Crisis Managment UN's missions


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English presentation about UN's peace missions

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Crisis Managment UN's missions

  1. 1. June 23 rd ,2009 Reporter: Nicolas Ballesteros
  2. 2. <ul><li>UN mission in Haiti (1993-1996) </li></ul><ul><li>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993-94) </li></ul><ul><li>New missions in the Balkans </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Preventive Deployment Force (1995-99) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Transitional Administration For Eastern Slavonia (96-98) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>East Timor operations </li></ul><ul><li>UN Mission in Sierra Leone </li></ul>
  3. 3. <ul><li>UNMIH: Resolution 940 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and United States </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Expenditures </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>$320.0 million </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Fatalities </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>6 military personnel </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>3 civilian police </li></ul></ul></ul>
  4. 4. <ul><ul><li>Initial authorization </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>567 civilian police and a military construction unit of 700 personnel including 60 military trainers </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Maximum authorization </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>6,000 troops and military support personnel, and 900 civilian police; there was also provision for approximately 230 international civilian staff, 200 local staff and 30 United Nations Volunteers </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>UNHIM was scheduled for deployment in October 1993, with normal self-defence authorization. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Initial target : monitor human rights and retrain the Haitian military and police, before return of ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>A Ship carrying the military and police of the mission turn away. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>turning-point resolution 940 authorized “all necessary means” cited Chapter VII, and the deployment of Multinational Force (MNF) led by US, also expanded UNMIH's mandate </li></ul></ul></ul>History of mission
  5. 5. <ul><li>UNMIH ROE first UN ROE to benefit from the lesson of Somalia. New phraseology. </li></ul><ul><li>“ Collateral damage ” was to be minimized “consistent with mission accomplishment” </li></ul><ul><li>Rule 5: “necessary force up to including deadly force” in self-defence and defence of UNMIH interest. </li></ul><ul><li>Rule 6: “UNMIH force may intervene to prevent death …innocent civilian” </li></ul><ul><li>Rule 8: “search, apprehension and disarmament” </li></ul><ul><li>Use of chemical riot control agents as a form of force. </li></ul><ul><li>Security Council describe the situation as “extraordinary nature, requiring an exceptional response”, ignoring the niceties of UN Charter distinction, approving whatever seems practicable. </li></ul><ul><li>ROE also cause difficulties, because they were interpreted as leaving law enforcement to indigenous force, which had terrorized the population for decades. </li></ul><ul><li>Reinterpretation of ROE after a woman died in a protester </li></ul>
  6. 7. <ul><li>Origin: 1993: Arusha Peace Agreement and help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government </li></ul><ul><li>After many delayed for deploying UN force, In April 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and of Burundi were killed while returning from peace talks in Tanzania, when the Rwandese plane crashed, in circumstances that are still to be determined, as it was landing in Kigali, Rwanda's capital. This set off a tidal wave of political and ethnic killings. </li></ul><ul><li>After some countries unilaterally withdrew their contingents, the Security Council, by its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, reduced UNAMIR's strength from 2,548 to 270. </li></ul><ul><li>SC new resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international action and increased UNAMIR's strength to up to 5,500 troops. But it took nearly six months for Member States to provide the troops. </li></ul><ul><li>To contribute to the security of civilians, the Council, by resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, authorized, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a multi-national humanitarian operation. French-led multinational forces carried out &quot; Operation Turquoise &quot;, which established a humanitarian protection zone in south-western Rwanda. The operation ended in August 1994 and UNAMIR took over in the zone. </li></ul>
  7. 8. <ul><li>Hutus and Tutsis </li></ul><ul><li>Symbolic presence and capability </li></ul><ul><li>General Romeo Dallaire </li></ul><ul><li>Only authorized to use force in Self-defence </li></ul><ul><li>Interim ROE, draft by Dallaire never approved </li></ul><ul><li>Radio Milles Collines </li></ul><ul><li>800.000 Tutsis killed in 100 days </li></ul><ul><li>Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali </li></ul><ul><li>Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) </li></ul><ul><li>May 1994 US (supported by UK) declined to label the situation of “Genocide” </li></ul><ul><li>resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, imposed an arms embargo strength to up to 5,500 troops. But no Chapter VII </li></ul><ul><li>SG Boutros-Ghali Frustration “I failed” </li></ul><ul><li>resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994, under Chapter VII of, a multi-national humanitarian operation. French-led &quot;Operation Turquoise” </li></ul>
