The Praxiology of Shared Agency  - ACERP2014
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

The Praxiology of Shared Agency - ACERP2014

on

  • 203 views

 

Statistics

Views

Total Views
203
Views on SlideShare
203
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Adobe PDF

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

The Praxiology of Shared Agency  - ACERP2014 The Praxiology of Shared Agency - ACERP2014 Presentation Transcript

  • The Praxiology of Shared Agency ACERP2014 Osaka, Japan March 03/31/2014 Piotr Makowski Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan http://pmakowski.com/ email: makowski@amu.edu.pl 1
  • OVERVIEW COLLECTIVE ACTION vs. COOPERATION HYPOTHESIS ABOUT THE BASIS OF COOPERATION REMARKS ON TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION BRATMAN ON SHARED INTENTION PROBLEMS WITH THE BRATMANIAN ACCOUNT ”WHAT THE HELL IS PRAXIOLOGY?” PRAXIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF COOPERATION 2
  • INITIAL IDEA: NOT ALL COLLECTIVE ACTIONS ARE COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • 11
  • 12
  • 13
  • COLLECTIVE ACTION vs. COOPERATION COLLECTIVE ACTION Examples: crowd walking on the streets, participants attending a talk, guests drinking in a pub COOPERATION Examples: choir singing, orchestral performance, walking together, playing football, organized rescue, attending a demonstration, fighting, what constitutes the difference between them? 14
  • COLLECTIVE ACTION vs. COOPERATION COLLECTIVE ACTION Examples: crowd walking on the streets, participants attending a talk, guests drinking in a pub COOPERATION Examples: choir singing, orchestral performance, walking together, playing football, organized rescue attending a demonstration, fighting, what constitutes the difference between them? 15
  • HYPOTHESIS: cooperation implies sharing attitudes between agents to articulate the conditions of doing things together is to propose an account of agents’ mental states - philosophy of psychology INTENTIONS 16
  • HYPOTHESIS: cooperation implies sharing attitudes between agents to articulate the conditions of doing things together is to propose an account of agents’ mental states - philosophy of psychology INTENTIONS 17
  • TYPICAL ACCOUNTS IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY John Searle (1990) inspired by Wilfrid Sellars: - shared agency cannot be described as a function of sets of individual intentions - ”we-intention” - a new irreducible primitive in our minds which explains the possibility of cooperation between the members of a group acting collectively 18
  • BRATMAN ON SHARED AGENCY 19
  • 20
  • INTERLOCKING INDIVIDUAL INTENTIONS - BRATMAN a. Each of us intends that we paint the house. b. Each of us intends that we paint the house by way of the intention of the other that we paint the house. (...) c. Each of us intends that (...) our sub-plans for our painting mesh with each other, in the sense of being co-possible. d. Each of us believes that our intentions in a. are interdependent in their persistence (...). e. There is in fact interdependence in persistence of the intentions in a. f. These conditions are out in the open among us. (Bratman 2013: 57-58) 21
  • INTERLOCKING INDIVIDUAL INTENTIONS - BRATMAN We intend to J if and only if 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J 2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1(a), 1(b) and meshing subplans of 1(a) and 1(b); you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1(a), 1(b), and meshing subplans of 1(a) and 1(b). 3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (Bratman 1993: 106) 22
  • SHARED AGENCY (BRATMAN) INTERDEPENDENT INTENTIONS [I (continue to) intend that we A, because you (continue to) intend that we A] COMMON KNOWLEDGE [I know and you know that we (continue to) intend that we A, you know that I know that... etc.] 23
  • PROBLEMS WITH THE BRATMANIAN APPROACH 1. Conditions described may be sufficient for cooperation, but - are they necessary? 2. Do these conditions apply to the standard cases of cooperation? Bratman focuses on “small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations” it seems that there are many typical examples of cooperation which do not meet the conditions Bratman describes 24
  • PROBLEMS WITH THE BRATMANIAN APPROACH 1. Conditions described may be sufficient for cooperation, but - are they necessary? 2. Do these conditions apply to the standard cases of cooperation? Bratman focuses on “small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations” (Bratman 2014: 7) it seems that there are many typical examples of cooperation which do not meet the conditions Bratman describes 25
  • PRAXIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SHARED AGENCY 26
  • PRAXIOLOGY effectiveness- and efficiency-oriented action theory, analytic description of the ”elements of action”, normative conditions of effectiveness and efficiency, optimization of actions Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886-1981) Lvov-Warsaw School 27
  • PRAXIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION the necessary and sufficient conditions of effectiveness of any type of cooperative action (on a micro- and macro- scale) two sorts of shared actions: positive cooperation: sharing goals with mutual support/help negative cooperation (fight): making difficulties for each other 28
  • PRAXIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION apart from Bratman’s ”duets and quartets”... - various types of massively shared agency (organized business actions, acting institutions, demonstrations), - asymmetric cooperation (with authority), - automated cooperation (the Mexican wave) - negative cooperation (games, fights, duels, battles, wars) 29
  • WEAKENING AND BROADENING THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHARED AGENCY 30
  • (POSITIVE) COOPERATION SHARED GOALS ✓ - wanted or accepted, not necessarily collectively built REASONS FOR ACTION ✓ - not necessarily the same, but always appropriate INTERLOCKING INTENTIONS ✘ - not necessary when we follow rules or orders COMMON KNOWLEDGE ✘ - only awareness of tendencies to act 31
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY Bratman, Michael E. (1993). “Shared Intention”. Ethics 104: 97–113. Bratman, Michael E. (2013). “Fecundity of Planning Agency” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. ed. by D. Shoemaker. Oxford UP: 47-69. Bratman, Michael E. (2014). Shared Agency. A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford UP. Kotarbinski, Tadeusz (1965). Praxiology: an Introduction to the Sciences of Efficient Action. transl. by O. Wojtasiewicz. New York: Pergamon Press [original Polish edition: Traktat o dobrej robocie, Warszawa: Ossolineum 1955]. Searle, John (1990). “Collective Intentions and Actions” in Intentions in Communication. ed by P. Cohen, J. Morgan & M. Pollack. MIT Press: 401-415. 32
  • The Praxiology of Shared Agency ACERP2014 Osaka, Japan March 03/31/2014 Piotr Makowski Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan http://pmakowski.com/ email: makowski@amu.edu.pl 33