194 DIJKSTERHUIS, SMITH, VAN BAAREN, WIGBOLDUSof the approach is conscious and highly intrapersonal. That tudes are bypassed completely. These impulse choices areis, the general picture that emerges is that of a conscious deci- usually strongly affected by subtle cues in the environment.sion maker who negotiates decisions based on processing the Sometimes such cues are at least informative for the product atpros and cons of a certain product. There is no doubt that peo- hand (such as when things are said to be scarce; Cialdini,ple sometimes do this, especially when such products are im- 2001). Sometimes, however, such cues are hardly related at all.portant and expensive, but very often they do not. A nice example is the work by North and colleagues (North, Recent insights on influence tactics and persuasion have Hargreaves, & McKendrick, 1997) who showed that Frenchemphasized that we often react rather “mindlessly” to stimuli music played in a store led to an increase in sales of Frenchthat trigger certain automated responses. Cialdini (2001), in a wine, whereas German music led customers to buy more Ger-highly influential overview of such automatic influence tac- man wine. Why does music influence our choice of wine?tics, described these phenomena as “click-zoom” reactions. In our view, to explain such results, it is fruitful to moveCertain stimuli directly affect our decisions and behavior; away from a purely conscious and intrapersonal perspectivewhen an advertisement features the phrase “today only,” and based on information processing. Instead, a useful road (albeitthereby indicates scarcity, we are more likely to run to the store one less traveled in the literature) is to take into account the un-and buy the product. The scarcity principle implicitly tells us conscious influence our environment exerts (see also Bargh,“what is scarce is good.” Other principles that make us act mind- 2002). In the past 15 years or so, social cognition researcherslessly are, for example, reciprocity, commitment, consistency, have been unraveling unconscious effects of environmentalsocial proof, and authority. Many experiments have shown cues on human behavior (see, e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999;these principles to be effective in subtly leading to compliance. Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2005; Ferguson & Bargh, Now let us go back to the supermarket example. You have 2004b; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). In this article, we review twothese 26 items that ended up in your cart, and our claim was important strands of this research and discuss their potentialthat most choices were made unconsciously or mindlessly. implications for our understanding of consumer behavior. TheAs said before, these choices were introspectively blank. In first area of research is the “perception–behavior link.” Thisour view, this is because for the majority of items, the amount work shows that mere perception of the social environmentof information processing going on was minimal or virtually leads people to engage in corresponding behavior (see Dijkster-nonexistent. That is, you cannot describe your information huis & Bargh, 2001; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). This research im-processing strategy if you have not engaged in information plies that our behavior is often highly imitative and thus thatprocessing in the first place. Now if one is willing to assume behavior is contagious. The second realm pertains to auto-that a substantial amount of consumer behavior (not just gro- matic goal pursuit (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, Goll-cery shopping) is unconscious and not the result of a great witzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Moskowitz,deal of information processing, this raises the question of Li, & Kirk, 2004). Research in this area shows that goal-directedwhat other factors influence consumer behavior. If people do behavior is often unconsciously guided by the environment.not (or hardly) process the various pros and cons of products, Before we move on, it should be noted that we use choicewhy do they end up buying them? behavior in supermarkets merely as a vehicle to explain the First, some of these unconsciously made shopping choices implications of research on the perception–behavior link andare highly habitualized and based on attitudes that are auto- on automatic goal pursuit for consumer behavior in general.matically activated on the perception of a product (Fazio, The implications, however, are decidedly broader. For in-Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Here, some informa- stance, the research we discuss later also speaks to matterstion processing may have taken place, but not right before you such as how long we linger in a shop, or how quickly orpicked a product. Instead, these choices are influenced by au- slowly we eat in a given situation. In a way, the research ontomatically activated attitudes that are based on earlier infor- the perception–behavior