Metropolitan Police Service Report 4 days in August

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The riots report entitled "4 days in August" states that the "phase red" instruction to mobilise all units across London on that Saturday night was not followed. The order was issued by the officer in charge of the Met's Public Order Command.

But instead an amber alert was relayed which meant all available resources were simply identified but not activated.

The report states there was an hour's delay before the mistake was rectified when the officer arrived in the special operations control room to discover the failure to issue the instruction.

The 145-page report also analyses what warnings were picked up following the police shooting of Mark Duggan.

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Metropolitan Police Service Report 4 days in August

  1. 1. Metropolitan Police Service4 DayS in auguStStrategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011final report MARCH 2012
  2. 2. foreworDI cannot conceive that there is a single person in We remain committed to calm and consideredthis country who was not affected in some way by analysis undertaken in a mature, open and whollythe events of last August; the Duggan family, those transparent way as the communities of Londonwhose lives and livelihoods were damaged or deserve nothing less. I continue to feel immenselydestroyed by the violence that spread across London, proud of the many officers and staff who did theirthose who chose to engage in criminal acts, those duty over those four days and beyond, in our bestwho watched, heard or read events unfolding on attempt to protect London and its people. From thesethe media or the many police officers and staff who wholly unprecedented events there are clearly thingsworked tirelessly to deal with the violent scenes. that we would do differently in the future or where we will have to enhance or invest in our approachThis review is the Metropolitan Police Service’s and I, and my Management Board, will carefullyassessment of what happened, importantly consider those plans as they come forward to ensurecontaining our key findings and recommendations, we are best placed to protect London in the future.detailing what work we have undertaken and willcontinue to take forward in the future.Since August we have worked alongside all of theother reviews to ensure that there is a measuredassessment of what happened and we will continue Bernard Hogan-Howe, QPM, MBA, MA (OXON)to participate fully in these processes. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report / 3
  3. 3. Scenes after the disorder in Clapham Junction.Photograph Courtesy of Press Association
  4. 4. contents1. Executive Summary and Recommendations2. Introduction3. The Events of August 2011 - Overview 3.1 Overview 3.2 Timeline4. Haringey - An in Depth Study 4.1 The Critical Incident - Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) working protocols 4.2 Family Liaison 4.3 Media 4.4 Community Engagement Haringey Borough 4.5 Outside Tottenham Police Station 4.6 Intelligence handling prior to disorder 4.7 Policing plans and resource considerations prior to the disorder5. Night One - disorder in Tottenham - 6th August 5.1 Overview 5.2 Responding to the disorder6. The Following Days 6.1 Day Two | Sunday 7th August - ­ncluding Enfield case study I 6.2 Day Three | Monday 8th August - ­ncluding Croydon and Wandsworth case studies I 6.3 Day Four | Tuesday 9th August7. The Findings 7.1 Independent Advice 7.2 Community Engagement - Local and London 7.3 Intelligence 7.4 Mobilisation 7.5 Resources 7.6 Public Order Tactics 7.7 Investigation 7.8 Criminal Justice8. Riot Damages9. conclusion10. Glossary of terms 11. Appendices Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 5
  5. 5. 1 executive summary and recommendationsThis report details the key issues that the Metropolitan staff interpreted the rules as meaning there werePolice Service (MPS) experienced during the limitations on what they could communicate publicly.disorders of August 2011 and outlines what went The seriousness of the Duggan investigation maywell and what did not, what developments have have made them even more cautious. The MPSoccurred and further changes that need to be made. accepts that it should have corrected the information once it became clear that the IPCC was not goingIn compiling this report the MPS has sought to take to correct the misreporting.a comprehensive view, to provide an accuratereflection of events and identify opportunities to 1.4 A new protocol between the IPCC and theimprove as an organisation. police in England and Wales on communication has now been published to provide greater clarityWhilst this is the final report of this review, extensive for police forces and the IPCC.work will continue within the MPS in order to developits findings and take the recommendations forward 2. Independent Adviceunder the direction of Assistant Commissioner 2.1 Haringey Borough made extensive use of aSpecialist Crime and Operations. community engagement model, which is in common use across the MPS, to obtain independent adviceThe MPS has already taken forward a significant and community intelligence. Central to this modelamount of work as a result of its review. Findings, areas is the use of Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs).of work underway and further work commissioned as The engagement model did not achieve its purposea result of the review are summarised below under in relation to the August disorder. It did not enablethemed headings. The senior MPS officer responsible the disorder to be predicted and did not help infor delivering the improvements is indicated, as well facilitating effective communication with Markas the timetable, where appropriate. Duggan’s family during the vigil outside Tottenham Police Station on Saturday 6th August, significantly1. Critical Incident Management at what turned out to be a crucial turning point in the1.1 Following the shooting of Mark Duggan the dynamics of the crowd.MPS took all appropriate actions to manage theimmediate events, complying with the national 2.2 Independent members of the community whostandards of critical incident management. are willing to give up their time and offer advice to the police are vital to the modern MPS. But the1.2 The MPS did not counter inaccurate reporting current MPS model for community engagement andabout the circumstances of Mark Duggan’s death. generating independent advice is inconsistent andThis was due to its belief that it was limited by the sometimes not transparent. In addition it is noteworthyprotocol agreed between the Independent Police that the complexity and diversity of London’sComplaints Commission (IPCC) and Association communities has grown since its establishment. Theof Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in relation to MPS is fundamentally reviewing the structure andcommenting on information so clearly pertinent to process of its community engagement model. It isthe IPCC’s investigation. looking at its effectiveness in penetrating communities and reaching key groups, including young people.1.3 The review found widespread confusion inthe MPS about what the police can say about an 2.3 This is involving not only talking to existinginvestigation involving the IPCC. MPS officers and IAG members but also seeking a new and wider6 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  6. 