendants sold an oil tanker described as lying on Jourmand Reef off Papua. The plaintiffsincurred considerable expenditure in sending a salvage expedition to look for the tanker. There wasin fact no oil tanker, nor any place known as Jourmand Reef. The plaintiffs brought an action for (1)breach of contract, (2) deceit, and (3) negligence. The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs inthe action for deceit. He held that Couturier v Hastie obliged him to hold that the contract of salewas void and the claim for breach of contract failed. Both parties appealed.The High Court of Australia stated that it was not decided in Couturier v Hastie that the contract inthat case was void. The question whether it was void or not did not arise. If it had arisen, as in anaction by the purchaser for damages, it would have turned on the ulterior question whether thecontract was subject to an implied condition precedent. In the present case, there was a contract, andthe Commission contracted that a tanker existed in the position specified. Since there was no suchtanker, there had been a breach of contract, and the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for thatbreach.High Court of Australia held that McRae succeeded in damages for breach of contract. They rejected thecontract was void because CDC had promised the tanker did exist. Courturier v Hastie was distinguishedbecause there the parties had both shared the assumption the corn existed, but here CDC had actuallypromised the tanker existed and therefore had assumed the risk that it did not.Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149An uncle told his nephew, not intending to misrepresent anything, but being in fact in error, that he(the uncle) was entitled to a fishery. The nephew, after the uncles death, acting in the belief of thetruth of what the uncle had told him, entered into an agreement to rent the fishery from the unclesdaughters. However, the fishery actually belonged to the nephew himself. The House of Lords heldthat the mistake was only such as to make the contract voidable. Lord Westbury said "If partiescontract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights,the result is that that agreement is liable to be set aside as having proceeded upon a commonmistake" on such terms as the court thought fit to impose; and it was so set aside.The House of Lords set the agreement aside on the terms that the defendant should have a lien onthe fishery for such money as the defendant had expended on its improvementsN.B. According to Smith & Thomas, A Casebook on Contract, Tenth edition, p506, "At common lawsuch a contract (or simulacrum of a contract) is more correctly described as void, there being intruth no intention to a contract". However,Denning LJapplied Cooper v Phibbs in Solle vButcher (1949)(below). Page 3 of 10
  • 4. Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161 House of LordsLever bros appointed Mr Bell and Mr Snelling (the two defendants) as Chairman and Vice Chairmanto run a subsidiary company called Niger. Under the contract of employment the appointments wereto run 5 years. However, due to poor performance of the Niger company, Lever bros decided tomerge Niger with another subsidiary and make the defendants redundant. Lever bros drew up acontract providing for substantial payments to each if they agreed to terminate their employment.The defendants accepted the offer and received the payments. However, it later transpired that thetwo defendants had committed serious breaches of duty which would have entitled Lever bros to endtheir employment without notice and without compensation. Lever bros brought an action based onmistake in that they entered the agreement thinking they were under a legal obligation to paycompensation.The House of Lords held that this was only a mistake as to quality and did not render the contractessentially different from that which it was believed to be. The action therefore failed. Page 4 of 10
  • 5. UNILATERAL MISTAKESmith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597The claimant had purchased a quantity of what he thought was old oats having been shown a sample.In fact the oats were new oats. The claimant wanted the oats for horse feed and new oats were of nouse to him. The seller was aware of the mistake of the claimant but said nothing. The claimantbrought an action against the seller based on mistake and misrepresentation.Held: both actions failed. The action based on misrepresentation failed as you cannot have silenceas a misrepresentation. The defendant had not mislead the claimant to believe they were old oats.The action based on mistake failed as the mistake was not as to the fundamental terms of thecontract but only a mistake as to quality.Webster v Cecil (1861) 30 Beav 62The defendant, having refused to sell some property to the plaintiff for £2,000, wrote a letter inwhich, as the result of a mistaken calculation, he offered to sell it for £1,250. The plaintiff acceptedbut the defendant refused to complete. Romilly MR refused a decree of specific performance.Cundy v Lindsey (1878) 3 App Cas 459A rogue, Blenkarn, hired a room at 37 Wood street, Cheapside. This was in the same street that ahighly reputable firm called Blenkiron & Son traded. The rogue ordered a quantity of handkerchiefsfrom claimant disguising the signature to appear