Not only is this a 'how to' change behaviour, but an architecture from social psychology to understand the (sometimes confusing) world of behavioural economics, and behavioural communication
1. Behaviour, and
communication
4th
August 2012
Oliver Payne, founder, The Hunting Dynasty
Author of ‘Inspiring Sustainable Behaviour: 19 ways to ask for change’
oliver@thehuntingdynasty.com
| How, do you change behaviour?
7. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
| How do you change behaviour?
8. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
| How do you change behaviour?
9. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is
relative to what
you can have, not
absolutely about
what you want.
Your decision is affected by
what’s on offer – to the point
where the addition or subtraction
of things you don’t want still
affects your decision.
| How do you change behaviour?
10. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is Shared
relative to what understanding
you can have, not about expectations
absolutely about of behaviour within
what you want. a group.
We tend to conform to
expectations even though we
Your decision is affected by like to think of ourselves as
what’s on offer – to the point making personal and
where the addition or subtraction principled decisions.
of things you don’t want still
affects your decision. (Social, Injunctive, Descriptive . . .
Provincial, Proscr/Pre, etc)
| How do you change behaviour?
11. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is Shared
relative to what understanding Where you think
you can have, not about expectationsabout something
absolutely about of behaviour withinrelative to yourself
what you want. a group. affects what you
We tend to conform to
think about it
expectations even though we
Your decision is affected by like to think of ourselves as The closer – or more proximal –
what’s on offer – to the point making personal and events are the more we think
where the addition or subtraction principled decisions. about ‘actions’; the further away
of things you don’t want still – or distal – events are the more
affects your decision. (Social, Injunctive, Descriptive . we think ‘in theory’
..
Provincial, Proscr/Pre, etc) - Here/not here
- Me/not me
- Now/not now
- Clear/Unclear
| How do you change behaviour?
12. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is
relative to what
you can have, not
absolutely about
what you want.
Your decision is affected by
what’s on offer – to the point
where the addition or subtraction
of things you don’t want still
affects your decision.
| How do you change behaviour?
13. Context
Rolls Royce were having
problems selling cars in their
regular showrooms.
| How do you change behaviour?
14. Context
So they sold them at Yacht fairs,
Rolls Royce were having where the items on sale go for
problems selling cars in their a few million rather than a few
regular showrooms. hundred thousand.
| How do you change behaviour?
15. Context
So they sold them at Yacht fairs,
Rolls Royce were having where the items on sale go for
problems selling cars in their a few million rather than a few
regular showrooms. hundred thousand.
(I've saved £8m not
buying that yacht…
what's £350k for a
lovely car?!)
| How do you change behaviour?
16. Context
Huber & Puto beer
choice experiement
‘Market boundaries and product
choice’ 1983
| How do you change behaviour?
17. $1.80 $2.60
Context
30% 70%
| How do you change behaviour?
18. $1.80 $2.60
$1.60 Context
30% 70%
| How do you change behaviour?
19. $1.80 $2.60
$1.60 Context
0%
50% 50%
| How do you change behaviour?
20. $1.80 $2.60
Context
30% 70%
| How do you change behaviour?
21. $1.80 $2.60 $3.40
Context
30% 70%
| How do you change behaviour?
22. $1.80 $2.60 $3.40
Context
10%
0% 90%
| How do you change behaviour?
23. $1.80 $2.60 $3.40
$1.60 Context
Huber & Puto beer
choice experiement
‘Market boundaries and product
choice’ 1983
0% 10%
30% 70%
Who are we?
| How do you change behaviour?
24. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is
relative to what
you can have, not
absolutely about
what you want.
Your decision is affected by
what’s on offer – to the point
where the addition or subtraction
of things you don’t want still
affects your decision.
| How do you change behaviour?
25. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Shared
understanding
about expectations
of behaviour within
a group.
We tend to conform to
expectations even though we
like to think of ourselves as
making personal and
principled decisions.
(Social, Injunctive, Descriptive . . .
Provincial, Proscr/Pre, etc)
| How do you change behaviour?
26. Norms
In Australia, tax-payers
were informed that
normal practice was
honesty in tax returns
HEADS, YOU DIE: Bad decisions, choice architecture, and how to mitigate predictable irrationality | Jack Fuller | Per Capita research
| How do you change behaviour?behaviour?
create sustainable
27. Norms
The discrepancy between the average behaviour of
people and the perceived behaviour of the average
person can be pretty wide.
Deductions plunged by 47%
(675,000,000 Aus$ extra revenue)
HEADS, YOU DIE: Bad decisions, choice architecture, and how to mitigate predictable irrationality | Jack Fuller | Per Capita research
| How do you change behaviour?behaviour?
create sustainable
28. Norms
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
29. Norms
People steal bits of wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park.
Many past visitors have Please don’t remove the
removed petrified wood petrified wood from the Park,
from the Park, changing [nothing] in order to preserve
the natural state the natural state
of the Petrified Forest of the Petrified Forest
Signs were tested to stop the theft: Some more successful than others…
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
30. Norms
People steal bits of wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park.