6. range of community voices that may not be heard approach to the monitoring of community tension,in the current system. The review is undertaking an the review recommends a detailed examination ofaudit of all MPS IAGs to include membership and the current Community Impact Assessment process.diversity profile and arrangements for their use. It will Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing)provide a clarity regarding the relationship of an - work to be completed by April 2012.independent member to the MPS and expectationsof that member. This will, in particular, address 3.4 Whilst the review has identified many goodthe question of advisors attending police planning examples of communication with local communitiesmeetings and then taking part in the public activity and business groups during and after the disorderwhich is the subject of that planning. More effective of August 2011, it has identified that activity wasrecording of the advice given, in order that disputes inconsistent and there was a degree of dislocationover what was said can be resolved later, will be between local and pan-London events. The MPS hasdeveloped. This will also allow the MPS to assess started a project to improve community engagementhow effectively it acted on specific advice. across London, identifying lessons from those boroughs which handle it well.2.4 In the shorter term, and in specific relation to Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing)Haringey Borough, the review recommends that - work to be completed by June 2012.the borough continues to work with its independentmembers and that representation is broadened from 3.5 The review has identified good examplesthe black community and those under the age of 30 of partnership working in a number of situations,to ensure younger voices are heard. particularly the strong relationship with London FireDeputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) Brigade. The MPS accepts that it should assess large- work to be completed by June 2012. scale public order incidents at an initial stage to assess whether the earlier utilisation of the London3. Community Engagement Local Resilience Partnership would be of benefit.3.1 Alongside IAGs, an additional element of To this end the MPS has already introduced thisthe MPS model of community engagement makes approach within its public order training courses.use of Key Individual Networks (KINs) - lists ofkey individuals within the local community. These 3.6 The MPS has identified the need to broadenwere used specifically in Haringey Borough and its engagement activity. In particular social mediaelsewhere in London during the August disorder. presented a portal through which the MPS shouldHowever the MPS did not gain an understanding have engaged with its communities more effectively,of the mood in communities and did not form an specifically by countering, in the interests of publicaccurate community intelligence picture. safety and confidence, information the MPS understood to be incorrect.3.2 In recognition that it is the MPS’s responsibilityto extend its reach into all communities, to fully 3.7 Through the launch of the ‘MPS Digitalunderstand what is happening locally, KINs are Communications Steering Group,’ the MPS hasalso subject to fundamental review as part of the undertaken significant work to sharpen its use ofMPS community engagement model. Initial work has social media and digital communications to engageidentified that, if they continue to be the engagement more widely with the people of London. It has alreadymechanism, the membership needs to be wider, increased the number and use of its twitter accountsparticularly to include young people. How the MPS and launched individual borough accounts, with anmakes the most effective use of these networks will undertaking for all boroughs to have an accountalso be an important aspect of this review. in 2012. It has also developed a new facebookDeputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) page and made use of ‘Bambuser,’ a live streaming- work to be completed by June 2012. website. This work will remain a high priority for years to come.3.3 The community impact assessment in Haringeysuggested tension before the first night of violence was 3.8 Public attitude surveys suggest there has beenat a relatively low level, raising questions about the no significant change in the public’s generaleffectiveness of the MPS model of tension monitoring. confidence in the MPS. However, the MPS isTo ensure a consistent and effective MPS-wide aware of perceptions that stop and search is a major source of discontent with the police. The most Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 7
  7. 7. significant issue raised with the MPS is not the use which the violence escalated and its spread. Theof the stop and search power itself but the nature of review highlights the bravery and dedication of thethe encounter. The MPS accepts, as it always has, individual actions of MPS officers and staff whothat the quality of interaction can improve. The MPS were placed in demanding and difficult situations.has undertaken work to review not only its stop andsearch strategy but also the wider engagement of 5.2 To assemble trained, equipped and fully briefedits officers, particularly those in the front line who officers quickly the MPS recognises the need forregularly come into contact with young people. a dynamic and flexible Service Mobilisation Plan (SMP). Since August the MPS has improved the3.9 The Deputy Commissioner has already set out the process for assembling public order trained officers.MPS’s new approach as part of the Commissioner’s They can now be mobilised more quickly. HoweverTotal War on Crime - the use of stop and search must there are still practical difficulties in getting significantbecome more targeted and effective, with a greater numbers of public order officers on the streets. Infocus on tackling violence and increasing trust and order to overcome this, the MPS is addressing twoconfidence among communities. The focus is not on key aspects; increasing the overall number of publicreducing the use of stop and search but making it order trained officers and ensuring a minimum numbermore effective and ensuring every encounter is first are available locally to aid speedy deployment.class. The vision is to achieve the highest level of trustand confidence in the MPS’s use of stop and search 5.3 Significant work is being examined to increaseas a tactic for keeping London’s streets safer. the number of Level 1 (by 25%) and Level 2 (byCommander (Territorial Policing) 50%) public order trained officers1. This resource- work to be completed by April 2012 increase will also include the necessary equipment and vehicles.4. Intelligence4.1 The MPS struggled with the volume and task of 5.4 The ongoing Territorial Policing Developmentidentifying accurate intelligence during the disorder. Programme will now incorporate the need to deliverThe MPS could not comprehensively monitor social public order resource in the shortest time possible tomedia in real-time and was therefore not in a position achieve an agile Service Mobilisation Plan.to be moving ahead of events. The MPS launch ofthe ‘Digital Communications Steering Group’ is a 5.5 The MPS is also looking at ways of achievingcommitment to developing its ability to use social a wider and swifter mobilisation of specialist staff,media as a tool to understand and know what is including intelligence experts, crime investigatorsgoing on in the community, as well as to measure and police staff. Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)the pulse and temperature of public attitude and - SMP improvement to be completed by April 2012,concern on police related issues. training to support uplift in public order officers to take place October 2012.4.2 Significant work is underway to obtain theappropriate technology for use in the policeintelligence arena. Furthermore, the Home Office 5.6 The software used in the MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) command centre was not designedhave agreed to fund the MPS in developing social for dynamic incident management. It did not easilymedia intelligence technology ahead of the Olympic allow the Strategic (Gold) and Tactical (Silver)Games, including relevant training. Commanders to monitor key incidents and staffCommander (Intelligence and Covert Policing) deployments, nor did it enable quick communication- responsible for the overall ‘MPS Digital with their ground commanders. The scale of theCommunications Steering Group’ - work ongoing. disorder and the number of officers deployed in response to it exacerbated these challenges.5. Mobilisation and Resources5.1 During the operational response to thedisorder resources were mobilised and allocated 1 Level 1, 2 and 3 officers have different levels of public order policing skills according to the training they have received. Level 1: Training based upon a 5 week cycle, includes shield tactics,proportionately across London, determined by including petrol bombs/missiles, barricades, containment to arrest, crowd entry, house entry & search, violent person handling. Further training includes prison tactics and working with firearmsinformation and intelligence. However, in hindsight, and baton rounds. Level 2: Officers trained for two days every 6 months, trained to the same standard as Level 1 with respect to basic shield tactics, violent person handling, crowd entry,the numbers were not enough and they did not search and containment tactics. Level 3: Basic public order training delivered to all police recruits during their initial training, It provides basic training around foot duty cordons, and deploymentsarrive quickly enough to deal with the speed with with mounted branch. This is the only training an officer will receive unless they progress to Level 2.8 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  8. 