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According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), terrorism is defined as “…the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom.”
Individuals, groups, or states with primary objective to:
Toppling country’s economic viability, will effect the political structure
Way of protecting their values, religious beliefs and societal norms
Common Vulnerabilities Facilities associated within the Commercial Facilities Sector of the DHS operate on the principle of open public access, meaning general public can move freely throughout these facilities without the deterrent of highly visible security barriers. The majority of the facilities in this sector are privately owned and operated, with minimal interaction with the Federal Government and other regulatory entities. The Commercial Facilities Sector consists of the following eight subsectors:
Common Vulnerabilities (cont.) There is no universal list of vulnerabilities that applies to all assets of a particular type within an infrastructure category. “Common” vulnerabilities should be interpreted as having a high likelihood of occurrence, but not as applying to each and every individual facility or asset. Some common vulnerabilities for hotels include: Guest drop-off and pick-up points that may not provide a safe distance in order to mitigate blasts from explosives in vehicles Parking garages that may have open access to the public with little to no screening A limited security force
Potential Indicators Potential indicators of surveillance may include:
Persons discovered with a suspicious collection of casino/hotel maps, photos, or diagrams with facilities highlighted
Personnel being questioned off-site about practices pertaining to the facility or the facility’s supporting infrastructure (e.g., electricity and natural gas lines)
Theft of employee or contractor ID cards or uniforms
A noted pattern or series of false alarms requiring a response by law enforcement or emergency services
Observable anomalies or incidents that may be indicators of an imminent attack include:
Persons in crowded areas wearing unusually bulky clothing
Unattended vehicles illegally parked near entrance, exit areas, or places where large numbers of patrons gather
Unattended packages (e.g., backpacks, briefcases, boxes or luggage)
Indications of unusual substances near air intakes
Crisis Recognition Stage 2: The Acute Crisis Stage – Whether the crisis appears suddenly or a symptom morphs into an urgent matter, immediate action is required. How long it continues is a matter of how much additional damage occurs. The key, of course, is to minimize the amount of that subsequent damage, however that's not always possible. Due to the nature of the situation, funds will need to be allocated directly to the problem area. By diverting funds from one area to another, a natural imbalance is created and only those companies that plan and set up strategic fund accounts will be able to survive. Stage 1: The Prodromal Stage – This is the "early warning" period. Sometimes referred to as the "pre-crisis" stage, it's when you get first glimpse of the potential of the crisis-to-come. The time frame in which the problem is dealt as well as how it is handled that will influence the repercussions faced. The reason why the Prodromal Stage is so important is that it's much easier to manage a crisis before it begins. Stage 3: The Chronic Stage – The "post-mortem" phase or make it or break it point. The attacks have subsided, clean-up has begun, and now it's time to investigate what happened and what did not, and make a decisive management decision based on the outcome. This could be the beginning of recovery for some firms or a death knell for others (Darling &Kash, 1998). Companies and managers can get accustomed to quick fixes, thus never truly addressing the crisis. They perceive issues as tolerable and have an attitude of we’ll deal with it as it comes instead of preparing for the future. Stage 4: The Crisis Resolution Stage – Problems that pertain to crises are often misinterpreted, causing management to think that everything has been resolved. In reality the problem or crisis has been neglected. Companies today are becoming more pro-active when sorting out symptoms, but the problem still remains in the area of implementation. If you don’t know how to resolve a crisis, it won’t matter how good your company is at detecting the symptoms.
Strategic Forecasting -Based on prediction. Managers today have several forecasting techniques at their disposal (i.e. qualitative, opinion quantification, extrapolation, simulation and cause and effect methods). It assumes the organization can adapt to major or broad changes.
Contingency Planning -Alternative moves taken when events don’t play out as expected. Safeguard companies and better prepare them to handle crisis situations.
Issue Analysis -Alert the decision makers of trends that are occurring in the external environment. This information should be used to maneuver companies into more advantageous waters.
Scenario Analysis -Involves thinking about favorable and unfavorable situations that might arise, and the company’s alternatives for preventing, facilitating or thwarting the processes that caused the situations.
Governments should act in hand with security forces, intelligence groups and the police
Aim: uncover terrorist plots, the trafficking of weapons, money and personnel in and out of countries
Objectives: protection of the middle to lower economy, anti-corruption policies, a healthy investment environment for foreign countries, and create resilience toward terrorist attacks
The U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC)
“Nation’s primary organization for analyzing and integrating all foreign and domestic terrorism related intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States”
Mission: to leverage all elements of national power to ensure terrorists do not strike the US again
Alliances: NCTC partners with Intelligence and law enforcement communities, allies overseas and the American society. As well as with entities, agencies or organizations to underline causes that turn young boys into terrorists
International cooperation – Form partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral organizations, and foreign governments to enhance counterterrorism objectives and national security of theU.S.
Choosing a Lawsuit Location
To decide on a location both the plaintiffs and the defendant must be or have any relation to the lawsuit location
Interests in deciding a forum: an adequate access to evidence and relevant sites, to witnesses, adequate enforcement of judgments, and the practicalities and expenses associated with the litigation
Case #1: Egypt inadequate forum because of place of attack and strong anti-Americans and anti-Israelis sentiments in the country, and plaintiffs would be unable to testify under Egyptian legal system
Case #2: Similar situation with case #1. However, defendants moved for dismissal on the ground of forum claiming information critical to its defense could be obtained only in Egypt and Egyptian court would better apply Egyptian tort law
Difference in cases: In case #2, court concluded Egypt had a greater interest in the litigation than New York because it is committed to protecting its tourist industry, Egyptian court would be more familiar with Egyptian law and because of the relation of 2 pending cases in Egypt
The Fourth Amendment
A person paying for a guest room has legitimate expectation of privacy in his/her hotel room
Case #1: Police identified suspected drug dealer entering a motel room. They entered the room with managers consent, found cocaine and arrested criminals. Defendants appealed claiming Fourth Amendment right, refused as they were past c/o time and there was no legitimate expectation of privacy after c/o
Case #2: Sheriff conducted random warrant check of the motel via guest registry list and found guest with an arrest warrant
“the random check of the motel registry revealing his whereabouts constitutes a violation of his privacy rights under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution”
Nevertheless, “unwanted random checks discourage the business of lawful patrons at motels, interfere with business operations, and compromise the duty and responsibility of a hotel operator to protect its guests against privacy violations”