link and on automatic goal pursuit ismation processing in the past. That is, you did not have to think relevant for our understanding of human behavior in general,about buying bananas because you simply already knew they and hence, also for a wide range of behaviors relevant forare your favorite fruit. However, even with such automatic atti- consumer psychologists.tude-driven decisions, earlier information processing does not In the following, we briefly review research on the per-explain decisions fully: There is quite some variance left to ex- ception–behavior link and on automatic goal pursuit. Later inplain. After all, when people buy groceries while very hungry, this article, we return to consumer behavior and discuss thethey usually end up buying considerably more (“Huh, why did importance of the reviewed research for (a) consumerI buy three different kinds of cheese?”) than under normal cir- choices based on (malleable) automatic attitudes and (b)cumstances. One reason may be that these automatically acti- choices whereby attitudes are bypassed altogether.vated attitudes are malleable and context dependent (Ferguson& Bargh, 2004a). We discuss this more elaborately later. Second, some of our choices are likely made without any PERCEPTION–BEHAVIOR LINKinformation processing at all, neither just before we pick aproduct, nor earlier. Here, attitudes do not really guide behav- Research on the perception–behavior link is rooted in theior, and we truly buy things on impulse. In other words, atti- idea that mental representations responsible for perception
THE UNCONSCIOUS CONSUMER 195and mental representations responsible for behavior are in- Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1996). Later, research on humantimately linked. This idea dates back to the 19th century participants using PET scan and functional MRI showed evi-(James, 1890; Lotze, 1852), but it then lost its appeal until dence for a mirror neurons system (e.g., Decety & Grezes,about 15 years ago (for an exception, see Greenwald, 1999; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti. 1995; Iacoboni1970). The consequence of this close linkage of represen- et al., 1999). Several brain regions are involved in both thetations underlying perception and behavior is that per- perception and the execution of simple motor actions. Whenception often affects behavior directly and unconsciously we observe someone perform a behavior, we activate the(Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). We often simply do what same premotor areas in our brain that are active when we per-we see. form that action ourselves. In addition, through linkage with The perception–behavior link affects behaviors ranging brain regions involved in coding intentions and goals, wein complexity from simple motor movements to elaborate “understand” others’ behavior (Iacoboni, 2004). That is,interpersonal behavioral patterns. Recently, the distinction when we observe the other perform an action, we map thewas made between the “low road” to imitation and the perception of that action onto our own representation of thatmore complex “high road” to imitation (Dijksterhuis, specific action, both in terms of meaning and actual motor2004). The low road refers to mimicry of relatively simple, performance. The findings show a relation between percep-observable behavior. For instance, people mimic facial ex- tion and action that is as direct as it can possibly get: Thepressions, gestures, postures, and various speech-related same neurons (or neuronal regions) are involved in perceiv-variables (Chartrand, Lakin, & Maddux, 2005; Dijksterhuis ing an action and in executing that same action. Our brains& Bargh, 2001). The high road refers to imitative effects are wired to understand what others do by mimicry. By doingmediated by constructs such as traits, goals, and stereo- what others do, we know what they do.types. The notion of a high road is based on the observation As already noted, evidence of mimicry has been obtainedthat the human perceptual repertoire is rich, and people of- for facial expressions, postures, gestures, and variousten automatically go beyond the information given. That is, speech-related variables. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) ob-we “see” much more than observable behavior. On the ba- served that people mimic inconsequential actions such assis of others’ actions, people infer underlying traits (Gilbert, foot shaking or nose rubbing. A confederate was instructed to1989; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) and goals either rub her nose or shake her foot while working with a(Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005). In addition, on the basis participant on a task. More important, the two were strangersof people’s social category membership, people activate so- and had only a minimal interaction, greatly reducing thecial stereotypes (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989; Dijksterhuis probability that any imitation was motivational in nature—& van