Nashville Dmi Impact Assessment

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Nashville Dmi Impact Assessment

  1. 1. Evaluating the MNPD Drug Market Initiative Nicholas Corsaro Southern Illinois University & Edmund F. McGarrell Michigan State University
  2. 2. The Problem <ul><li>The 800 block of N. 2 nd St. was a long entrenched open air drug market </li></ul><ul><li>This is a transitional neighborhood. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rental Properties </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Some scattered sight Sec. 8 housing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Older homes being remodeled </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>New residents moving in and revitalizing the area </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Demanding an end to the drug dealing </li></ul></ul></ul>
  3. 4. Problem - Calls for Service These two streets provide a good basis for comparison and some appreciation of the scope of the problem. Stockell St. is a parallel street one block east of N. 2 nd . Year 800 Block N. 2 nd St. 800 Block Stockell St. 2006 872 82 2007 1091 72 2008 thru 6/23 255 52
  4. 5. Preparation <ul><li>Obtaining support and approval from the Chief of Police </li></ul><ul><li>Obtaining buy-in from Precinct personnel. </li></ul><ul><li>Going public – explaining the concept to community stakeholders – residents, area neighborhood and business groups. </li></ul><ul><li>Informing the faith and treatment community about the concept and developing a coalition. </li></ul>
  5. 6. Preparation (cont’) <ul><li>Informing the rest of the Criminal Justice Community and City Administration getting buy-in </li></ul><ul><ul><li>District Attorney </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Public Defender </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>General Session and Criminal Courts </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mayor’s Office </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Sheriff’s Department </li></ul></ul>
  6. 7. The Law Enforcement Branch <ul><li>The easy part – this is what we do. </li></ul><ul><li>Over a period of months the East Precinct Crime Suppression Unit made undercover buys resulting in: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>55 cases prepared against </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>26 defendants </li></ul></ul><ul><li>All the buys were filmed – </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Terrific evidence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Provide great tool for informing citizen groups about the dynamics of street level drug dealing. </li></ul></ul>
  7. 8. The Intervention Transition <ul><li>At the time arrest sweep was conducted, the East Precinct had already met with area treatment providers and members of the faith community on 3 separate occasions informing them of our intent to replicate the High Point West End Project and recruiting partners. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Sought assistance from area faith leaders and leaders of treatment coalitions to get the word out. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The project was well received. We were very fortunate to get active partners involved. </li></ul></ul>
  8. 9. The Intervention Transition <ul><li>Who goes to intervention and how many? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Treatment providers want to know how many people will be referred to them and what their needs are. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>East Precinct could only provide that information toward the end of the law enforcement phase. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The District Attorney’s Office assigned a single prosecutor to work these cases. That prosecutor, working with investigators, made the final recommendations in regard to who faced prosecution and who was offered intervention. </li></ul></ul>
  9. 10. The Intervention Transition (cont’) <ul><ul><li>East officers began the process of meeting with families and completed briefs on each person slated for prosecution. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A meeting of the treatment providers was called and they were provided with these briefs. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The providers then did follow-up visits with family members of the intervention candidates and assisted in encouraging them to attend the call-in session. </li></ul></ul>
  10. 11. Notification <ul><li>On March 17, 2008, 18 persons were served with sealed indictments for drug trafficking. 2 others were served at a later date. </li></ul><ul><li>On March 24, 2008, 5 candidates were called in for intervention. </li></ul><ul><li>1 candidate re-offended the following weekend and was indicted. </li></ul><ul><li>1 additional candidate was called in for an intervention on a later date </li></ul>
  11. 12. Outcomes <ul><li>Calls for service in the 2 reporting areas immediately adjacent to N. 2 nd have dropped 46.3%. </li></ul><ul><li>Charges related to Drug equipment, Drug/Narcotic and Prostitution Arrests have dropped 88.4% </li></ul><ul><li>5 out of the 6 intervention candidates have continued to stay out of trouble. </li></ul><ul><li>UCR Part 1 crimes have remained somewhat constant when comparing 2007 and 2008 data. However, 2008 violent crime remains significantly lower than in 2006, prior precinct’s more focused efforts in the area. </li></ul>
  12. 13. Sustaining Gains <ul><li>Continued monitoring of the immediate treatment area and adjacent problem spots for emerging drug trafficking. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Efficient follow-up on citizen complaints </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Encourage continued empowerment and ownership on the part of area residents. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Aggressive and proactive enforcement </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Continued monitoring of our intervention candidates </li></ul>
  13. 14. Impact Assessment <ul><li>We used time series analysis to assess programmatic impact, which are highly regarded research methods (Bushway and McDowall, 2006) </li></ul><ul><li>5 years worth of UCR data, Drug Offense data, and Calls for Police Service (CFS) data </li></ul><ul><li>4 years pre-, 1 year post-intervention (March 2008, intervention date) </li></ul>
  14. 15. Impact Assessment <ul><li>Research design accounts for autocorrelation, seasonality, and trends in the data and isolates the intervention effect </li></ul><ul><li>We modeled UCR, drug offense, and CFS data for the McFerrin Park target community, adjacent neighborhoods, and the remainder of the Davidson County </li></ul>
  15. 16. Drug Offense Trends Narcotics & Drug Equipment Offenses aggregated = Drug Offenses Target & Adjoining neighborhoods combined 21.4 Drug Offenses Pre-Intervention, 11.2 Drug Offenses Post-Intervention
  16. 17. UCR Offense Trends Total Violent & Property Crimes aggregated = UCR Offenses Target & Adjoining neighborhoods combined 13.8 UCR Offenses Pre-Intervention, 10.2 UCR Offenses Post-Intervention
  17. 18. Calls For Service Trends Total CFS aggregated where someone requested police assistance = CFS Target & Adjoining neighborhoods combined 92.0 CFS Pre-Intervention, 74.2 CFS Post-Intervention
  18. 19. ARIMA Time Series Results MS = Marginally Statistically Significant p < .15 (Impact Assessment Standard) SS = Statistically Significant p < .05 (Social Science Standard) NS = Not Statistically Significant (Change May Be Product of Chance) Outcome McFerrin Park Adjacent Area Remainder Nashville Violent Crime MS Decline -24.0% NS Decline -23.9% NS Decline -7.4% Property Crime SS Decline -28.4% MS Decline -25.9% NS Decline -7.0% Drug Equipment SS Decline -36.8% SS Decline -22.2% MS Decline -9.3% Narcotics Offenses SS Decline -55.5% SS Decline -50.3% NS Increase 5.5% CFS MS Decline -18.1% MS Decline -1.0% NS Decline -5.9%
  19. 20. Summary of Statistical Results <ul><li>Immediate/Abrupt, statistically significant, and substantial decline in all outcomes for the McFerrin Park Target Community </li></ul><ul><li>Immediate/Abrupt, statistically significant decline with varying substantial changes for most outcomes in Adjacent Area </li></ul><ul><li>No evidence of a general trend in overall Davidson County that would account for changes seen in target and adjacent areas </li></ul>
  20. 21. Further Evaluation/Next Steps <ul><li>The need for detailed resident interviews </li></ul><ul><li>In addition to the criminal justice, social service, and faith-based community actions—what did active residents do beyond support the initiative? </li></ul><ul><li>Has resident ‘engagement’ changed after the intervention? </li></ul><ul><li>Does the DMI pulling levers intervention have a similar impact in other cities and sites? </li></ul>

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