Responsible Mining by Robert Goodland (March 4, 2012)
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Responsible Mining by Robert Goodland (March 4, 2012) Document Transcript

  • 1. Responsible  Mining     Defining  what  “Responsible  Mining”  means1                                                   Rough  draft,  last  revised:  7  March  2012     Comments  and  corrections  to:  Rbtgoodland@gmail.com                                                                                                                            1  “Responsible  mining”  is  widely  used  by  mining  corporations,  but  rarely  with  a  definition.    For  example  February  12,  2012  Philippine  Daily  Enquirer’s  full  page  advertisement  (p.20)  paid  by  the  Chamber  of  Mines,  asserts:    “Responsible  mining   boosts   the   economy,   attracts   investment,   generates   employment,   improves   the   quality   of   life,   protects   the  environment.”   And   yet   there   many   are   calls   for   Mining   No   Go   Zones,   such   as   in   Australia:  www.miningaustralia.com.au/.../margaret-­‐river-­‐declared-­‐no-­‐go-­‐zone-­‐for-­‐coal-­‐mining;   www.sunshinecoastdaily.  com.au/   story/   2012/02/14;     India:   www.downtoearth.   org.in/content/environment-­‐ministry-­‐firm-­‐no-­‐go-­‐zones;   Peru:  mininginparadise.org/en/node/79;     and   the     Philippines:   rosancruz.blogspot.com/2011/10/gina-­‐lopez-­‐wants-­‐no-­‐go-­‐zones-­‐in-­‐mining.html.       1  
  • 2. 1.0   Introduction  and  Perspective    Why  should  mining  become  responsible?    The  main  reason  is  that  mining  is  wreaking  havoc  with  communities   and   ecosystems   worldwide.   When   the   earth   was   relatively   empty   of   people   and  ecosystems  were  intact,  a  mine  here  and  there  seemed  to  be  acceptable.      The  world  was  huge  and  the   human   economy   tiny.   That   idyll   has   markedly   shifted.   The   world   has   become   puny   and  vulnerable.    The  atmosphere  has  been  so  polluted  that  it  is  damaging  our  climate.  The  oceans  have  been   so   polluted   that   they   have   acidified   by   30%   since   the   industrial   revolution.2   The   world   is   now  overfull  of  people  and  their  artifacts.    The  health  of  the  world  has  become  grim,  if  not  morbid.    The  world  seems  to  have  entered  a  period  on  uncontrollable  decline.    We  know  the  solutions,  but  we  don’t  like  them!    Slowing  down  the  pace  of  destruction  is  no  longer  adequate.    We  have  to  get  back  down  and  reverse  damage  if  the  world  is  to  approach  sustainability.    Mines   often   have   to   be   squeezed   between   communities   or   are   placed   where   they   damage   already  scarce   life-­‐support   systems   such   as   forests   or   wetlands.     Therefore   communities   and   their   life-­‐support   systems   need   more   protection   from   industrial   mines   than   was   hitherto   needed.     The  richest  ores  have  already  been  depleted.    Leaner  ores  produce  more  severe  impacts  as  they  have  more  ore  to  be  processed  and  dumped  for  the  same  output.      This  priority  is  relatively  new  for  the  mining  sector  and  it  is  taking  time  for  companies  to  adapt  to  this  new  reality.    The  default  position  has  become  that  mining  should  not  damage  any  life-­‐support  systems  any  longer.    The  conditions  outlined  in  the  paper  are  robust.    Some  regions  are  not  at  all  suitable   for   mining,   that   is   why   an   increasing   number   of   governmental   jurisdictions   have  mandatory  moratoria  on  mining.    El  Salvador,  Costa  Rica,  and  the  Philippines  are  examples  where  moratoria  on  mining  are  in  place  or  proposed  as  the  prudent  course.3 Government  and  industry  on  their  own  cannot  assure  responsible  mining.  That  is  why  an  increasing  number  of  jurisdictions  are  enacting  forms  of  moratoria.                                                                                                                2   The   oceans   are   becoming   more   acidic   faster   than   they   have   in   the   past   300   million   years.   Increases   in   carbon   dioxide  in   the   atmosphere   warmed   the   planet   and   made   the   oceans   more   acidic.   These   changes   are   associated   with   major  shifts  in  climate  and  mass  extinctions.    See:  Honisch  et  al.  2012.  3   For   example:   The   2012   “Mindanao   Declaration:   Defending   the   Dignity   of   Life,   Securing   our   Future”.  taborasj.wordpress.com/2012/01/27/mindanao-­‐declaration-­‐defending-­‐the-­‐dignity-­‐of-­‐life-­‐securing-­‐our-­‐future/.       2  
  • 3. 2.0   Eight  Principles  of  Responsible  Mining    Eight  principles  are  outlined  here  in  order  to  ensure  risky  mines  are  never  proposed.    These  focus  on  encouraging  the  best  mining  corporations,  while  keeping  the  worst  corporations  away.    Mining  corporations  wanting  to  follow  best  practice  for  responsible  mining  will  find  this  section  useful  in  future   projects.   4     Responsible   here   is   used   to   mean   having   a   capacity   for   moral   decisions   and  therefore   accountable;   liable   to   legal   review   or   in   case   of   fault   to   penalties;   based   on   or  characterized   by   good   judgment   or   sound   thinking;   honest,   capable,   reliable,   trustworthy.     Note  that  decisions,  sound  thinking  and  good  judgment  require  much  information.    Mining  is  here  used  to   mean   the   extractive   industries   of   oil,   gas   and   mining   both   metals   and   non-­‐metals.     