Securing underwater wireless communication by Nisha Menon K

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Securing underwater wireless communication by Nisha Menon K

  1. 1. SECURING UNDERWATER WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NISHA MENON K ROLL NO: 16 M-TECH COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING 1 11/15/2013
  2. 2. OUTLINE • Introduction • Underwater Wireless Communication Network • Attacks and counter measures • Security requirements • Proposed security mechanisms • Conclusion • Reference 2 11/15/2013
  3. 3. Introduction (UWCNs) are constituted by sensors , sink and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) that interact to perform specific applications such as underwater monitoring. 3 11/15/2013
  4. 4. Sensor nodes also known as motes or simply nodes are small and energy constrained devices that have the ability of sensing the surrounding environment. Sink also known as base station, is a more powerful node that behaves as an interface between the sensor nodes and the clients. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) that interact to perform specific applications such as underwater monitoring 4 11/15/2013
  5. 5. Underwater Wireless Communication System  Radio waves do not propagate well underwater due to the high energy absorption of water  Therefore, underwater communications are based on acoustic links characterized by large propagation delays. The propagation speed of acoustic signals in water (typically 1500 m/s)  Acoustic channels have low bandwidth . As a result, the bit error rates of acoustic links are often high, and losses of connectivity arise  It cannot rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) because it uses radar waves in the 1.5 GHz band that do not propagate in water. 5 11/15/2013
  6. 6. Underwater Wireless Communication System  Underwater wireless communication networks are particularly vulnerable to malicious attacks due to the high bit error rates, large and variable propagation delays, and low bandwidth of acoustic channels.  Several methods are proposed to secure Underwater Wireless Communication Networks. Three schemes namely, secure time synchronization, localization, and routing in UWCNs 6 11/15/2013
  7. 7. Wormhole attack Sinkhole Attack Jamming Attacks Hello Flood attack Sybil attack Acknowled gement spoofing Selective Forwarding 7 11/15/2013
  8. 8. Jamming Method of Attack • The transmission of data packets continuously so that the wireless channel is completely blocked. Countermeasures • Spread spectrum techniques • Sensors can switch to sleep mode 8 11/15/2013
  9. 9. Wormhole Attack Method of attack • False neighborhood relationships are created • The adversary can delay or drop packets sent through the wormhole. Countermeasures • Dis-VoW • Estimating the direction of arrival 9 11/15/2013
  10. 10. Selective Forwarding Method of Attack • Malicious nodes drop certain messages instead of forwarding them to hinder routing. Countermeasures • Multipath routing • Authentication 10 11/15/2013
  11. 11. Sinkhole Attack Method of Attack • A malicious node attempts to attract traffic from a particular area towards it by announcing that it is a high quality route. Countermeasures • Geographical routing • Authentication of nodes exchanging routing 11 information. 11/15/2013
  12. 12. Helloflood Attack Method of Attack • A node receiving a HELLO packet from a malicious node may interpret that the adversary is a neighbor. Countermeasures • Bidirectional link verification • Authentication is a possible defense 12 11/15/2013
  13. 13. Acknowledgement Spoofing Method of Attack • A malicious node overhearing packets sent to neighbor nodes use the information to spoof acknowledgements. Countermeasures • Encryption of all packets sent through the 13 network 11/15/2013
  14. 14. Sybil Attack Method of attack • Sybil attack is defined as a malicious node illegitimately taking on multiple identities • Attacker with multiple identities pretend to be in many places at once. Countermeasures • Authentication • Position verification 14 11/15/2013
  15. 15. Security Requirements Authentication Proof that data was sent by a legitimate user Confidentiality Information is not accessible to unauthorized parties Integrity Information is not altered Availability Data should be available when needed by an authorized user 15 11/15/2013
  16. 16. Proposed Security Mechanism Secure under water communication Secure time synchronization Secure localization 16 Secure routing 11/15/2013
  17. 17. Secure time Synchronization Why is Time Synchronization Important?  Location and proximity of siblings  Intranetwork coordination  Maintain ordering of messages  Use of TDMA  Energy efficiency 17 11/15/2013
  18. 18. Secure time Synchronization Multilateration algorithm Phase 1 Phase 2 • Assume that a set of anchor nodes on ocean surface already know their location and time without error • A group of nearby sensors receives synchronization packets from at least 5 anchor nodes • The sensors learn their time difference between themselves and anchor nodes by comparing the synchronization packets • These nodes subsequently becomes the next anchor nodes. 18 11/15/2013
  19. 19. Secure Localization Why is Localization important?  Vulnerability of WSN What an attacker can potentially do? GOAL: Make the node think it is somewhere different from actual location Wormhole attack Jamming As a result… Wrong results: wrong decisions 19 11/15/2013
  20. 20. Secure Localization  Goal: To guarantee correctness despite of the presence of intruders  Localization is the process for each sensor node to locate its positions in the network.  Localization algorithms developed for terrestrial sensor networks are either based on the signal strength or the time-of-arrival (TOA) 20 11/15/2013
  21. 21. Secure Localization • Range-based – Use exact measurements (point-to-point distance estimate (range) or angle estimates) – More expensive – Scalable Localization with Mobility Prediction (SLMP) • Range-free – Cost-effective alternative to range-based solutions 21 11/15/2013
  22. 22. Secure Routing  Routing is specially challenging in UWCNs due to the large propagation delays, low bandwidth, difficulty of battery refills of underwater sensors, and dynamic topologies.  A secure routing rejects routing paths containing malicious nodes. 22 11/15/2013
  23. 23. Secure Routing  Proactive protocols ( DSDV)  Reactive protocols (AODV)  Focused Beam Routing Protocol 23 11/15/2013
  24. 24. Advantages  It avoids data spoofing.  It avoids privacy leakage.  Minimize communication and computational cost.  Maximizes the battery power by preserving the power of Underwater sensors 24 11/15/2013
  25. 25. Conclusion  Wireless technology plays a vital role in many application areas that were not possible in the past. Wireless Underwater communication is one of them.  The main attacks related to UWCN have been surveyed.  A system with secure time synchronization, secure localization and secure routing can overcome these attacks.  Since the deployment of the proposed system is still in its development stage, an account of actual implementation has not been provided here. 25 11/15/2013
  26. 26. REFERNCES [1] “Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks: Research Challenges,” Ad HocNet., vol. 3, no. 3, I. F. Akyildiz, D. Pompili, and T. Melodia, Mar. 2005. [2] “Visualization of Wormholes in Underwater Sensor Networks: A Distributed Approach,” Int’l. J. Security Net., vol. 3, no. 1, W. Wang et al., 2008, pp. 10–23. [3] “A Taxonomy for Denial-of-Service Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks.” chapter in Handbook of Sensor Networks: Compact Wireless and Wired Sensing Systems, A. D. Wood and J. A. Stankovic, M. Ilyas and I. Mahgoub, Eds., CRC Press, 2004. [4] Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selfish Behavior in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing, Cambridge Univ. Press, L. Buttyán and J.-P. Hubaux, 2008. [5] “Wormhole-Resilient Secure Neighbor Discovery in Underwater Acoustic Networks,” R. Zhang and Y. Zhang, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2010. 26 11/15/2013
  27. 27. THANK YOU 27 11/15/2013

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