Knippenberg, 1996; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, such as part of an attempt to ingratiate the other person. Their1994). These inferences are made automatically and perme- hypothesis, that participants would mimic the behavior of theate social interactions continuously. More important for confederate, was confirmed. Under conditions where thethese purposes, these inferences or “percepts” also automat- confederate rubbed her nose, participants engaged more inically lead to corresponding behavior. nose rubbing than in foot shaking, whereas the opposite was We provide some examples of both the low and the high true when participants interacted with the confederate whoroad, starting with the low road (for more elaborate reviews, shook her foot.see Chartrand, Lakin, & Maddux, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Recently, Johnston (2002) obtained evidence for imita-Bargh, 2001). tion that has direct relevance for consumer behavior. In her experiments, participants were asked to eat ice cream and to judge its taste. Each experimental participant ate iceLow Road to Imitation cream in the presence of a confederate, and the confederateEvidence for automatic mimicry of the observable behaviors was always the first to take a sample of ice cream. Unbe-of others is abundant (Chartrand, Lakin, & Maddux, 2005; knownst to participants, the confederate was either in-Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). It is no wonder that mimicry is structed to eat a large sample or a very modest sample. Theeasy to demonstrate, as recent research shows that spontane- dependent variable in this research was the size of the sam-ous mimicry is a consequence of humans’ neural makeup. ple participants took. As predicted, participants imitated theThe tendency to mimic is, in other words, a capacity people behavior of the confederate: They ate significantly more iceare born with. Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1983) demon- cream when the confederate had taken a large sample rela-strated that infants of about 2 to 3 weeks old imitated move- tive to when the confederate had taken a small sample.1 Inments such as tongue protusions, cheek and brow motions, addition, Johnston showed that participants were not con-and eye blinking. Recent evidence from research on mirror sciously aware of the subtle influence of the confederate onneurons unraveled the reasons for the findings that even new- their behavior.borns mimic. At first, it was observed that the same neuronsin the prefrontal cortex in a monkey brain “fire” both when amonkey perceives a gesture and when it performs a gesture 1Interestingly, the behavior of the confederate was not imitated when the(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, confederate was obese.
196 DIJKSTERHUIS, SMITH, VAN BAAREN, WIGBOLDUS It has been known for quite a while that mimicry is related tense shocks than did control participants. That is, primingto liking and rapport. Early demonstrations of this relation hostility indeed led to more hostile behavior.showed impressive correlations between imitation and rap- Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996; Experiment 1) primedport (Bernieri, 1988; Charney, 1966, LaFrance, 1979; La- their participants with either rudeness or politeness. TheyFrance & Broadbent, 1976). Bernieri found a correlation of presented their participants with a scrambled sentence task.74 between degree of posture mirroring and experienced in which they were to construct grammatically correct sen-positive affect during an interaction. LaFrance (1979) re- tences out of a random ordering of words (see Srull &ported a correlation of .63 between posture mirroring and Wyer, 1979), as a purported test of language ability. Therapport. To shed light on the direction of causality (i.e., does scrambled sentences either contained some words related tomimicry lead to liking or does liking lead to more mimicry?) rudeness (e.g., aggressively, bold, rude) or to politenessChartrand and Bargh (1999) manipulated mimicry. In an ex- (e.g., respect, patiently, polite) or neither. Participants weretension of the work discussed before, they obtained clear asked to meet the experimenter in a different office on com-causal evidence that imitation leads to increased liking of in- pletion of the task. When participants arrived, the experi-teraction partners. They found that participants who were menter was talking to a confederate. The confederate sur-surreptitiously imitated by the confederate liked the confed- reptitiously measured the time it took for participants toerate more relative to participants who were not imitated. In interrupt the conversation. Participants who were primedaddition, participants who were imitated indicated that the with rudeness were more likely to interrupt than were con-interaction proceeded more smoothly. trol participants, whereas participants primed with polite- Recently, van Baaren and colleagues (van Baaren, Hol- ness were least likely to