This   note  focuses   more   on   large-­‐scale   and   industrial   mining,   and   not   on   artisanal   mining.     It   outlines   the   sort  of  information  required  in  order  to  make  mining  responsible.5      2.1.   Transparency  vs.  Secrecy:    No  social  and  environmental  assessment  should  be  kept  secret  from   the   potentially   impacted   stakeholders.     Potentially   impacted   people   must   be   fully   and   openly  participating   or   meaningfully   involved   throughout   the   c.2-­‐year   EIA   preparation   period,   from  stakeholder   identification,   through   Panel   of   Experts,   drafting,   Impact/Benefit   Contract   to  restoration   and   rehabilitation.   Citizens   groups   must   actually   participate   in   the   collection   and  interpretation   of   data.   Simply   “talking”   at   public   meetings   has   little   or   no   value.   Corporations   must  be   compelled   to   pay   for   such   efforts,   but   remain   at   arms-­‐length   in   terms   of   influence   on   civil  society.   At   present,   all   project   data   comes   from   the   financially-­‐interested   project   proponent.  Transparency  is  one  of  the  most  important  key  principles;  therefore  publicizing  the  names  of  the  Panel  of  Experts  (PoE)  should  routinely  be  mandatory,  not  optional.    An  Expert  who  is  willing  to  be  paid  by  the  mining  company  for  expert  advice,  but  not  willing  to  risk  tarnishing  his/her  name  is  not  an  expert,  but  a  consultant.      2.2.   Acceptance   by   Stakeholders:   If   Stakeholders   Don’t   Want   the   Proposed   Project:   it   should  not  go  ahead.    Stakeholders  include  mining  company  employees,  local  communities  and  residents  and   the   government   units   receiving   taxes   and   royalties   and   granting   permits   as   well   as   the  stockholders  and  managers  of  the  company.  Responsible  mining  corporations  don’t  force  mines  on  people   and   communities   who   don’t   want   them.     Corporations   should   follow   some   degree   of  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR).    Best  corporations  aim  to  ensure  that  all  potentially  impacted  stakeholders   actually   welcome   the   project   because   the   risks   are   slight,   compensation   is   great,  training,  employment  and  procurement  is  attractive.    FPIC  is  the  best  practice  here,  as  mandated  by  UNDRIP.                                                                                                                    4   Best   practice   means   fully   espousing   all   relevant   policies   and   procedures   as   set   out   in   OECD’s   Guidelines  are  recommendations   addressed   by   governments   to   multinational   enterprises   operating   in   or   from   adhering   countries.  They   provide   voluntary   principles   and   standards   for   responsible   business   conduct   in   areas   such   as   employment   and  industrial  relations,  human  rights,  environment,  information  disclosure,  combating  bribery,  consumer  interests,  science  and  technology,  competition,  and  taxation.  www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines.    5   The   best   single   source   of   further   information   on   responsible   mining   is:   IRMA:   The   Initiative   for   Responsible   Mining  Assurance:  a  multi-­‐sector  effort  to  develop  a  voluntary  system  to  independently  verify  compliance  with  environmental,  human   rights   and   social   standards   for   mining   operations.   Participants   include   mining   companies,   jewelry   retailers,  NGOs,  organized  labor  and  affected  communities.  (responsiblemining.net/.  See  also:  Miranda  et  al.  2005).       3  
  • 4. 2.3.   Food   Production   Trumps   Questionable   Mining:   The   threats   to   life   through   depletion   of  water  and  food  mining  must  not  increase  resources  in  areas  of  scarce  land  or  water.  Many  national  laws  mandate  that  priority  for  water  use  is  given  to  domestic  use  first,  second  to  municipal  water  supply,   third   to   irrigation,   fourth   to   power   generation,   fifth   to   fisheries,   livestock   raising,   and  industrial  use,  and  lastly  to  mining.        2.4.   Standards  of  Mining  Corporations:  Better  mining  corporations  will  uphold  all  international  social   and   environmental   agreements.6     Better   corporations   possess   in-­‐house   environmental   and  social   units   staffed   by   seasoned   social   and   environmental   professionals,   which   are   adequately  resourced   to   ensure   the   corporation   follows   best   practice.   Better   companies   have   clear   policies   on  Corporate   Social   Responsibility   (CSR)7   and   complies   with   all   applicable   social   and   environmental  policies   of   the   host   country   and   of   the   proponent’s   home   country.     Double   standards   are   to   be  avoided.     A   sample   of   standards   and   codes   of   conduct   followed   by   better   mining   corporations   is  provided  in  Figure  1  below.    Most  such  corporations  will  attempt  to  get  away  with  whatever  they  can   -­‐-­‐   especially   when   the   median   educational   level   encourages   such   abuse,   and   where   the  government   provides   no   real   buffer   for   the   citizenry.     For   example,   most   of   the   recent  environmental   and   social   impact   assessments   (ESIA)   I   have   reviewed   are   essentially   “public  relations”  documents  -­‐-­‐  and  national  regulators  have  approved  them  all.    2.5.   