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Civilization the west and the rest niall ferguson

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  • 1. NIALL FERGUSON
  • 2. CivilizationThe West and the Rest ALLEN LANE an imprint of PENGUIN BOOKS
  • 3. ALLEN LANE Published by the Penguin Group Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, EnglandPenguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd) Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi – 110 017, India Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, Auckland 0632, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa
  • 4. Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England www.penguin.com First published 2011 Copyright © Niall Ferguson, 2011 The moral right of the author has been asserted All rights reserved Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise)without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book ISBN: 978-1-84-614282-6
  • 5. For Ayaan
  • 6. Contents List of Illustrations List of Maps List of Figures Preface to the UK Edition Introduction: Rasselas’s Question1 Competition Two Rivers The Eunuch and the Unicorn The Spice Race The Mediocre Kingdom2 Science
  • 7. The Siege Micrographia Osman and Fritz Tanzimat Tours From Istanbul to Jerusalem3 Property New Worlds Land of the Free American Revolutions The Fate of the Gullahs4 Medicine Burke’s Prophecy The Juggernaut of War Médecins Sans Frontières The Skulls of Shark Island Black Shame5 Consumption
  • 8. The Birth of the Consumer Society Turning Western Ragtime to Riches The Jeans Genie Pyjamas and Scarves6 Work Work Ethic and Word Ethic Get your Kicks The Chinese Jerusalem Lands of Unbelief The End of Days? Illustrations Conclusion: The Rivals Notes Bibliography Index
  • 9. List of Illustrations1. Scene from the Hundred Years’ War (Corbis)2. The Four Conditions of Society: Poverty, Jean Bourdichon, c. 1500 (Bridgeman)3. The Triumph of Death, Peter Bruegel the Elder, c. 1562 (Getty)4. The Yongle Emperor (National Palace Museum, Taiwan)5. Su Song’s water clock (Adrian Pennink)6. A game of Chinese golf (Palace Museum, Forbidden City)7. The qilin (Jinghai Temple)8. The Chinese civil service examination, from a 17th-century history of Chinese emperors
  • 10. (Bridgeman) 9. Vasco da Gama’s tomb, monastery of St Jerome, Lisbon (Dewald Aukema)10. Earl Macartney’s embassy to the Xianlong Emperor, cartoon by James Gillray (Getty)11. Jan Sobieski’s men raise the siege of Vienna (Vienna Museum)12. Sultan Osman III (Bridgeman)13. Ahmed Resmî Effendi’s arrival in Berlin, 1763 (Dewald Aukema)14. Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel, with annotations by Voltaire (Dewald Aukema)15. Pages from the German edition of Benjamin Robin’s New Principles of Gunnery (Dewald Aukema)16. Machu Picchu, Peru (Dewald Aukema)17. Boneyard Beach, South Carolina (Dewald Aukema)18. Millicent How’s indenture document
  • 11. (National Archives at Kew)19. Abraham Smith’s land grant (National Archives at Kew)20. Map of Charleston (The South Carolina Historical Society)21. Jerónimo de Aliaga (Dewald Aukema)22. Simón Bolívar mural in present-day Caracas (Dewald Aukema)23. Scarred slave (National Portrait Gallery, Washington, DC; copyright © Photo SCALA, Florence)24. Saint-Louis, Senegal (Dewald Aukema)25. Blaise Diagne (Getty)26. Louis Faidherbe (Corbis)27. Senegalese tirailleurs (Institut Pasteur)28. French doctors in the tropics (Institut Pasteur)29. Three photographs of ‘Bastard’ women (Adrian Pennink)
  • 12. 30. A Senegalese tirailleur on the Western Front (French MoD; copyright © ECPAD)31. Lüderitz, Namibia (Magic Touch Films; © Manfred Anderson)32. Young woman on horseback, Urga [Ulan Bator], Mongolia, 1913 (Musée Kahn)33. Hirohito and Edward (Getty)34. Observance of His Imperial Majesty of the Military Manoeuvres of Combined Army and Navy Forces, Yōshū Chikanobu, 1890 (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)35. Ladies Sewing, Adachi Ginkō, 1887 (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)36. Poster for Giant (Alamy) ®37. Levi’s London flagship store, 174–176 Regent Street (Levi Strauss & Co)38. Egon Bondy’s Happy Hearts Club Banned, The Plastic People of the Universe (Jaroslav Riedel)
  • 13. 39. Headscarves on dummies in Istanbul (Dewald Aukema)40. Max Weber in America (Getty)41. The St Louis World’s Fair, 1904 (Missouri History Museum, St Louis)42. China Inland Mission Students, c. 1900 (Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library)43. An American missionary’s map of South- east China (British Library)44. A scene of death and destruction from the Taiping Rebellion (Getty)45. The Nanjing Amity Bible Printing Company (Reuters/Sean Yong)46. Industrial China (Dewald Aukema)47. Barack Obama and Wen Jiabao, November 2009 (Corbis)
  • 14. List of Maps1. Zheng He’s Seventh Voyage and da Gama’s First Voyage2. Ottoman Empire Disintegration from 16833. Prussian Expansion from 16684. United States Expansion from 17835. Gran Colombia’s Disintegration6. The French and German Empires in Africa, 19147. Protestant Missionaries in China, 1902
  • 15. List of Figures1. Western Future Empires, 1500, and Western Empires, 19132. UK/China per capita GDP Ratio, 1000– 20083. Military Labour Productivity in the French Army4. The Racial Structure of the New World, 1570–19355. Life Expectancy at Birth: England, the United States, India and China, 1725–19906. The Timing and Pace of Health Transitions in the French Empire7. Work Ethics: Hours Worked per Year in the West and the East, 1950–2009
  • 16. 8. Religious Belief and Observance, Early 1980s and Mid-2000s 9. Patents Granted by Country of Origin of Applicant, 1995–200810. GDP of Greater China as a Percentage of US GDP, 1950–200911. Average Mathematics Score of 8th Grade (~ 14-year-old) Students, 200712. Europe, America, China and India, Estimated Shares of Global GDP, Selected Years, 1500–2008
  • 17. Preface to the UK EditionI am trying to remember now where it was, and whenit was, that it hit me. Was it during my first walk alongthe Bund in Shanghai in 2005? Was it amid thesmog and dust of Chongqing, listening to a localCommunist Party official describe a vast mound ofrubble as the future financial centre of South-westChina? That was in 2008, and somehow itimpressed me more than all the synchronizedrazzamatazz of the Olympic opening ceremony inBeijing. Or was it at Carnegie Hall in 2009, as I satmesmerized by the music of Angel Lam, thedazzlingly gifted young Chinese composer whopersonifies the Orientalization of classical music? Ithink maybe it was only then that I really got the pointabout the first decade of the twenty-first century, just
