Competition issues in the road goods transport industry in india


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Competition issues in the road goods transport industry in india

  1. 1. Competition Issues in the Road Goods Transport Industry in India
  2. 2. Competition Issues in the Road Goods Transport Industry in India with special reference to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region S.Sriraman Walchand Hirachand Professor of Transport Economics, Department of Economics, University of Mumbai with Anand Venkatesh Manisha Karne Assistant Professor, Reader in Economics,Institute of Rural Management, Anand S.N.D.T. University, Mumbai and assistance from Vidya Mohite Research Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Mumbai Final Report submitted to The Competition Commission of India July 2006
  3. 3. Rail – Road Share in India Rail RoadPassenger 15 85Freight 30 70During the last decade,road freight has grownat a compounded growthrate of 11.9% comparedto 1.4% on rail.Share ofroad in freight likely to stabilize around 85%.
  4. 4. Road Transport• In the passenger business- public and private sectors are supposed to have an equal role.• In freight business – almost exclusively handled by the private sector.
  5. 5. Recent Trends• In recent years, freight movement by road has not kept up with capacity – leading to lower capacity utilisation.• The utilisation has gone down from nearly 70% in the early 1990s to less than 60% in 2001-02.• This has affected profitability of operators – though freight rates have gone up, fuel costs have trebled.
  6. 6. Trucking Industry Ownership Pattern• According to GOI (1966) – about 89% of road transport operators owned one vehicle each .• The proportion owning 5 vehicles or less was 98% .• UN mission (1993) claimed 95% of vehicles belonged to operators who had less than 5 vehicles.
  7. 7. Truck Industry Ownership (continued)• CIRT study (1998) – 77% of fleet under operators who owned 5 trucks or less 10% belonged to those with 6 to 10 trucks 4% belonged to those with 11 to 15 trucks 3% belonged to those with 16 to 20 6% belonged to those with more than 20• This ownership pattern continues (Deloitte Study 2003).
  8. 8. • The unique ownership profile has resulted in middle men – booking agents and brokers.• With Fleet Operators shifting to a non asset based model, dependenceof SRTOs on middlemen is increasing.
  9. 9. Possible Market Structure• Conceptually the presence of a large number of operators would lead us to infer that market is highly competitive.• This indeed seems to be true in regard to general goods transportation – market forces determine freight rates.• NCAER (1979) observed that due to intense competition, profitability was rather low in the case of SRTOs.
  10. 10. • In fact, GOI (1996) had been concerned with viability of operators especially from the financial point of view.• GOI (1980), Sriraman (GOI 1998) had contested this since exit was an option.On the other hand, supply of services had, in reality, increased.• Does it mean that a competitive regime prevails ?
  11. 11. • Given the segmentation of both in terms of market supply and demand (players) – the emerging feeling is that there are some dominant elements especially in the case of specialized traffic where shippers are likely to dominate.• At the next level, the fleet operators, and other market players like the middle men could be exerting a certain influence.
  12. 12. Objectives of the Study1. To understand the supposedly competitive nature of themarket for general road freight transport services with a viewto examining the role of different players in the industry infixation of tariffs.2. To examine the possible use of supply/ area restrictionsby the different players to derive some benefit.3. To look at the possibilities of a limited but possibledominating role in price fixation of the supplier of bulkservices such as the fleet operator in the context ofsubcontracting orders to smaller operators to handle a partof the movement.4. To examine the role of bulk buyers of road transportservices especially specialized services in the fixation ofprices.
  13. 13. • Setting – Mumbai Metropolitan Region, Satara, Goa• Work plan included : Literature Insights. Developments of Analytical models of costing and pricing of road freight transport services. Surveys of SRTOs, FOs, Booking Agents,Brokers,Associations,Financiers and Users. Question : To find out whether there is cartelisation (of any type) in the trucking industry in India ?
  14. 14. Insights from the Literaturea. International Insights This involved a close look at the relevant literature and the material especially in the context of the industry in the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia and some developing countries like Chile, Malaysia. We have attempted to draw some insights from the deregulatory process that has been set in motion quite some time back and its impact on the market structure.