interrupt.land, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003) demonstrated a Macrae and Johnston (1998) investigated the conse-spectacular advantage of the strategic use of imitation. In- quences of activation of the trait helpful. In their experi-spired by the results of Chartrand and Bargh (1999), they ments, half of the participants were primed with the conceptconducted a field experiment in a restaurant. They first es- of helpfulness, whereas the remaining participants were nottablished the average tip that waitresses received during a primed. After finishing the priming task, the experimenter,normal evening. They then instructed waitresses to imitate while supposedly leading the participant to another room,the verbal behavior of customers. That is, they were in- “accidentally” dropped the items she was carrying. As ex-structed to literally repeat the order of each customer. In the pected, participants primed with helpfulness picked up moreno-mimicry condition, they were instructed to avoid literal items from the floor than did control participants.imitation, but paraphrase instead. In two separate studies, it In what is probably the best known experiment on the ef-was shown that exact verbal mimicry significantly in- fects of priming on behavior, Bargh et al. (1996, Experimentcreased the tips, whereas avoidance of mimicry reduced 2) exposed some participants to words related to older peopletips compared to baseline. (e.g., gray, bingo, Florida) in the context of a scrambled-sen- tence language task. After participants finished the priming task, they were told that the experiment was over. A confed- erate, however, recorded the time it took participants to walkHigh Road to Imitation to the nearest elevator. The data of two separate experimentsAs argued before, social perceivers often go beyond the in- showed that participants primed with the older people con-formation given. Perception of (the behavior of) others auto- cept walked significantly slower than did control partici-matically activates traits, stereotypes, and goals (Bargh, pants. In other words, people displayed behavior correspond-1994; Devine, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Hassin et al., 2005; ing to the activated stereotype. Older people are associatedUleman et al., 1996). Priming research from social cognition with slowness, and activating the stereotype of older peopleresearchers demonstrates that once these constructs are acti- indeed led to slowness among the participants. This experi-vated, they often lead to corresponding behaviors. ment has broad implications because speed is a relevant pa- In the first published research on these effects, Carver, rameter for nearly all of human behavior. This is true for con-Ganellen, Froming, and Chambers (1983) primed the con- sumer behavior, as well. We can shop or make decisions orcept of hostility among half of their participants by inciden- eat or drink either relatively quickly or slowly, and this cantally exposing them to words related to this concept (e.g., have profound implications.hostile, aggressive). The remaining half of the participants It is also known that activating stereotypes and traitswere not primed. Subsequently, participants played the role leads to corresponding behavior in the domain of mentalof a teacher in a learning task based on the classic experiment performance. Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) im-of Milgram (1963). Participants were asked to administer proved people’s intellectual performance in a series of ex-electrical shocks to a second participant (actually a confeder- periments. In some of them, half of the participants wereate) whenever this second participant gave an incorrect an- primed with the stereotype of professors. These participantsswer. The participants were free to choose the intensity of the were asked to think about college professors and to writeshocks. Participants primed with hostility delivered more in- down everything that came to mind regarding the typical
THE UNCONSCIOUS CONSUMER 197behaviors and attributes of professors. Control participants they could earn money. Results showed that participants whowere not given this task. In an ostensibly unrelated second were exposed to the goal implying earning money workedexperiment, participants answered 42 general knowledge faster than did those in the control condition.questions taken from the game “Trivial Pursuit” (e.g., In two other studies, Aarts et al. (2004) replicated these“Who painted La Guernica?” a. Dali, b. Velasquez, c. Pi- goal contagion effects for the goal of casual sex. In thesecasso, d. Miro). In line with the prevailing stereotype of studies, heterosexual male students read a short story aboutprofessors as intelligent, primed participants answered a man who meets a former female friend at a bar andmore questions correctly than did other participants. An- spends a few hours with her. In the casual sex goal-imply-other experiment showed that participants could also be led ing condition—but not in the control—the man asks