nullcon 2011 - Security and Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments

  • 3,522 views
Uploaded on

Security and Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments by Manu Zacharia

Security and Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments by Manu Zacharia

More in: Technology
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
3,522
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
1

Actions

Shares
Downloads
90
Comments
1
Likes
1

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. CLOUD 9:
    UNCOVERING SECURITY & FORENSICS DISCOVERY IN CLOUD
    byManu Zacharia
    MVP (Enterprise Security), C|EH,
    ISLA-2010 (ISC)², C|HFI, CCNA, MCP
    Certified ISO 27001:2005 Lead Auditor
    HackIT – Technology & Advisory Services
    “Aut viam inveniam aut faciam ”
    Hannibal Barca
  • 2. # whoami
    • I am an Information Security Evangelist
    • 3. For paying my bills – I do consulting - HackIT – Technology & Advisory Services – A startup.
    • 4. Awards
    • 5. Information Security Leadership Achievement Award from (ISC)² - 2010
    • 6. Microsoft Most Valuable Professional (Enterprise Security) – 2009 and 2010
    • 7. Co-Author of a Book
    • 8. President – Information Security Research Association - NPO
  • # whoami
    • Chief Architect - Matriux – (www.matriux.com) - OS for Hacking, Forensics and Security testing – Open Source & Free 
    • 9. Founder c0c0n – International Security & Hacking Conference
    • 10. Extend service to various state and central investigations agencies as Cyber Forensics Consultant
  • # whoami
    • Speaker at various national and international security, technology and hacking conferences:
    • 11. Microsoft Tech-Ed 2010 (& 2011 upcoming)
    • 12. IQPC - Enterprise Security 2010 - Singapore
    • 13. Information Security Conference - Bangalore
    • 14. ClubHack, etc
    • 15. DevCon
  • # whoami
    • Training associations:
    • 16. Indian Navy - Signal School , Centre for Defense Communication and Electronic and Information / Cyber Warfare and INS Valsura.
    • 17. Centre for Police Research, Pune and Kerala Police
    • 18. SCIT - Symbiosis Centre for Information Technology,Pune
    • 19. Institute of Management Technology (IMT) – Ghaziabad
    • 20. IGNOU M-Tech (Information Systems Security) – Expert Member – Curriculum Review Committee
    • 21. C-DAC, ACTS (DISCS & DSSD)
  • DISCLAIMER(S)
    • The opinion here represented are my personal ones and do not necessary reflect my employers views.
    • 22. Registered brands belong to their legitimate owners.
    • 23. The information contained in this presentation does not break any intellectual property, nor does it provide detailed information that may be in conflict with any laws (hopefully...) :)
    6
  • 24. REFERENCES
    • Information and resources from Internet (including publications from Cloud Security Alliance) were extensively used for the creation of this presentation.
    7
  • 25. AGENDA
    INTRO & CLOUD ARCHITECTURE
    CLOUD SECURITY & RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
    EXPLOITING CLOUD & FORENSICS
    CONCLUSION
    8
  • 26. INTRODUCTION
    9
  • 27. QUESTION
    • So what is Cloud Computing?
    • 28. Do you know what is EC2 and S3?
    • 29. What is SPI Model?
    10
  • 30. WHY THIS TALK?
    • cloud is loud
    • 31. Headline stealer
    • 32. Everybody is concerned about Cloud Security
    11
  • 33. WHY CLOUD IS DIFFERENT?
    • Why handle cloud differently?
    • 34. Simple – power of cloud
    12
  • 35. TIGR - ??????
    • Barack Obama's Technology Innovation and Government Reform Team (TIGR) describe the use of cloud computing as "one of the most important transformations the federal government will go through in the next decade."
    13
  • 36. CLOUD POWER
    • A 64 node Linux cluster can be online in just five minutes
    • 37. Forget about those sleepless nights in your data centers
    14
  • 38. EC2
    • Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2)
    • 39. A web service that provides resizable compute capacity in the cloud
    15
  • 40. EC2 - WIKIPEDIA
    • Allows users to rent computers on which to run their own computer applications.
    • 41. A user can boot an Amazon Machine Image (AMI) to create a virtual machine, which Amazon calls an "instance", containing any software desired.
    16
  • 42. EC2 - WIKIPEDIA
    • A user can create, launch, and terminate server instances as needed, paying by the hour for active servers, hence the term "elastic".
    17
  • 43. S3
    • Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) is an online storage web service offered by Amazon Web Services.