as Blenkiron. The goods were dispatched toBlenkiron & co 37, Wood street but payment failed. Blenkarn sold a quantity the handkerchiefs on tothe defendant who purchased them in good faith and sold them on in the course of their trade. Theclaimants brought an action based in the tort of conversion to recover the value of the handkerchiefs.The success of the action depended upon the contract between the Blenkarn and the claimant beingvoid for mistake. If the contract was void, title in the goods would not pass to the rogue so he wouldhave no title to pass onto the defendants. Ownership of the goods would remain with the claimant.Held: The contract was void for unilateral mistake as the claimant was able to demonstrate anidentifiable existing business with whom they intended to contract with. Page 5 of 10
  • 6. Kings Norton Metal v Edridge Merret (1897) TLR 98A rogue named Wallis ordered some goods, on notepaper headed "Hallam & Co", from KingsNorton. The goods were paid for by a cheque drawn by "Hallam & Co". Kings Norton receivedanother letter purporting to come from Hallam & Co, containing a request for a quotation of pricesfor goods. In reply Kings Norton quoted prices, and Hallam then by letter ordered some goods,which were sent off to them. These goods were never paid for. Wallis had fraudulently obtained thesegoods and sold them to Edridge Merret, who bought them bona fide. Kings Norton brought anaction to recover damages for the conversion of the goods.It was held by the Court of Appeal held that if a person, induced by false pretences, contracted with arogue to sell goods to him and the goods were delivered the rogue could until the contract wasdisaffirmed give a good title to a bona fide purchaser for value. The plaintiffs intended to contractwith the writer of the letters. If it could have been shown that there was a separate entity calledHallam & Co and another entity called Wallis then the case might have come within the decision inCundy v Lindsay. In the opinion of AL Smith LJ, there was a contract by the plaintiffs with theperson who wrote the letters, by which the property passed to him. There was only one entity,trading it might be under an alias, and there was a contract by which the property passed to him.Phillips v Brooks [1919] 2 KB 243A rogue purchased some items from the claimants jewellers shop claiming to be Sir George Bullogh.He paid by cheque and persuaded the jewellers to allow him to take a ring immediately as he claimedit was his wives birthday the following day. He gave the address of Sir George Bullogh and thejewellers checked the name matched the address in a directory. The rogue then pawned the ring atthe defendant pawn brokers in the name of Mr. Firth and received £350. He then disappearedwithout a trace. The claimant brought an action based on unilateral mistake as to identity.Held: The contract was not void for mistake. Where the parties transact face to face the lawpresumes they intend to deal with the person in front of them not the person they claim to be. Thejewellers were unable to demonstrate that they would only have sold the ring to Sir George Bullogh.Lake v. Simmons (1927) A.C. 487A lady X induced Y to deliver possession of two pearlnecklaces falsely representing that she wasthe wife of baron Z and that she wanted them for showing them to her husband for his approval.Held : Y intended to contract only with the wife of the baron, and not with X herself. Hence, thecontract was voidand X could not convey any title even to bonafide buyers. Page 6 of 10
  • 7. MUTUAL MISTAKEWood v Scarth (1858) 1 F&F 293The defendant offered in writing to let a pub to the plaintiff at £63 pa. After a conversation with thedefendants clerk, the plaintiff accepted by letter, believing that the £63 rental was the only paymentunder the contract. In fact, the defendant had intended that a £500 premium would also be payableand he believed that his clerk had explained this to the plaintiff. The defendant refused to completeand the plaintiff brought an action for specific performance. The court refused the order of specificperformance but the defendant was liable in damages.Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H&C 906The plaintiff agreed to sell cotton to the defendant which was "to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay".When the cotton arrived the plaintiff offered to deliver but the defendants refused to accept thecotton. The defendants pleaded that the ship mentioned was intended by them to be the ship calledthe Peerless, which sailed from Bombay in October and that the plaintiff had not offered to delivercotton which arrived by that ship, but instead offered to deliver cotton which arrived by another ship,also called Peerless, which had sailed from Bombay in December.Judgment was given for the defendants. It was held that there was nothing on the face of the contractto show which Peerless was meant; so that this was a plain case of latent ambiguity, as soon as it wasshown that there were two Peerlesses from Bombay; and parol evidence could be given when it wasfound that the plaintiff meant one and the defendants the other. If this was the case, there was noconsensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract.Scriven Bros v Hindley [1913] 3 KB 564The defendants bid at an auction for two lots, believing both to be hemp. In fact Lot A was hemp butLot B was tow, a different commodity in commerce and of very little value. The defendants declinedto pay for Lot B and the sellers sued for the price. The defendants mistake arose from the fact thatboth lots contained the same shipping mark, "SL", and witnesses stated that in their experiencehemp and tow were never landed from the same ship under the same shipping mark. Thedefendants manager had been shown bales of hemp as "samples of the SL goods". The auctioneerbelieved that the bid was made under a mistake as to the value of the tow.Lawrence J said that as the parties were not ad idem the plaintiffs could recover only if thedefendants were estopped from relying upon what was now admittedly the truth. He held that the Page 7 of 10