  • 18. as it was drawing to a close: that we are livingthrough the end of 500 years of Westernascendancy. The principal question addressed by this bookincreasingly seems to me the most interestingquestion a historian of the modern era can ask. Justwhy, beginning around 1500, did a few small politieson the western end of the Eurasian landmass cometo dominate the rest of the world, including the morepopulous and in many ways more sophisticatedsocieties of Eastern Eurasia? My subsidiaryquestion is this: if we can come up with a goodexplanation for the West’s past ascendancy, can wethen offer a prognosis for its future? Is this really theend of the West’s world and the advent of a newEastern epoch? Put differently, are we witnessingthe waning of an age when the greater part ofhumanity was more or less subordinated to thecivilization that arose in Western Europe in the wakeof the Renaissance and Reformation – thecivilization that, propelled by the ScientificRevolution and the Enlightenment, spread across
  • 19. the Atlantic and as far as the Antipodes, finallyreaching its apogee during the Ages of Revolution,Industry and Empire? The very fact that I want to pose such questionssays something about the first decade of the twenty-first century. Born and raised in Scotland, educatedat Glasgow Academy and Oxford University, Iassumed throughout my twenties and thirties that Iwould spend my academic career at either Oxford orCambridge. I first began to think of moving to theUnited States because an eminent benefactor ofNew York University’s Stern School of Business, theWall Street veteran Henry Kaufman, had asked mewhy someone interested in the history of money andpower did not come to where the money and poweractually were. And where else could that be butdowntown Manhattan? As the new millenniumdawned, the New York Stock Exchange was self-evidently the hub of an immense global economicnetwork that was American in design and largelyAmerican in ownership. The dotcom bubble wasdeflating, admittedly, and a nasty little recession
  • 20. ensured that the Democrats lost the White Housejust as their pledge to pay off the national debtbegan to sound almost plausible. But within justeight months of becoming president, George W.Bush was confronted by an event that emphaticallyunderlined the centrality of Manhattan to theWestern-dominated world. The destruction of theWorld Trade Center by al-Qaeda terrorists paid NewYork a hideous compliment. This was target numberone for anyone serious about challenging Westernpredominance. The subsequent events were heady with hubris.The Taliban overthrown in Afghanistan. An ‘axis ofevil’ branded ripe for ‘regime change’. SaddamHussein ousted in Iraq. The Toxic Texan riding highin the polls, on track for re-election. The USeconomy bouncing back thanks to tax cuts. ‘OldEurope’ – not to mention liberal America – fumingimpotently. Fascinated, I found myself reading andwriting more and more about empires, in particularthe lessons of Britain’s for America’s; the result wasEmpire: How Britain Made the Modern World
  • 21. (2003). As I reflected on the rise, reign and probablefall of America’s empire, it became clear to me thatthere were three fatal deficits at the heart ofAmerican power: a manpower deficit (not enoughboots on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq), anattention deficit (not enough public enthusiasm forlong-term occupation of conquered countries) andabove all a financial deficit (not enough savingsrelative to investment and not enough taxationrelative to public expenditure). In Colossus: The Rise and Fall of America’sEmpire (2004), I warned that the United States hadimperceptibly come to rely on East Asian capital tofund its unbalanced current and fiscal accounts. Thedecline and fall of America’s undeclared empiremight therefore be due not to terrorists at the gates,nor to the rogue regimes that sponsored them, but toa financial crisis at the very heart of the empire itself.When, in late 2006, Moritz Schularick and I coinedthe word ‘Chimerica’ to describe what we saw asthe dangerously unsustainable relationship – theword was a pun on ‘chimera’ – between
  • 22. parsimonious China and profligate America, we hadidentified one of the keys to the coming globalfinancial crisis. For without the availability to theAmerican consumer of both cheap Chinese labourand cheap Chinese capital, the bubble of the years2002–7 would not have been so egregious. The illusion of American ‘hyper-power’ wasshattered not once but twice during the presidencyof George W. Bush. Nemesis came first in thebackstreets of Sadr City and the fields of Helmand,which exposed not only the limits of Americanmilitary might but also, more importantly, the naivetyof neo-conservative visions of a democratic wave inthe Greater Middle East. It struck a second time withthe escalation of the subprime mortgage crisis of2007 into the credit crunch of 2008 and finally the‘great recession’ of 2009. After the bankruptcy ofLehman Brothers, the sham verities of the‘Washington Consensus’ and the ‘Great Moderation’– the central bankers’ equivalent of the ‘End ofHistory’ – were consigned to oblivion. A secondGreat Depression for a time seemed terrifyingly
  • 23. possible. What had gone wrong? In a series ofarticles and lectures beginning in mid-2006 andculminating in the publication of The Ascent ofMoney in November 2008 – when the financial crisiswas at its worst – I argued that all the majorcomponents of the international financial system hadbeen disastrously weakened by excessive short-term indebtedness on the balance sheets of banks,grossly mispriced and literally overrated mortgage-backed securities and other structured financialproducts, excessively lax monetary policy on the partof the Federal Reserve, a politically engineeredhousing bubble and, finally, the unrestrained sellingof bogus insurance policies (known as derivatives),offering fake protection against unknowableuncertainties, as opposed to quantifiable risks. Theglobalization of financial institutions that were ofWestern origin had been supposed to usher in anew era of reduced economic volatility. It tookhistorical knowledge to foresee how an old-fashioned liquidity crisis might bring the whole shakyedifice of leveraged financial engineering crashingto the ground.
