Transcending Zombies

Transcending Zombies Pete Mandik Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory William Paterson University, New Jersey USA

Primary Goal

To articulate a transcendental argument for the conclusion that my physical doppelganger cannot be a zombie.

Reductive Physicalism and Zombies

Reductive Physicalism = A being maximally physically similar to me while numerically distinct must be phenomenally similar to me.

I’m not a zombie.

Reductive Physicalism = A being maximally physically similar to me while numerically distinct must not be a zombie.

The Transcending Zombies Argument in Brief

I know that I’m not a zombie.

If it’s possible to know that I’m not a zombie, then it’s necessary that qualia are such-and-such.

Fixing my physical properties fixes my such-and-such.

____

 Qualia are physical

What’s SUCH-AND-SUCH?

(A certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content

What are concepts?

Two working characterizations:

1. The knowledge we bring to bear in judgment

(George judges dogs to be mammals  George has the concepts /dog/ and /mammal/  George knows stuff about dogs and mammals)

2. Mental particulars satisfying the re-identifiability criterion

(possessing concept C  the possessor is able to re-identify objects falling under C as such)

(George has /dog/  George is able to identify a dog as such on multiple occasions)

The Transcending Zombies Argument

P1. If it is possible for me to know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.

P2. I know that I am not a zombie.

P3. Phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.

P4. Fixing my physical properties fixes my conceptualized egocentric contents.

C. Fixing my physical properties fixes my phenomenal properties.

Remarks on premises 1, 3, & 4

P1. If it is possible for me to know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character has to be exhausted by (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.

P2. I know that I am not a zombie.

P3. Phenomenal character is exhausted by (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content.

P4. Fixing my physical properties fixes my conceptualized egocentric contents.

C. Fixing my physical properties fixes my phenomenal properties.

P1: This is the biggie. Much will be said very soon on its behalf, including clarifications of the notions of conceptualized and egocentric contents used in P1, P3, and P4

P3: Follows straightforwardly from P1 & P2.

P4: Further discussion must await the unpacking of “conceptualized” and “egocentric”

P2: I know that I am not a zombie

I know that I am not a zombie

I know that I am not a zombie

Following Lynch (2004), I stipulate the equivalence of P2 to:

I am certain that I have some qualitatively conscious mental states now

P2: I know that I am not a zombie (cont’d)

Also following Lynch (2004), three reasons for P2:

Attempts to doubt P2 hurts your head, and head hurting is phenomenal

The falsity of P2 cannot be imagined

The “problem of consciousness” makes sense only if P2

P1, Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Conceptual Content

The story of George and the rock:

If George has the concepts /hard/ and /lumpy/ but not the concept /igneous/, then all George can know about the rock is that it is hard and lumpy and not that it is igneous. hard & lumpy! hard, lumpy, & igneous

P1, Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Conceptual Content (cont’d)

The story of George and the rock:

Relative to George’s current conceptual repertoire, that the rock is igneous is unknowable. It is un-conceptualized residue. For all George knows, that rock is not igneous. hard & lumpy! hard, lumpy, & igneous

The story of Pete and his qualia:

If I know that I’m not a zombie, then my current mental states have a set of qualia, Q, such that I know that I have them and no member of which is un-conceptualized residue. Relative to my current qualia, my conceptual repertoire is fully adequate . Mmm, coffee-y! Self-known non-zombie

The story of Pete and his qualia:

If my current qualia are un-conceptualized residue, then for all I know I don’t have them. For all I know, I’m a zombie. Mmm, coffee-y! Self-known non-zombie

P1, Part Two: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Egocentricity

Egocentric content = the content of mental states concerning the creature of which they are states

EXAMPLES:

My perceptual content of my coffee cup as being off to my left

Neural activations in one’s LGN code for luminance events in retinocentric space

P1, Part Two: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Egocentricity (cont’d)

The story of Pete and his qualia (cont’d):

If I’m incapable of representing my qualia as mine, then I can know that someone has qualia without knowing that it’s me. Whose coffee qualia are these? WTF!? Ignorant coffee fiend

P1, Part Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is Phenomenal Character

The previous arguments showed

PK  (P  CE)

(where PK=Phenomenal Knowledge, P=Phenomenal Character, and CE = Conceptualized Egocentric Content)

Now consider whether

PK  (CE  P).