    • 44. Provides unlimited storage through a simple web services interface
    18
  • 45. S3
    • $0.15 per gigabyte-month
    • 46. 102 billion objects as of March 2010
    19
  • 47. POWER OF CLOUD
    • The New York Times - Amazon EC2 and S3 - PDF's of 15M scanned news articles.
    • 48. NASDAQ uses Amazon S3 to deliver historical stock information.
    20
  • 49. CLOUD
    • Cloud separates:
    • 50. application and information resources from the underlying infrastructure, and
    • 51. the mechanisms used to deliver them.
    21
  • 52. CLOUD
    Use of a collection of
    comprised of pools of compute, network, information, and storage resources.
    22
  • 56. CLOUD
    • Components can be
    • 57. rapidly orchestrated,
    • 58. provisioned,
    • 59. implemented & decommissioned, and
    • 60. scaled up or down
    • 61. Provide an on-demand utility-like model.
    23
  • 62. CLOUD CONFUSION
    • From an architectural perspective; there is much confusion
    • 63. How cloud is both similar to and different from existing models of computing?
    24
  • 64. CLOUD CONFUSION
    • How these similarities and differences impact the
    • 65. organizational,
    • 66. operational, and
    • 67. technological approaches
    to network and information security practices.
    25
  • 68. CLOUD SECURITY – DIFFERENT?
    Marcus Ranum - Same old,
    Same old
    26
  • 69. CLOUD SECURITY – DIFFERENT?
    Same Client / Server paradigm from Mainframe days – Bruce Schneier
    27
  • 70. So what is this cloud?
    28
  • 71. CLOUD ARCHITECTURE
    29
  • 72. CLOUD
    • NIST (U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology) defines cloud computing by describing:
    • 73. five essential characteristics,
    • 74. three cloud service models, and
    • 75. four cloud deployment models.
    30
  • 76. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Five essential characteristics
    • 77. On-demand self-service
    • 78. Broad network access
    • 79. Resource pooling
    • 80. Rapid elasticity
    • 81. Measured service
    31
  • 82. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • On-demand self-service
    • 83. Unilaterally provision computing capabilities as needed automatically, without requiring human interaction with a service provider.
    • 84. Computing capabilities include server time and network storage
    32
  • 85. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Broad network access
    • 86. Available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms
    33
  • 87. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Can be accessed through heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs) as well as other traditional or cloud based software services.
    34
  • 88. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Resource pooling
    • 89. The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model,
    • 90. Different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand.
    35
  • 91. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Degree of location independence - customer has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources
    • 92. Customer may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or datacenter).
    36
  • 93. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    37
  • 99. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Rapid elasticity
    • 100. Capabilities can be
    • 101. rapidly and elastically provisioned to quickly scale out ; and
    • 102. rapidly released to quickly scale in.
    • 103. In some cases this is done automatically.
    38
  • 104. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Measured service.
    • 105. Metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service
    • 106. Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported — providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the service.
    39
  • 107. CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    40
  • 112. MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Myths about Cloud Computing Essential Characteristics
    • 113. Virtualization is mandatory
    • 114. Answer is No
    • 115. Cloud services are often but not always utilized in conjunction with, and enabled by, virtualization technologies
    41
  • 116. MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • There is no requirement that ties the abstraction of resources to virtualization technologies
    • 117. In many offerings virtualization by hypervisor or operating system container is not utilized.
    42
  • 118. MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS
    • Multi-tenancy as an essential cloud characteristic
    • 119. Multi-tenancy is not called out as an essential cloud characteristic by NIST but is often discussed as such.
    43
  • 120. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS
    • Divided into three archetypal models.
    • 121. The three fundamental classifications are known as the SPI Model.
    • 122. Various other derivative combinations are also available.
    44
  • 123. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS
    • Cloud Service Models
    • 124. Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS).
    • 125. Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS).
    • 126. Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
    45
  • 127. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS
    • The client use the software / applications running on a cloud infrastructure.
    • 128. Accessed through thin client interface such as a browser.
    46
  • 129. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS
    • User does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including:
    • 130. network,
    • 131. servers,
    • 132. operating systems,
    • 133. storage, or
    • 134. even individual application capabilities
    47
  • 135. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS
    • Possible exception - limited user specific application configuration settings.
    48
  • 136. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS
    • User can deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created using programming languages and tools supported by the provider.