  • 24. The danger of a second Depression recededafter the summer of 2009, though it did notaltogether disappear. But the world hadnevertheless changed. The breathtaking collapse inglobal trade caused by the financial crisis, as creditto finance imports and exports suddenly dried up,might have been expected to devastate the bigAsian economies, reliant as they were said to be onexports to the West. Thanks to a highly effectivegovernment stimulus programme based on massivecredit expansion, however, China suffered only aslow-down in growth. This was a remarkable featthat few experts had anticipated. Despite themanifest difficulties of running a continental economyof 1.3 billion people as if it were a giant Singapore,the probability remains better than even at the timeof writing (December 2010) that China will continueto forge ahead with its industrial revolution and that,within the decade, it will overtake the United Statesin terms of gross domestic product, just as (in 1963)Japan overtook the United Kingdom. The West had patently enjoyed a real and
  • 25. sustained edge over the Rest for most of theprevious 500 years. The gap between Western andChinese incomes had begun to open up as long agoas the 1600s and had continued to widen until asrecently as the late 1970s, if not later. But since thenit had narrowed with astonishing speed. Thefinancial crisis crystallized the next historicalquestion I wanted to ask. Had that Western edgenow gone? Only by working out what exactly it hadconsisted of could I hope to come up with ananswer.What follows is concerned with historicalmethodology; impatient readers can skip it and gostraight to the introduction. I wrote this book becauseI had formed the strong impression that the peoplecurrently living were paying insufficient attention tothe dead. Watching my three children grow up, I hadthe uneasy feeling that they were learning lesshistory than I had learned at their age, not becausethey had bad teachers but because they had badhistory books and even worse examinations.Watching the financial crisis unfold, I realized that
  • 26. they were far from alone, for it seemed as if only ahandful of people in the banks and treasuries of theWestern world had more than the sketchiestinformation about the last Depression. For roughlythirty years, young people at Western schools anduniversities have been given the idea of a liberaleducation, without the substance of historicalknowledge. They have been taught isolated‘modules’, not narratives, much less chronologies.They have been trained in the formulaic analysis ofdocument excerpts, not in the key skill of readingwidely and fast. They have been encouraged to feelempathy with imagined Roman centurions orHolocaust victims, not to write essays about why andhow their predicaments arose. In The History Boys,the playwright Alan Bennett posed a ‘trilemma’:should history be taught as a mode of contrarianargumentation, a communion with past Truth andBeauty, or just ‘one fucking thing after another’? Hewas evidently unaware that today’s sixth-formers areoffered none of the above – at best, they get ahandful of ‘fucking things’ in no particular order.
  • 27. The former president of the university where Iteach once confessed that, when he had been anundergraduate at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, his mother had implored him to take atleast one history course. The brilliant youngeconomist replied cockily that he was moreinterested in the future than in the past. It is apreference he now knows to be illusory. There is infact no such thing as the future, singular; only futures,plural. There are multiple interpretations of history, tobe sure, none definitive – but there is only one past.And although the past is over, for two reasons it isindispensable to our understanding of what weexperience today and what lies ahead of ustomorrow and thereafter. First, the current worldpopulation makes up approximately 7 per cent of allthe human beings who have ever lived. The deadoutnumber the living, in other words, fourteen to one,and we ignore the accumulated experience of sucha huge majority of mankind at our peril. Second, thepast is really our only reliable source of knowledgeabout the fleeting present and to the multiple futuresthat lie before us, only one of which will actually
  • 28. happen. History is not just how we study the past; itis how we study time itself. Let us first acknowledge the subject’slimitations. Historians are not scientists. They cannot(and should not even try to) establish universal lawsof social or political ‘physics’ with reliable predictivepowers. Why? Because there is no possibility ofrepeating the single, multi-millennium experimentthat constitutes the past. The sample size of humanhistory is one. Moreover, the ‘particles’ in this onevast experiment have consciousness, which isskewed by all kinds of cognitive biases. This meansthat their behaviour is even harder to predict than ifthey were insensate, mindless, gyrating particles.Among the many quirks of the human condition isthat people have evolved to learn almost instinctivelyfrom their own past experience. So their behaviouris adaptive; it changes over time. We do not wanderrandomly but walk in paths, and what we haveencountered behind us determines the direction wechoose when the paths fork – as they constantly do. So what can historians do? First, by mimicking
  • 29. social scientists and relying on quantitative data,historians can devise ‘covering laws’, in CarlHempel’s sense of general statements about thepast that appear to cover most cases (for instance,when a dictator takes power instead of a democraticleader, the chance increases that the country inquestion will go to war). Or – though the twoapproaches are not mutually exclusive – thehistorian can commune with the dead byimaginatively reconstructing their experiences in theway described by the great Oxford philosopher R. G.Collingwood in his 1939 Autobiography. These twomodes of historical inquiry allow us to turn thesurviving relics of the past into history, a body ofknowledge and interpretation that retrospectivelyorders and illuminates the human predicament. Anyserious predictive statement about the possiblefutures we may experience is based, implicitly orexplicitly, on one or both of these historicalprocedures. If not, then it belongs in the samecategory as the horoscope in this morning’snewspaper.