theto perform worse on the same task by having them think woman whether he can come with her to her apartment (seepreviously about soccer hooligans, a social group that is as- also Clark & Hatfield, 1989). Next, all participants weresociated with a rather modest level of intelligence. asked to help a female or male experimenter by providing In addition, various studies have shown that activation of a feedback on a task they performed earlier on in the study.stereotype can affect memory performance (Dijksterhuis, Previous findings show that heterosexual men know that of-Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Dijksterhuis, fering help can be instrumental in attaining sex withBargh, & Miedema, 2000; Levy, 1996). In experiments by women, and that men behave accordingly (Buss, 1988; Ca-Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et al. (2000), for instance, participants nary & Emmers-Sommer, 1997). Thus, goal contagionwere seated at a desk on which 15 objects were placed. Some should lead participants to be more helpful. Indeed, maleparticipants answered questions about older people (“How participants exerted more effort in helping the female ex-often do you meet elderly people?” “Do you think elderly perimenter in the sex goal condition than in the control con-people are conservative?”), whereas others answered ques- dition. Moreover, the effects of goal contagion were mani-tions about college students. After 3 min, participants were fest even after a brief delay, showing some degree ofplaced in a different experimental room and asked to recall as persistence.many of the objects present in the previous room as they The conclusion of the research on the perception–behav-could. As expected, participants primed with the older people ior link is that behavior is highly contagious. People stronglystereotype recalled fewer objects than did other participants. adjust their behavior to that of the immediate social environ- By now, effects of trait activation and stereotype activa- ment, without even being aware of it.tion on behavior have been demonstrated for a wide range ofbehaviors. The evidence for various forms of interpersonalbehavior and for mental performance is especially impres-sive (see Dijksterhuis et al., 2005, for a review). People can AUTOMATIC GOAL PURSUITbe made aggressive, helpful, cooperative, competitive, con-forming, friendly, unfriendly, creative, intelligent, unintelli- A second realm of automaticity research relevant for con-gent, forgetful, and more. sumer behavior is recent work on automatic goal pursuit. Whereas the effects of trait activation and of stereotype This research shows that the entire route from goal activationactivated are assumed to be nonmotivational in nature, recent and goal setting to goal completion can proceed without con-research tested the hypothesis that goals could be contagious scious awareness. Merely priming a goal is enough to havetoo (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; see also Aarts, people engage in goal-directed behavior.Dijksterhuis, & Dik, 2005). That is, Aarts and colleagues Chartrand and Bargh (1996) were the first to investigatetested the hypothesis that actively striving to achieve a goal goal priming. They based their research on previous researchcan also be imitated automatically. In one of their studies, on conscious goals. Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980) ob-participants read a short behavioral script in which a student served that participants process information about other peo-plans a vacation with friends. After planning the vacation the ple differently, depending on whether they are given the goalstudent either (a) went to a farm to work as an assistant for a to form an impression, or the goal to remember the informa-month (a pretest showed that students encode this behavior in tion. Ironically, people who are presented with informationterms of the goal of making money) or (b) went to a commu- about another person remember this information better ifnity center to do volunteer work for a month (control condi- their goal is to form an impression rather than to memorizetion). Participants were then told that the study was almost the information. In addition, people told to form an impres-completed, but that they had to perform a short task on the sion also show superior organization of information in mem-computer. Crucially, participants were told that if enough ory. Chartrand and Bargh (1996) replicated these findings,time was left at the end of the session they would be able to but with one important procedural difference. Rather thanparticipate in a lottery in which they could win money. Partic- giving people the explicit instruction to form an impressionipants’ pace on the computer task served as a measure of or to memorize the information, they primed these goals un-goal-directed activity: The faster they worked on it, the stron- consciously, using a scrambled-sentence task. As it turnedger their motivation to get to the part of the session where out, they obtained the same results. It did not matter whether