If [PK & (CE & ~P)], then I could have phenomenal knowledge even though all my judgments of the form “I have qualia Q” are false.

However, knowledge entails truth.

P1, Part Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is Phenomenal Character (cont’d)

So far, PK  (CE  P)

If my current qualia are knowable by me, then my current conceptual repertoire must contain a structure isomorphic to my current qualia

Beyond Isomorphism: Identity

I want to argue that phenomenal character is not just isomorphic to, but identical to, a certain kind of conceptual content.

However, reflections on knowability alone will not establish this, otherwise George would have rocks in his head.

Preliminary reasons why, unlike rocks, qualia are made of concepts

Plausibly, at least some character is conceptual, e.g. the experience of experts

The concept-independence of rocks bears an explanatory burden unmatched by the concept-independence of qualia. (More later.)

Part of our rock concept is that they have a reality that outstrips their appearance, whereas /quale/ is an appearance concept (explicable in terms of epistemic appearances. More later.)

P4: My Physical Properties Fix My Conceptualized and Egocentric Contents

Conceptual contents alone do not suffice for phenomenality

example:

unconscious object id

Egocentric contents alone do not suffice for phenomenality

examples:

visual agnosic’s “card posting”

LGN retinocentric neural codes

P4: My Physical Properties Fix My Conceptualized and Egocentric Contents (cont’d)

Arguments to the contrary presuppose direct phenomenal concepts, which are the target of my “The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity”

Brief remark: alleged concepts that can be had only while currently having a quale violate the re-identifiability criterion

Conceptualism, Part One: Explaining Appearances

What needs to be explained: How can the dog seem blue to Jones even though he believes it’s white?

Compare: The Monty Hall Problem: How can keeping his door seem correct to Jones even though he believes it’s incorrect?

In both cases, Jones has a disposition to make a judgment that he overrides due to collateral information.

We still need, however, an explanation of the difference between Jones’s belief that the dog is white and his experience of it as if blue.

Jones’s as if blue dog experience = a reciprocally interacting pairing of a sensation carrying egocentric blue dog information and a conceptualization of that information

Jones’s white dog belief = a conceptualization concerning a white dog

011001 Blue dog White dog

Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining Diachronic-Discrimination Failures

Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not serial presentations prima facie constitute violations of the re-identifiability criterion

Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not serial presentations

MASK!

My conceptualist explanatory strategy:

Argue that the simultaneous and serial presentations differ in their perceptual contents.

Judgment-based models of Kelly cases:

A is F

B is not F

A  B

(where F is predicative and A and B are names, demonstatives, or descriptions)

In the simultaneous presentation, judgments 1, 2, and 3 are roughly simultaneous. In the serial presentation, 1 and 2 are temporally more spread out and 3 is withheld.

Why would someone fail to judge that, (3) A  B?

The Information Deficiency option: The subject fails to believe either (1) or (2) or both.

The Inferential-Failure option: The subject believes both (1) and (2) but nonetheless fails to infer (3)

Problems with the Inferential-Failure option.

Plausible explanations of inferential failure would appeal to either

The complexity of the premises,

The premises being believed but non-occurrently, or

The premises being believed but non-consciously

… none of which are particularly applicable to Kelly cases which involve non-complex, occurrent, conscious states.

Cashing out Information Deficiency

Memory Failure (E.g., it is forgotten that A is F )

Problem: if /A/ is atomic and the first and fleeting representation of A, then it fails re-identifability. (And some may find implausible that it’s non-atomic.)