  15. 15. Insights from the Literature (Continued)Broadly the effects have been as follows:• The capacity available for common use has increased significantly with increasing dominance by highly competitive small operators.• Rates have fallen considerably as a result of more capacity and introduction better technological features.• Falling rates have benefited consumers but with costs not reducing to such an extent, profit levels have fallen though operators offering higher levels of service have achieved higher profit levels.
  16. 16. • National Insights This concerned a review of work done on the industry in the Indian context- Studies, Reports of Committees, etc. This review has been useful to understand the evolving policy and the regulatory framework in regard to some of the dimensions such as the legislation, taxation and organizational framework within which the industry has grown.
  17. 17. National Insights (continued)This review leads us to conclude: 1.Trucking historically subject to very little regulation in India unlike many other countries which had regulations on routes, pricing, licensing of operators,etc. 2. The only deregulatory move that has taken place in India has been relaxation concerning movements all over the country. 3. The focus of the regulatory system has been on revenue collection (tax and otherwise) rather than enforcement of MV Act provisions. 4. Internally, industry characterised by skews – in terms of operators,users and intermediaries – there does seem to be an imbalance in the way revenue is shared by the various players.
  18. 18. National Insights (continued)5. This imbalance is possibly a consequence of the intermediaries having access to greater information flows than the users and the operators.6. The intermediaries appear to exert a far greater influence on the industry than what is normally thought of.7. Maybe a need to bring intermediaries under the purview of regulation.
  19. 19. Analysis of freight rates and operator costs day-to- This involved collection of data on a day-to-day basis relating to freight rates from 2002 prevailing in case of point-to- point-to-point movements between Mumbai and some major cities such as Delhi, Ahmedabad, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore. Also attempted was an examination of the growth in fuel costs. “ A sharp increase in fuel price along with a gradual increase in freight rates has implied a negative impact on operator profit.”
  20. 20. Analysis of freight rates and operator costs (continued) Given the prevailing market rates only a muchhigher level of movement (nearly 350-400kms. asagainst 200-250kms. move today) could enableoperations to be viable (given the registered payload).However, given the limitation on movements due toenroute delays, this is not easily done. As a result,overloading is a normal phenomenon. With judicialintervention overloading may be a thing of thepast.Thus, overall demand is expected to go upleading to higher freight rates. (A higher level ofefficiency could bring down costs and therebyrates).The question: whether this higher realisationwould eventually reach the operators?
  21. 21. The Industry structure:The Market Players There are large number of operators who areeither single truck operators or small operators.This is a common feature observed in the abovethree regions. The number of big fleet operatorshaving specialized vehicles or otherwise appearsto be very limited. The small and to a limitedextent the large fleet operators depend on theintermediaries for business. Let us now look atthe different players in the industry. Figure1 givesthe most general picturisation of the structure ofthe trucking industry in terms of the marketplayers and their functions.
  22. 22. Figure 1: Players and their functions Players Functions User needs specialized or general vehicles to User transport goods. He represents the demand side of the market. Transport Companies/contr Collecting, forwarding,Intermedi actors/Supplier/ Booking Agents distributing goods.aries Ensures supply of trucks to the Brokers transport contractor. Transport Operator Providing haulage service Small Operator Large operator
  23. 23. The Industry Structure: The Market Makers• The traditional evidence is that the intermediaries dominate and are the real makers of the market.• In other words, the intermediaries are supposedly the real power centers - with a major role in determining the broad contours of the market in terms of the rates, conditions of the movements, etc. in relation to the consignors (users) and operators.
  24. 24. The Industry Structure: The Market Makers (continued)• However, it is widely believed that the rate paid by the consignor is the competitive one.• This really brings us to the question: if the consignor is being offered a competitive rate, which is low, how much lower is the final rate offered to the operator given that the final rate has no relationship to the consignor rate ? Would the rate to the consignor be lower given reasonable margins to the booking agents ?
  25. 25. Market Surveys and Analysis Surveys have been undertaken in and aroundMumbai and to a minor extent in Satara and in Goa.In Mumbai itself, operators, brokers and bookingagents totaling about 100 have been interviewed. InSatara and Goa about a dozen of these players havebeen interviewed. In these surveys we focused on certain issueslike the nature of business, functions performedby the players, the area of operations, nature ofmarket, degree of competition and the importantproblems faced by these players in this industry.