198 DIJKSTERHUIS, SMITH, VAN BAAREN, WIGBOLDUSthe goals were set consciously, or whether they were merely habitual bicycle users with such goals, the concept of bicycleunconsciously activated. was automatically activated, as measured by a lexical deci- Bargh et al. (2001) extended this research using more sion task. Among nonhabitual bicycle users, activating a rele-social goals. They showed that the goals to achieve and to vant goal did not lead to activation of this concept. Amongcooperate can operate without awareness. Moreover, their habitual bicycle users there was a one-to-one relation be-research also demonstrated that action resulting from un- tween the goal and the means to reach that goal, implyingconscious goals has sophisticated characteristics compara- that the decision about how to reach the goal is completelyble to those of conscious goals. For instance, like conscious automatized.goals, unconscious goals lead to persistence in the face of The conclusion from these recent insights into automaticobstacles. That is, participants who were temporarily pre- goals pursuit is that even goal-directed behavior often takesvented from achieving their goals demonstrated increased place outside conscious awareness and that goals can be au-motivation over time. tomatically activated by a multitude of environmental cues. Moreover, the social environment can trigger the activa-tion of unconscious goals through important others. Peopleassociate goals with other people, and the activation of a rep- IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMER BEHAVIORresentation of such an important other can lead to automaticactivation of these associated goals (Fitzsimons & Bargh, What are the potential implications of this array of findings2003; Shah, 2003). This way, both goals that you often per- for our understanding of consumer behavior? Whereas someform in the presence of an important other (e.g., you often of the work discussed bears direct relevance (Johnston, 2002;help a particular friend) and goals that others have for you van Baaren et al., 2003), other findings are not operation-(e.g., your mother wants you to achieve) can be activated. alized in terms of consumer behavior. However, it is the gen-Fitzsimons and Bargh demonstrated that merely thinking eral conclusion that is most important: Behavior often un-about an important other leads to the activation of goals, folds unconsciously as a result of the mere perception of cueswhereas Shah obtained similar effects with subliminal prim- in the environment. We briefly touch on these more generaling of the representation of another person. For example, par- implications first, before we return to shopping behavior inticipants primed with their mother (Fitszsimons & Bargh, supermarkets.2003) or father (Shah, 2003) tried harder to succeed on a task One may have observed that research on the percep-relative to control participants. tion–behavior link is more relevant for influencing the pa- Other goals can automatically affect our behavior because rameters of ongoing behavior than for the onset of new be-these goals are linked to specific environments. In research havior. That is, the participants in the experiments by Barghby Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) on automatic normative be- and colleagues (Bargh et al., 1996) did not walk to the ele-havior, participants were asked to look at a visual image of a vator because they were primed with the stereotype of oldercertain environment such as a library or an expensive restau- people. Instead, they walked to the elevator because theyrant. Behavioral goals typically associated with this environ- were asked to do so by the experimenter, but the prime af-ment (e.g., being silent in a library or being neat and tidy in fected the speed with which they walked. Likewise, partici-an expensive restaurant) become automatically activated pro- pants in the Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) ex-vided people are led to believe that they actually have to visit periments did not spontaneously show off their intelligence.the depicted locations. For instance, people who were led to They were presented with a general knowledge task, but thebelieve that they had to go to a library at the end of the experi- prime affected how well they did. Such parameters, how-ment spontaneously started to whisper. This research shows ever, are highly important. We know that shop owners orthat norms can become activated automatically, provided restaurant owners sometimes try to affect these parameters.they are goal relevant. One effective way, for instance, to influence the time peo- Finally, Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) demonstrated that ple spend in an establishment is to manipulate backgroundgoals can also cause habitual behavior to ensue automati- music. Slow music tends to make people stay longer,cally. They asked Dutch undergraduate students how often whereas fast music tends to increase turnover