1) The document discusses how introducing monetary incentives can "crowd out" intrinsic motivation for contributors to open source software projects. It provides examples of incentive systems used and discusses factors that influence their success or failure.
2) The Debian/dunc-tank example, where two release managers were paid to complete a release on time, is analyzed as potentially crowding out intrinsic motivation and causing issues. In contrast, Google Summer of Code is seen as generally positive for attracting new community members.
3) The conclusion is that the effect of incentives depends on the perception of participants and is context-specific. More empirical research is needed on incentive systems and how they interact with group dynamics and community characteristics in open source projects.
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Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
1. Crowding Effects:
How Money Influences Open Source Projects
and its Contributors
LinuxTag 2007 Berlin, Track „Building and Management of Communities“
June 1st 2007, Matthias Stuermer, ETH Zürich & /ch/open, mstuermer@ethz.ch
2. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
3. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
3
June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
4. Macro and Micro Perspective on Communities
Macro
Best practices of successful OSS projects
Some hints based on anecdotal evidence
Micro
Interaction between actors: social behavior
Human behavior: Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
5. Best Practices of Successful OSS Projects
Modular structure of the code
Documentation for different stakeholders
Controlled release management
Efficient collaboration platform
Regular physical meetings
Real-world organization such as a foundation
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
6. Some hints based on anecdotal evidence
Structure follows problems → re-act, not pro-act
Openness for newcomers, new ideas, new leaders
Do provide incentives for writing documentation
→ More about OSS leadership and preconditions for new OSS
projects: Stuermer, 2005
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
7. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
7
June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
8. Standard Economic Model
⊕
supply curve
Working Effort
⊕
Extrinsic Incentive
Source: Frey & Jegen 2001
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
9. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Motivation
Intrinsic Motivation (from within the person)
Enjoyment-based
Obligation-based
Extrinsic Motivation (underlying preferences)
Non-monetary: reputation, career options...
Monetary: employment, rewards, sponsoring...
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
10. Importance of Intrinsic Motivation
Basis for uncompensated voluntary work
→ foundation of OSS contributions
When results cannot be observed and attributed
(complex tasks)
Necessary in all knowledge-intensive tasks
Relevant for team work
Source: Weibel et al. 2007
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
11. Crowding-out effect:
Experiment 1 of Gneezy & Rusticini (2000)
Voluntary collection: 180 pupils divided in 3 groups
1: Motivation speech and no reward
2: Motivation speech and 1% of collected sum
3: Motivation speech and 10% of collected sum
Who collected the most money?
Group 1: Highest intrinsic motivation
Who collected the least money?
Groups 2: Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
Conclusion: “Pay Enough or Don't Pay at all“
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
12. Crowding-Out with a Negative Net Effect
⊕
supply curve
new supply curve
Working Effort
crowding-out
effect shifts supply
curve, e.g. because
of introduction of
money
⊕
Extrinsic Incentive
Source: Frey & Jegen 2001
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
13. Experiment 2 of Gneezy & Rusticini (2000)
Parents come late to pick up their child from day-care
Deterrence theory: Penalty reduces bad behavior
Results from introducing fine for coming late:
Parents arrive even later!
After withdrawing fine, parents still come later
Conclusions from experiment:
Incomplete contracts become preciser with fine
New perception of the situation: “A fine is a price”
Outcome of intervention depends on initial perception
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
14. Crowding-in and -out of Intrinsic Motivation
External intervention has two opposite effects:
Price effect
Crowding-out effect
Big question: Which effect is stronger?
→ Determines if net effect of intervention is
positive or negative
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
15. Combining Standard Economic Model and
Crowding-Out Effect of Intrinsic Motivation
Effort
standard economic model fails to standard economic model predicts
predict correctly correctly
proportion of intrinsic motivation
Incentive
nonobservable crowdingout effect observable behaviour (total effect)
nonobservable price effect
Source: Weibel et al. 2007
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
16. Effects of Motivational Incentives on Effort
Decision Making Self-Determination
⊕
(Perceived Internal Control)
Goal Setting ⊕
Self-Esteem
⊕
Constructive Feedback (Appreciation of Involvement)
⊖
motivational crowding-out
⊖
Intrinsic Motivation
Performance-
Contingent Rewards
⊕
⊕ ⊕
Extrinsic Motivation Work Effort
Source: Weibel et al. 2007; Frey and Jegen, 2000
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
17. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
17
June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
18. The Motivation Mix of OSS Contributors
Intrinsic motivation
Fun, curiosity
Ideology („Software must be free.“)
Responsibility, commitment (maintainer's fate)
Extrinsic motivation
Reputation
Career options (learning effect, student projects)
Employment, contracts, own business
→ How much are we really intrinsically motivated?