8. 5.7 The shortcomings that were identified during 6.5 The MPS is undertaking work on the use ofthese events will be fed into the requirements for new more assertive tactics in a public order context, butcommand and control systems which are already does recognise that there is a need for wider publicin the planning stages. The MPS is testing a new debate and engagement around such use.tracking system aimed at improving the ability ofsenior commanders to coordinate officers across 6.6 AEPs (commonly referred to as baton rounds) wereLondon. not used in August because they were not availableDeputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order) at times and in places where they might have been- new tracking system trials to be completed and used. The MPS is looking at ways of making AEPsevaluated by July 2012. more readily available but it recognises the need to consult widely on this issue. It has already increased6. Public Order Tactics the number of officers trained to work with Kestrel6.1 The MPS acknowledges that there are examples Teams (specialists that deploy with baton rounds). Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)of the public feeling let down where police were - work is ongoing.not immediately able to come to their aid or preventthe destruction of property. This was mainly becausethere were not enough officers to deal with the 6.7 The events of August generated a public debateunprecedented scale and geographical spread of about whether water cannons are appropriate forthe disorder. use on the UK mainland. Work is ongoing at a national level to develop the tactics to facilitate the6.2 Events have prompted the need to review deployment of water cannon. It is estimated thatcurrent public order tactics and to explore new ACPO will be in a position to issue agreed guidelinesways of responding to fast-moving disorder of the to forces in May 2012. The MPS is contributing tokind experienced in August. A working group of national discussions about the potential purchase ofexperienced public order leaders, trainers, front-line three water cannon vehicles, to be based regionallyofficers and firearms specialists was set up after in England and Wales. Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)August to look at more flexible and dynamic tactics. - work is ongoing.6.3 The work of the group has already led to there-introduction of the use of specialist officers in 7. Investigationplain clothes (with uniform support) in public order 7.1 The crime investigation (Operation Withern) ofsituations. This has led to arrests at some recent almost 4,000 offences during the disorder, waspublic order events. A revised MPS public order well managed by the MPS and its criminal justicetraining programme will be circulated in the MPS in partners. The operation has underlined the vital2012. Specifically the use of ‘Go Forward Tactics’ importance of CCTV evidence which enabled thehas been re-introduced in relation to intervention MPS to bring thousands of criminals to justice. Thetactics and the use of vehicles. In addition the MPS MPS is working to ensure that every borough has anis looking at options to enhance its ability to make effective viewing facility with dedicated supervisorsmultiple arrests without removing officers from the and trained staff. There are already significantly morestreets for long periods. CCTV viewing stations, and more trained ‘viewers’Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order) - both MPS staff and volunteers. The wider ‘MPS- work to be completed by April 2012. Digital Imagery Strategy’ is a far reaching project but includes an aim to promote the professional skills6.4 Inspectors on the ground played a pivotal role needed to make the most effective use of CCTVduring August. They have good understanding of evidence.public order-related legislation but the MPS needs toensure that they are empowered by feeling confident MPS Digital Imagery Strategy: Commander (Specialistthat their fast-time, dynamic decisions will be Crime and Operations Command)supported. The MPS has introduced a programme - work to be completed by April 2014.for the professional development of all public ordertrained inspectors, including mentoring and jointtraining with senior public order commanders.Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)- work to be completed by April 2012. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 9
  9. 9. 8. Criminal Justice8.1 The investigation and criminal justice responseto the disorder is widely recognised as a success.The MPS has identified many examples of effectiveworking between the police and partners such asthe Crown Prosecution Service, National OffenderManagement System and Her Majesty’s Courts andTribunals Service. To build on this good practice, theMPS has prepared a formal contingency plan to setout the roles and responsibilities of the police andcriminal justice partners in public disorder situations.This includes identifying the circumstances whichwould trigger the involvement of partners at theearliest opportunity.Commander (Criminal Justice) - work completed.8.2 The MPS’s existing custody management modelfor centralised cell allocation proved successful formanaging demand. The model has been developedand is already successfully operating at one of theMPS’s three Central Communications Commandcentres and will extend to cover the whole ofLondon. The criminal justice system used was stilla paper-based one which presented file buildingchallenges. The MPS aims for all boroughs to usea digital criminal justice file building system. It hasalready rolled this out in 24 boroughs.Commander (Criminal Justice)- work to be completed by April 2012.The MPS continues to work with all other reviewsbeing conducted into these events and remainsof the view that an open, calm and consideredapproach is essential to develop an understandingof what occurred to prevent a reoccurrence. It is theview of the MPS that much of this will be beyond theremit of the police service.10 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  10. 10. 2 introductionOperation Kirkin was the Metropolitan Police The full terms of reference are attached atService (MPS) response to the pan-London disorder Appendix A.which took place in early August 2011. AssistantCommissioner Lynne Owens has reviewed Operation The MPS will continue to learn from a range of otherKirkin on behalf of the Commissioner. Following her reviews and enquiries being conducted into theappointment as Chief Constable of Surrey Police, disorder and will share its findings and contribute asAssistant Commissioner Mark Rowley assumed wholly as possible to improving the capability of theresponsibility for finalising the review and driving MPS and partners in dealing with public disorderthrough its recommendations. and criminality.The overarching objective of the Operation Kirkin The review has undertaken comprehensive analysisStrategic Review was: of the events of August 2011 - to examine the MPS response, systems and the results of its action. This‘To develop a detailed understanding of the MPS has involved work and input from across the policeresponse to significant public disorder in London family in order to provide the fullest picture possible.between Thursday 4th August and Friday 19th The review will identify the policing themes thatAugust 2011 in order to inform future policing have been subject to thorough review, learning andoperations by ensuring organisational learning improvement. It will explain progress and changes tois recognised and developed for the future. This current procedures and operational tactics that havelearning and the subsequent costed plans will be already been implemented and further work that isshared promptly, as appropriate, with key internal planned.and external stakeholders.’ The report seeks to provide specific detail aroundThe strategic intentions underpinning this objective events that took place in Haringey between Thursdaywere: 4th August and Saturday 6th August 2011. It will • To gain a detailed understanding of the then similarly explore the events of Sunday 7th community, stakeholder and policing issues August, Monday 8th August and Tuesday 9th August surrounding the death of Mark Duggan that 2011 before providing the overall findings under precipitated significant public disorder in the eight broad headings: capital. • Independent Advice • To review the MPS response to widespread • Community Engagement - Local and London and unprecedented public disorder in London to inform senior police leaders and external • Intelligence stakeholders. • Mobilisation • To ensure that all relevant written and electronic data is centrally retained or reliably retrievable • Resources to ensure that the MPS response to any future • Public Order Tactics accountability process is complete, transparent and authoritative. • Investigation • To learn the lessons with respect to the • Criminal Justice MPS strategic community and stakeholder The report will also deal with the MPS’s involvement engagement, policing response, planning, in addressing claims under the Riot (Damages) Act tactics, intelligence and investigation to inform 1886. future operational activity. • To recognise and disseminate organisational learning and good practice. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 11
  11. 11. “My initial resources were a mixture of local response teams, safer neighbourhoods officers and pretty much anyone we could round up including CID officers...only a very small proportion of these officers were public order trained, most were wearing regular uniform and for the CID officers it was a question of grabbing whatever was available...” Chief Inspector Mark Nanji Croydon Borough12 / Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report
  12. 12. 3 the eventS of auguSt 2011 Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report / 13
  13. 13. 3.1overviewThe events of August 2011 were unprecedented in Day three exceeded the expectations of authoritiesthe capital’s history. A number of factors set them and the public alike as intense disorder and criminalityaside from anything that had been witnessed before. proliferated across 22 of London’s 32 boroughs. Repeated attempts to quell disorder in one areaThe rapidly changing character of the disorder was met with its outbreak in other areas. Resources wereone such factor. What began as a peaceful protest stretched across the capital resulting in an insufficientin response to the police shooting of Mark Duggan response to some of the worst violence London hadescalated to violent local protest during the evening ever witnessed.of Saturday 6th August 2011. This local protestoutside Tottenham Police Station itself spread to Whilst the spread of disorder had begun to travelwider parts of Haringey Borough and evolved from across the country on day three, day four sawanger directed towards police to the opportunistic this aspect become the primary feature. Londonlooting of local shops in the knowledge that police meanwhile was flooded with police resources andresources were committed elsewhere. order was restored.On day two disorder spread geographically to atotal of five London boroughs. The disorder intensifiedrapidly which tested police resources unremittinglyby the speed and scale of its escalation. Arson andlooting became key features and it also becameclear that social networking was being used tocoordinate groups in direct conflict with the police. who was involved? arrestees As of February 27th 2012 the MPS has made 4,019 arrests what happened? associated to the disorder. Of these - 87% were male, 55% from a black ethnic group and only 8% were older than 35. Mark Duggan was fatally shot in Tottenham on 4th August A total of 70% of arrestees had previously been convicted, 2011. received a caution, warning or reprimand. Between 6th August and 9th August 2011disorder broke Spectators out in London presenting unprecedented levels of policing Bystanders watched the disorder in person, via blanket news demand for the MPS. coverage and social media. Mobile technology was utilised to post scenes on social networking sites. Overall, as of February 27th 2012, 3,931 offences have been recorded which were connected to the disorder: victims Two individuals lost their lives during the disorder. Across • 1,265 were non residential burglaries London local shops and stores were mostly targeted. The police also came under attack themselves. • 880 were criminal damage (excluding arson) • 467 were robberies public Most Londoners say they are positive about the job police do • 166 were arsons in London and in their local areas. This has not changed as a result of the disorder.14 / Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report
  14. 14. Saturday 6th local DiSorDer These maps indicate the locations of the highest levels of disorder; there are other locations in which police presence was required to deal with disorder, though not on the scale of these areas. Significant levels of disorder including violence were present in one borough: Haringey.Sunday 7th Significant levels of disorder including violence were present in five boroughs: Enfield, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth and Waltham Forest. Monday 8thSignificant levels of disorder includingviolence occurred in 22 boroughs:Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Brent,Bromley, Camden, Croydon, Ealing,Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey,Hillingdon, Kensington and Chelsea,Lewisham, Merton, Newham,Redbridge, Sutton, Southwark, TowerHamlets, Wandsworth, Waltham Forestand Westminster. wiDeSpreaD DiSorDer Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report / 15
  15. 15. 3.2 timeline DAY Three The Events of August DAY 8th A ugust TWO 2011- Overview 7th A 06:00 Building on the experience of the previous days, the resource levels for the policing operation were ugust significantly increased to around 6000 MPS officers. 09:30 MPS formally requests mutual aid from other forces via ACPO Police night National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC) to increase one 06:00 Full command team report for duty to resources for the ongoing policing operation. Initial request for eight relieve the on-call command team. PSUs with further requests being made throughout the day. 6 07:00 Temporary Commissioner chairs an 10:00 Tactical plan: PSUs divided into five sectors each led by th emergency Management Board meeting to public order commander to support BOCUs and respond discuss operational plans and community to intelligence. Centrally coordinated from SOR. August engagement. 14:00 Reports of minor disorder in Southwark - local officers respond. 07:30 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Territorial 4 Policing instructs high risk BOCUs to review 15:00 Reports of minor disorder in Barking - local officers respond th 08:35 Intelligence received that community engagement and local policing there would be a march to plans in light of disorder at Haringey. Reports of disorder in Hackney - PSUs deployed to support local officers. 