  • 30. Collingwood’s ambition, forged in thedisillusionment with natural science and psychologythat followed the carnage of the First World War,was to take history into the modern age, leavingbehind what he dismissed as ‘scissors-and-pastehistory’, in which writers ‘only repeat, with differentarrangements and different styles of decoration,what others [have] said before them’. His thoughtprocess is itself worth reconstructing: a) ‘The past which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present’ in the form of traces (documents and artefacts) that have survived. b) ‘All history is the history of thought’, in the sense that a piece of historical evidence is meaningless if its intended purpose cannot be inferred. c) That process of inference requires an imaginative leap through time: ‘Historical knowledge is the re-enactment in the historian’s mind of the thought whose history
  • 31. he is studying.’d) But the real meaning of history comes from the juxtaposition of past and present: ‘Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs.’e) The historian thus ‘may very well be related to the nonhistorian as the trained woodsman is to the ignorant traveller. “Nothing here but trees and grass,” thinks the traveller, and marches on. “Look,” says the woodsman, “there is a tiger in that grass.” ’ In other words, Collingwood argues, history offers something ‘altogether different from [scientific] rules, namely insight’.f) The true function of historical insight is ‘to inform [people] about the present, in so far as the past, its ostensible subject matter, [is] incapsulated in the present and [constitutes] a part of it not at once obvious to the untrained eye’.
  • 32. g) As for our choice of subject matter for historical investigation, Collingwood makes it clear that there is nothing wrong with what his Cambridge contemporary Herbert Butterfield condemned as ‘present- mindedness’: ‘True historical problems arise out of practical problems. We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act. Hence the plane on which, ultimately, all problems arise is the plane of “real” life: that to which they are referred for their solution is history.’A polymath as skilled in archaeology as he was inphilosophy, a staunch opponent of appeasement *and an early hater of the Daily Mail, Collingwoodhas been my guide for many years, but never has hebeen more indispensable than in the writing of thisbook. For the problem of why civilizations fall is tooimportant to be left to the purveyors of scissors-and-paste history. It is truly a practical problem of our
  • 33. time, and this book is intended to be a woodsman’sguide to it. For there is more than one tiger hidden inthis grass.In dutifully reconstructing past thought, I have triedalways to remember a simple truth about the pastthat the historically inexperienced are prone toforget. Most people in the past either died young orexpected to die young, and those who did not wererepeatedly bereft of those they loved, who did dieyoung. Consider the case of my favourite poet, theJacobean master John Donne, who lived to the ageof fifty-nine, thirteen years older than I am as I write.A lawyer, a Member of Parliament and, afterrenouncing the Roman Catholic faith, an Anglicanpriest, Donne married for love, as a result losing hisjob as secretary to his bride’s uncle, Sir Thomas †Egerton, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. In thespace of sixteen impecunious years, Anne Donnebore her husband twelve children. Three of them,Francis, Nicholas and Mary, died before they wereten. Anne herself died after giving birth to the twelfthchild, which was stillborn. After his favourite daughter
  • 34. Lucy had died and he himself had very nearlyfollowed her to the grave, Donne wrote hisDevotions upon Emergent Occasions (1624),which contains the greatest of all exhortations tocommiserate with the dead: ‘Any man’s deathdiminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde;And therefore never send to know for whom the belltolls; It tolls for thee.’ Three years later, the death of aclose friend inspired him to write ‘A Nocturnal uponSt Lucy’s Day, Being the Shortest Day’: Study me then, you who shall lovers be At the next world, that is, at the next spring; For I am every dead thing, In whom Love wrought new alchemy. For his art did express A quintessence even from nothingness, From dull privations, and lean emptiness; He ruin’d me, and I am re-begot Of absence, darkness, death – things whichare not.
