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Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
Buying Success in the English Premier League
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Buying Success in the English Premier League

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  • 1. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Sports Economics An Analysis of the Ability to Buy Success in the English Football Association Premier League and the Subsequent Implications on Consumer Welfare‘The professional game has consistently rebutted the notion that success can be built,crafted or coerced out of anything other than a significant heft in the transfer market.Under Abramovich Chelsea spent £150m on players and abruptly won the league forthe first time in 50 years. Manchester United (valued at just over £900m), Arsenal(£600m) and Chelsea (£384m) are among the top eight richest clubs in the world.Between them theyve won the last 13 Premier League titles.’ Ronay (2008, p.1) Out of the top 25 richest clubs in the world, 10 are from the English FootballAssociation Premier League (FAPL). That is two fifths of the world’s richest footballclubs that ply their trade in the Premiership. In addition to the observation by Ronay,Liverpool are also among the top eight, thus it is clear to see why these four clubs,Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool, have gained the reputation as the‘Big Four.’ Is it possible for other clubs in the league to dislodge one of these teamsor become successful enough to create the hypothetical ‘Big Five?’ On the contrary,does a glass ceiling exist where teams’ advancements are limited by financial power?Competitive balance must surely be a foregone conclusion between the Big Four andthe rest of the FAPL. Between the 2000/01 and 2007/08 seasons; the Big Four camein the top four league positions 28 times out of a possible 32, won 69% of domesticcups (FA and League Cup) and claimed the prestigious UEFA Champions League(CL) twice. This dominance, domestically, is in part ‘shaped by assumed annualreturns from lucrative European club soccer competition (Williams 2007, p.139).’ It appears that the Big Four have been entered into a vicious circle, wheresporting success yields financial rewards, allowing the club to invest to ensure furthersuccesses in the future (Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo et al. 2006). This articlewill examine the extent to which teams in the FAPL are buying success. Can awinning team be purchased? One of the most interesting questions in soccer, whereplayers’ salaries are relatively high, is whether salary structures and playerperformance are correlated (Torgler & Schmidt 2007, p.2355). A host of authorssuggest so, identifying a strong positive correlation between pay and performance(Szymanski & Smith 1997; Hall et al. 2002; Rosner & Shropshire 2004; Buraimo etal. 2007; Barros & Garcia-del-Barrio 2008). To add to this intriguing range of Page No. 1
  • 2. MA Sports Management Philip Barnesliterature, this study will also look at wage disparity, its consequent competitiveimbalance and the implication of subsequent ‘bought successes’ on consumer welfare. Sporting success is an individual entity with different meanings for differentteams; for example, to recently promoted teams, the interpretation of success ismaintaining FAPL status for the following year. To the Big Four, success is theFAPL title and competing for the CL, whilst mid table teams’ aim for entry to the lessimportant but still financially resourceful UEFA Cup. As Downward & Dawson(2000) identify, the Big Four may contest the championship whereas many stand nohope in even competing. In the FAPL, it appears that the more affluent clubs gain themost success. Differences in teams’ prosperity originate from an array ofcharacteristics including their history, demand for tickets with willingness to pay,stadium size, allure of sponsorship, effective management and marketing to mention afew (Szymanski & Smith 1997, Frick 2005). Can a financial injection upon a clubenhance that team’s performance? This is an extremely captivating question,considering the fact that Chelsea couldn’t compete with Arsenal, Liverpool andManchester United before they were taken over by Russian billionaire RomanAbramovich prior to the 2003/2004 season. Interestingly, Arsenal, Liverpool andManchester United all share one common characteristic, their red home kit. Attrill etal. (2008) undertook a study that suggested football teams with a red kit share a strongpositive correlation with long term success. They warn that ‘the injection of largesums of money into individual teams, irrespective of shirt colour, may begin tooverride any selective advantage that has built up over the last 50 years (p.581).’Chelsea’s kit is blue, and so is the mood of Williams (2007, p.137) who proposesbillionaire takeovers provide ‘a bleak future for the premiership as a whole.’ Abramovich doubled Chelsea’s wage bill in his first season, bringing themcloser to FAPL success than ever before, finishing second to Arsenal. Frick (2005,p.250) argues that in addition to players salaries, ‘head coach remuneration has apositive and statistically significant influence on a team’s performance.’ A newmanager, whose contract made him the highest paid manger in the world (Burt 2005),Jose Mourinho, took over in the summer of 2004 and promptly guided his highestpaid FAPL team to two successive FAPL titles, the FA Cup and two League Cups.Coinciding with this drive towards English football dominance was an ever-advancing Page No. 2
  • 3. MA Sports Management Philip Barnesassault on European CL success (Appendix 1). Wagg (2007, p.447) places this recentsuccess by virtue of Mourinho’s skill rather than Abramovich’s millions, adding thatin the Premiership ‘there is equality of opportunity and that money cannot buysuccess,’ which is nonsense as Chelsea’s recent success has been no coincidence;looking at the Big Four price for success analysis (Appendix 2), we can see thatChelsea have paid a much higher price than their competitors for domestic andEuropean points1. The comparative Big Four success graph (Appendix 3) paints aclear picture, with Chelsea spending an estimated £406 million more than their rivalsfor an equivalent level of success. Football clubs spend in an attempt to achieve sporting success, as the financialrewards continue to prove principal incentives (Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo etal. 2006). If successful, the rewards can be plentiful, but if not, clubs can fall intoserious financial difficulty; this may involve selling top players for a reduced price,going into administration or selling the club. This scenario has escalated recentlyaccording to Buraimo et al. (2006), who recall the downfall of Leeds and West HamUnited who had to sell their best talent at a reduced rate. The authors also discover aparadox where FAPL is ever increasing in affluence due to the vast broadcast ofgames and the fact that clubs are becoming global brands. These characteristicscombined were the catalyst for the high wage bills of the current climate (Forrest et al.2006; Noll 2007). Rosner & Shropshire (2004) identify a spiral effect whereescalating salary costs increase as a result of the precedent set by the previous season.As we see by comparing recent FAPL total wage bills (Appendix 4), a coefficient (R²)of 0.85 shows a strong positive correlation that the total wage expenditure in theFAPL increases each season. According to Deloitte (2008), the wage total for the2007/08 Premier League season was £1.1 billion2. Unlike the majority of Americansports, football is a free market where teams can offer whatever they can afford;according to Hall et al. (2002), ‘teams compete in the market for playing talent,bidding up salaries to the point where wages equal marginal revenue products,therefore total payroll is a perfect predictor of performance.’ We will look at pointsas a measure of team’s performance, despite Simmons & Forrest (2004, p.128)suggesting that ‘teams in a league competition are probably less concerned with1 Using the familiar point system, 3 for a win, 1 for a draw, 0 for a defeat, in the knockout stages of theCL, this analysis became more accurate.2 Estimated with the average exchange rate for the year on €1.4 billion Page No. 3
  • 4. MA Sports Management Philip Barnespoints ratio than their relative standing.’ It is an obvious theory that the more points ateam has the higher their relative standing; with an R² of 0.89 (Appendix 5), thisrelationship is nearly perfect and is therefore an ideal measurement of performance. Barros & Garcia-del-Barrio (2008, p.26) summarise an extensive range ofliterature (Hall et al. 2002; Rosner & Shropshire 2004; Simmons & Forrest 2004;Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo et al. 2006; Togler & Schmidt 2007) suggesting‘investment made in players is positively correlated to points scored on the pitch.’Looking at the FAPL between the 2000/01 and 2006/07 seasons, a coefficient of 0.58was identified (Appendix 6), showing the significant positive relationship betweenindividual annual team wage bills and the level of seasonal points they accrued. It ispossible however to eliminate time from the equation to strengthen the analysisfurther. A seven year time span can see a huge difference in the value of money, thususing a relative wage system, where the season’s average wage is taken from eachteam’s wage bill, the relationship is further reinforced with a coefficient 0.63(Appendix 7). This reinforces the wide array of literature suggesting higher wagespend will yield better performance. Incidentally the PKF Football Finance AnnualReport 2008 shows that 59% of FAPL club financial directors would be budgeting tospend more on the first team salaries, with 66% saying they would be reducing thefirst team squad to do so; perhaps their optimal FAPL team would sacrifice squaddepth for richer quality which could possibly have an adverse effect. The theorysuggests that performance and wage bill are very highly correlated (Szymanski &Smith 1997), yet not perfect ‘due to factors such as managerial talent, injuries, luck orpoor judgement (Hall et al. 2002, p.157).’ Team cohesion and homesickness mayalso affect individual performances, which according to Torgler & Schmidt (2007),are significantly related to salary. Tunaru et al. (2004, p.284) suggest that a football team striving for success indomestic and European competition ‘must employ the best, and inevitably, the mostexpensive players’; thus the most affluent clubs will command a greater level ofplaying talent (Szymanski & Smith 1997). Looking at the recent ProfessionalFootballer’s Association Player of the Year award, we can see the best players playfor the top four placed teams each year, coincidentally the highest paid as well(Appendix 8). With regard to the employment of the best playing talent, net transfer Page No. 4
  • 5. MA Sports Management Philip Barnesactivity must be taken into account. Comparing the transfer spend with theperformance of the thirteen teams that remained in the premiership throughout a fiveyear observation period (2002/03 – 2006/07), a significant relationship of 0.5 can beseen (Appendix 9). This relationship would be a lot stronger if Chelsea hadn’t spenterratically in the transfer market, three times more in fact than the next highestspending team. Investment in player talent alone will not guarantee success accordingto Frick & Simmons (2005, p.16), who suggest that an increase in wages and transferspending needs to be ‘accompanied by some investment in coaching talent if teamsare to progress up the league.’ In a detrimental effect on the league, larger marketteams will preside over smaller teams as they can afford to hire more talent, be itplaying or managerial (Simmons & Forrest 2004). Wage disparity is damaging the competitiveness of the FAPL, with a wideninggap between the big four and the rest (Michie & Oughton 2005; Buraimo et al. 2006);Rosner & Shropshire (2004, p.9) picture it as ‘the division between the haves and thehave nots.’ A successful league campaign and subsequent European expedition willbring increased revenue to a club enabling the potential capture of more and betterplaying talent, to help ensure future successes. Conversely, usually the financiallyweaker teams that aren’t performing well get relegated, which can be economicallydevastating to the club who will have to make substantial losses to survive (Michie &Oughton 2005; Buraimo et al. 2006); Simmons & Forrest (2004) recommend thatteams with high relegation risk should spend to survive. Buraimo et al. (2007, p.204)add to the already identified relationship between pay and performance, confirmingthat ‘teams with higher revenues will have higher league positions or winningpercentages than teams with smaller revenues.’ Every year the inequality ofexpenditure is increasing, shown in a wage dispersion box plot (Appendix 10). Thissystem shows the level of imbalance there is through dispersion and skew. Acommon characteristic through the seasons was the majority of teams sitting below£45 million per year, which coincided with an unfair rapid increase of wages betweenthe top tier and the bottom. The highest paid team was paying an estimated 3.5 timesas much as the lowest paid team in the 2000/2001 season opposed to an incredible 7.5times in 2006/2007. The FAPL is the worlds most popular soccer league, howeverWagg (2008) points out that the competition is beginning to lack credibility as thepotential champions are too easily predicted. Page No. 5
  • 6. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Using the C5 index of competitive balance derived by Michie & Oughton(2004), we can analyse if the FAPL is in fact competitively imbalanced. The C5index is gained by dividing the top five teams’ net total of points by the total numberof points won by all clubs. In a perfectly balanced league of 20 teams, the C5 ratioshould equal 0.25, therefore anything greater than this shows the level of competitivedisproportion. The FAPL has an average C5 index of 0.35 between the 2000/01 and2006/07 seasons highlighting the constant inequality. Given the link between pay andperformance alongside the widening gap between the top and bottom teams, it isobvious to see why the contest is imbalanced. Research suggests that this competitivediscrepancy could deteriorate the level of FAPL broadcasting as consumers want tosee more competition and uncertainty of outcome (Forrest et al. 2006; Noll 2007).Kesenne (2007, p.11) argues that ‘fans don’t like to see the same clubs on top yearafter year;’ this author regards competitive imbalance to reduce fan interest.However, to explain the global popularity of the league, the ‘competitiveness of theweaker teams is crucial to maintain the uncertainty of game outcomes (Rosner &Shropshire 2004, p.57).’ Thus the FAPL remains balanced when the big four are removed from theequation, and even when they aren’t, Andreff & Szymanski (2006, p.597) suggest the‘realisation of the completely unexpected can generate enormous satisfaction.’ On thecontrary, competition between the big four is also fierce with unbelievablecompetitive balance where bookmakers usually give very small odds as they are souncertain of the outcome. It is this uncertainty of outcome which maintains consumerinterest according to Rosner & Shropshire (2004). One of the best feasible measuresto determine fan interest level is through attendance figures. Whilst the FAPL’saverage attendance also gradually increased throughout the seven year period, aconsiderable relationship of 0.33 was seen between attendance figures andperformance (Appendix 12). Therefore the consumer interest remains high despitethis imbalance with fans increasing in attendance watching teams achieving moresuccess (Forrest & Simmons 2002). However, Noll (2007, p.419) warns that ‘thecentralization of the sale of television rights in leagues will cause increasing harm toconsumers by restricting choice and raising prices.’ The twenty teams that form theFAPL must remain independent sporting clubs with respect to their sporting Page No. 6
  • 7. MA Sports Management Philip Barnesperformances, yet also form economic allies to sustain and enhance consumer welfare(Flynn & Gilbert 2001; Rosner & Shropshire 2004); in addition, Buraimo et al. (2006)argue that a financial disaster for one team could weaken the league as a whole. To summarise, this study has strengthened the recent array of recent literaturehighlighting the link between pay and performance. A significant relationship of 0.63helped prove the assumption that ‘greater spending on talent will indeed translate tohigher win percent (Simmons & Forrest 2004, p.123).’ Thus teams in the FAPL canbuy success to a relatively large extent; considering that the theory isn’t perfect due toexternal factors such as injuries and poor form, the PKF Football Finance AnnualReport 2008 suggests performance related pay is the way forward for teams lookingto focus their financial resources on the best players. 54% of FAPL clubs in thecurrent 2008/2009 season are making 10-25% of players pay dependant onperformance. However, such a system will evidently create a competitive imbalancebetween the richer and poorer teams (Hall et al. 2002; Michie & Oughton 2004;Szymanski 2007). However, given the attendance figures we can see that buyingsuccess in the FAPL fails to affect consumers’ welfare negatively with fans inclinedto increase in attendance as their team gets more successful. Michie & Oughton(2004) suggest that applying best practice across each teams’ business strategy,marketing, financial management and corporate governance ‘would help to boost theincome of lagging clubs and close the revenue gap.’ Page No. 7
  • 8. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Appendix Appendix 1 – Chelsea’s Champions League Progression (Various Seasons) Owner Season Chelsea’s Champions League Progression Ken Bates 1998/99 Didn’t Qualify Ken Bates 1999/00 Quarter Final Ken Bates 2000/01 Didn’t Qualify Ken Bates 2001/02 Didn’t Qualify Ken Bates 2002/03 Didn’t Qualify Abramovich 2003/04 Semi Final Abramovich 2004/05 Semi Final Abramovich 2005/06 Quarter Final Abramovich 2006/07 Semi Final Abramovich 2007/08 Final Appendix 2 – The Big Four: Price for Success Analysis Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Wages 60,569,000 69,889,000 66,012,000 82,965,000 89,700,000 Transfers 16,762,000 12,188,000 8,736,000 11,793,000 8,009,000Arsenal Total Money 77,331,000 82,077,000 74,748,000 94,758,000 97,709,000 League Points 78 90 83 67 68 Cup Points 10 13 10 25 11 Total Points 88 103 93 92 79 Money Per Point £878,761 £796,864 £803,742 £1,029,978 £1,236,823 Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Wages 54,365,000 114,784,000 108,887,000 114,002,000 132,800,000 Transfers -354,000 131,049,000 126,724,000 85,425,000 11,740,000Chelsea Total Money 54,011,000 245,833,000 235,611,000 199,427,000 144,540,000 League Points 67 79 95 91 83 Cup Points 0 19 19 11 19 Total Points 67 98 114 102 102 Money Per Point £806,134 £2,508,500 £2,066,763 £1,955,167 £1,417,059 Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Wages 54,431,000 65,635,000 64,233,000 68,868,000 92,300,000 Transfers 15,981,000 3,324,000 20,157,000 28,212,000 46,173,000Liverpool Total Money 70,412,000 68,959,000 84,390,000 97,080,000 138,473,000 League Points 64 60 58 82 68 Cup Points 8 0 22 12 22 Page No. 8