Pre-­‐Qualification   or   certification   of   potential   mining   permit   seekers:     National  governments   nowadays   often   mandate   pre-­‐qualification   or   certification   of   potential   bidders   on  governmental   work.     This   pre-­‐qualification   mechanism   encourages   the   better   corporations   that  already   have   Environmental   and   Social   (E   &   S)   units   in-­‐house,   E   &   S   codes   and   standards,   and   a  reputable  track  record  of  E  &  S  quality  in  previous  projects.    For  example,  MCEP  (See:  Soloman  et  al.   2006)   project   evaluated   whether   independent,   third-­‐party   certification   of   environmental   and  social  performance  could  be  applied  to  mine  sites.  Three  main  questions  were  investigated  during  the   project   encompassing:   governance;   standards   and   assessment;   and,   assurance.   However  mining  corporations  with  reprehensible  track  records,  often  with  no  in-­‐house  E  &  S  units,  and  no  corporate   social   responsibility   or   E   &   S   Policies   will   not   meet   pre-­‐qualification   criteria.     This   pre-­‐                                                                                                                6   For   example:   African-­‐Eurasian   Waterbird   Agreement   (AEWA,   1995);   UNESCO   Biosphere   Reserves   (1968);   the  Convention   on   Biological   Diversity   (CBD,   1992);   Cartagena   Protocol   on   Biosafety   to   the   Convention   on   Biological  Diversity  (2000);  the  Nagoya  Protocol  on  Access  to  Genetic  Resources  and  the  Fair  and  Equitable  Sharing  of  Benefits  Arising  from  their  Utilization  to  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (2010);    the  Convention  on  International  Trade  in  Endangered  Species  of  Wild  Fauna  and  Flora  (CITES,  1973);    the  Convention  on  the  Conservation  of  Migratory  Species  of   Wild   Animals   (CMS   or   Bonn   Convention,   1979);   the   International   Treaty   on   Plant   Genetic   Resources   for   Food   and  Agriculture  (Plant  Treaty,  2004),  the  Convention  on  Wetlands  (Ramsar,  1971);  Convention  concerning  the  Protection  of  the   World   Cultural   and   Natural   Heritage   (1972);   Basel   Convention   on   the   Control   of   Transboundary   Movements   of  Hazardous   Wastes   and   their   Disposal   (1989);     Rotterdam   Convention   on   the   Prior   Informed   Consent   Procedure   for  certain   hazardous   Chemicals   and   Pesticides   in   international   trade   (1998);   The   Stockholm   Convention   on   Persistent  Organic   Pollutants   (2001);   Convention   to   combat   desertification   (UNCCD,   2007);     the  Convention   on   Climate   Change  (UNFCC,  1992);  Kyoto  Protocol  (1997);  Montreal  Convention  on  Substances  That  Deplete  the  Ozone  Layer  (1987);  the  Vienna   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   the   Ozone   Layer   (1985),   and   the   Vienna   Convention   on   the   Law   of   Treaties  (1969).    7  CSR  seeks  to  ensure  that  the  interests  of  all  stakeholders  about  the  environment  are  met  in  corporate  policies  and  projects.   In   a   narrow   sense,   CSR   means   operating   a   business   in   a   manner   that   accounts   for   the   social   and  environmental   impacts   created   by   the   business.   CSR   is   a   form   of   voluntary   corporate   self-­‐regulation   such   that   the  company   actively   complies   with   the   spirit   of   the   law,   ethical   standards,   and   international   norms   (see:   UN   Principles   for  Responsible  Investment).     4  
  • 5. qualification  will  promote  the  better  companies,  and  discourage  the  weaker  companies.  Third  party  independent  review  is  powerful.  What  is  needed  is  some  sort  of  ESIA  Consortium  on  Mining,  largely  funded   by   corporate   contributions   to   IUCN   or   UNEP,   or   other   independent   body,   with   the  independent  body  in  turn  responsible  for  ESIA  contracting,  guidelines  (international  standard)  and  quality  review.    For  most  mining  projects  that  cost  commonly  a  few  billion  dollars,  the  added  cost  would  be  trivial,  but  the  benefits  enormous:    they  would,  finally,  get  objective  advice.    2.6.   Insurance  and  Performance  Bonds:    Insurance  and  performance  bonds  are  mechanisms  to  foster  compliance  with  contractual  obligations  and  to  improve  the  quality  of  results.    They  are  in  widespread   use   in   the   construction   industries   and   elsewhere.     They   should   become   standard   in  mining.    The  main  challenge  is  setting  the  insurance  and  bonds  high  enough  to  cover  accidents  and  non-­‐compliance  adequately  and  for  long  enough  into  the  future.    Often,  after  mine  closure  a  miner  may  declare  bankruptcy  or  be  taken  over  by  another  company.    Then  if,  some  decades  later,  a  toxic  waste  lagoon  ruptures,  liability  is  not  as  clear  as  desirable.    The  most  notorious  case  at  present  is  in  Ecuador  where  Texaco  polluted  vast  areas  of  Amazon  forest  for  30  years  before  they  were  bought  out   by   Chevron.     The   18   years   of   court   trials   in   Ecuador   and   the   USA   recently   led   to   fining   Chevron  US$18   Bn.,   as   Texaco’s   successor.     The   transferability   of   insurance   bonds   with   the   sale   of   the  company  needs  to  be  clarified  in  advance.  Frequently,  the  “interested  party”  is  allowed  to  choose  the  consultant  that  will  calculate  the  amount  of  the  bond  /  insurance.  