  • 35. Everyone should read these lines who wants tounderstand better the human condition in the dayswhen life expectancy was less than half what it istoday. The much greater power of death to cut peopleoff in their prime not only made life seem precariousand filled it with grief. It also meant that most of thepeople who built the civilizations of the past wereyoung when they made their contributions. The greatDutch-Jewish philosopher Baruch or BenedictSpinoza, who hypothesized that there is only amaterial universe of substance and deterministiccausation, and that ‘God’ is that universe’s naturalorder as we dimly apprehend it and nothing more,died in 1677 at the age of forty-four, probably fromthe particles of glass he had inhaled doing his day-job as a lens grinder. Blaise Pascal, the pioneer ofprobability theory and hydrodynamics and the authorof the Pensées, the greatest of all apologias for theChristian faith, lived to be just thirty-nine; he wouldhave died even younger had the road accident thatreawakened his spiritual side been fatal. Who
  • 36. knows what other great works these geniuses mighthave brought forth had they been granted thelifespans enjoyed by, for example, the greathumanists Erasmus (sixty-nine) and Montaigne (fifty-nine)? Mozart, composer of the most perfect of alloperas, Don Giovanni, died when he was just thirty-five. Franz Schubert, composer of the sublime StringQuintet in C (D956), succumbed, probably tosyphilis, at the age of just thirty-one. Prolific thoughthey were, what else might they have composed ifthey had been granted the sixty-three years enjoyedby the stolid Johannes Brahms or the even moreexceptional seventy-two years allowed theponderous Anton Bruckner? The Scots poet RobertBurns, who wrote the supreme expression ofegalitarianism, ‘A Man’s a Man for A’ That’, wasthirty-seven when he died in 1796. What injustice,that the poet who most despised inherited status(‘The rank is but the guinea’s stamp, / The Man’s thegowd [gold] for a’ that’) should have been so muchoutlived by the poet who most revered it: Alfred, LordTennyson, who died bedecked with honours at theage of eighty-three. Palgrave’s Golden Treasury
  • 37. would be the better for more Burns and lessTennyson. And how different would the art galleriesof the world be today if the painstaking Jan Vermeerhad lived to be ninety-one and the over-prolific PabloPicasso had died at thirty-nine, instead of the otherway round? Politics, too, is an art – as much a part of ourcivilization as philosophy, opera, poetry or painting.But the greatest political artist in American history,Abraham Lincoln, served only one full term in theWhite House, falling victim to an assassin with apetty grudge just six weeks after his secondinaugural address. He was fifty-six. How differentwould the era of Reconstruction have been had thisself-made titan, born in a log cabin, the author of themajestic Gettysburg Address – which redefined theUnited States as ‘a nation, conceived in liberty, anddedicated to the proposition that all men are createdequal’, with a ‘government of the people, by thepeople, for the people’ – lived as long as the polo-playing then polio-stricken grandee Franklin DelanoRoosevelt, whom medical science kept alive long
  • 38. enough to serve nearly four full terms as presidentbefore his death at sixty-three? Because our lives are so very different from thelives of most people in the past, not least in theirprobable duration, but also in our greater degree ofphysical comfort, we must exercise our imaginationsquite vigorously to understand the men and womenof the past. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments,written a century and half before Collingwood’smemoir, the great economist and social theoristAdam Smith defined why a civilized society is not awar of all against all – because it is based onsympathy: As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us
  • 39. what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation.This, of course, is precisely what Collingwood saysthe historian should do, and it is what I want thereader to do as she encounters in these pages theresurrected thoughts of the dead. The key point ofthe book is to understand what made theircivilization expand so spectacularly in its wealth,influence and power. But there can be nounderstanding without that sympathy which puts us,through an act of imagination, in their situation. Thatact will be all the more difficult when we come toresurrect the thoughts of the denizens of othercivilizations – the ones the West subjugated or, atleast, subordinated to itself. For they are equallyimportant members of the drama’s cast. This is nota history of the West but a history of the world, inwhich Western dominance is the phenomenon to beexplained.In an encyclopaedia entry he wrote in 1959, the
  • 40. French historian Fernand Braudel defined acivilization as: first of all a space, a ‘cultural area’ … a locus. With the locus … you must picture a great variety of ‘goods’, of cultural characteristics, ranging from the form of its houses, the material of which they are built, their roofing, to skills like feathering arrows, to a dialect or group of dialects, to tastes in cooking, to a particular technology, a structure of beliefs, a way of making love, and even to the compass, paper, the printing press. It is the regular grouping, the frequency with which particular characteristics recur, their ubiquity within a precise area [combined with] … some sort of temporal permanence …Braudel was better at delineating structures thanexplaining change, however. These days, it is oftensaid that historians should tell stories; accordingly,this book offers a big story – a meta-narrative of whyone civilization transcended the constraints that hadbound all previous ones – and a great many smallertales or micro-histories within it. Nevertheless therevival of the art of narrative is only part of what isneeded. In addition to stories, it is also important
  • 41. that there be questions. ‘Why did the West come todominate the Rest?’ is a question that demandssomething more than a just-so story in response.The answer needs to be analytical, it needs to besupported by evidence and it needs to be testableby means of the counterfactual question: if thecrucial innovations I identify here had not existed,would the West have ruled the Rest anyway for someother reason that I have missed or under-emphasized? Or would the world have turned outquite differently, with China on top, or some othercivilization? We should not delude ourselves intothinking that our historical narratives, as commonlyconstructed, are anything more than retro-fits. Tocontemporaries, as we shall see, the outcome ofWestern dominance did not seem the mostprobable of the futures they could imagine; thescenario of disastrous defeat often loomed larger inthe mind of the historical actor than the happy endingvouchsafed to the modern reader. The reality ofhistory as a lived experience is that it is much morelike a chess match than a novel, much more likefootball game than a play.