  26. 26. Market Surveys and Analysis (continued) Any market has to be understood in terms of the following:• product service that is offered• the geographic which it serves• the nature of substitution possibilities within and outside• the ease of entry and/or exit into the sector in terms of policy/regulatory elements and factors within the sector.
  27. 27. I. Service differentiation• Parcels or small business• Full Truck Load• Container movement to take care of both• Movement in Specialised Vehicles
  28. 28. II. Areas of OperationTrucking operation can be classified as: Local Regional National There are some operators who operate at the local level only. Many more seem to be operating on specific routes on an inter-regional basis. Some others operate on a national basis. Figure 2 gives this delineation.
  29. 29. Figure 2:Areas of operation National operation (Inter- Route based operation (Inter-regional) Route based operation (Intra-regional) (Intra- Local operation
  30. 30. III. Substitution Possibilities• Choice of railways as a substitute mode has always been a possibility especially long distance movements.• But the railways have been consistently under performing in terms of their potential.• As a result diversion of traffic to the roads has been a common feature despite higher explicit costs of movement.• Given the emergence of a more dynamic approach on the part of the railways in recent times especially in regard to parcel traffic, some increase in railways share in the near future is an emerging possibility.
  31. 31. IV. Ease of Entry and Exit• Entry barriers are almost nonexistent –this is a perception which is almost true.• However, once entry is made, there is a problem of knowledge as to where the demand for the services existed – basic information requirements are not satisfied.• As a result there is attachment to the intermediaries not only for traffic considerations but also for a host of other things.• This preempts exit also.
  32. 32. Interrelationships observed in surveys among players Operators UserOwner Operator Broker User
  33. 33. Interrelationships observed in surveys among players (continued)Owner operator Broker B.Agent UserOperator Broker Fl.Op B.Agent User
  34. 34. Interrelationships observed in surveys among players (continued)Owner operator Fl. Op. User
  35. 35. MAIN FINDINGS 1.Thus, from the above different supply chain models one could possibly say that the market appears to be segmented on various basis, say as per area of operation, as per routes, i.e. operators as well as commission agents seem to have certain preferred routes.2. Historically, this kind of market segmentation to have led to more powers in the hands of intermediaries as the information flow is accessible to the intermediaries only.
  36. 36. MAIN FINDINGS (continued)3.Given the dominance of small operators and the user requirements in terms of reliable haulage, loss protection, the role of the intermediaries is substantial and proving to be very useful, both from demand and supply perspectives.
  37. 37. Effects of Policy and Regulatory Regimes on Competitiveness of the Industry• Policy Effects • Taxation Regime • #Vehicle and Operation Related
  38. 38. Policy Effects (cont’d)# Commodity Related - These have resulted in significant barriers to movement as has been noted in many studies.
  39. 39. Regulatory EffectsIneffective implementation of theregulatory framework has seriouslyimpeded efficiency of truck operations.
  40. 40. Competition Advocacy Measures and Initiatives (CAMI)• The State Governments through the RTA and with the help of Operators’ Association could eliminate price fixation practices in local movements.• The Central and State Governments must be requested to ensure that the bidding processes are very transparent.
  41. 41. CAMI (cont’d)• An effective public sector role (Central and State) can be in facilitating applications and adaptability of information technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS).
  42. 42. CAMI (cont’d)• Promotion of Transport Operator Cooperatives – as a means of enabling viability of operations, information asymmetries etc.
  43. 43. CAMI (cont’d)• Rate regulation is an anachronism and even provision for such regulation must be removed.
  44. 44. CAMI (cont’d)• Even with effective control of truck overloading and emergence of MAV friendly highways, it is widely recognized that efficient trucking technology will be introduced and used in India much more significantly only when the perverse system of financial incentives such as high tax rates and tolls on such vehicles is corrected. Governments need to be advised on this issue so as to ensure that more efficient use of trucking and road capacity is in place.
  45. 45. CAMI (cont’d)• We must move away from development and investment decision-making based on segmented modes and many tiers of management to an integrated nationally consistent multi-modal approach.
  46. 46. CAMI (cont’d)• As a matter for advocacy in this regard, to begin with, it may be useful to designate ‘Trade Corridors’ along the Golden Quadrilateral.