Critical Incident Management and Simulations While leading a project to improve the rapid response capacity of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Raj developed an interest in finding ways to develop organizational and management capacity to respond to critical incidents. He drew upon his own experiences in crisis management as a United Nations Peacekeeper in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), and further field missions with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). From these experiences he drew on the example of simulation training developed by the London Metropolitan Police in training their senior officers in crisis management, and has since gone on to develop a number of simulation exercises all of which have been delivered to multi-agency audiences of senior managers of international civilian organizations who commit staff to missions in hostile environments. Examples of his work include the Advanced Workshop developed for the Security Management Initiative (SMI) of the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR, 2006/07), the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action of the Swedish International Development Agency (ATHA/SIDA 2006) and the Course Security Management in Hazardous Environments, developed for the Folk Bernadotte Academy (FBA, 2007, 2008). Participants to his course have been senior headquarters managers and security professionals with operational responsibilities. They will generally have been directly involved in crisis management at the headquarters and mission level. Examples of the types of candidates would include Directors of Operations, Heads of Security, Head of Mission/Country Representative, Regional or Desk Officers, Rapid Response Team members, etc. Participants have come from government institutions, armed forces, the private sector, UN agencies, international NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, academia and policy writers.

1. Security and Leadership
Introduction to the Simulation Exercise
Raj RANA, the WolfGroup Consultants
raj@thewolfgroup.org

2. aim
• good leadership and good security- are they
connected?
• who benefits from your decision making?
• are there limits to cooperation?

3. aim
• some background
• good leadership and good security- are they
• connected? security? leadership?
what about
•• why simulation?
who benefits from your decision making?
•• how does it work?
are there limits to cooperation?

4. the origins

5. the origins
London Metropolitan Police- Dr. Jonathan Crego
Overcome ‘police culture’
Empower creativity vs. process-
‘safe learning environment’

6. the origins

7. the origins
Harvard University- Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research- Security Management Initiative - 2004
What is missing to improve security management of
civilian agencies?
Identified a series of critical gaps in thinking and
practice:

8. the origins
Risk-thresholds of many agencies are not suited for the compliance of their mandates in hazardous areas,
Accountability frameworks and command structures are generally not suited to operations in hazardous areas
requiring adequate crisis management capacities
Basic security skills training for staff is available in most agencies (in-house training
Harvard University- Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
courses of variable length, outsourced training with specialized organizations,
Research- Security Management Initiative - 2004
Training resources address primarily practical issues encountered in fieldwork and present
each agency’s specific security regulations an operating standards,
Security training is generally not made available to nationally recruited staff,
What is missing to improve security management of
Capacity building for senior security management and mainstreaming of risk and security management within agency structures
is in its initial stages,
civilian agencies?
Many agencies experience considerable difficulties in finding adequate and affordable insurance cover against losses due to risks
related to the prevailing safety and security environments
Many agencies and donors only start to grapple with emerging issues related to the liability of governance and management for the
Identified a series of critical gaps in thinking and
consequences of security incidents,
practice:
Inter-operability of basic security management tools including within agencies remains problematic and Inter-agency information
exchange on key data related to staff security in hazardous missions remains punctual and limited,
Working relations between civilian operators and the military and security agencies in integrated missions and other contexts remain
fraught with profound misunderstandings detrimental to the discharging of their respective missions,
Most agencies recognize the need to improve their selection processes for managers and staff to be posted in hazardous missions,
Most agencies recognize the need to improve their analytical capacity prior and during deployment of staff in hazardous missions,
Most agencies remain hesitant towards the establishment of risk and security management standards, but accept the notion that such
standards may improve their capacity to cope with emerging liability issues and could ultimately contribute to the improvement of security of
their staff in hazardous missions.

9. what about security?
a few experiences

10. what about security?
a few experiences
Briefing for my departure to Chechnya/Russian
Federation
‘If anything were to happen to one of your staff
members, you need to be able to tell the families that
you had done everything possible to avoid that
happening.’

11. what about security?
a few experiences
Briefing for my departure to Chechnya/Russian
Federation
‘If anything were to happen to one of your staff
members, you need to be able to tell the families that
you had done everything possible to avoid that
happening.’

12. what about security?
a few experiences
Briefing for my departure to Chechnya/Russian
Federation
‘If anything were to happen to one of your staff
members, you need to be able to tell the families that
you had done everything possible to avoid that
happening.’

13. what about security?
a few observations
• Security as something increasingly specialized, outsourced
• Difficulty in equating principles, operations and risks
• Too much focus on hyper contexts- Afghanistan, Iraq
• Avoidance of the question of ‘what now?’ after a major
incident strikes an organization
• Promote ‘security cultures’ and not security techniques
• Security as Art, Science... or both?

14. what about security? leadership?
a few uncomfortable questions
What is a life worth to our organization?
Are we willing to sacrifice the life of our staff member for our
work and principles?
How much more risk are we willing to assume after the first
major incident?
How are we shaping- and deforming- the security
environment?

15. what about security? leadership?
a few uncomfortable questions
What is a life worth to our organization?
Are we willing to sacrifice the life of our staff member for our
work and principles?
How do we reward our leaders?
How much more risk are we willing to assume after the first
major incident?
How are we shaping- and deforming- the security
environment?

16. what about security? leadership?
a few uncomfortable questions
What is a life worth to our organization?
Are we willing to sacrifice the life of our staff member for our
work and principles?
How do we reward our leaders?
How much more risk are we willing to assume after the first
major incident?
How are we shaping- and deforming- the security
environment?

17. what about security? leadership?
a few uncomfortable questions
What is a life worth to our organization?
Are we willing to sacrifice the life of our staff member for our
work and principles?
How do we reward our leaders?
How much more risk are we willing to assume after the first
major incident?
How are we shaping- and deforming- the security
environment?

18. why simulation?

19. why simulation?
Simulation is an over-used term
• military- very process oriented approach to simulation
• ‘field’ exercises- try to re-create reality

20. why simulation?
Simulation is an over-used term
Simulation is a means to engender experience
• military- sessions are a ‘break from the action’
Plenary very process oriented approach to simulation
• Not process-oriented
‘field’ exercises- try to re-create reality

21. why simulation?
It is reality
• immersion into a situation- complexity, chaos....
• adopt different roles, timewarps
• you will receive information as you do in reality
• Do not say, ‘Well, in the real world....’

22. why simulation?
• ‘100 years of experience’
• force ourselves into a multi-agency approach
• integrate divergent views and think holistically
• create a neutral learning environment- no right or wrong

23. how does it work?
• syndicate groups- Groups One, Two and Three
• all groups receive the same information
• groups will play different roles and receive different tasks
• possibility to request further information via IM

24. how does it work?

25. how does it work?

26. how does it work?

27. how does it work?

28. how does it work?

29. how does it work?

30. how does it work?

31. how does it work?
• record your thinking, decisions and who benefits from
your decision(s)
• plenary sessions to present and question your peers

32. hints
• do not try to ‘beat’ the simulation- there is no winning or losing
• be open to ideas as far out of the box as possible
• write down your decisions and who benefits from your
decision(s)

33. patience...
• this is a pilot exercise
• all information is received from within the NGO Tears and Hope
• how successful is this ‘battle of perspectives’ for learning?

34. questions?