ratesthey used their bicycle to reach various destinations (note (Milliman, 1982). The research reviewed previously showsthat, especially in cities, bicycle use in Holland is about as that parameters such as speed are strongly influenced bycommon as car use in the United States). Later, participants our social environment as well.were divided into habitual bicycle users (i.e., people who use But let us go back to the supermarket example. At the out-their bike all the time) and nonhabitual bicycle users. In the set, we argued that an approach that emphasizes consciousactual experiments, participants were given a certain goal im- and thorough information processing can only account for aplying a specific location, such as the goal to “attend a lec- limited subset of the choices people make. The vast majorityture.” The locations that were implied (such as the university) of choices are not the result of much information processingcould be reached by bicycle, but also by other means, such as at all. For our purposes, we divide these remaining choicesby car or by various modes of public transport. On presenting into two categories. The first category involves choices based
THE UNCONSCIOUS CONSUMER 199on automatically activated attitudes. The second category in- vative, it was predicted that primed participants would becomevolves choices that are not driven by attitudes at all. That is, more conservative. And indeed, participants primed with thesometimes the environment makes people bypass attitudes older people concept were suddenly worried about the amountaltogether. Both types of choices, we argue, are strongly af- of sex on TV and about the decreasing number of churchgoersfected by cues in the environment. in the Netherlands, relative to control participants who were not primed. That is, people primed with the older people ste- reotype indeed demonstrated more conservative attitudes to-Malleable Automatic Attitudes ward things such as sex and nudity on TV. In a follow-up study,Researchers long believed that attitudes guide behavior in a a more worrisome consequence of such stereotype-induced at-deliberate and conscious manner. Attitudes were seen as con- titude change was found. Priming the stereotype of skinheadsscious evaluations based on a considerable amount of (associated with racism) led people to express more discrimi-weighting pros and cons of attitude objects. The research by natory attitudes. When asked to evaluate statements such asFazio and colleagues (Fazio et al., 1986) strongly diverged “The Netherlands should accept more immigrants from poorfrom this conceptualization. They demonstrated that on the countries” or “I think that minorities ask too much in their de-mere perception of an object, its attitude is automatically ac- mands for equal rights,” participants primed with skinheadstivated and “ready” to guide further behavior. These findings adopted more negative attitudes toward foreigners than diddramatically increased the range of behaviors that could po- control participants who were not primed.tentially be influenced by attitudes. Ferguson and Bargh (2004b) recently revealed that even For our purposes, it is important to realize that automati- automatically activated attitudes are affected by subtlecally activated attitudes are malleable. Recent research sug- goal-priming manipulations. In their work, some participantsgests that mimicry, automatic stereotype activation, and au- were subtly given certain goals, whereas others were not.tomatic goal activation can temporarily change attitudes. Subsequently, participants’ automatic attitudes were mea-Mimicry can affect attitudes in at least two ways. First, sured for objects that were highly goal relevant versus irrele-people consciously and intentionally take over one an- vant. As they predicted, objects that were normally regardedother’s attitudes. When the “cool kids” wear a new clothing as rather neutral were seen as highly positive once they hadstyle or start to listen to new music, the “wannabe” cool become goal relevant. For instance, participants who had justkids follow their example in the hope of being cool, too. In been given the opportunity to drink had a neutral attitude to-this case, people want to mimic. However, mimicry can ward water, whereas participants who had been forced to eatalso lead to attitude change in cases where people do not pretzels without the opportunity to drink afterward heldconsciously choose to assimilate toward another person. highly positive attitudes toward water. Likewise, ShermanRecent studies by van Baaren, Niël, Peeters, and Ruiter and colleagues (Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin,(2005) confirmed what we already knew: Similar people 2003) showed that attitudes toward cigarettes among smok-think similar things (see Cialdini, 2001). In two experi- ers differed dramatically as a function of when they hadments, van Baaren et al. (2005) had a naive confederate ei- smoked their last cigarette. Craving a cigarette was clearlyther mimic or not mimic the