And,  even  more  frequently,  they   fail   to   make   “truly-­‐conservative”   assumptions   about   future   costs.   Mostly   they   succeed   in  bonding   only   for   earth-­‐moving   activities   and   avoid   bonding   for   the   truly   expensive   tasks,   such   as  collecting  and  treating  contaminated  waters  -­‐-­‐  often  in  perpetuity.  Thus,  they  are  thinking  only  in  the  short-­‐term  and  passing  the  actual  costs  to  the  future  generations.        2.7.   Social  and  Environmental  Assessment:  Social  and  environmental  assessment  is  mandated  by   the   laws   of   many   national   governments.   However,   the   quality   and   professionalism   of   some  ESIA’s  are  questionable;  the  aim  is  to  achieve  a  reliable  and  effective  ESIA.  The  mining  proponent  often   selects   the   ESIA   team,   which   then   has   a   clear   conflict-­‐of-­‐interest   in   not   finding   too   many  serious   impacts.     This   conflict-­‐of-­‐interest   has   been   realized   for   decades,   so   mechanisms   to   foster  objectivity   by   ESIA   teams   paid   by   the   mining   proponent   have   become   standard   procedure.     The  first  effective  mechanism  is  for  a  small  team  or  panel  of  social  and  environmental  experts  (PoE,  see  Goodland   et   al.   2011)   to   help   the   proponent   select   the   most   appropriate   team   to   prepare   the  ESIA.8    To  be  frank,  no  modern,  large-­‐scale,  open  pit  mine  can  be  operated  without  significant  long-­‐term   impacts.   To   pretend   otherwise,   is   to   ignore   the   world-­‐mining   track   record.   All   other   decisions  follow  from  accepting  this  reality.                                                                                                                    8   The   PoE   is   composed   of   about   three   highly   seasoned   professionals   who   care   more   for   their   lifetime   professional  reputations  and  scientific  objectivity,  rather  than  for  their  next  consultancy.    They  meet  on  site  a  couple  of  times  a  year  to  ensure  the  ESIA  is  off  to  a  reliable  start  and  that  it  is  of  good  quality  when  the  final  draft  appears  in  c.24  months  time.  The  PoE  usually  let  their  names  be  known.    If  the  ESIA  team  members  are  not  identified  by  name,  suspicion  may  arise  about  their  capabilities.    The  PoE  supports  and  strengthens  the  in-­‐house  E&S  unit  of  the  proponent  and  may  liaise  with   the   governments   E&S   staff.     The   second   mechanism   to   foster   quality   is   to   ensure   critical   reviews   of   the   final   draft  ESIA  report  to  ensure  it  is  reliable  before  it  is  released.           5  
  • 6. 2.8.   Royalties,   Taxes   and   Fees:     see   Andrew   Bauer’s   paper.     Caveat:     Responsible   mining   also  can  be  achieved  by  ensuring  that  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  potentially  impacted  people  clearly  exceed  the  costs  and  impacts.    This  issue  comes  down  to  payments  and  other  compensation  from  the  mining  proponent  to  the  impacted  people.    World  experience  shows  that,  most  unfortunately,  compensation   to   impacted   peoples   and   to   their   government   almost   always   is   marginal   at   best.    How  to  set  royalties,  taxes,  fees  etc  and  other  compensation  sufficiently  high  is  a  highly  important  financial  and  economic  issue  not  dealt  with  here,  but  well  outlined  by  Andrew  Bauer  (2012).       Figure  1:  Codes  of  Conduct  and  Standards  Followed  by  Better  Mining  Corporations     Note:    Most  of  these  codes  and  standards  are  voluntary;  they  need  to  become  mandatory;   compliance  must  be  monitored  by  independent  third  parties  and  enforced.  EITI:    The  Extractive  Industries  Transparency  Initiative  Plus  Plus.  UNDRIP:    The  United  Nations  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples.  UNHCR  The  United  Nations  High  Commission  for  Human  Rights.  The  Voluntary  Principles  on  Security  and  Human  Rights  IRMA:  The  Initiative  for  Responsible  Mining  Assurance.  UN  Convention  Against  Corruption  UN  Precautionary  Principle  The  Voluntary  Principles  on  Security  and  Human  Rights.  The  Equator  Principles.  The  UN  Aarhus  Convention  The  Extractive  Industry  Review.  Corporate  Social  Responsibility.  The  UN  Global  Compact.  The  Environmental  Liability  Directive.  IPIECA  Guidance  Document  on  Sustainable  Social  Investment.  The  ECOWAS  Directive  on  the  Harmonization  of  Guiding  Principles  and  Policies  in  the  Mining   Sector.  UN  ILO  Convention  169:  Core  Labor  Standards.  The  International  Convention  on  Economic,  Social  and  Civil  Rights.  The  International  Convention  on  Elimination  of  all  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimination.  Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Voluntary  Principles  on  Security  and  Human  Rights.  UN  Guiding  Principles  on  Business  and  Human  Rights  The  OECD  Guidelines  for  Multinational  Enterprises.  The  Akwé:  Kon  Guidelines           6  
