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Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view
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Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view

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A talk I gave at the 2011 NSF Cloud PI meeting at the National Science Foundation.

A talk I gave at the 2011 NSF Cloud PI meeting at the National Science Foundation.

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Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing - a High-level view Presentation Transcript

  • Security and Privacy inCloud Computing: A High-level View
    Ragib HasanNSF/CRA Computing Innovation Fellow
    Johns Hopkins University
    www.ragibhasan.com
    NSF Cloud PI Meeting, March 17, 2011
  • If cloud computing is so great, whyisn’t everyone using it?
    2
    Clouds are still subject to traditional data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy issues, plus some additional attacks
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • What the “experts” are saying?
    3
    [Cloud Computing] is a security nightmare and it can't be handled in traditional ways.
    John Chambers
    CISCO CEO
    It’s stupidity. It’s worse than stupidity
    Richard Stallman
    GNU
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Businesses don’t trust clouds (yet)
    Almost 75% of business CFOs are still afraid to use clouds for sensitive data due to lack of security
    3/17/11
    4
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security
    Securing a cloud
    Securing a traditional system
    3/17/11
    5
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security
    Analogy
    Securing a motel
    Securing a house
    Owner and user are often the same entity
    Owner and users are almost invariably distinct entities
    3/17/11
    6
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Traditional systems security vsCloud Computing Security
    Securing a motel
    Securing a house
    Biggest user concerns
    Securing perimeter
    Checking for intruders
    Securing assets
    Biggest user concern
    Securing room against (the bad guy in next room | hotel owner)
    3/17/11
    7
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Research on Cloud Computing Security: A High Level View
    Novel attacks
    Trustworthy cloud architectures
    Data integrity and availability
    Computation integrity
    Data and computation privacy
    Data forensics
    Misbehavior detection
    Malicious use of clouds
    3/17/11
    8
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Co-tenancy in clouds creates new attack vectors
    A cloud is shared by multiple users
    Malicious users can now legally be in the same infrastructure
    Misusing co-tenancy, attackers can launch side channel attacks on victims
    Research question: How to prevent attackers from exploiting co-tenancy in attacking the infrastructure and/or other clients?
    Example: the Topology attack on Amazon EC2 (“Hey You! Get off of my Cloud …” CCS 2009)
    3/17/11
    9
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Today’s cloud architectures act like big black boxes
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    10
    Clients have no idea of or control over what is happening inside the cloud
    Clients are forced to trust cloud providers completely
    Research Question: How do we design cloud computing architectures that are semi-transparent and provide clients with control over security?
    Existing Approaches: TCCP (uses TPM), CloudProof
  • Today’s clouds provide no guarantee about outsourced data
    Amazon’s Terms of services
    3/17/11
    11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Today’s clouds provide no guarantee about outsourced data
    Problem:
    Dishonest cloud providers can throw data away or lose data.
    Malicious intruders can delete or tamper with data.
    Clients need reassurance that the outsourced data is available, has not been tampered with, and remains confidential.
    Research Question: How can clients get assurance/proofs that the cloud provider is actually storing data, is not tampering with data, and can make the data available on-demand?
    3/17/11
    12
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    Example Approaches: Provable Data Possession (PDP), Proof of Retrievability (PoR), HAIL
  • Ensuring confidentiality of data in outsourced computation is difficult
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    13
    Most type of computations require decrypting data before any computations
    If the cloud provider is not trusted, this may result in breach of confidentiality
    Research Question: How can we ensure confidentiality of data and computations in a cloud?
    Existing Approaches: Homomorphic encryption, TCCP
  • Clients have no way of verifying computations outsourced toa Cloud
    14
    Scenario
    User sends her data processing job to the cloud.
    Clouds provide dataflow operation as a service (e.g., MapReduce, Hadoop etc.)
    Problem: Users have no way of evaluating the correctness of results
    Research question: How can we verify the accuracy of outsourced computation?
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    Existing Approaches: Runtime Attestation, Majority voting, Redundant operations
  • Data Forensics in Clouds is difficult
    Certain Government regulations mandate the ability to audit and run forensic analysis on critical business or healthcare data
    Clouds complicate forensic analysis, since the same storage infrastructure is shared by many clients
    Cloud providers are not willing to open up their entire storage for forensic investigations.
    Research question: How can we augment cloud infrastructures to allow forensic investigations?
    3/17/11
    15
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Clouds can be used for malicious purposes
    Adversaries can rent clouds temporarily to create a large scale botnet very quickly
    Clouds can be used for spamming, Denial of service, brute force password breaking, and other attacks
    Example:WPACracker.com – Claims to break WPA passwords for $17 in under 20 minutes, using a cloud
    Research question: How can we rapidly detect misbehavior of clients in a cloud?
    3/17/11
    16
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • (Largely) Unexplored Areas
    Legal/policy issues and regulatory compliance:
    How does cloud computing fit in with data security laws and regulations such as SOX, HIPAA?
    For example,
    If I store my data in Amazon, can the Govt. subpoena Amazon to access my data without violating 4th amendment?
    Will a cloud based storage system comply with SOX?
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    17
  • My Research Agenda
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    18
    Question: How can we make clouds more accountable?
    Approach: By maintaining secure and verifiable provenance chains for all data and computations outsourced to a cloud, clients can get more accountability.
    Provenance of data
    What happened to the data object while it was inside the cloud? (i.e., entire history of the data object)
    Provenance of computations
    How was a particular result computed inside a cloud?
    Challenges: How to ensure correct collection of provenance inside a cloud, even when the cloud provider may not be trustworthy?
  • Observations: What’s wrong with today’s cloud security research
    Failure to look at reality
    Many security schemes impose unrealistic overheads (e.g., >35%!!) – no one will use them in real life clouds
    Failure to consider economy
    Security schemes would cause significant changes to existing cloud infrastructures
    Many attacks simply don’t make any economic sense
    Lack of realistic threat models
    Many papers present unrealistic threat models, (“Solutions in search of a problem”)
    3/17/11
    19
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
  • Summary
    3/17/11
    Ragib Hasan | NSF Cloud PI Meeting 2011 | Cloud Security Panel
    20
    The nature of clouds introduce new security challenges
    Today’s clouds are not secure, accountable, or trustworthy
    Many open problems need to be resolved before major users will adopt clouds for sensitive data and computations
  • Thank You
    Check outmy Cloud Computing Security and Privacy course at Johns Hopkins University
    http://bit.ly/jhucloudsec
    Questions? Comments?
    Email: rhasan7@jhu.edu
    Web: http://www.ragibhasan.com