    49
  • 137. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS
    • The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including
    • 138. network,
    • 139. servers,
    • 140. operating systems, or
    • 141. storage,
    50
  • 142. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS
    • Has control over the deployed applications and possibly application hosting environment configurations.
    51
  • 143. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS
    52
  • 148. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS
    • The consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications.
    • 149. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure
    53
  • 150. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS
    • Has control over
    • 151. operating systems,
    • 152. storage,
    • 153. deployed applications, and
    • 154. possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).
    54
  • 155. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Regardless of the service model, there are four cloud deployment models:
    • 156. Public Cloud
    • 157. Private Cloud
    • 158. Community Cloud
    • 159. Hybrid Cloud
    55
  • 160. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • There are derivative variations that address specific requirements.
    56
  • 161. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Public Cloud
    • 162. The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or a large industry group
    • 163. Owned by an organization providing cloud services.
    57
  • 164. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Private Cloud
    • 165. The cloud infrastructure is operated solely for a single organization.
    • 166. It may be managed by the organization or a third party, and may exist on-premises or off-premises.
    58
  • 167. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Community Cloud
    • 168. The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations
    • 169. Supports a specific community that has shared concerns
    59
  • 170. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    60
  • 175. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    It may be managed by the:
    • organizations or
    • 176. a third party
    and may exist
    • on-premises or
    • 177. off-premises.
    61
  • 178. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Hybrid Cloud
    • 179. Composition of two or more clouds (private, community, or public)
    • 180. They remain unique entities but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability
    62
  • 181. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Example - Hybrid Cloud
    • 182. Cloud bursting for load-balancing between clouds.
    63
  • 183. CLOUD BURSTING
    • New twist on an old concept :)
    • 184. Bursting into the cloud when necessary, or
    • 185. using the cloud when additional compute resources are required temporarily
    64
  • 186. CLOUD BURSTING
    • Example - used to shoulder the burden of some of the application's processing requirements.
    • 187. How it is done?
    • 188. Basic application functionality could be provided from within the cloud
    65
  • 189. CLOUD BURSTING
    • More critical (e.g. revenue-generating or mission critical) applications continue to be served from within the controlled enterprise data center.
    66
  • 190. CLOUD BURSTING
    • How it is different from the traditional bursting?
    • 191. Traditionally been applied to resource allocation and automated provisioning / de-provisioning of resources
    • 192. Historically focused on bandwidth.
    67
  • 193. CLOUD BURSTING
    • In the cloud, it is being applied to resources such as:
    • 194. servers,
    • 195. application servers,
    • 196. application delivery systems, and
    • 197. other infrastructure…
    68
  • 198. CLOUD BURSTING
    • …required to provide on-demand computing environments that expand and contract as necessary, without manual intervention.
    69
  • 199. CLOUD BURSTING
    • Without manual intervention means?
    • 200. We generally call it - automation
    • 201. But is automation sufficient for cloud? or is it the right thing for cloud?
    70
  • 202. CLOUD ORCHESTRATION
    Orchestration describes the automated
    complex computer systems, middleware, and services.
    71
  • 205. CLOUD ORCHESTRATION
    • Generally used in the context of:
    • 206. Service Oriented Architecture,
    • 207. virtualization,
    • 208. provisioning, and
    • 209. dynamic datacenter topics.
    72
  • 210. DERIVATIVE - DEPLOYMENT MODELS
    • Derivative cloud deployment models are emerging due to the maturation of market offerings and customer demand.
    • 211. Example
    • 212. Virtual Private Clouds
    73
  • 213. VIRTUAL PRIVATE CLOUDS
    • Public cloud infrastructure in a private or semi-private manner
    • 214. By interconnecting these resources to the internal resources of a consumers’ datacenter, usually via virtual private network (VPN) connectivity.
    74
  • 215. CLOUD SERVICE BROKERS
    • Providers that offer intermediation, monitoring, transformation/portability, governance, provisioning, and integration services.
    • 216. They also negotiate relationships between various cloud providers and consumers.
    75
  • 217. CLOUD SERVICE BROKERS
    • They take advantage of the incompatibility issues prevailing and provide an interface for customers.
    • 218. Acts as proxy (middle man)
    76
  • 219. OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API
    • Open and proprietary APIs are evolving which seek to enable things such as
    • 220. management,
    • 221. security and
    • 222. inter-operatibility
    for cloud.