  • 7. Box  1:    Voluntary  Compliance  versus  Mandatory  Regulation    For   real   changes   to   occur,   societies   cannot   rely   on   the   good   intentions   and   aspirations   of  corporations.   The   founders   of   most   developed,   western   countries   understood   this   principle   and  mandated   the   creation   of   actual   checks   and   balances,   although   many   seem   to   be   eroding   in   the  natural  resource  /  environmental  arenas.  Instead,  we  seem  to  be  evolving  towards  Mussolini’s  ideal  of   a   partnership   between   business   and   governments,   with   the   desires   of   the   citizens   largely  ignored.     For   example,   right   now   there   are   more   than   200   on-­‐going   demonstrations   /   disputes  around  mining  projects  in  Peru  alone.    The   widespread   and   strengthening   opposition   to   mining,   the   increasing   number   of   jurisdictions  adopting   mining   moratoria,   and   the   soaring   need   for   improved   protection   of   the   earth,   are  evidence   that   voluntary   standards   are   not   working   adequately.   The   perspective   here   is   that   mining  improvements   are   best   achieved   by   mandatory   regulations,   with   third   party   monitoring   and  government   sanctions   for   violations.     This   should   be   backed   up   by   performance   bonds,   escrow  accounts,   insurance   and   meaningful   penalties,   including   in   the   stock   markets   where   mining  corporations  are  listed.    Credit  rating  agencies  assigning  credit  ratings  should  weight  environmental  and  social  risks  of  the  mining  corporation,  and  its  credit  worthiness,  such  as  its  ability  to  prevent  catastrophic   damage   (e.g.,   waste   dump   breaches),   effective   post-­‐mining   restoration,   clean-­‐up   of  toxic  spills,  and  prevention  of  acid  mine  drainage  in  perpetuity.9                                                                                                                  9   The   Acid   Mine   Drainage   (AMD)   is   the   number   one   environmental   impact   facing   the   mining   industry.   AMD   occurs  when   sulphide-­‐bearing   minerals   in   rock   are   exposed   to   air   and   water,   converting   sulphide   to   sulphuric   acid.   It   can  devastate  aquatic  habitats,  is  difficult  and  very  expensive  to  treat,  (many  millions  of  dollars  for  each  abandoned  mine  in  the  USA,  for  example),  and  once  started,  can  continue  for  centuries.  Roman  mines  in  Great  Britain  and  Spain  continue  to   generate   acid   drainage   more   than   2000   years   after   the   mining   had   ceased.   Acid   mine   drainage   can   develop  throughout   the   mining   process:   in   underground   workings,   open   pit   mine   faces,   waste   rock   dumps,   tailings   deposits,  and   ore   stockpiles.   www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/mining-­‐effects-­‐on-­‐rainfall-­‐drainage_cac4.     Many   coal   mines   also  suffer   from   acid   mine   drainage.     Much   AMD   also   contains   toxic   heavy   metals,   such   as   lead,   mercury,   arsenic   and  cadmium.     7  
  • 8. 3.0   No-­‐Go  Zones  for  Mining    Five  types  of  socially  or  environmentally  sensitive  areas,  which  are  valuable  when  intact,  and   whose   value   would   be   jeopardized   by   extractive   industries   are   given   special  consideration  in  mining  regulations.10    If  the  potentially  affected  communities  reject  the  project   on   these   categories   of   lands,   the   area   would   be   off-­‐limits   to   mining.  Meaningfully  informed,  prior  consent  is  a  precondition  for  licensing  mining  operations.    An   important   proviso   is   that   offsets   can   be   more   valuable   for   local   communities   and  even  for  conservation,  so  the  possibility  of  trade-­‐offs  is  available  in  certain  cases.    The  five  main  types  of  areas  off  limits  to  mining  are:    3.1   Indigenous   Peoples   Reserves:     Areas   in   which   Indigenous   Peoples   live,   or   on  which   they   depend.     Ancestral   Domains,   Indigenous   Peoples,   tribal   people,   forest  dwellers,  vulnerable  ethnic  minorities;  their  territories,  reserves  or  usucapion  lands  are  off  limits  to  mining.    3.2   Conflict   Zones:   Areas   of   overt   or   simmering/latent   social   conflict,   especially  armed  conflict.  Worldwide  experience  shows  that  mining  in  such  conflict  zones  almost  invariably   exacerbates   conflict.   Land   grabbing,   deforestation   and   illegal   expansion   of  mining,  cattle  ranching,  and  oil  palm  plantations  still  are  fuelled  by  violence.    3.3   Fragile  Watersheds:  such  as  those  protecting  a  dependent  project  downstream.  Riparian   ecosystems   important   for   conserving   riparian   services.   Watershed   conserving  water   for   irrigation   or   intensive   agriculture   below.   Any   mining   activity   is   illegal   within  1000   meters   of   any   source   of   water.       Some   nations   ban   mining   in   all   mountainous  zones.   Areas   with   active   seismicity   or   geological   faults   should   be   avoided   for   mining  because   of   the   risk   that   toxic   lagoons   and   heaps   of   mine   wastes   will   rupture   or   leak.    Steep  slopes  should  be  protected.    Areas  prone  to  landslides,  lahars  or  mudslides  should  be   off   limits.   No   mining   should   be   permitted   in   a   wide   swath   either   side   of   possible  hurricane  or  cyclone  paths.  All  water  catchments  above  or  feeding  into  irrigation  need  conservation.   Unfortunately,   many   of   the   highest-­‐grade   metal   ore   bodies   exist   in   the  headwaters   of   some   of   the   highest   and   most   seismically   active   regions   of   the   world.   So,  leaders,   such   as   the   present   Prime   Minister   of   Peru   will   argue   that   this   (above)  restriction  would  essentially  stop  mining  in  such  countries.    3.4   Biodiversity,  Habitats  and  Wildlands:  Areas  of  high  biodiversity  and  endemism,  rare  or  endangered  species,  rare  habitats,  and  intactness  (e.g.,  coral  reefs,  mangroves,  tropical  rain  forest,  remaining  old  growth,  biological  hotspots,  wetlands,  and  wilderness,  as   defined   by   IUCN   and   by   Phillips   (2001).   This   includes   all   conservation   units,   IUCN’s                                                                                                                  10   Based   on:   Dudley   &   Stolton   2002,   IUCN,   The   Forest   Stewardship   Council,   and   the   World   Bank   Group  definitions  of  sensitive  areas  and  high  conservation  value  areas.         8  