  • 42. It wasn’t all good. No serious writer would claimthat the reign of Western civilization wasunblemished. Yet there are those who would insistthat there was nothing whatever good about it. Thisposition is absurd. As is true of all great civilizations,that of the West was Janus-faced: capable of nobilityyet also capable of turpitude. Perhaps a betteranalogy is that the West resembled the two feudingbrothers in James Hogg’s Private Memoirs andConfessions of a Justified Sinner (1824) or inRobert Louis Stevenson’s Master of Ballantrae(1889). Competition and monopoly; science andsuperstition; freedom and slavery; curing and killing;hard work and laziness – in each case, the Westwas father to both the good and the bad. It was justthat, as in Hogg’s or Stevenson’s novel, the better ofthe two brothers ultimately came out on top. Wemust also resist the temptation to romanticizehistory’s losers. The other civilizations overrun by theWest’s, or more peacefully transformed by it throughborrowings as much as through impositions, werenot without their defects either, of which the mostobvious is that they were incapable of providing their
  • 43. inhabitants with any sustained improvement in thematerial quality of their lives. One difficulty is that wecannot always reconstruct the past thoughts of thesenon-Western peoples, for not all of them existed incivilizations with the means of recording andpreserving thought. In the end, history is primarily thestudy of civilizations, because without writtenrecords the historian is thrown back on spearheadsand pot fragments, from which much less can beinferred. The French historian and statesmanFrançois Guizot said that the history of civilization is‘the biggest of all … it comprises all the others’. Itmust transcend the multiple disciplinary boundarieserected by academics, with their compulsion tospecialize, between economic, social, cultural,intellectual, political, military and international history.It must cover a great deal of time and space,because civilizations are not small or ephemeral.But a book like this cannot be an encyclopaedia. Tothose who will complain about what has beenomitted, I can do no more than quote theidiosyncratic jazz pianist Thelonious Monk: ‘Don’tplay everything (or every time); let some things go by
  • 44. … What you don’t play can be more important thanwhat you do.’ I agree. Many notes and chords havebeen omitted below. But they have been left out for areason. Does the selection reflect the biases of amiddle-aged Scotsman, the archetypal beneficiaryof Western predominance? Very likely. But I cherishthe hope that the selection will not be disapproved ofby the most ardent and eloquent defenders ofWestern values today, whose ethnic origins are verydifferent from mine – from Amartya Sen to LiuXiaobo, from Hernando de Soto to the dedicatee ofthis book.A book that aims to cover 600 years of world historyis necessarily a collaborative venture and I owethanks to many people. I am grateful to the staff atthe following archives, libraries and institutions: theAGI Archive, the musée départemental Albert Kahn,the Bridgeman Art Library, the British Library, theCharleston Library Society, the Zhongguo guojiatushuguan (National Library of China) in Beijing,Corbis, the Institut Pasteur in Dakar, the DeutschesHistorisches Museum in Berlin, the Geheimes
  • 45. Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz at Berlin-Dahlem, Getty Images, the Greenwich Observatory,the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna, theIrish National Library, the Library of Congress, theMissouri History Museum, the musée du Chemindes Dames, the Museo de Oro in Lima, the NationalArchives in London, the National Maritime Museum,the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (OttomanArchives) in Istanbul, PA Photos, the PeabodyMuseum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard,the Archives Nationales du Sénégal in Dakar, theSouth Carolina Historical Society, the School ofOriental and African Studies, the SülemaniyeManuscript Library and of course Harvard’sincomparable Widener Library. It would be wrongnot to add an additional line of thanks to Google,now an incomparable resource for speeding uphistorical research, as well as Questia andWikipedia, which also make the historian’s workeasier. I have had invaluable research assistance fromSarah Wallington, as well as from Daniel Lansberg-
  • 46. Rodriguez, Manny Rincon-Cruz, Jason Rockett andJack Sun. As usual, this is a Penguin book on both sides ofthe Atlantic, edited with customary skill and verve bySimon Winder in London and Ann Godoff in NewYork. The peerless Peter James did more thancopy-edit the text. Thanks are also due to RichardDuguid, Rosie Glaisher, Stefan McGrath, JohnMakinson and Pen Vogler, and many others toonumerous to mention. Like four of my last five books, Civilization wasfrom its earliest inception a television series as wellas a book. At Channel 4 Ralph Lee has kept mefrom being abstruse or plain incomprehensible, withassistance from Simon Berthon. Neither series norbook could have been made without theextraordinary team of people assembled byChimerica Media: Dewald Aukema, a prince amongcinematographers, James Evans, our assistantproducer for films 2 and 5, Alison McAllan, ourarchive researcher, Susannah Price, who producedfilm 4, James Runcie, who directed films 2 and 5,
  • 47. Vivienne Steel, our production manager, andCharlotte Wilkins, our assistant producer for films 3and 4. A key role was also played in the early phaseof the project by Joanna Potts. Chris Openshaw,Max Hug Williams, Grant Lawson and Harrik Maurydeftly handled the filming in England and France.With their patience and generosity towards theauthor, my fellow Chimericans Melanie Fall andAdrian Pennink have ensured that we remain apretty good advertisement for the triumvirate as aform of government. My friend Chris Wilson onceagain ensured that I missed no planes. Among the many people who helped us film theseries, a number of fixers also helped with theresearch that went into the book. My thanks go toManfred Anderson, Khadidiatou Ba, Lillian Chen,Tereza Horska, Petr Janda, Wolfgang Knoepfler,Deborah McLauchlan, Matias de Sa Moreira, DaisyNewton-Dunn, José Couto Nogueira, Levent Öztekinand Ernst Vogl. I would also like to thank the many people Iinterviewed as we roamed the world, in particular
  • 48. Gonzalo de Aliaga, Nihal Bengisu Karaca, PastorJohn Lindell, Mick Rawson, Ryan Squibb, IvanTouška, Stefan Wolle, Hanping Zhang and – last butby no means least – the pupils at Robert ClackSchool, Dagenham. I am extremely fortunate to have in Andrew Wyliethe best literary agent in the world and in Sue Aytonhis counterpart in the realm of British television. Mythanks also go to Scott Moyers, James Pullen andall the other staff in the London and New York officesof the Wylie Agency. A number of eminent historians generously readall or part of the manuscript in draft, as did a numberof friends as well as former and current students:Rawi Abdelal, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Bryan Averbuch,Pierpaolo Barbieri, Jeremy Catto, J. C. D. Clark,James Esdaile, Campbell Ferguson, MartinJacques, Harold James, Maya Jasanoff, JoannaLewis, Charles Maier, Hassan Malik, Noel Maurer,Ian Morris, Charles Murray, Aldo Musacchio, GlenO’Hara, Steven Pinker, Ken Rogoff, EmmaRothschild, Alex Watson, Arne Westad, John Wong