Many past visitors have Please don’t remove the
removed petrified wood petrified wood from the Park,
from the Park, changing [nothing] in order to preserve
the natural state the natural state
of the Petrified Forest of the Petrified Forest
8% theft
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
31. Norms
People steal bits of wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park.
Many past visitors have Please don’t remove the
removed petrified wood petrified wood from the Park,
from the Park, changing [nothing] in order to preserve
the natural state the natural state
of the Petrified Forest of the Petrified Forest
8% theft 3% theft
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
32. Norms
People steal bits of wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park.
Many past visitors have Please don’t remove the
removed petrified wood petrified wood from the Park,
from the Park, changing [nothing] in order to preserve
the natural state the natural state
of the Petrified Forest of the Petrified Forest
8% theft 3% theft 1.7% theft
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
33. Norms
People steal bits of wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park.
Many past visitors have Please don’t remove the
removed petrified wood petrified wood from the Park,
from the Park, changing [nothing] in order to preserve
the natural state the natural state
of the Petrified Forest of the Petrified Forest
8% theft 3% theft 1.7% theft
“…a message that focuses recipients on the injunctive norm will
be superior to messages that focus recipients on the descriptive
norm.” (Cialdini et al., 2003)
Yes! 50 secrets from the science of persuasion | Goldstein, Martin, Cialdini | 2007 | pp20
| How do you change behaviour?
34. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Shared
understanding
about expectations
of behaviour within
a group.
We tend to conform to
expectations even though we
like to think of ourselves as
making personal and
principled decisions.
(Social, Injunctive, Descriptive . . .
Provincial, Proscr/Pre, etc)
| How do you change behaviour?
35. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Where you think
about something
relative to yourself
affects what you
think about it
The closer – or more proximal –
events are the more we think
about ‘actions’; the further away
– or distal – events are the more
we think ‘in theory’
- Here/not here
- Me/not me
- Now/not now
- Clear/Unclear
| How do you change behaviour?
36. US hybrid sales 2000 –’ 06 Temporal
discounting
(3,000 to 250,000)
1
1
Sales tax incentive: $1k
$1,000 $2,000
Kick-back Kick-back
| How do you change behaviour?
37. US hybrid sales 2000 –’ 06 Temporal
(3,000 to 250,000) discounting
1
1
Sales tax incentive: $1k
$1,000 $2,000
Sales tax discount Income tax rebate
| How do you change behaviour?
38. US hybrid sales 2000 –’ 06 Temporal
(3,000 to 250,000) discounting
1
1
Sales tax incentive: $1k
$1,000 $2,000
Sales tax discount Income tax rebate
Now Not now
| How do you change behaviour?
39. US hybrid sales 2000 –’ 06 Temporal
discounting
(3,000 to 250,000)
7 6
5
3 4 1
2
1
$1,000 $2,000
Sales tax discount Income tax rebate
Now Not now
The tendency for people to have excessively stronger
preferences for immediate gains relative to future gains.
| How do you change behaviour?
40. Norms
(quasi-stationary
Context equilibria)
(situational influences) Construal
(subjective influence)
Decision-making is Shared
relative to what understanding Where you think
you can have, not about expectationsabout something
absolutely about of behaviour withinrelative to yourself
what you want. a group. affects what you
We tend to conform to
think about it
expectations even though we
Your decision is affected by like to think of ourselves as The closer – or more proximal –
what’s on offer – to the point making personal and events are the more we think
where the addition or subtraction principled decisions. about ‘actions’; the further away
of things you don’t want still – or distal – events are the more
affects your decision. (Social, Injunctive, Descriptive . we think ‘in theory’
..
Provincial, Proscr/Pre, etc) - Here/not here
- Me/not me
- Now/not now
- Clear/Unclear
| How do you change behaviour?
41. “Just as no building lacks an
architecture, so no choice
lacks a context.”
Dr. Robert Cialdini, ex-Regents' Professor of Psychology and
Marketing Arizona State University
| How do you change behaviour?
Anthropologically speaking, we’ve developed lots of rules of thumb and schematic about the world around us in order to reduce the burned of cognitive load for day-to-day tasks liberating us to focus on advantage and survival. However, the last few hundred years of development have placed us in a world we no longer recognise: We jump a mile at snakes [show snake], but are ambivalent about electricity cable [show cable (ref: Pinker)]
Deal with hits developed lots of rules of thumb (and they are in system 1 – we get the answers for ‘free’ so we can think about protecting ourselves from lions, tigers, and strange monks lurking in the woods) [shot from In The Name Of The Rose]
There are so many decisions to make in life, those that are made for us a often welcomed. “ Defaults work best when decision makers are too indifferent, confused, or conflicted to consider their options. That principle is particularly relevant in a world that’s increasingly awash with choices https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A_marketers_guide_to_behavioral_economics_2536
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple. The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.) But here come the additions. A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this. Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal. With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split. The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
” In Israel – one of the first countries to sign a zero-emissions agreement with the Renault-Nissan Alliance – the government cut the purchase tax for new vehicles from 80% to 10% for all-electric vehicles.” We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/
It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.