  • 9. Categories  I  thru  IV  and  to  a  certain  extent  Categories  V  and  VI,  such  as  National  Parks,  state   or   provincial   parks,   UN   Biosphere   Reserves,   World   Heritage   Sites,   areas   scheduled  for   inclusion   in   the   national   system   of   conservation   units,   protected   forests,   UN   Ramsar  Convention   wetland   sites,   as   well   as   their   buffer   zones.     Most   mangroves   and   old-­‐growth   tropical   forests   should   be   included.   The   bottom   line   here   is   that   forests   have  become   much   more   important   for   their   GHG   sequestration   function   than   hitherto.     The  world  urgently  needs  more  GHG  sequestration,  not  less.    A  warmer  world  surely  means  more   forest   fires.11   Deforestation   must   be   halted   and   promptly   reversed.     Any   tree  cutting  must  be  more  than  compensated  for  by  tree  plantations  or  regeneration.    This  is  all  in  addition  to  the  value  of  forest  for  community  livelihoods,  providing  water  in  the  dry  season,  attenuating  floods,  and  conservation  of  biodiversity.    3.5   Cultural   Property:   For   example,   an   Indigenous   Peoples   religious   site,   sacred  groves,  battlefields,  archeological  sites,  petroglyphs,  geoglyphs  or  rich  fossil  sites.  Note:    there  may  conceivably  be  exceptions,  for  example,  when  a  compensatory  offset  reserve  is   purchased   with   funding   in   perpetuity   by   the   mining   proponent,   which   is  unambiguously  bigger  in  size  and  richer  in  contents  than  the  area  sought  for  the  mine  (See:  Section  4).                                                                                                                        11  Indonesia’s  1997-­‐1998  peatland  forest  fires  smoldered  for  months  over  eight  million  hectares,  releasing  the   equivalent   of   at   least   30%   of     worldwide   fossil   fuel   GHG   emissions   for   the   entire   year.   As   possibly   the  biggest  forest  fire  in  recorded  history,  it  polluted  much  of  SE  Asia,  almost  from  N.  Australia,  Kalimantan,  Sumatra,   Java,   Malaysia,   Singapore,   Vietnam,   Thailand,   Philippines,   and   Sri   Lanka   to   the   Horn   of   Africa.  www.fire.uni-­‐freiburg.de/iffn/country/id/id_32.htm.     9  
  • 10. 4.0   The  Exceptions  of  Environmental  or  Compensatory  Offsets     Sources:    ten  Kate  et  al.  (2004),  Soloman  et  al.  (2006,  2011),  Goodland  (2003).   www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biocertification/offsets.htm.    As   mentioned   in   the   introduction,   the   default   position   for   industrial   mining   is   not   to  permit   any   harm   to   communities   or   to   their   life-­‐support   systems;   the   precautionary  principle  should  prevail.      But  there  may  be  some  rare  exceptions  called  compensatory  offsets.  12    Compensatory  environmental  offsets  are  mainly  environmental  conservation  measures  designed   to   compensate   for   unavoidable   environmental   impacts   caused   by   a  development  project.    The  advantage  for  the  mining  proponent  is  that  offsets  enhance  a  company’s   social   license   to   operate,   strengthen   trust   between   proponent,   impacted  people   and   government,   bolsters   regulatory   goodwill,   and   boosts   the   company’s  reputation  -­‐-­‐  normally  at  low  cost.  Offsets  often  provide  proactive  companies  (one  that  moves   quickly)   a   “first   mover   advantage”,   as   other,   more   reactive,   companies   find  themselves   dealing   with   high   entry   costs,   unforeseen   regulatory   hurdles   and   fully  developed  and  complex  regulatory  regimes.    A  clear  case  is  if  a  mining  company  wants  its  project  to  be  carbon-­‐neutral.  To  become  carbon-­‐neutral   the   company   would   calculate   the   amounts   of   GHG   it   expects   to   emit  over  the  course  of  the  mine’s  life,  then  plant  sufficient  trees  to  sequester  that  amount  of   GHG.     Another   example   would   be   biodiversity   offsets   where   a   mine   cannot   avoid  converting   say   10   km2  of   forest.     The   offset  would  be  to  conserve  in  perpetuity  a  similar  tract  of  forest  nearby  of  a  small  multiple13  of  the  10  km2  lost.    Sometimes  a  “Paper  Park”  is  expanded  by  the  multiple  of  the  tract  lost  or  is  converted  into  a  viable  conservation  unity  by  financing.  Any  compensation  for  biodiversity  loss  should  leave  the  environment  “better  off”  than  before  the  project.  