  • 49. and Jeremy Yellen. Thanks are also due to PhilipHoffman, Andrew Roberts and Robert Wilkinson. Allsurviving errors are my fault alone. At Oxford University I would like to thank thePrincipal and Fellows of Jesus College, theircounterparts at Oriel College and the librarians ofthe Bodleian. At the Hoover Institution, Stanford, Iowe debts to John Raisian, the Director, and hisexcellent staff. This book has been finished at theLondon School of Economics IDEAS centre, where Ihave been very well looked after as the PhilippeRoman Professor for the academic year 2010–11.My biggest debts, however, are to my colleagues atHarvard. It would take too long to thank everymember of the Harvard History Departmentindividually, so let me confine myself to a collectivethank-you: this is not a book I could have writtenwithout your collegial support, encouragement andintellectual inspiration. The same goes for mycolleagues at Harvard Business School, particularlythe members of the Business and Government in theInternational Economy Unit, as well as for the faculty
  • 50. and staff at the Centre of European Studies. Thanksare also due to my friends at the WeatherheadCentre for International Affairs, the Belfer Centre forScience and International Affairs, the Workshop inEconomic History and Lowell House. But most of all Ithank all my students on both sides of the CharlesRiver, particularly those in my General Educationclass, Societies of the World 19. This book startedlife in your presence, and greatly benefited from yourpapers and feedback. Finally, I offer my deepest thanks to my family,particularly my parents and my oft-neglectedchildren, Felix, Freya and Lachlan, not forgettingtheir mother Susan and our extended kinship group.In many ways, I have written this book for you,children. It is dedicated, however, to someone whounderstands better than anyone I know what Westerncivilization really means – and what it still has to offerthe world.London December 2010
  • 51. Introduction: Rasselas’s Question He would not admit civilization [to the fourth edition of his dictionary], but only civility. With great deference to him, I thought civilization, from to civilize, better in the sense opposed to barbarity, than civility. James Boswell All definitions of civilization … belong to a conjugation which goes: ‘I am civilized, you belong to a culture, he is a barbarian.’ Felipe Fernández-ArmestoWhen Kenneth Clark defined civilization in histelevision series of that name, he left viewers in nodoubt that he meant the civilization of the West – andprimarily the art and architecture of Western Europefrom the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century.The first of the thirteen films he made for the BBCwas politely but firmly dismissive of ByzantineRavenna, the Celtic Hebrides, Viking Norway andeven Charlemagne’s Aachen. The Dark Ages
  • 52. even Charlemagne’s Aachen. The Dark Agesbetween the fall of Rome and the twelfth-centuryRenaissance simply did not qualify as civilization inClark’s sense of the word. That only revived with thebuilding of Chartres cathedral, dedicated though notcompleted in 1260, and was showing signs offatigue with the Manhattan skyscrapers of his owntime. Clark’s hugely successful series, which was firstbroadcast in Britain when I was five years old,defined civilization for a generation in the English-speaking world. Civilization was the chateaux of theLoire. It was the palazzi of Florence. It was theSistine Chapel. It was Versailles. From the soberinteriors of the Dutch Republic to the ebullientfaçades of the baroque, Clark played to his strengthas an historian of art. Music and literature made theirappearances; politics and even economicsoccasionally peeked in. But the essence of Clark’scivilization was clearly High Visual Culture. Hisheroes were Michelangelo, da Vinci, Dürer, 1Constable, Turner, Delacroix. In fairness to Clark, his series was subtitled APersonal View. And he was not unaware of theimplication – problematic already in 1969 – that ‘thepre-Christian era and the East’ were in some sense
  • 53. uncivilized. Nevertheless, with the passage of fourdecades, it has become steadily harder to live withClark’s view, personal or otherwise (to say nothingof his now slightly grating de haut en bas manner). Inthis book I take a broader, more comparative view,and I aim to be more down and dirty than high andmighty. My idea of civilization is as much aboutsewage pipes as flying buttresses, if not more so,because without efficient public plumbing cities aredeath-traps, turning rivers and wells into havens forthe bacterium Vibrio cholerae. I am,unapologetically, as interested in the price of a workof art as in its cultural value. To my mind, acivilization is much more than just the contents of afew first-rate art galleries. It is a highly complexhuman organization. Its paintings, statues andbuildings may well be its most eye-catchingachievements, but they are unintelligible withoutsome understanding of the economic, social andpolitical institutions which devised them, paid forthem, executed them – and preserved them for ourgaze. ‘Civilisation’ is a French word, first used by theFrench economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot in1752, and first published by Victor Riqueti, marquisde Mirabeau, father of the great revolutionary, four
  • 54. 2years later. Samuel Johnson, as the first epigraphto this Introduction makes clear, would not acceptthe neologism, preferring ‘civility’. If barbarism hadan antonym for Johnson, it was the polite (thoughsometimes also downright rude) urban life heenjoyed so much in London. A civilization, as theetymology of the word suggests, revolves around itscities, and in many ways it is cities that are the 3heroes of this book. But a city’s laws (civil orotherwise) are as important as its walls; itsconstitution and customs – its inhabitants’ manners 4(civil or otherwise) – as important as its palaces.Civilization is as much about scientists’ laboratoriesas it is about artists’ garrets. It is as much aboutforms of land tenure as it is about landscapes. Thesuccess of a civilization is measured not just in itsaesthetic achievements but also, and surely moreimportantly, in the duration and quality of life of itscitizens. And that quality of life has manydimensions, not all easily quantified. We may beable to estimate the per-capita income of peoplearound the world in the fifteenth century, or theiraverage life expectancy at birth. But what about theircomfort? Cleanliness? Happiness? How manygarments did they own? How many hours did they