participants during an inter- reflected in smokers’ very positive attitudes.view session. During that interview, the confederate Given that consumer choices are at least partly based onexpressed his attitude toward a Dutch sport (korfbal). The automatically activated attitudes, the consequences of theseparticipant’s own attitude toward korfbal was measured on findings are far-reaching. These automatically activated atti-a pre- and a postmeasure. The results showed that after tudes are not stable, and hence, they do not always lead to themimicry, participants assimilated significantly more toward same choices. Instead, such attitudes are partly determinedthe confederate’s attitude, compared to the no-mimicry con- by the current social environment and by current goals.dition. That is, their attitudes toward korfbal had shifted. Moreover, people are generally unaware of the moderatingThere seems to be an intimate link between similarity in effects of these subtle influences.doing and similarity in thinking. Evidence for the effect of stereotype activation on attitude Bypassing Attitudeschange comes from research by Kawakami and colleagues(Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003). In their experi- Consumer choices are not affected only by malleable atti-ments, half of the participants were primed with the stereotype tudes. There are reasons to believe that some choices mayof older people. Different priming methods were used, ranging completely bypass the influence of attitudes.2 Aarts,from rather bold, conscious manipulations to subtle, sublimi-nal manipulations. In a later task, participants were asked to 2Strictly speaking, it is possible that participants’ behavior in some of thewhat extent they agreed with attitude statements such as experiments reviewed in this section was affected by attitudes. However, be-“There is too much sex and nudity on TV these days” and cause attitudes were not measured, the most parsimonious explanation of the“More people should go to church these days.” Based on pre- findings is to assume a more direct effect of perception on choice, rather thanvailing stereotypes of older people as being somewhat conser- an effect mediated by attitudes.
200 DIJKSTERHUIS, SMITH, VAN BAAREN, WIGBOLDUSDijksterhuis, and de Vries (2001) did experiments in which chovies, the bananas, the peanut butter, the detergent, andthey made some people thirsty by having them eat very salty the big container of Ben & Jerry’s New York Super Fudgecandies. Rather than assessing attitudes toward goal-relevant Chunk ice cream? Well, you know you bought bananas be-items (as in Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), they measured the ac- cause you love bananas and you always buy them. Also,cessibility of objects that could be instrumental in quenching you know you bought detergent because you needed tothirst (e.g., cup, water). Indeed, a lexical decision task wash those two shirts. Or did those freshly cleaned floors inshowed that such objects became more accessible, demon- the supermarket play a role as well? And what about thestrating that goals make people perceptually ready to act. The rest? You hardly ever buy peanut butter, but a small boyconsequence is that active goals increase the possibility that running through the aisles reminded you of your 5-year-oldpeople perceive goal-relevant objects in their environment. nephew who loves peanut butter. You bought a big rather Environmental features can also activate goals when than a small container of ice cream because you witnessedthey are perceived without conscious awareness. Strahan, someone else grabbing a big container. And although youSpencer, and Zanna (2002) subliminally primed people bought too many groceries because you were hungry, youwith words related to thirst. Immediately afterward, partici- forgot to buy coffee, perhaps because you thought aboutpants compared two beverages in a taste test. Participants what birthday present to buy grandma while you negotiatedprimed with thirst-related words drank more than control the coffee aisle. Unfortunately, the mere thought of yourparticipants who had not been exposed to the prime words. grandmother made you forgetful.However, these effects were moderated by actual thirst.Half of the participants had been asked not to drink duringthe last 3 hr before the experiment. Only among these peo- ACKNOWLEDGMENTSple did the priming manipulation have effects. In sum,when people have a certain goal (e.g., they want to quench Work on this article was supported by NWO Granttheir thirst), even subliminal primes can activate goals to al- 016–025–030 (Vernieuwingsimpuls) awarded to Apleviate these needs. Dijksterhuis and an NWO Grant 451–03–051 (VENI) Recently, Holland and colleagues (Holland, Hendriks, & awarded to Rick B. van Baaren.Aarts, 2005) tested the effects of the perception–behavior linkwith an unusual stimulus input: smell. In their laboratory, theyhid a bucket full of lukewarm water with citrus-scentedcleanser. 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