Phenomenal Consciousness and the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Pete Mandik Associate Professor Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory Chairman, Department of Philosophy William Paterson University, New Jersey USA

Three Problems of Consciousness What is state consciousness? (What makes a mental state conscious and not unconscious?) What is transitive consciousness? (What are we conscious of ?) What is phenomenal character? (What are qualia? What is “what it is like” ?)

What is state consciousness?

(What makes a mental state conscious and not unconscious?)

What is transitive consciousness?

(What are we conscious of ?)

What is phenomenal character?

(What are qualia? What is “what it is like” ?)

The Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Consciousness Consciousness consists in the interface between allocentric and egocentric coding schemes for perceptible features Conscious states are hybrids of allocentric and egocentric representations and phenomenal character is determined by their contents

Consciousness consists in the interface between allocentric and egocentric coding schemes for perceptible features

Conscious states are hybrids of allocentric and egocentric representations and phenomenal character is determined by their contents

What is the egocentric allocentric distinction? ALLOCENTRIC EGOCENTRIC Self-specifying contents Non-self-specifying contents Online (sensorimotor) Offline (memory and planning) Analog, isomorphism Conceptual, categorical Info. encapsulation Inferential promiscuity

Levels of visual processing

What is the progression of levels? Egocentric-to-Allocentric transformations Low-level (LGN and V1) Egocentric reps Intermediate-level (IT and PP) Egocentric/Allocentric Hybrid reps Highlevel (Frontal Cortex and Hippocampus) Allocentric reps

Egocentric-to-Allocentric transformations

So, where is consciousness? Not at either end of the Egocentric-Allocentric continuum

Not at either end of the Egocentric-Allocentric continuum

Pure Allocentric Pure Egocentric Retinocentric Body-centered Limited viewpoint invariance Amodal Category knowledge The Allocentric-Egocentric Interface The reciprocally influencing representations jointly comprise a conscious state

Pure Allocentric

Consciousness is not purely egocentric Patient DF’s visual form agnosia (Milner and Goodale 1995) Bilateral ventral stream damage to area LO

Patient DF’s visual form agnosia (Milner and Goodale 1995)

Bilateral ventral stream damage to area LO

Consciousness is not purely egocentric Patient DF’s visual form agnosia Perceptual consciousness of form and orientation destroyed, but sensorimotor skill intact

Patient DF’s visual form agnosia

Perceptual consciousness of form and orientation destroyed, but sensorimotor skill intact

Consciousness is not purely egocentric Visual consciousness is conceptually informed Theory ladeness of perception Dog Dog sniffing ground Dog’s butt facing you Did I mention the dog? What is this a picture of? Hints:

Visual consciousness is conceptually informed

Theory ladeness of perception

Dog

Dog sniffing ground

Dog’s butt facing you

Did I mention the dog?

Consciousness is not purely allocentric Thoughts alone have no phenomenal character: “ Pi is an irrational number” “ Natural selection depends on the variable inheritance of fitness” “ Democracy and capitalism are incompatible” Apparent phenomenality of thought due to associated imagery (Jackendoff 1987)

Consciousness is not purely allocentric . . .this . . . this, . . . or this . . . . . .but not this. THREE HOUSES Visual consciousness is never viewpoint independent. The contents are like. . .

. . .this . . . this, . . . or this . . .

The need for recurrence: TMS: feedback from area MT+/V5 to V1 necessary for visual awareness (P ascual-Leone & Walsh 2001) Backward masking invokes feedforward activation but suppresses recurrence (Lamme 2004) Feedforward activation recorded in anesthetized animals (Lamme 2004)

TMS: feedback from area MT+/V5 to V1 necessary for visual awareness (P ascual-Leone & Walsh 2001)

Backward masking invokes feedforward activation but suppresses recurrence (Lamme 2004)

Feedforward activation recorded in anesthetized animals (Lamme 2004)

State Consciousness Conscious states are composed of mutually influencing egocentric and allocentric representations Contra Higher Order Representational theories, metarepresentational states are unnecessary Contra First Order Representational theories, involvement of higher- level (though not higher order) states is necessary

Conscious states are composed of mutually influencing egocentric and allocentric representations

Contra Higher Order Representational theories, metarepresentational states are unnecessary

Contra First Order Representational theories, involvement of higher- level (though not higher order) states is necessary

Transitive Consciousness What we are conscious of are the contents of the allocentric-egocentric hybrid reps Contra HO theories, contents need not include other mental states (Transitivity is false) Contra FO theories, contents need not exclude other mental states (Transparency is false)

What we are conscious of are the contents of the allocentric-egocentric hybrid reps

Contra HO theories, contents need not include other mental states (Transitivity is false)

Contra FO theories, contents need not exclude other mental states (Transparency is false)

Phenomenal Character What it is like to be in a conscious state is fully determined by the representational content of that state.

What it is like to be in a conscious state is fully determined by the representational content of that state.

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