  • 8. defendants were not estopped since their mistake had been caused by or contributed to by thenegligence of the plaintiffs.Foster v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704The defendant, an elderly gentleman, signed a bill of exchange on being told that it was a guaranteesimilar to one which he had previously signed. He had only been shown the back of it. It was heldthat there should be a new trial. Byles J stated:"It seems plain, on principle and on authority, that if a blind man, or a man who cannot read, orwho, for some reason (not implying negligence) forbears to read, has a written contract falselyread over to him, the reader misreading it to such a degree that the written contract is of a naturealtogether different from the contract pretended to be read from the paper which the blind orilliterate man afterwards signs; then at least if there be no negligence, the signature obtained is ofno force. And it is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the groundthat the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, he never intended tosign and therefore, in contemplation of law, never did sign the contract to which his name isappended. In the present case, … he was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to theactual contents of the instrument."LEstrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394Miss L‟Estrange owned a café in Llandudno in Wales. A pair of salesmen representing F Graucob Ltdcame to visit her. She purchased a cigarette machine and signed a document entitled “salesagreement”.In small print, an exclusion clause stated: “This agreement contains all the terms and conditionsunder which I agree to purchase the machine specified above, and any express or implied condition,statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated herein is hereby excluded.”L‟Estrange did not read the agreement before signing. After the machine was delivered it did notwork, despite mechanics coming to fix it. She refused to continue paying her instalments andbrought an action for the sums already paid, arguing the machine was not fit for purpose. Graucobcontended that any warranties for fitness were expressly excluded by the contractual agreement shesigned.It was held (on appeal) that L‟Estrange was bound by the agreement. Lord Justice Scrutton said thatin cases where there is a written but unsigned document “it is necessary to prove that an allegedparty was aware, or ought to have been aware, of its terms and conditions” but “these cases have noapplication when the document has been signed.” He added: “When a document containingcontractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, the partysigning it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not.” Page 8 of 10
  • 9. If the same facts arose again today in relation to a consumer, the case would be regulated by unfairterms legislation and the Sale of Goods Act. However, the case still holds significance. A signature isa universally accepted formal device by which a party confirms its agreement to the terms containedin a document, whether that party has read it or accepts the risk of not doing so.The absence of such a rule would bring chaos to everyday business transactions. Therefore parties toa signed written agreement are bound by its detailed terms. If either party chooses not to read thedocument prior to signature, that party takes 
the risk of agreeing to terms that 
are unfavourable. Page 9 of 10
  • 10. FURTHER CASESMistake as to the possibility of performing the contract(a) Physical impossibilitySheikh Bros v Ochsner [1957] AC 136(b) Commercial impossibilityGreat Peace Shipping v Tsavliris Salvage (The Great Peace) (2002)Mistake as to qualityIf there is no misdescription, mistake as to quality generally does not nullify consent.Scott v Littledale (1858)Kennedy v Panama etc Royal Mail Co (1867)Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 KB 86Rose v Pim [1953]Oscar Chess v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370Mistake as to quantityCox v Prentice (1815) 3 M&S 344(6) Cases in which a fundamental mistake does not nullify consentClark v Lindsay (1903) 19 TLR 202Barrow Lane & Ballard v Phillips [1929] 1 KB 574S.6 Sale of Goods Act 1979Mistake negating consentMistake as to the personLewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31.Shogun Finance v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2004] 1 AC 919.Mistake as to the subject matterRaffles v Wichelhaus (1864)Falck v Williams [1900] AC 176 Page 10 of 10

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