15:10 August Tottenham Police Station at midday. Gold Group meeting at SOR; 5 bronze commanders and 46 PSUs 10:00 Tactical plan: 33 PSUs (825 officers), 16:10 deployed to support BOCUs. 5th 10:20 Local police planning meeting public order commanders and to discuss the demonstration and specialist resources mobilised to support 18:15 Following a proactive surveillance BOCUs. MPS obtained four PSUs from 17:30 Reports of minor disorder in Kensington - local officers respond. develop a policing plan. operation led by Trident, Mark August neighbouring forces. Command teams Duggan is shot near Tottenham Hale 11:00 Police Support Unit (PSU) on standby put in place to provide 24 hour cover, 18:25 Reports of disorder in Croydon - PSUs deployed to support local officers. Station. to support Haringey Borough. centrally coordinated from SOR. 13:00 Community Representatives Meeting 18:30 Reports of disorder in Peckham - PSUs deployed to support local officers DAY 11:00 Hackney Carnival cancelled due to18:29 Mark Duggan is pronounced dead held whereby Haringey Borough intelligence regarding disorder. four 18:43 Numerous sites of disorder now across London at the scene. 09:00 Assistant Commissioner seeks independent advice. 9th Central Operations briefs 16:20 Reports of disorder in Hackney. PSUs at 18:45 Reports of disorder and fires in Lewisham - PSUs deployed full Management Board 17:05 Group of 40 leave Broadwater18:30 Critical incident is declared. MPS location and responding. to support local officers. on the critical incident at Farm Estate and march to Commander assumes overall control Tottenham Police Station. This of the incident. Haringey. 16:49 Reports of disorder in Enfield - PSUs 19:00 Reports of disorder in Sutton - local officers respond. August increases to about 100 outside deployed to support local officers. the police station. 19:45 Reports of disorder in Greenwich - PSUs deployed18:39 Assistant Commissioner Central 18:30 Reports of disorder in Lambeth - PSUs to support local officers. Operations briefed as Management 10:00 Gold Group meeting, chaired 18:15 Chief Inspector takes charge of deployed to support local officers. Board lead. Temporary by MPS Commander, held at the policing plan outside the 19:47 Reports of disorder in Wandsworth - local New Scotland Yard to discuss police station. 08:00 Temporary Commissioner and Commissioner, Temporary Deputy 18:49 officers respond. the incident. Reports of disorder in Haringey - PSUs at Management Board take the Commissioner and Chair of 20:30 Serious disorder breaks out in location and responding. decision to increase resources 20:19 Reports of disorder in Ealing - PSUs deployed Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) Tottenham and additional PSUs from 13,000 to 16,000 to support local officers. informed. 13:00 Haringey Borough Commander are deployed. 19:45 Intelligence received that two hand officers. This included 50 chairs local police planning grenades were in circulation and were to Mr Trevor Ellis died following a shooting PSUs (1,250 officers) provided 21:3019:20 IPCC informed. They declare an 20:30 Service Mobilisation Plan be used to attack police. in Croydon. through PNICC. meeting every three hours and independent investigation and assume initiated; this included 9 PSUs contacts established community 20:20 Further reports of disorder in Lambeth due 09:00 Temporary Commissioner briefs the immediate responsibility. and an on-call command team. 22:24 Police responding to multiple sites of disorder, partners. to the Brixton splash event - further PSUs Prime Minister on policing plans 20:40 Special Operations Room (SOR) deployed. extensive damage to property and violence19:30 Haringey Borough Commander for London prior to COBR (Cabinet takes over the coordination of the across London. Police resources deployed Office Briefing Room) meeting. makes contact with MPA link, local 22:15 across 22 of the 32 London boroughs. incident. Command structure put Reports of disorder in Waltham Forest - MP and leader of the council to PSUs deployed to support local officers. 09:00 Operation WITHERN launched to inform them of the incident and in place. 22:45 Mr Richard Mannington-Bowes attacked by a investigate all crimes committed discuss implications. 21:10 Second PSU arrives in Haringey 00:45 Waltham Forest - three police officers are group of youths in Ealing whilst trying to stamp during the disturbances. Borough driven at and are hospitalised. out litter fire, subsequently died in hospital on21:00 MPS Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) 11th August. 10:00 Tactical plan: PSUs and command speak to members of Mark Duggan’s 22:40 Mobilised PSUs begin to arrive. teams allocated to boroughs to 23:00 Responding to the unprecedented scale provide high visibility patrolling and family. 23:00 Request for mutual aid assistance and spread of disorder across London, mobile response to any incidents. from forces surrounding London Temporary Commissioner and Management Centrally coordinated from SOR.22:00 Haringey Borough Commander chairs – 4 PSUs (100 officers) supplied Board take the decision to substantially pm London was comparatively quiet. local police planning meeting to discuss and deployed to Tottenham. increase the number of officers to be However disorder and criminality incident and instigate the preparation of deployed on the policing operation. continued in other parts of the a community impact assessment and a 23:00 Assistant Commissioner Central early Disorder continued in Hackney and there were country. borough policing plan. Operations briefs Temporary Commissioner and Management am significant fires in Newham, Croydon and 17:00 Magistrates Court centres sit Board members. Peckham. Resources deployed across London, extended hours up to 2100hrs and including armoured vehicles into Wandsworth night courts open at Westminster Intense disorder and criminality and Ealing to clear violent crowds. and Highbury. am continue in Haringey with police officers deployed primarily to the 02:00 Reports of disorder in Barnet - local officers High Road. respond.16 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 17
  16. 16. Tottenham Police Station - High Road, Tottenham.18 / Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report
  17. 17. 4 haringey An in depth studyThis section examines the MPS response followingthe death of Mr Mark Duggan through to the eventsof Saturday 6th August 2011 in Haringey. Thereview team interviewed police, community membersand Independent Police Complaints Commission(IPCC) staff. It also looked at internal records. It isimportant to note however, that what follows is anMPS account of events, based on its evidence andthe consultation it has undertaken. Metropolitan police Service | Strategic review into the DiSorDer of auguSt 2011 - final report / 19
  18. 18. 4.1 the critical incident response MPS and IPCC working protocolsMr Mark Duggan was fatally shot by police on This review has considered two aspects of theThursday 4th August 2011 whilst subject of an response to this event. The police response is governedoperation conducted by Trident. The IPCC is by the policy and standard operating procedure forconducting an investigation into the circumstances managing what are termed ‘critical incidents’. Aleading to his death and therefore this report will not critical incident is defined as ‘any incident where theseek to examine those matters. effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the victim, their family and/Trident is the MPS operational command unit or their community.’dedicated to preventing and investigating shootingsin London. Trident was originally established as a There is also a protocol that is followed in the eventpolicing operation in 1998 as a result of community of a police shooting resulting in the death of aand police concerns about increased shootings in member of the public. The MPS responds and takesLondon’s black community, and in 2008 became control of the initial incident but informs the IPCC ata permanent operational command. Gun crime in the earliest opportunity. The IPCC in turn decides theLondon still disproportionately affects London’s black mode of the investigation that will