  • 9. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Total Points 72 60 80 94 90 Money Per Point £977,944 £1,149,317 £1,054,875 £1,032,766 £1,538,589 Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Wages 79,517,000 76,874,000 77,010,000 85,389,000 77,600,000 Transfers 7,861,000 28,804,000 -2,651,000 32,551,000 10,587,000Manchester Total Money 87,378,000 105,678,000 74,359,000 117,940,000 88,187,000 League Points 83 75 77 83 89 Cup Points 15 15 11 6 18 Total Points 98 90 88 89 107 Money Per Point £891,612 £1,174,200 £844,989 £1,325,169 £824,178 Appendix 3 – Buying Success: The Big Four Buying Success - The Big Four 1,000,000,000 600 900,000,000 Expenditure Points Achieved 500 Expenditure (Wage & Transfers) 800,000,000 Points (Premiership and 700,000,000 Champions League) 400 600,000,000 500,000,000 300 400,000,000 200 300,000,000 200,000,000 100 100,000,000 0 0 Arsenal Chelsea Liverpool Manchester United Team Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 – 2007, Champions League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Appendix 4 -Recent Increase of FAPL Wages Graph Recent Increase of FAPL Wages £1,000 Annual FAPL Wages (Millions) £900 £800 2 R = 0.8524 £700 y = 53.12x - 105656 £600 £500 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Page No. 9 2006 2007 Annual FAPL Seasons
  • 10. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Appendix 5 - Points and Performance Relationship Graph FAPL Points and Performance Relationship 20 18 16 14Position in League 2 R = 0.8917 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 League Points Accrued Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League) Appendix 6 - FAPL Wage Performance Relationship Graph FAPL Wage Performance Relationship (2000-2007) 120 100 League Points Accrued 80 60 y = 6E-07x + 30.833 R2 = 0.5826 40 20 0 Page No. 10 £0 £20,000,000 £40,000,000 £60,000,000 £80,000,000 £100,000,000 £120,000,000 £140,000,000 Annual Wage (Millions)
  • 11. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Appendix 7 – FAPL Relative Wage Performance Graph FAPL Relative Wage Performance Relationship 120 100 Performance (Points) 80 60 40 2 R = 0.6284 y = 6E-07x + 52.121 20 0 -£60,000, -£40,000, -£20,000, £0 £20,000, £40,000, £60,000, £80,000, £100,000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 ,000 Relative Wage Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Appendix 8 – The Performance of Teams with Award Winning High Wage Players 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 PFA Player of the Year T.Sheringham R.V.Nistelrooy T.Henry T.Henry J.Terry S.Gerrard C.Ronaldo Team Man Utd Man Utd Arsenal Arsenal Chelsea Liverpool Man Utd Teams Wage Bill 50,002,000 69,999,000 60,569,000 69,889,000 108,887,000 68,868,000 92,300,000 Teams Position in League 1 3 2 1 1 3 1PFA Young Player of the Year S.Gerrard C.Bellamy J.Jenas S.Parker W.Rooney W.Rooney C.Ronaldo Team Liverpool Newcastle Newcastle Chelsea Man Utd Man Utd Man Utd Teams Wage Bill 48,880,000 32,055,000 45,195,000 114,784,000 77,010,000 85,389,000 92,300,000 Teams Position in League 3 4 3 2 3 2 1 Data Source: Professional Footballer’s Association 2008 Page No. 11
  • 12. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Appendix 9 – Net Transfer Activity Affecting Performance Player Spending and Performance (Five Year Period) 450 400 2 R = 0.5019 350 Net Points 300 250 200 0 50,000,0 100,000, 150,000, 200,000, 250,000, 300,000, 350,000, 400,000, 00 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 Net Transfer Activity (£) Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2002 - 2007) Appendix 10 – Wage Dispersion Box Plot FAPL Wage Dispersion Box Plot [2000 to 2007] 140 120 100Club Wages (Millions) 80 60 40 20 0 Page No. 12 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Annual FAPL Seasons
  • 13. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes Data Source: Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2002 - 2007) Appendix 11 – Seasonal Wage Comparison Graph Coefficient of Pay Season Mean Wage Standard Deviation and Performance 2000/01 28.3998 11.646873 0.486519 2001/02 34.2090 14.943004 0.779042 2002/03 38.0396 15.732267 0.533733 2003/04 40.5737 23.088258 0.617164 2004/05 38.3837 22.551997 0.741742 2005/06 41.0479 25.421491 0.708655 2006/07 48.5150 27.912529 0.668845 Data Source: Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Appendix 12 – Club Performance and Consumer Welfare Performance and Consumer Welfare 80000 R2 = 0.3291 70000 60000 50000Attendance 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Points (Performance) Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007) Page No. 13