    77
  • 223. OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API
    • Open Cloud Computing Interface Working Group,
    • 224. Amazon EC2 API,
    • 225. VMware’s DMTF-submitted vCloud API,
    • 226. Sun’s Open Cloud API,
    • 227. Rackspace API, and
    • 228. GoGrid’s API,
    78
  • 229. OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API
    • Play a key role in cloud portability and interoperability as well as common container formats such as the DMTF’s Open Virtualization Format (OVF).
    • 230. DMTF - Distributed Management Task Force
    79
  • 231. MULTI-TENANCY IN CLOUD
    • Not an essential characteristic of Cloud Computing in NIST’s model.
    • 232. Generally identified as an important element of cloud.
    80
  • 233. MULTI-TENANCY IN CLOUD
    • Implies a need for
    • 234. policy-driven enforcement,
    • 235. segmentation,
    • 236. isolation,
    • 237. governance,
    • 238. service levels, and
    • 239. chargeback/billing models for different consumers.
    81
  • 240. CLOUD
    82
  • 241. CLOUD CUBE
    83
  • 242. CLOUD REFERENCE MODEL
    84
    • Understanding the relationships and dependencies between Cloud Computing models is critical to understanding Cloud Computing security risks.
  • CLOUD REF MODEL
    85
    • IaaS is the foundation of all cloud services, with PaaS building upon IaaS, and SaaS in turn building upon PaaS
    • 243. As the capabilities are inherited, so are information security issues and risk.
  • CLOUD REF MODEL
    86
  • 244. CLOUD SECURITY
    87
  • 245. CLOUD – WHAT COULD BE TARGETTED?
    88
  • 249. WHY CLOUD SECURITY IS DIFFERENT?
    • With any new technology comes new risks
    • 250. New vectors - that we need to be aware of
    • 251. Confusion exists - how cloud is both similar to and different from existing models of computing
    89
  • 252. SECURITY ISSUES
    • Cloud based security issues, also commonly know as Cloud Based Risk – CRISK
    90
  • 253. SECURITY ISSUES
    Lock-in
    • When a cloud user decides to migrate (due to various reasons including poor SLA) to another cloud service provider or to in-house IT
    • 254. Different cloud service providers use different API – not compatible with each other for migrating the data 
    91
  • 255. SECURITY ISSUES
    Lack of:
    can considerably delay or prevent a successful migration.
    92
  • 259. SECURITY ISSUES
    Shared Service Consequences
    • Any kind of intentional and un-intentional malicious activity carried out or executed on a shared platform may affect the other tenants and associated stake holders.
    93
  • 260. SECURITY ISSUES
    Examples - Shared Service Consequences:
    • Blocking of IP ranges
    • 261. Confiscation of resources as part of an investigation - the availability is in question.
    94
  • 262. SECURITY ISSUES
    Examples - Shared Service Consequences:
    • The diversity of application running on the cloud platform and a sudden increase in the resource usage by one application can drastically affect the performance and availability of other applications shared in the same cloud infrastructure.
    95
  • 263. SECURITY ISSUES
    Sudden Acquisitions and Take-overs
    • Cloud is upcoming and promising domain for organizations to venture and expand.
    • 264. Sudden take over can result in a deviation from the agreed Terms of Use & SLA which may also lead to a Lock-In situation.
    96
  • 265. SECURITY ISSUES
    Run-on-the-cloud
    • Similar to the conventional run on the bank concept.
    • 266. Bankruptcy and catastrophes does not come with an early warning.
    97
  • 267. SECURITY ISSUES
    • What happens if the majority clients withdraw the associated services from a cloud infrastructure?
    98
  • 268. SECURITY ISSUES
    • The cloud service providers may try to prevent that move through direct and indirect methods – which may include a lock-in also.
    99
  • 269. SECURITY ISSUES
    Maintaining Certifications & Compliance
    • Organizations need to ensure that they can maintain the same when moving to cloud.
    • 270. ToU prohibits VA/PT
    • 271. This may introduce security vulnerabilities and gaps
    • 272. Result – Loose your certification.
    100
  • 273. SECURITY ISSUES
    Example - Maintaining Certifications:
    • In general scenario, the PCI DSS compliance cannot be achieved with the Amazon EC2/S3 cloud service.
    • 274. Major downfall in performance and quality metrics may affect your certifications.
    101
  • 275. SECURITY ISSUES
    Technical and Procedural Vulnerability
    • Vulnerabilities applicable to the conventional systems & networks are also applicable to cloud infrastructure.
    • 276. Lack of could based security standards and non-adherence to procedures may affect the CIA of customer data.