follow4.community (approximately 75% of all victims ofshootings in London are from the black community). An independent investigation is normally declared following a fatal shooting. This effectively means thatAs well as investigating shootings, Trident undertakes the IPCC appoint a Senior Investigator and assumea number of operations on those involved in serious responsibility for the entire investigation. The MPSfirearms criminality and firearms supply. The seizure will however continue to be involved in supportingof firearms is one of the best ways to prevent their the response to the incident.use and protect individuals and some of London’smost vulnerable communities. Since April 2011 The police declared the death of Mark Duggan aTrident has seized over 80 firearms, all of which are critical incident at 1829hrs on 4th August 2011,either capable of firing, or readily convertible to fire, fourteen minutes after the shooting which resulted inlethal ammunition. his death. Information regarding the shooting was immediately communicated through police chains of command. At 1830hrs Commander MartinOn the 4th August 2011, police received Hewitt was appointed as Gold5 and assumedintelligence that Mark Duggan was planning to take overall control of the incident. At 1839hrs Assistantpossession of a firearm. Trident was supported by Commissioner Lynne Owens was informed andarmed officers from CO192 and armed surveillance became the Management Board6 lead. This in turnofficers from SCD113 in a mobile surveillance led to the Temporary Commissioner Tim Godwin,operation on Mark Duggan that crossed a number the Temporary Deputy Commissioner Bernardof North London boroughs. A decision was made Hogan-Howe and Kit Malthouse, the Chair of theby the officer commanding the operation to stop the 4 Modes of investigation are Independent (carried out by IPCC investigators and overseen byvehicle, which was undertaken by CO19 officers in an IPCC Commissioner); Managed (carried out by police Professional Standards Departments (PSDs) under the direction and control of the IPCC) and Supervised (carried out by police PSDsFerry Lane, Tottenham. It was during this stop that under their own direction and control). The IPCC will set the terms of reference and receive the investigation report when it is complete.Mark Duggan was fatally shot by police. 5 Gold, Silver and Bronze are titles of functions adopted by each of the emergency services and are role-related, not rank-related. These functions are equivalent to the 3 levels: strategic, tactical and operational. 6 Management Board is responsible for the leadership, strategy and performance of the organisation, for the delivery of the Business Plan and budget, and for the overall day to day running of the MPS. Members as at August 2011: Commissioner (Chair), Deputy Commissioner (Deputy Chair), Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing, Assistant Commissioner Serious Crime2 The MPS Specialist Firearms Command Directorate, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations, Assistant Commissioner Central3 The MPS Surveillance Command Operations, Director of Resources, Director of Information, Director of Public Affairs.20 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  19. 19. then Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), all beinginformed also.Extensive activity was undertaken in the immediateaftermath to the incident to meet the requirementsof a critical incident response. This includedscene preservation and management, communityengagement, media handling, family liaison, thedevelopment of a policing plan for Haringey Boroughand the instigation of the Post Incident Procedure7.The review has audited the actions of the MPSagainst the national standards for effective criticalincident management8, and has found that thestandards were complied with.Following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan, theMPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS)was immediately informed and Acting DetectiveInspector Peter Suggett was nominated as the MPSprimary liaison for the IPCC. Through this officer, theIPCC were informed of the incident at 1920hrs. TheIPCC determined it as an independent investigation,their on call team assumed responsibility immediatelyand Mr Colin Sparrow was appointed as the DeputySenior Investigator. The Senior Investigator, MrSimon Cousins, and the IPCC Commissioner, RachelCerfontyne, were appointed the following day.Both DPS officers from the MPS and IPCC investigatorswere deployed to the scene in Tottenham and tothe Metropolitan Police Firearms base. DPS officersarrived at the Tottenham scene at 1956hrs and theIPCC investigators shortly after 2100hrs. Followingany discharge of a firearm by police there are PostIncident Procedures that determine how evidence isgathered and preserved from the relevant officers.These include all operational officers involvedreturning to their firearms base where this processis overseen by the IPCC assisted by the DPS. In thiscase both IPCC and DPS were represented at thebase by 1945hrs.Two areas have come under particular scrutiny whenactions in the immediate aftermath of the incidenthave been reviewed; the support provided to thefamily and the media handling of the incident. Bothare governed by the MPS/IPCC working protocol.Both have subsequently been subject of complaintby the Duggan family.7 The term post incident is used to describe situations in which shots have been discharged by the police. The procedures are scalable depending on the significance and consequences of the event, but involve the comprehensive collection of evidence amongst other things.8 The National Police Improvement Agency’s Protective Services Minimum Standards (2010) sets out 20 standards underpinned by 114 definitions for Forces and their Borough Command Units to maintain in order to ensure an effective response to critical incidents. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 21
  20. 20. 4.2 family liasionFollowing the shooting of Mark Duggan attention It is now known that the accounts of Ms A andwas immediately turned to the priority of delivering Ms B differ from those of the MPS FLOs and thethe news to his family. Detective Chief Superintendent IPCC Family Liaison Managers (FLMs)9 as to thisStuart Cundy, head of Trident, arrived at the scene interaction. Rather than present an account basedat 1930hrs. He was subsequently made aware only on the accounts of some parties, this reportthat an immediate member of Mark Duggan’s refers the reader to the published IPCC ‘Report of thefamily was believed to be present at one of the investigation into a complaint made by the family ofcrime scene cordons and by 1955hrs Detective Mark Duggan about contact with them immediatelyChief Superintendent Cundy had requested the after his death’10 for the accounts that have beenattendance of MPS Family Liaison Officers (FLOs). provided by family, police and IPCC staff.The MPS have a cadre of FLOs whose primary roleis engagement with bereaved families to assist with The MPS accepts the findings of the IPCC investigationthe investigation of offences. They have been trained into the complaint made by the family of Markin communicating with people who have suffered a Duggan about contact with them after his death.recent loss. Whatever the reasons for not doing so, the parents of Mark Duggan were not personally informed ofAt around 2050hrs two FLOs from the MPS his death and this caused extra distress to them. TheDirectorate of Professional Standards, Detective MPS notes that the family’s complaint was upheld.Constables Alex Manz and Katie Buchanan, arrivedat the scene. Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy The conclusion of this review is that the decisionhad since been informed that the member of Mark made by police not to visit Mark Duggan’s parentsDuggan’s family had left the scene. The FLOs were and inform them personally of his death was madebriefed and at 2100hrs were informed that other in good faith.family members had made themselves known atanother cordon. They located a second immediate However, on Monday 8th August 2011 the MPSmember of the family and a woman who introduced issued a press release apologising for the distressherself as Mark Duggan’s partner. They were both that had been caused to the family of Mark Duggantaken to the closest appropriate private venue (within and contacted his parents via their lawyers to offer toTottenham Hale underground station) and informed meet them. Following this, on 2nd September 2011,of his death by the FLOs. the family agreed to meet Commander Mak Chishty, the Area Commander covering Tottenham who hadFor ease of reading and describing events, the been leading the work with the local communitiesimmediate member of Mark Duggan’s family will be both during and following the disorder. Commanderreferred to in this report as Ms A and the woman Chishty took the opportunity to apologise to thewho introduced herself as Mark Duggan’s partner parents of Mark Duggan for the fact that they hadas Ms B. not been spoken to directly by police.The interaction between Ms A, Ms B and the policeFLOs has been central to the investigation by theIPCC into a complaint by the Duggan family aboutcontact with them immediately after his death. In lightof this investigation taking place, the review teamdid not approach members of the Duggan family. 9 Family Liaison Managers undertake the role of family liaison on behalf of the IPCC. 10 IPCC reference 2011/01644922 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  21. 21. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 23
  22. 22. 4.3mediaThe fatal shooting of Mark Duggan was an incident this detail and the MPS did not express any furtherthat attracted urgent and widespread verbal concerns about the need to correct misinformation.communication between a large number of parties,both within and outside the police. Following the At 2126hrs the IPCC informed the MPS of theirIPCC’s declaration of an independent investigation proposed first formal statement. The ‘exchangeat 1920hrs, a media strategy was set and recorded of fire’ quote did not form part of it. Commanderby Commander Hewitt. Hewitt was able to request some changes, including removing reference to an officer being wounded, asAt 1935hrs he recorded his decision that the MPS this was unconfirmed at the time.would not respond to any media enquiries butwould actively liaise with the IPCC to ensure an The second erroneous media report of noteunderstanding of the messages that were put out. appeared on Friday 5th August 2011, when theHe reasoned that for the MPS to make comment on Evening Standard printed an article containing anthe circumstances of the shooting would potentially eye witness account which described Mark Dugganbe seen as an attempt to prejudice the investigation. being held down and shot on the ground. It is claimed that the paper contacted the MPS at 1030hrs onTwo particularly significant issues arose regarding Friday 5th August for comment on this account. Thethe shooting and associated media coverage. MPS does not have a specific record of this contact. That this story had permeated public consciousnessCommander Hewitt became aware of the first of is perhaps evidenced by a reference to what wouldthese at 2018hrs on Thursday 4th August, when he become known as the ‘assassination’ rumour madewas informed that the Press Association had quoted by Haringey Borough Black Independent Advisoryan IPCC spokesman as saying ‘We do not know Group (BIAG)11 members during the Haringeythe order the shots were fired. We understand the community representatives meeting at 1300hrs onofficer was shot first before the male was shot.’ This Saturday 6th August 2011.statement never formed part of the official press linesfrom either the MPS or the IPCC. It is likely to have It was not until Sunday 7th August 2011 that theoriginated from the very first verbal briefings given IPCC released a statement stating, ‘Speculationfrom the scene to the IPCC including the fact that a that Mark Duggan was ‘assassinated’ in anpolice officer had been shot and taken to hospital. execution style involving a number of shots to theExperience informs both organisations that such head are categorically untrue. Following the formalearly information is often unreliable and should not identification of the body Mr Duggan’s family knowform the basis for press briefings. The subsequent that this is not the case and I would ask anyonereporting of this gave the impression that Mark reporting this to be aware of its inaccuracy and itsDuggan had fired upon police, which was not true. inflammatory nature.’At 2040hrs the MPS’s Directorate of Public Affairs Neither the MPS nor the IPCC actively rebutted(DPA), on the instruction of Commander Hewitt, the ‘exchange of fire’ story prior to the disorder incontacted the IPCC Press Office and raised concerns Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6th Augustregarding this statement. Commander Hewitt made 2011. Similarly the ‘assassination’ rumour was notclear that the MPS had been unaware that this detail refuted directly until after the disorder on the Saturday.was being released and emphasised that it was not 11 The BIAG is one of two independent advisory groups in Haringey Borough. The role of anthe MPS’s agreed position. The IPCC never repeated Independent Advisory Group (IAG) and the specific structure of Haringey’s advisory groups are explained in section 4.4.24 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  23. 23. The MPS undoubtedly acted cautiously in its reticenceto speak directly on these issues and it is clear thatit relied on its belief that it was constrained by thelead role of the IPCC. The IPCC, on the other hand,state that they were not aware until after the disorderhad broken out that inaccuracies and rumours werecirculating that needed to be rebutted.The review has found widespread confusionacross the MPS at all levels on the issue of its ownfreedom to comment on matters connected to anIPCC investigation. Both locally in Haringey andcentrally, MPS officers believed that there werelimitations on what they could communicate publicly.The seriousness of this particular investigation mayindeed have enhanced the tendency to caution inthis respect.The MPS, however, maintains its responsibility forpolicing London and its communities. Part of thatpolicing will always require public communicationto reduce community tension andv to address publicexpectation and the fear of crime. The only legalrestriction on the MPS is to refrain from publicly statinganything that may prejudice an investigation or anysubsequent trial arising from it. There is widespreadunderstanding of that limitation amongst MPS staff.The issue of inaccuracy in the media story concerningan exchange of fire between officers and MarkDuggan should have been positively rebuttedimmediately. However, the MPS believed that as anorganisation it was subject to the limitation aboveand therefore did not speak regarding the issue ofthe number and origin of shots fired, believing itto be at the very heart of the investigation beingconducted by the IPCC.The specific detail of shots fired did clearly formpart of an investigation into the fatal shooting.However the MPS accepts that its responsibilitiesto its communities, and in particular the communityof Haringey, should have led it to raise concernswith the IPCC to correct that point after newspaperreports carried the story on Friday 5th August.A new protocol between the IPCC and the police oncommunication has been published. This providesgreater clarity on the matters discussed above and aframework for addressing similar issues in the future. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 25