  • 14. MA Sports Management Philip Barnes BibliographyANDREFF, W., SZYMANSKI, S. 2006. Handbook on the Economics of Sport. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing.ATTRILL, M. J. GRESTY, K.A., HILL, R.A., BARTON, R.A. Red Shirt Colour isAssociated with Long-Term Success in English Football. Journal of Sports Sciences,26(6):577-582, February 2008BARROS, C.P., GARCIA-DEL-BARRIO, P. Efficiency Measurement of the EnglishFootball Premier League with a Random Frontier Model. Economic Modelling,25(1):994-1002, January 2008BURAIMO, B., FORREST, D., SIMMONS, R. Freedom of Entry, Market Size andCompetitive Outcome: Evidence from English Soccer. Southern Economic Journal,74(1):204-213, July 2007BURAIMO, B., SIMMONS, R., SZYMANSK, S. English Football. Journal of SportsEconomics, 7(1):29-46, February 2006BURT, J. 6th April 2005. The Independent - Victory for Mourinho as Chelsea Back Down andOffer Record Deal. [Online]. Available:http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/victory-for-mourinho-as-chelsea-back-down-and-offer-record-deal-531341.html. [4th November 2008]DELOITTE & TOUCHE. (2000 - 2007). Annual Review of Football Finance. Manchester:Deloitte and Touche.DOWNWARD, P., DAWSON, A. 2000. The Economics of Professional Team Sports.London: Routledge.FLYNN, M.A., GILBERT, R.J. The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint -Ventures. The Economic Journal, 111(469):27-46, February 2001FORREST, D., SIMMONS, R. BURAIMO, B. 2006. Broadcaster and Audience Demand forPremier League Football. In JEANRENAUD, C., KESENNE, S., The Economics of Sportand the Media (p.93-105). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.FORREST, D., SIMMONS, R. Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance Demand in Sport: TheCase of English Soccer. The Statistician, 51(2):229-241, 2002FRICK, B. Buying Success is Possible. Sportwissenschaft, 35(3):250-270, 2005FRICK, B., SIMMONS, R. The Impact of Managerial Quality on OrganizationalPerformance: Evidence from German Soccer (Working Paper). The Department ofEconomics: Lancaster University:1-25, 2005 Page No. 14
  • 15. MA Sports Management Philip BarnesHALL, S., SZYMANSKI, S., ZIMBALIST, A.S. Testing Causality Between TeamPerformance and Payroll: The Cases of Major League Baseball and English Soccer. Journalof Sports Economics, 3(2):149-168, May 2002KESENNE, S. 2007. The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports: An AnalyticalTreatment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.MICHIE, J., OUGHTON, C. 2004. Competitive Balance in Football: Trends and Effects.London: Sport Nexus.MICHIE, J., OUGHTON, C. 2005. Competitive Balance in Football: An Update. London:Sport Nexus.NOLL, R.G. Broadcasting and Team Sports. Scottish Journal of Political Economy,54(3):400-421, July 2007PKF FOOTBALL SERVICES GROUP. (2008). Under Pressure - The Annual Survey ofFootball Club Finance Directors. London: Author.PREMIER LEAGUE. (2000 – 2007). Statistics Centre. [Online]. Available:http://www.premierleague.com/page/Statistics/0,,12306,00.html. [3rd November 2008]PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLERS ASSOCIATION. 2008. Roll of Honour. [Online].Available: http://www.givemefootball.com/pfa-awards/pfa-players-player/roll-ofhonour. [2ndNovember 2008]RONAY, B. 3rd September 2008. The Guardian - Can Money Buy Success? [Online].Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/sep/03/manchestercity.business. [4thNovember 2008]ROSNER, S. SHROPSHIRE, K.L. 2004. The Business of Sports. London: Jones & BartlettPublishers.SIMMONS, R., FORREST, D. 2004. Buying Success: Team Performance and Wage Bills inU.S and European Sports Leagues. In FORT, R., FIZEL, J., International Sports EconomicsComparisons (p.123-140). Kent: Greenwood Publishing Group.SZYMANSKI, S. The Champions League and The Coase Theorem. Scottish Journal ofPolitical Economy, 54(3):353-373, July 2007SZYMANSKI, S., SMITH, R. The English Football Industry: Profit, Performance andIndustrial Structure. International Review of Applied Economics, 11(1):135-153, January1997TORGLER, B., SCHMIDT, S.L. What Shapes Player Performance in Soccer? EmpiricalFindings from a Panel Analysis. Applied Economics, 39(18):2355-2369, October 2007TUNARU, R., CLARK, E., VINEY, H. An Option Pricing Framework for Valuation ofFootball Players. Review of Financial Economics, 14(1):281-295, November 2004WAGG, S. Angels of Us All? Football Management, Globalization and the Politics ofCelebrity. Soccer and Society, 8(4):440-458, October 2007WILLIAMS, J. Rethinking Sports Fandom: The Case of European Soccer. Leisure Studies,26(2):127-146, April 2007 Page No. 15

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