    102
  • 277. SECURITY ISSUES
    Confidentiality is @ Risk
    • The information deleted by the customer may be available to the cloud solution provider as part of their regular backups.
    • 278. Insecure and inefficient deletion of data, true data wiping not happening, exposing the sensitive information to other cloud users.
    103
  • 279. SECURITY ISSUES
    Lack of transparency in cloud
    • The service provider may be following good security procedures, but it is not visible to the customers and end users.
    • 280. May be due to security reasons.
    • 281. But end user is finally in the dark.
    104
  • 282. SECURITY ISSUES
    Lack of transparency in cloud
    • End user questions remains un-answered:
    • 283. how the data is backed up,
    • 284. who back up the data,
    • 285. whether the cloud service provider does it or has they outsourced to some third party,
    105
  • 286. SECURITY ISSUES
    • how the backup is transferred to a remote site as part of the backup policy,
    • 287. is it encrypted and send,
    • 288. is the backup properly destroyed after the specified retention period or
    106
  • 289. SECURITY ISSUES
    • is it lying somewhere in the disk,
    • 290. what kind of data wiping technologies are used.
    • 291. The lists of questions are big and the cloud users are in dark
    107
  • 292. SECURITY TESTING
    • Problems testing the cloud?
    • 293. Permission
    • 294. How do you get permission to test your application running on Amazon EC2 when the results of your testing could show you data from another client completely?
    108
  • 295. SECURITY TESTING
    • Getting black hole or getting kicked-off
    • 296. "In networking, black holes refer to places in the network where incoming traffic is silently discarded (or "dropped"), without informing the source that the data did not reach its intended recipient." - From Wikipedia
    109
  • 297. SECURITY TESTING
    • How do you track version?
    • 298. How do you do regression testing?
    • 299. How do you know what version of the search engine google is currently running on?
    110
  • 300. SECURITY TESTING
    • If you test an application today and find it vulnerable or not vulnerable, how do you know that the app you testing tomorrow is the same one that you tested yesterday? - You don't
    111
  • 301. THEN WHY WE MOVE?
    If its not good, safe or not even new, then why cloud adoption happening?
    112
  • 302. FEW TOP REASONS
    • Management by in-flight magazines
    • 303. Management version – something new and promising – let’s try it out
    • 304. Geek version – It’s really cool
    • 305. There is nobody to put a break when these two people join together.
    113
  • 306. OTHER REASONS
    • Poor uptime and service delivery experience from IT department.
    • 307. Economical factors
    • 308. Multi-tenancy means cost sharing
    114
  • 309. OTHER REASONS
    • Cost saving makes it attractive during recession.
    • 310. Cloud computing allows you to move from CAPEX to OPEX.
    • 311. Save 30% of IT Operational Cost
    115
  • 312. OTHER REASONS
    • Variable cost subscription model – rapidly scale up and scale down.
    • 313. Go Green or Green IT also influenced many.
    • 314. Powerful - A 64 node Linux cluster can be online in just five minutes - forget about those sleepless nights in your data centers
    116
  • 315. ADDRESSING SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD – RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD
    117
  • 316. ADDRESSING CLOUD SECURITY
    • Adopt a risk based approach
    • 317. Evaluate your tolerance for moving an asset to cloud
    • 318. Have a framework to evaluate cloud risks.
    118
  • 319. RA FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD
    • Identify the asset for cloud.
    • 320. Evaluate the asset
    • 321. Map the asset to cloud deployment models
    • 322. Evaluate cloud service models & providers
    • 323. Sketch the potential data flow
    119
  • 324. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • Two types of assets are supported by cloud:
    • 325. Data
    • 326. Applications/Functions/Processes
    • 327. Either partial functions or full applications
    120
  • 328. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • In cloud, we do not need data and application to reside at the same location.
    • 329. We can shift parts of functions to the cloud.
    121
  • 330. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • Example:
    • 331. Host the main application and data in our own data-centre.
    • 332. Outsource a portion of its functionality to the cloud through Platform as a Service (PaaS).
    122
  • 333. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • First step in evaluating risk for the cloud - determine exactly what data or function is being considered for the cloud.
    • 334. Include potential use of the asset once it moves to the cloud
    123
  • 335. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • This will help you account for scope creep
    • 336. Data and transaction volumes are often higher than expected.
    124
  • 337. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    125
  • 343. 1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET
    • Refers to uncontrolled changes in a project's scope.