This  implies  “informed  agreement  of  stakeholders  that  the  proposed  offset  is  more  extensive  in  area,  greater  in  environmental  value  (less  disturbed,   less   damaged,   more   biodiversity,   greater   environmental   service   value),   and  under  a  more  secure  level  of  protection,  such  as  by  financing  in  perpetuity”  (Goodland,                                                                                                                  12   The  term  “mitigate”  meaning  to  minimize  harm  or  to  make  it  less  severe,  is  often  used  in  the  USA  for  precautions   to   compensate   for   unavoidable   environmental   damage.   In   the   US,   therefore,   it   is   generally  interchangeable   with   the   term   “offset”.     “Offset”   is   often   used   interchangeably   with   “compensate”.  “Compensation”   itself   has   several   meanings,   however.   It   can   mean   financial   payment   for   impacts   as   in  “Impact-­‐Compensation  Contracts”,  or  it  can  mean  measures  designed  to  counteract  harm  or  impacts.    13   The   “small   multiple”,   of   course,   has   to   be   more   than   a   one-­‐for-­‐one   ratio   as   that   would   be   the   old-­‐fashioned  “no  net  loss”  or  stagnation.    The  needs  of  the  world  have  now  become  much  greater  than  no  net   loss.     The   world   has   moved   from   no   net   loss   to   net   gain   or   net   benefit.   “Net   benefit”   is   now  increasingly  accepted;  the  decision  devolves  more  around  how  big  the  ratio  should  be.  The  US  1972  Clean  Water   Act   /   Clean   Air   Act   check…is   interpreted   as   a   rule   of   thumb   to   be   a   c.3:1   ratio   for   wetland   banking.    Nowadays  a  10:1  ratio  would  be  best  practice.  See:  King  &  Price  (2004).       10  
  • 11. 2003).    Thus  the  term  “compensatory  environmental  offset”  extends  the  conservation  hierarchy  of   first,   do   no   harm   or   prevent,   second,   minimize,   and   third,   mitigate   any   residual  impacts.    Offsets  supplement  the  mitigatory  measures.    Social   impacts   sometimes   can   be   compensated   for   in   a   manner   acceptable   by   the  impacted   people   in   monetary   terms.     Financial   transfers   can   sometimes   win   FPIC   to   the  impacted   community.   The   miner   pays   the   impacted   community   a   sum   of   money  negotiated  in  the  Impact-­‐Compensation  Contract,  often  into  an  account,  which  can  be  drawn  down  only  for  community-­‐approved  expenditures.    GHG  sequestration  capacity  is  severely  impaired  worldwide  by  deforestation.    Therefore  offsets  have  to  expand  GHG  sequestration  capacity.    No  net  loss  is  far  too  modest  as  a  goal;  we  have  already  lost  too  much  biodiversity,  and  GHG  sequestration  capacity.    Newmont’s   Conga14   proposal   to   convert   a   Peruvian   natural   water   system   (including  lakes,  wetlands,  etc.)  into  an  engineered  system  (managed  reservoirs,  treatment,  etc.)  is  a   perverse   example   of   a   narrow   “compensatory   offset”.     The   bigger   issue   is:   who  controls  (and  pays  for)  the  new  system?  Obviously  the  private  corporation  will  control  the  waters  of  many  basins  and  communities,  following  the  “offset”.    Caveat:    Climate  change  is  already  forcing  ecosystems  to  shift  polewards  fast,  currently  at  about  4  km/year.    What  is  protected  today  may  be  worthless  a  decade  later  if  such  changes  are  not  factored  in.                                                                                                                    14   Newmont’s   $4.8   bn.   Conga   Project   3,700   m   above   sea   level,   involves   open-­‐cast   surface   mining   of   a  large  copper  porphyry  deposit  also  containing  gold,  located  24  kilometers  northeast  of  its  Yanacocha  Gold  Mine,   the   largest   gold   producer   in   Latin   America.   The   municipality   of   Celendín   passed   a   law   that   declared  all   watersheds,   wetlands,   and   lakes   within   the   Conga   project   area   as   protected   places.   The   pro-­‐mining  federal  government  did  not  view  this  too  favorably;  in  2007  then  president  Alan  Garcia  signed  a  decree  revoking   all   protection   granted   from   municipalities.   Thereafter   only   regional   governments   had   the  authority  to  do  so.  This  seemed  like  a  roadblock,  but  a  temporary  one.  In  2010  the  regional  government  of  Cajamarca   came   to   support   the   Celendín   municipality’s   protection   law.   The   then   Minister   of   the  Environment   ordered   that   protected   areas   can   only   be   declared   protected   after   the   owner   of   the  concession   allows   them   to   do   so.   Essentially,   Newmont   would   have   to   allow   local   communities   to   protect  their   land   from   Newmont’s   own   mega   mine.   "Getting   rid   of   the   lakes   would   be   like   dynamiting   the  glaciers   in   the   Andes,   wed   be   creating   a   problem   that   impacts   the   ecosystem,"   observed   Environment  Minister   Ricardo   Giesecke.www.earthworksaction.org/earthblog/detail/   newmonts_conga_       mine_brings  _major_clean_water_problems.  Perus  deputy  environment  minister  Jose  De  Echave  resigned,  calling  the  official  environmental  impact  studies  on  the  project  "weak,  outdated  and  lacking  in  credibility."  Political  leaders   in   Cajamarca   began   a   general   strike   against   the   project   in   November   2011,   and   violence   has   been  escalating,   with   sabotage   of   machinery   and   clashes   with   the   police.   The   Prime   Minister   said   in   January  2012   that   the   stalled   Conga   project   will   be   developed   as   the   government   could   end   up   with   a   “huge”  compensation  payment  if  the  $4.8  billion  mine  does  not  go  ahead.     11  