  8. 10. <ul><ul><li>UN Preventive Deployment Force (1995-99) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>“ Preventive deployment” in Macedonia (FRYM) 1000 UN troops under Chapter VII </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Intended to signal to Serbia that UN might use force to stop a Serbian invasion or incursion </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Transitional Administration For Eastern Slavonia (96-98) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>2 November 1995 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium provided for the peaceful integration of that region into Croatia, as a part of Dayton Agreement. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Combining Chapter VI and VII, full scale UN operation. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>5000 troops, 100 military observers, 600 CivPols </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Threat of force on occasion but had no had to use of force. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>
  9. 11. <ul><ul><ul><li>UNAMET 25 October 1999 to 20 May 2002 </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Civil mission, 1000 international personnel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>TARGET: conduct and certify a referendum. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>STRENGTH </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>7,687 total unifomed personnel, including 6,281 troops, 1,288 civilian police and 118 military observers; UNTAET also includes 737 international civilian personnel and 1,745 local civilian staff </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>a non-UN force operating in accordance with UN resolutions. Interfet, with the role of restoring peace and security </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Under Chapter VII, “restore peace and security, support UNAMET, facilitating humanitarian assistance operation” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Led by Australia, plus 18 countries </li></ul></ul><ul><li>ROE robust, but individual contingents would be able to use their own combination of firepower. </li></ul><ul><li>FATALITIES (31 March 2002) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>15 military personnel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1 civilian police </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1 military observer </li></ul></ul>
  10. 12. <ul><ul><li>UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET three distinct phases of UN’s involvement in West Timor </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Kofi Annan, new Secretary-General </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>After referendum chaos, evacuation UN personnel to Australia </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>INTERFET “take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>INTERFET led by Australia. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Annan “Speedy deployment is an absolute necessity…” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Smooth transition </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Clashes between INTERFET and militia forces from across the border </li></ul></ul>Peter Cosgrove Major General, he led the international forces
  11. 13. <ul><li>The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1991, by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under Foday Sankoh. Tens of thousands died and more than 2 million people (well over one-third of the population) were displaced because of the 11-year conflict. Neighbouring countries became host to significant numbers of refugees attempting to escape the civil war. It was officially declared over on 18 January 2002. </li></ul><ul><li>Foday Sankoh (1937-2003) was the leader and founder of the Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) </li></ul>BACKGROUND
  12. 14. <ul><li>With the assistance of the international community, President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement, which was signed on 7 July 1999 </li></ul><ul><li>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, with an initial force of 6,000 to monitor the Lomé Peace Agreement </li></ul><ul><li>Under Chapter VII, “necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel” but military weakness </li></ul><ul><li>And the unwillingness of Western states </li></ul><ul><li>May 2000, UNAMSIL personnel hostage and capturing their arms. Lack of communication, lack of information about RUF moves. </li></ul><ul><li>BRITISH REINFORCEMENT: Operation Palliser to evacuate foreign nationals and establish order. They stabilized the situation, and were the catalyst for a ceasefire and ending of the civil war. </li></ul>
  13. 15. <ul><li>Serious lack of cohesion within the mission </li></ul><ul><li>No commonly shared understanding of the mandates and rules of engagement </li></ul><ul><li>Problem of internal communication and coordination between the civilian and military components as well as within each component </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of integrated planning and logistic support </li></ul><ul><li>Peacekeeping poorly equipped and trained troops </li></ul>