    • 344. Can occur when the scope of a project is not properly defined, documented, or controlled.
    126
  • 345. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • Determine how important the data or function is to the organization.
    • 346. A detailed valuation is recommended only if the organization has an existing process for that.
    127
  • 347. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • If not, a rough assessment of the following is recommended:
    • 348. how sensitive an asset is, and
    • 349. how important an application / function / process is.
    128
  • 350. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • How do we do it?
    • 351. For each asset, ask the following questions:
    • 352. How would we be harmed if the asset became widely public and widely distributed?
    129
  • 353. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • How would we be harmed if an employee of our cloud provider accessed the asset?
    • 354. How would we be harmed if the process or function were manipulated by an outsider?
    130
  • 355. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • How would we be harmed if the process or function failed to provide expected results?
    • 356. How would we be harmed if the information/data were unexpectedly changed?
    131
  • 357. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • How would we be harmed if the asset were unavailable for a period of time?
    132
  • 358. 2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET
    • What are we doing basically with the above process?
    • 359. Assessing confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements for the asset; and
    • 360. how those are affected if all or part of the asset is handled in the cloud.
    133
  • 361. 3 – MAP THE ASSETS
    • Step 3 - Map the asset to potential cloud deployment models
    • 362. Determine which deployment model is good for the organizational requirement.
    134
  • 363. 3 – MAP THE ASSETS
    • Decide whether the organization can accept the risks implicit to the various deployment models (private, public, community, or hybrid); and hosting scenarios (internal, external, or combined).
    135
  • 364. 3 – MAP THE ASSETS
    • For the asset, determine if you are willing to accept the following options:
    • 365. Public.
    • 366. Private, internal/on-premises.
    • 367. Private, external (including dedicated or shared infrastructure).
    • 368. Community
    • 369. Hybrid
    136
  • 370. 3 – MAP THE ASSETS
    • End of this phase you should have answer to the following:
    • 371. Deployment models and locations that fits your security and risk requirements.
    137
  • 372. 4 – EVALUATE MODELS & PROVIDERS
    • Focus on the degree of control you’ll have at each SPI tier to implement any required risk management.
    138
  • 373. 5 – SKETCH DATA FLOW
    • Map out the data flow between:
    • 374. your organization,
    • 375. the cloud service, and
    • 376. any customers/other nodes.
    139
  • 377. 5 – SKETCH DATA FLOW
    • High-level design can be adopted for the same.
    • 378. Absolutely essential to understand whether, and how, data can move in and out of the cloud before finalizing.
    140
  • 379. RA - CONCLUSION
    • You should have a clear understanding of the following:
    • 380. the importance of what you are considering moving to the cloud,
    • 381. risk tolerance,
    141
  • 382. RA - CONCLUSION
    • which combinations of deployment and service models are acceptable, and
    • 383. potential exposure points for sensitive information and operations.
    142
  • 384. RA - CONCLUSION
    • For low-value assets you don’t need the same level of security controls
    • 385. Can skip most of the recommendations — such as on-site inspections, discoverability, and complex encryption schemes.
    • 386. A high-value regulated asset might entail audit and data retention requirements.
    143
  • 387. EXPLOITING CLOUD for iw / attacks
    144
  • 388. DO YOU KNOW THIS?
    145
  • 389. INFORMATION WARFARE
    • Clue:
    • 390. Kendo (kumdo in korean)
    146
  • 391. INFORMATION WARFARE
    風 - Swift as the wind
    林 - Quiet as the forest
    火 - Conquer like the fire
    山 - Steady as the mountain
    147
  • 392. INFORMATION WARFARE
    • Battle strategy and motto of Japanese feudal lord Takeda Shingen( 武田信玄 )(1521–1573 A.D.).
    • 393. Twenty-Four Generals - famous groupings of battle commanders
    • 394. (Takeda Nijūshi-shō )武田二十四将
    148
  • 395. INFORMATION WARFARE
    • Came from the Art of War by Chinese strategist and tactician Sun Tzu (Sunzi)
    • 396. A sort of abbreviation to remind officers and troops how to conduct battle
    149
  • 397. INFORMATION WARFARE
    • This is what we need in information warfare or when launching an attack
    150
  • 398. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    151
  • 402. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Try – ElcomSoft Distributed Password Recovery (with some patches to handle PGP ZIP)
    • 403. Two elements - EDPR Managers & EDPR Agents
    152
  • 404. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Dual core Win7 box - 2100 days for a complex passphrase.
