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Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
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Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view

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A talk I gave at the 2011 NSF Cloud PI meeting at the National Science Foundation.

A talk I gave at the 2011 NSF Cloud PI meeting at the National Science Foundation.

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  • 1. Security and Privacy inCloud Computing: A High-level View<br />Ragib HasanNSF/CRA Computing Innovation Fellow<br />Johns Hopkins University<br />www.ragibhasan.com<br />NSF Cloud PI Meeting, March 17, 2011<br />
  • 2. If cloud computing is so great, whyisn’t everyone using it?<br />2<br />Clouds are still subject to traditional data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy issues, plus some additional attacks<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 3. What the “experts” are saying?<br />3<br />[Cloud Computing] is a security nightmare and it can't be handled in traditional ways.<br />John Chambers<br />CISCO CEO<br />It’s stupidity. It’s worse than stupidity<br />Richard Stallman<br />GNU<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 4. Businesses don’t trust clouds (yet)<br />Almost 75% of business CFOs are still afraid to use clouds for sensitive data due to lack of security<br />3/17/11<br />4<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 5. Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security<br />Securing a cloud<br />Securing a traditional system<br />3/17/11<br />5<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 6. Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security<br />Analogy<br />Securing a motel<br />Securing a house<br />Owner and user are often the same entity <br />Owner and users are almost invariably distinct entities<br />3/17/11<br />6<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 7. Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security<br />Securing a motel<br />Securing a house<br />Biggest user concerns<br />Securing perimeter<br />Checking for intruders<br />Securing assets<br />Biggest user concern<br />Securing room against (the bad guy in next room | hotel owner)<br />3/17/11<br />7<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 8. Research on Cloud Computing Security: A High Level View<br />Novel attacks<br />Trustworthy cloud architectures<br />Data integrity and availability<br />Computation integrity<br />Data and computation privacy<br />Data forensics<br />Misbehavior detection<br />Malicious use of clouds<br />3/17/11<br />8<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 9. Co-tenancy in clouds creates new attack vectors<br />A cloud is shared by multiple users<br />Malicious users can now legally be in the same infrastructure<br />Misusing co-tenancy, attackers can launch side channel attacks on victims<br />Research question: How to prevent attackers from exploiting co-tenancy in attacking the infrastructure and/or other clients?<br />Example: the Topology attack on Amazon EC2 (“Hey You! Get off of my Cloud …” CCS 2009)<br />3/17/11<br />9<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 10. Today’s cloud architectures act like big black boxes<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />10<br />Clients have no idea of or control over what is happening inside the cloud<br />Clients are forced to trust cloud providers completely<br />Research Question: How do we design cloud computing architectures that are semi-transparent and provide clients with control over security?<br />Existing Approaches: TCCP (uses TPM), CloudProof<br />
  • 11. Today’s clouds provide no guarantee about outsourced data<br />Amazon’s Terms of services<br />3/17/11<br />11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 12. Today’s clouds provide no guarantee about outsourced data<br />Problem: <br />Dishonest cloud providers can throw data away or lose data.<br />Malicious intruders can delete or tamper with data.<br />Clients need reassurance that the outsourced data is available, has not been tampered with, and remains confidential.<br />Research Question: How can clients get assurance/proofs that the cloud provider is actually storing data, is not tampering with data, and can make the data available on-demand?<br />3/17/11<br />12<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />Example Approaches: Provable Data Possession (PDP), Proof of Retrievability (PoR), HAIL<br />
  • 13. Ensuring confidentiality of data in outsourced computation is difficult<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />13<br />Most type of computations require decrypting data before any computations<br />If the cloud provider is not trusted, this may result in breach of confidentiality<br />Research Question: How can we ensure confidentiality of data and computations in a cloud?<br />Existing Approaches: Homomorphic encryption, TCCP<br />
  • 14. Clients have no way of verifying computations outsourced toa Cloud<br />14<br />Scenario<br /> User sends her data processing job to the cloud.<br /> Clouds provide dataflow operation as a service (e.g., MapReduce, Hadoop etc.)<br />Problem: Users have no way of evaluating the correctness of results<br />Research question: How can we verify the accuracy of outsourced computation?<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />Existing Approaches: Runtime Attestation, Majority voting, Redundant operations<br />
  • 15. Data Forensics in Clouds is difficult<br />Certain Government regulations mandate the ability to audit and run forensic analysis on critical business or healthcare data<br />Clouds complicate forensic analysis, since the same storage infrastructure is shared by many clients<br />Cloud providers are not willing to open up their entire storage for forensic investigations. <br />Research question: How can we augment cloud infrastructures to allow forensic investigations?<br />3/17/11<br />15<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 16. Clouds can be used for malicious purposes<br />Adversaries can rent clouds temporarily to create a large scale botnet very quickly<br />Clouds can be used for spamming, Denial of service, brute force password breaking, and other attacks<br />Example:WPACracker.com – Claims to break WPA passwords for $17 in under 20 minutes, using a cloud<br />Research question: How can we rapidly detect misbehavior of clients in a cloud?<br />3/17/11<br />16<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 17. (Largely) Unexplored Areas<br />Legal/policy issues and regulatory compliance:<br />How does cloud computing fit in with data security laws and regulations such as SOX, HIPAA?<br />For example, <br />If I store my data in Amazon, can the Govt. subpoena Amazon to access my data without violating 4th amendment?<br />Will a cloud based storage system comply with SOX?<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />17<br />
  • 18. My Research Agenda<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />18<br />Question: How can we make clouds more accountable?<br />Approach: By maintaining secure and verifiable provenance chains for all data and computations outsourced to a cloud, clients can get more accountability.<br />Provenance of data <br />What happened to the data object while it was inside the cloud? (i.e., entire history of the data object)<br />Provenance of computations<br />How was a particular result computed inside a cloud?<br />Challenges: How to ensure correct collection of provenance inside a cloud, even when the cloud provider may not be trustworthy?<br />
  • 19. Observations: What’s wrong with today’s cloud security research<br />Failure to look at reality<br />Many security schemes impose unrealistic overheads (e.g., >35%!!) – no one will use them in real life clouds<br />Failure to consider economy<br />Security schemes would cause significant changes to existing cloud infrastructures<br />Many attacks simply don’t make any economic sense<br />Lack of realistic threat models<br />Many papers present unrealistic threat models, (“Solutions in search of a problem”) <br />3/17/11<br />19<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />
  • 20. Summary<br />3/17/11<br />Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel<br />20<br />The nature of clouds introduce new security challenges<br />Today’s clouds are not secure, accountable, or trustworthy <br />Many open problems need to be resolved before major users will adopt clouds for sensitive data and computations<br />
  • 21. Thank You<br />Check outmy Cloud Computing Security and Privacy course at Johns Hopkins University<br />http://bit.ly/jhucloudsec<br />Questions? Comments?<br />Email: rhasan7@jhu.edu<br />Web: http://www.ragibhasan.com <br />

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