  24. 24. 4.4 community engagement Haringey BoroughCommunity engagement is at the core of the MPS Haringey Borough will be referred to by the letterspolicing style. It is a fundamental element of the C, D, E and F. This will assist the reader in his or herresponse to any critical incident whereby the desire understanding of the narrative.)to understand community concerns and respond tothem is recognised as key to success. The MPS’s continued commitment to community engagement was enhanced in a significant wayThis review has sought to understand who the MPS by the introduction of Safer Neighbourhoods Teamsengaged with and by what means, whether the (SNTs) in April 2004. These mixed teams of officersexisting networks were effective and the extent to and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) arewhich the process achieved its purpose of contributing deployed to set geographical locations where theyto the management of the impact on the community. are expected to be known to their local communities. Specifically they develop and maintain relationshipsThe MPS model of IAG is used throughout policing with Key Individual Networks (KINs).in the UK. An MPS central IAG was first introducedfollowing the Stephen Lawrence Public Inquiry KIN members are residents and/or local businessand was further developed with the formation of people who have a commitment to making theirIAGs working with individual boroughs, and some community a safer place. They work closely with thespecialist command units. Individuals become IAG local police team to represent the thoughts, feelingsmembers by invitation and come from particular and concerns of the local community. They are alsocommunities although do not specifically represent relied upon at times of critical incident to act as athem. The purpose of an IAG is to provide informed portal for information flow.critical feedback to the MPS. The MPS in turn shareinformation with the IAG members which would Haringey’s Safer Neighbourhoods and KINs modelsnot ordinarily be made public in order to make this reflect those of the wider MPS.feedback meaningful and valid. The events of August 2011 have raised importantIAGs have become one of the principal means of questions about the effectiveness of MPS communitygauging community tension and are heavily relied engagement. In discussing the communityupon in assessing community feeling and views on engagement that took place after the death of Markmany aspects of policing, particularly at times when Duggan it is helpful in the first instance to deal withincidents are likely to have an impact on community the first fifty hours, focused primarily on Haringeyconfidence. Borough. Community engagement which took place subsequent to the evening disorder on Saturday 6thThe membership, manner of engagement and remit August 2011, which was conducted across London,of IAGs vary across the MPS. It is certainly the case is dealt with in later sections of this report.that the IAG structure at Haringey is unique. There isboth an IAG and a self-defined Black IAG (BIAG). The First Three DaysThe BIAG is a self-governed group, whose membersare, on average, in their mid forties. Its members Thursday 4th Augustsee its function as focusing police attention more As previously stated, at 1830hrs Commanderdirectly on the needs of the black community. (For Martin Hewitt assumed overall control of the criticalthe purposes of this report, BIAG members who incident. It is clear that community engagementplay a part in events leading up to the disorder in was seen as an immediate priority. The Haringey26 / Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the disorder of august 2011 - Final Report
  25. 25. Borough Commander, Chief Superintendent Sandra specific policing plan for the Broadwater Farm EstateLooby, was contacted and, in her role as the face of were discussed and actioned. Chief Superintendentthe borough police, immediately attended the scene Looby directed that a member of the Seniorand began directing her borough’s community Management Team was to be present on Haringeyengagement response. Borough 24 hours a day for the next four days. The West Green Ward SNT’s Sergeant, Mike Tisi, wasDetective Chief Superintendent Cundy had contacted a key contributor to this meeting.a member of both the Haringey BIAG and the MPSTrident IAG, Mr C, at around 1920hrs whilst travelling The policing response specific to the Broadwaterto the scene. Mr C attended, was fully briefed and Farm Estate was to continue to enter the estate togiven access to the scene. Chief Superintendent answer any calls from the public or requests forLooby and Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy assistance but to suspend all proactive police activityconsulted with him on managing community tension on the estate, for example the effecting of searchand Mr C provided advice on media lines to provide warrants, in an effort to avoid any escalation oflocal reassurance. He continued to be consulted tension. Thus any pre-planned police operations didthroughout the evening. not take place. As an extra measure, the local duty officer (inspector rank) was made aware of any callsCommander Hewitt recognised that the local police onto the estate to ensure that any policing actionowned the relationships with the community that was handled sensitively.was most affected. Due to the importance of therole of the Borough Commander in community Chief Superintendent Looby also telephonedengagement, he appointed Chief Superintendent independent key partners on that Thursday eveningLooby as the ‘Bronze’ (operational lead) for - the Chief Executive of the Local Authority, thecommunity engagement in the overall policing Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) link member,command structure. Commander Mak Chishty, Haringey Council’s leader and the local MP, bothresponsible for the group of North London boroughs to inform them of events and also to listen to theirincluding Haringey, was nominated to support Chief advice and concerns.Superintendent Looby in this role. At the end of Thursday 4th the picture of communityChief Superintendent Looby initiated activity engagement in Haringey was that it possessedto reassure the community and obtain relevant structure, appropriate governance and relevantinformation. The results of this activity would inform a actions in place to progress it.Community Impact Assessment (CIA)12. She retainedthe West Green ward’s SNT on duty in order for them Friday 5th Augustto contact KINs from the ward. This ward includes the Having briefed the Temporary Commissioner and theBroadwater Farm Estate, judged to be most affected Temporary Deputy Commissioner the night before,by this incident due to Mark Duggan’s familial links Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens briefed theto this area and its historic iconic status. The KINs wider Management Board at 0900hrs on Friday 5thfor this particular ward comprise a cross section of August 2011. A Gold Group meeting13 was thenthe local community, including faith leaders, local held at 1000hrs in New Scotland Yard, chairedcouncillors and youth workers amongst others, some by Commander Hewitt. As well as comprehensiveof whom are also IAG and BIAG members, and police attendance, Mr C, the BIAG representativewere relied upon to make an informed assessment who had been at the scene the previous day, wasof the impact being felt within the community. In present to provide community views and advice. Thetotal, 23 KINs were contacted and police received IPCC was represented by Mr Simon Cousins anda response from 19. Haringey Borough Local Authority members were also present.Community response planning was central to alocal police planning meeting chaired by Chief The CIA compiled by the Haringey BoroughSuperintendent Looby at 2200hrs that evening. Community Engagement Team was presented at thisDuring this meeting the construction of a CIA and a meeting and set out the findings from the wide range12 Community Impact Assessments are a standard tool for gauging levels of community tension 13 A Gold Group is a meeting designed to add value to the police response to an internal or following an incident or specific event. A template is included at Appendix B. external incident, crime or other matter. This involves bringing together appropriately skilled and qualified internal or external stakeholders who can advise, guide or otherwise support the management of an effective response to the identified incident, crime or other matter. Metropolitan Police Service | Strategic Review into the Disorder of august 2011 - Final Report / 27

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