    • 405. Not acceptable – too long
    • 406. Lets exploit the cloud.
    153
  • 407. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • First things first – Create an Account on Amazon. Credit Card Required 
    • 408. Install Amazon EC2 API Tools on your linux box.
    sudo apt-get install ec2-api-tools
    154
  • 409. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Select an AMI
    • 410. Example - use a 32 bit Windows AMI - ami-df20c3b6-g
    155
  • 411. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Start an instance from the Linux shell as follows:
    ec2-run-instances -k ssh-keypair ami-df20c3b6-g default
    156
  • 412. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Enumerate the instance ID & public IP:
    ec2-describe-instances
    157
  • 413. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Instance status change from “pending” to “running”
    • 414. Extract the admin password for the instance
    ec2-get-password -k ssh-keypair.pem $instanceID
    158
  • 415. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Configure EC2 firewall to permit inbound RDP traffic to the instance.
    ec2-authorize default -p 3389 -s $trusted_ip_address/32
    159
  • 416. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Configure the firewall in front of the EDPR manager system to permit TCP/12121 from anywhere.
    • 417. RDP into the instance & configure EDPR
    160
  • 418. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Login using the password obtained from ec2-get-password command
    161
  • 419. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Install EDPR Agent,
    • 420. Configure the Agent to connect to the Manager.
    • 421. 3 points to configure mainly
    162
  • 422. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Configure the public IP address or hostname of the EDPR manager you have configured.
    163
  • 423. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Interface tab - Set the Start-up Mode to "At Windows Start-up".
    164
  • 424. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Registry hack
    • 425. EDPR creates a pair of registry values which are used to uniquely identify the agent when connecting to the manager.
    • 426. We need to scrub these values – why?
    165
  • 427. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • If we don’t, every single instance we initiate will appear to be the same agent to the manager.
    • 428. Output = The job handling will be totally corrupted.
    166
  • 429. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareElcomSoftDistributed AgentUID
    • Set the value of the UID key to null, but DO NOT DELETE THE KEY.
    167
  • 430. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Let’s bundle the EC2 instance.
    • 431. Remember in cloud, bundle is similar to creating a ‘template’ in VMware terminology.
    168
  • 432. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Install and configure EC2 AMI Tools
    • 433. Command:
    ec2-bundle-instance $instance_id -b $bucket_name -p $bundle_name -o $access_key_id -w $secret_access_key
    169
  • 434. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Bundling process runs sysprep on the Windows instance, compress and copies the instance to S3.
    170
  • 435. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Check the progress of the bundle task:
    ec2-describe-bundle-tasks
    171
  • 436. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • Register the bundled AMI:
    ec2-register $bucket_name/$bundle_name.manifest.xml
    172
  • 437. EXPLOITING CLOUD
    • The register command returns AMI ID
    • 438. Used to spawn instances of the EDPR agent. Example:
    IMAGE ami-54f3103d
    173
  • 439. ACTION TIME 
    • Start EDPR manager & configure task.
    • 440. to brute an password composed of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, and the numbers 0-9, with a length of between 1 to 8 characters against a PGP ZIP file.
    174
  • 441. ACTION TIME 
    175
  • 442. ACTION TIME 
    • Start a single instance of our EDPR agent:
    ec2-run-instances -k $ssh-keypair ami-54f3103d -g default
    176
  • 443. ACTION TIME 
    • Agent check in with the EDPR manager.
    177
  • 444. ACTION TIME 
    • We started it with default parameters
    • 445. EC2 “small” instance
    • 446. Trying 500K keys per second
    • 447. How long will it take?
    178
  • 448. ACTION TIME 
    • What???? 3600 days? = 10 years!!!!!
    179
  • 449. ACTION TIME 
    • Let’s scale up – deploy 10 additional instances:
    ec2-run-instances -n 10 -k ssh-keypair ami-54f3103d -g default -t c1.medium
    180
  • 450. ACTION TIME 
    • The -n 10 parameter tells EC2 to launch 10 instances.
    • 451. c1.medium instance = “High CPU" instance
    181
  • 452. ACTION TIME 
    182
  • 453. ACTION TIME 
    • Now we have more cracking agents in the party!!!
    • 454. 2+M keys/second
    • 455. So what's the time required now???
    183
  • 456. ACTION TIME 
    • Down to 122 days
    184
  • 457. ACTION TIME 
    • Kickoff another 89 to hit a century.
    ec2-run-instances -n 89 -k ssh-keypair ami-54f3103d -g default -t c1.medium
    Note: Check your EDPR License.