  • 55. have to work? What food could they buy with theirwages? Artworks by themselves can offer hints, butthey cannot answer such questions. Clearly, however, one city does not make acivilization. A civilization is the single largest unit ofhuman organization, higher though more amorphousthan even an empire. Civilizations are partly apractical response by human populations to theirenvironments – the challenges of feeding, watering,sheltering and defending themselves – but they arealso cultural in character; often, though not always,religious; often, though not always, communities of 5language. They are few, but not far between. Carroll 6Quigley counted two dozen in the last ten millennia.In the pre-modern world, Adda Bozeman saw just 7five: the West, India, China, Byzantium and Islam.Matthew Melko made the total twelve, seven ofwhich have vanished (Mesopotamian, Egyptian,Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American,Andean) and five of which still remain (Chinese, 8Japanese, Indian, Islamic, Western). ShmuelEisenstadt counted six by adding Jewish civilization 9to the club. The interaction of these few civilizationswith one another, as much as with their own
  • 56. environments, has been among the most important 10drivers of historical change. The striking thingabout these interactions is that authentic civilizationsseem to remain true unto themselves for very longperiods, despite outside influences. As FernandBraudel put it: ‘Civilization is in fact the longest storyof all … A civilization … can persist through a series 11of economies or societies.’If, in the year 1411, you had been able tocircumnavigate the globe, you would probably havebeen most impressed by the quality of life in Orientalcivilizations. The Forbidden City was underconstruction in Ming Beijing, while work had begunon reopening and improving the Grand Canal; in theNear East, the Ottomans were closing in onConstantinople, which they would finally capture in1453. The Byzantine Empire was breathing its last.The death of the warlord Timur (Tamerlane) in 1405had removed the recurrent threat of murderousinvading hordes from Central Asia – the antithesis ofcivilization. For the Yongle Emperor in China and theOttoman Sultan Murad II, the future was bright. By contrast, Western Europe in 1411 wouldhave struck you as a miserable backwater,recuperating from the ravages of the Black Death –
  • 57. which had reduced population by as much as half asit swept eastwards between 1347 and 1351 – andstill plagued by bad sanitation and seeminglyincessant war. In England the leper king Henry IVwas on the throne, having successfully overthrownand murdered the ill-starred Richard II. France wasin the grip of internecine warfare between thefollowers of the Duke of Burgundy and those of theassassinated Duke of Orléans. The Anglo-FrenchHundred Years’ War was just about to resume. Theother quarrelsome kingdoms of Western Europe –Aragon, Castile, Navarre, Portugal and Scotland –would have seemed little better. A Muslim still ruledin Granada. The Scottish King, James I, was aprisoner in England, having been captured byEnglish pirates. The most prosperous parts ofEurope were in fact the North Italian city-states:Florence, Genoa, Pisa, Siena and Venice. As forfifteenth-century North America, it was an anarchicwilderness compared with the realms of the Aztecs,Mayas and Incas in Central and South America, withtheir towering temples and skyscraping roads. Bythe end of your world tour, the notion that the Westmight come to dominate the Rest for most of thenext half-millennium would have come to seem wildlyfanciful.
  • 58. And yet it happened. For some reason, beginning in the late fifteenthcentury, the little states of Western Europe, with theirbastardized linguistic borrowings from Latin (and alittle Greek), their religion derived from the teachingsof a Jew from Nazareth and their intellectual debts toOriental mathematics, astronomy and technology,produced a civilization capable not only ofconquering the great Oriental empires andsubjugating Africa, the Americas and Australasia,but also of converting peoples all over the world tothe Western way of life – a conversion achievedultimately more by the word than by the sword. There are those who dispute that, claiming thatall civilizations are in some sense equal, and that theWest cannot claim superiority over, say, the East of 12Eurasia. But such relativism is demonstrablyabsurd. No previous civilization had ever achievedsuch dominance as the West achieved over the 13Rest. In 1500 the future imperial powers of Europeaccounted for about 10 per cent of the world’s landsurface and at most 16 per cent of its population. By *1913, eleven Western empires controlled nearlythree-fifths of all territory and population and more
  • 59. than three-quarters (a staggering 79 per cent) of 14global economic output. Average life expectancyin England was nearly twice what it was in India.Higher living standards in the West were alsoreflected in a better diet, even for agriculturallabourers, and taller stature, even for ordinary 15soldiers and convicts. Civilization, as we haveseen, is about cities. By this measure, too, the Westhad come out on top. In 1500, as far as we can workout, the biggest city in the world was Beijing, with apopulation of between 600,000 and 700,000. Of theten largest cities in the world by that time only one –Paris – was European, and its population numberedfewer than 200,000. London had perhaps 50,000inhabitants. Urbanization rates were also higher inNorth Africa and South America than in Europe. Yetby 1900 there had been an astonishing reversal.Only one of the world’s ten largest cities at that timewas Asian and that was Tokyo. With a population ofaround 6.5 million, London was the global 16megalopolis. Nor did Western dominance endwith the decline and fall of the European empires.The rise of the United States saw the gap betweenWest and East widen still further. By 1990 theaverage American was seventy-three times richer
  • 60. 17than the average Chinese.
  • 61. Moreover, it became clear in the second half ofthe twentieth century that the only way to close thatyawning gap in income was for Eastern societies tofollow Japan’s example in adopting some (thoughnot all) of the West’s institutions and modes ofoperation. As a result, Western civilization becamea kind of template for the way the rest of the worldaspired to organize itself. Prior to 1945, of course,there was a variety of developmental models – oroperating systems, to draw a metaphor fromcomputing – that could be adopted by non-Westernsocieties. But the most attractive were all ofEuropean origin: liberal capitalism, nationalsocialism, Soviet communism. The Second WorldWar killed the second in Europe, though it lived onunder assumed names in many developingcountries. The collapse of the Soviet empire