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
19. Unattractive Tasks in Open Source Projects
What gets done? → Itches of developers
Unattractive tasks 1: Usability
High quality documentation for different target groups
GUI design
End user features
Unattractive tasks 2: Quality
Code review
Bug fixing
→ Tasks of „The Last Mile“ are often neglected.
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
20. Why introducing incentive system?
1. Gaps of contributions: Solve unattractive tasks
2. Motivate new people getting into the community
3. 'Weed-out' old, inactive people
→ Who should be attracted with incentive system?
Long-term vs. short-term contributors
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
21. Examples of Extrinsic Incentives in OSS
Monetary
Employment of contributors
Bounty system
Sponsoring of projects
How does it affect
Awards, competitions
self-determination?
Near-Monetary (performance-
Flight and hotel for conference
contingent or fixed)
Non-Monetary
Acknowledgments
Credit point system
Activity ranking
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
22. Controlling Effect of Extrinsic Incentives
Theory predicts crowding-out
⊕
→ Performance-contingency
Perceived external control
Credit point
system Contingent-Reward
Bounty system
Employment
Activity
ranking
Sponsoring
Flight and hotel
for conference
Awards
Fixed-Salary
Employment
Acknowledgments
⊕
„Extrinsicy“
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
23. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
24. Unhappy example: Debian/dunc-tank
Disclaimer: Highly controversial topic in Debian community
Google “Debian dunc tank”: ≈ 10'100 entries... (and much more 'private')
About Debian/dunc-tank
Paying 2 release managers to get out Debian 4.0 on time (Dec 4th)
Started Sept 2006, goal of Dec 4th not reached because of...?
Preliminary conclusions
Impossible to measure crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
Envy because of selection process → Why not silently employed?
Payment from Debian itself vs. from external entity
Don't experiment with money – or at least don't declare it as this!
Employment issues depend on community characteristics
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
25. Successful example: Google Summer of Code
About GSoC
2007: Accepted 905 students for 136 OSS projects
Projects sign up, students apply for tasks, mentor supervises
Student receive 4500$ on completion, mentoring orgs 500$
Preliminary conclusions
Highly successful: Everybody seems happy, just little chaotic...
Positive because of funding new community entrants
Participating in GSoC becomes level of 'certification'
Focus only on code, documentation is secondary
Implementation of new code in projects?
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
26. Other Influences on Success of Extrinsic
Incentive Systems in OSS communities
Group effects
Crowding-out occurs only on individual level
Envy between contributors → fair/unfair intervention
Literature on group dynamics → no data in OSS so far
Community characteristics
Target group of software
Project age and activity level
Software complexity, programming language, OS
Working situation of contributors (paid vs. voluntary)
Dominant ideology (Free Software vs. OSS)
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
27. Content
1. Different Perspectives on Community Building
2. About Economics, Motivation and Crowding-Out
3. Incentive Systems in Open Source Communities
4. Debian/dunc-tank and Google Summer of Code
5. Conclusions
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
28. Conclusions
What intervention is definitively positive? → Moral call
„Make them feel the pain“ (Kasper Skårhøj, TYPO3)
Increase identification to elevate importance of certain tasks
No penalties
New insights and future research
Differentiation between personal motivation (=not knowing
what others do or receive) and social behavior (fair/unfair)
Extrinsic incentives in OSS sometimes positive, sometimes
negative → perception of participants is relevant
Economists often oversimplify, empirical tests are necessary
No empirical studies in OSS environments so far
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
29. Discussion, Acknowledgments
What are your experiences in this area?
To OSS project leads: Interested in collaboration
on research about crowding-out?
Thanks to
Kasper Skårhøj
/ch/open - www.ch-open.ch
LinuxTag
Matthias Stuermer, mstuermer@ethz.ch
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors
30. References
Frey, B. S. & Jegen, R. (2001). 'Motivation Crowding Theory', Journal of
Economic Surveys, 15, 589-611.
Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A. (2000a). 'Pay Enough Or Don't Pay At All', The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 791-810.
Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A. (2000b) 'A fine is a price', Journal of Legal Studies,
29, 1-18.
Stuermer, M. (2005). 'Open Source Community Building', master thesis,
University of Bern, http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/sturmer.pdf
von Krogh, G.; Spaeth, S. & Lakhani, K. R. (2003). 'Community, Joining, And
Specialization In Open Source Software Innovation: A Case Study', Research
Policy, 32, 1217-1241.
Weibel, A., Rost, K. & Osterloh, M. (2007). 'Crowding-Out Of Intrinsic
Motivation – Opening The Black Box', Working Paper, University of Zurich.
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June 1st 2007 Crowding Effects: How Money Influences Open Source Projects and its Contributors