    185
  • 458. ACTION TIME 
    • Error:
    Client.InstanceLimitExceeded: Your quota allows for 9 more instance(s). You requested at least 89
    186
  • 459. ACTION TIME 
    • Option 1
    • 460. Request to instance amazon EC2 Instance Limit - http://aws.amazon.com/contact-us/ec2-request/
    187
  • 461. ACTION TIME 
    • Option 2
    • 462. Amazon spot instances - allows us to bid on unused Amazon EC2 capacity and run those instances.
    188
  • 463. ACTION TIME 
    • Option 3
    • 464. Create custom python script to bypass this limitation
    189
  • 465. ACTION TIME 
    • With a couple more of instances, we can reduce it to hours
    • 466. A successful cloud based distributed cracking system.
    190
  • 467. CLOUD FORENSICS
    191
  • 468. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Mixed Responses
    • 469. Bad guys have started using cloud based services and infrastructure for launching attacks
    • 470. Cloud do provide a good platform for incidence response and forensics investigations
    192
  • 471. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • By utilizing the inherent features of cloud computing, computer forensic can become an on-demand service under certain circumstances.
    193
  • 472. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Regular business and operations are not affected when a cloud environment needs to be forensically examined.
    • 473. Not the case with the traditional infrastructure where the equipments are seized.
    • 474. Cloud Example – Amazon EBS
    194
  • 475. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Cloud based forensics took a new turn when Amazon introduced Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes
    • 476. Enables the user to launch an instance with an Amazon EBS volume that will serve as the root device.
    195
  • 477. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • When there is a need to preserve a cloud environment, EBS can create an exact replica of the cloud instance & put it on the same cloud for forensics evaluation and examination.
    • 478. Since the forensic investigators will be working with another instance of the environment, the regular operations is not affected in any way.
    196
  • 479. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Replication process achieved in few minutes.
    • 480. Forensic evidences are invalid if they are not cryptographically hashed.
    • 481. This can be easily achieved using the on-demand feature of cloud.
    197
  • 482. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Replication process achieved in few minutes.
    • 483. Forensic evidences are invalid if they are not cryptographically hashed.
    • 484. This can be easily achieved using the on-demand feature of cloud.
    198
  • 485. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • The cloud based hashing takes less time and is much faster when you compare it with the traditional cryptographic hashing process.
    • 486. Amazon Web Services is already providing a good forensic feature where it can provide a MD5 hash of every file that is on the cloud system.
    199
  • 487. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • What this practically means is that when a bit by bit copy is initiated (forensic duplication), you have systems in place which can ensure that you made the exact replica and not even a bit has changed during the replication and copying process.
    200
  • 488. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Even though you have all the above services available, cloud forensics is still challenging.
    • 489. Virtualization of various entities like the applications and host systems, which once used to be in-house is now scattered on the cloud.
    201
  • 490. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Makes evidence gathering a challenging task
    • 491. Since we are acquiring data from a virtual environment, the forensic investigator should have a clear and precise understanding of how they work and what files are interesting and required to acquire.
    202
  • 492. CLOUD FORENSICS
    • Near to impossible to acquire the complete hard disk due to various reasons including but not limited to:
    • 493. multiple data owners on the same disk,
    • 494. remote geographical location,
    • 495. jurisdictional difficulties,
    • 496. RAID configurations etc
    203
  • 497. AND FINALLY
    • Questions also arise on the compatibility and reliability of the tools used for investigating cloud forensics - because most of the tools are meant for real time systems and not for virtualized environments.
    • 498. A collaborative and collective effort is required to address what we discussed.
    204
  • 499. conclusion
    205
  • 500. CONCLUSION
    • The architectural mindset used when designing solutions has clear implications on the:
    • 501. future flexibility,
    • 502. security,
    • 503. collaborative capabilities, and
    • 504. mobility
    of the resultant solution.
    206
  • 505. CONCLUSION
    • With so many different cloud deployment and service models, and their hybrid permutations — no list of security controls can cover all these circumstances.
    207
  • 506. GOOD SECURITY PROFESSIONAL
    A good security professional is someone who always looks both ways before crossing a one-way street.
    208
  • 507. 209
    QUESTIONS??
    Manu Zacharia
    m@matriux.com
    or
    m@HackIT.co
    or
  • 508. THANK YOU !