  • 12. Conclusion    This   paper   outlines   what   “Responsible   Mining”   actually   implies.     It   is   designed   for   those  mining   corporations   wanting   to   adopt   responsible   mining.   Responsible   mining   would  become   a   valuable   goal   if   mining   corporations   agree   with   this   definition.     Mining  corporations   following   all   international   environmental   agreements,   striving   to   achieve  best  practice,  and  avoiding  No  Go  Zones,  would  become  industry  leaders.    The  transition  from   voluntarily   following   these   measures,   over   to   accepting   mandatory   regulations  with   third   party   monitoring   should   be   made   as   smooth   as   possible.     Many   mining  corporations   already   have   adopted   responsible   mining   rhetorically;   the   better   mining  corporations  will  put  it  into  practice.      Acknowledgements      Antonio  Claparols,  Robert  Moran…..  To  be  added…..    About  the  Author    Robert   Goodland   served   as   the   World   Bank   Group’s   environmental   adviser   from   1978  for  23  years,  after  which  he  was  the  Technical  Director  of  the  independent  “Extractive  Industry  Review”  of  the  World  Bank’s  oil,  gas  and  mining  portfolio  (EIR.org).    The  Library  of  Congress  (Loc.Gov)  lists  39  of  his  books  and  monographs.    His  most  recent  book,  with  Clive   Wicks,   is:   "Philippines:   Mining   or   Food?"    He   was   elected   chair   of   the   Ecological  Society   of   America   (Metropolitan),   and   President   of   the   International   Association   for  Impact   Assessment.   Last   year   he   was   awarded   IUCN’s   Coolidge   Medal   for   outstanding  lifetime  achievement  in  environmental  conservation.         5.0   References  cited  and  sources  of  further  information    11.11.11  Coalition  of  the  Flemish  North-­‐South  Movement,  2012.    Workshop  on  “No  Go  Zones  to  Mining”.    Scheduled  for  12th.  March  2012.    Alyansa  Tigil  Mina,  2011,  July  4.    Establishing  a  No-­‐Go  Zone  policy  in  the  utilization  and  management  of  Philippine  natural  resources:  Issues,  Concerns,  Guidelines.  Manila,  ATM:  30  pp.    Bauer,   Andrew,   2012.   Philippine   Mineral   Wealth   for   Development?     Revenue   Watch  International.   Davao,   Conference:   “Mining   in   Mindanao”   (26   January).     Davao,  Philippines,  Ateneo  de  Davao  University.  abauer@revenuewatch.org.       12  
  • 13. Business   and   Biodiversity   Offsets   Programme   (BBOP).   2009.   Biodiversity   offset   design  handbook.   BBOP,   Washington   ,   D.C.:   105   pp.   www.forest-­‐trends.org/  biodiversityoffsetprogram/guidelines/odh.pdfISBN  978-­‐1-­‐932928-­‐31-­‐0.    Crowe,   Michael   &   Kerry   ten   Kate.   2010.   Biodiversity   offsets:   policy   options   for  government.   Business   and   Biodiversity   Offsets   Programme,   Washington   ,   D.C.:   41   pp.  www.cbd.int/financial/doc/bbop-­‐innovative-­‐financial-­‐mechanisms-­‐2011-­‐en.pdf.    Dudley,   N.   &   Stolton,   S.   2002.   To   dig   or   not   to   dig?   Criteria   for   determining   the  suitability   or   acceptability   of   mineral   exploration,   extraction   and   transport   from  ecological  and  social  perspectives.    WWF  International  and  WWF  UK:  23  pp.    Dudley,  N.,  Phillips,  A.  and  Stolton,  S.  2004.  [IUCN’s  protected  area]  categories,  mining  and   the   Amman   Recommendation.   Chapter   2.15:   150-­‐161.   In:   Bishop,   K.,   Dudley,   N.,  Phillips,  A.  and  Stolton,  S.  (eds.).  Speaking  a  Common  Language.  Uses  and  performance  of   the   IUCN   System   of   Management   Categories   for   Protected   Areas   Cardiff   University,  IUCN   –   The   World   Conservation   Union   and   UNEP   –   World   Conservation   Monitoring  Centre.    195  pp.    Equator  Principles.  2003.  Available  online  at  www.equator-­‐principles.com.    Extractive   Industries   Review,   2003.   Striking   a   Better   Balance   [World   Bank   Extractive  Industries  (EIR).  Jakarta,  Indonesia  and  Washington,  DC:  World  Bank.  6  vols.    Goodland.   R.   2008.   Sustainable   development   sourcebook   for   the   World   Bank   Groups  Extractive  Industries  Review:  examining  the  social  and  environmental  impacts  of  oil,  gas,  and  mining.  Washington  DC.,  Extractive  Industry  Review  /WorldBank:  189  pp.    Draft  at:  commdev.org/.../1113  _file_policy_  options_for_the_world_bank_group.pdf.    Goodland,  R.  &  Clive  Wicks,  2008.  Philippines:  mining  or  food?  London,  Working  Group  on  Mining  in  the  Philippines,  273  pp.  Full  text  at:  www.piplinks.org/miningorfood.    Goodland,   R,   2011.   What   is   Best   Practice   Mining?   Bogota,   Controlaria   General   de   la  Republica,  Forum  sponsored  by  Ikv  Pax  Christi  (28  November  -­‐  2  December):  28  pp.    Goodland,  R.  2012.    Cotabato’s  Tampakan  mine  project:  How  to  reduce  the  social  and  environmental   impacts   and   promote   responsible   mining   (23   pp.).   International  conference   on   mining   in   Mindanao,   Davao   City,   Ateneo   de   Davao   University,  Proceedings.    Herbertson,   K.,   Ballesteros,   A.,   Goodland,   R.   &   Munilla,   I.   2009.   Breaking   Ground:  Engaging   Communities   in   Extractive   and   Infrastructure   Projects.     Washington   DC.   WRI  47  pp.      pdf.wri.org/breaking_ground_engaging_communities.pdf.       13  
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