Why	  Eve	  and	  Mallory	  Love	                 Android	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Android	  SSL	  (In)Security	  
WARNING	  •  The	  views	  presented	  in	  this	  presentaAon	  are	  my	  own	  and	     do	  not	  express	  the	  view...
Building	  Our	  Story	  •  There	  once	  was	  a	  mobile	  device	  called	  Android…	  •  2012	  market	  share	  fore...
Developers	  Are	  Idiots	  •  Or	  completely	  malicious	  geniuses!	  •  Case	  in	  point:	       –  ApplicaAon	  Deve...
My	  Advice	  to	  the	  UI	  Class	                  String	                  BRICK	                  Required	  to	  be	...
Why	  Should	  Fruit	  Ninja…	  •  Have	  access	  to	  your	  phone	  state?	  •  Be	  able	  to	  read	  SMS?	     	  • ...
Android	  Security	  •  Trend	  Micro	  reported	  17	  malicious	  apps	     discovered	  in	  the	  Google	  Play	  Stor...
Malicious	  App	  Stats	  
WARNING:	  It’s	  About	  to	  Get	  Real	  •  Prior	  to	  jumping	  straight	  into	  current	  Android	     research,	 ...
ExtrapolaAng	  the	  Experimental	    Method	  for	  evaluaAng	  Android	  Apps	  •  You	  take	  a	  handful	  of	  apps,...
A	  Study	  of	  Android	  ApplicaAon	                              Security	  •  William	  Enck	  et	  al.	  
Android	  App	  Security	  •  “1,100	  Popular	  Free	  Apps	  examined.”	  •  “ded	  decompiler	  used	  to	  recover	  A...
Android	  App	  Security	  •  ded	  is	  a	  Dalvik	  decompiler	  that	  is	  used	  to	  recover	  an	  applicaAons	    ...
Trivia	  •  What	  is	  IMEI?	  •  IMSI?	  •  ICC-­‐ID	  
This	  is	  a	  really	  big	  paper…	  •  So	  we’ll	  menAon	  the	  stuff	  that	  is	  interesAng:	      –  Authors	  p...
Points	  that	  Repeat	  •  Leaking	  informaAon	  to	  logs:	  Log	  API	  (logcat).	  •  Unprotected	  Broadcast	  Recei...
SCanDroid:	          Automated	  Security	  CerAficaAon	  of	  Android	                          ApplicaAons	  •  Adam	  Fu...
Android	  App	  Security	  •  Unless	  I	  missed	  it,	  no	  collecAon	  of	  apps	  were	  pulled	  from	  the	  Market...
SCanDroid	  •  ScanDroid	  (Program	  Analysis):	     –  Parses	  manifest	  file,	  and	  	     –  Analyzes	  data	  flow.	...
Android	  Basics	  λ    Intents	  are	  the	  preferred	  mechanisms	  for	  asynchronous	  IPC	  in	  Android.	        - ...
TaintDroid:	     An	  InformaAon-­‐Flow	  Tracking	  System	  for	  RealAme	               Privacy	  Monitoring	  on	  Sma...
Trivia	  •  Where	  else	  have	  we	  seen	  tainAng	  used?	  
TaintDroid	  •  “30	  popular	  third-­‐party	  Android	  ApplicaAons.	  •  “TaintDroid,	  an	  efficient,	  system-­‐wide	 ...
TaintDroid	  •  An	  extension	  to	  the	  mobile	  playorm,	  not	  an	     applicaAon	  itself.	  •  Taints	  data	  so...
Permission	  Re-­‐DelegaAon	                           Apacks	  &	  Defenses	  •  Adrienne	  Porter	  Felt	  et	  al.	  	  
ExtrapolaAng	  the	  Experimental	     Method	  for	  evaluaAng	  Android	  Apps	  •  872	  survey	  applicaAons.	  •  Dem...
Permission	  Re-­‐DelegaAon	  •  Permission	  re-­‐delegaAon	  is	  an	  apack	  when	     lower	  priv.	  app	  can	  gai...
Permission	  Bloat	  
Eve	  and	  Mallory	  <3	  Android	  •  Finally,	  we’ll	  move	  on	  to	  discussing	  the	  paper	     at	  hand.	  •  ...
Eve	  and	  Mallory	  <3	  Android	  •  Paper	  wants	  to:	      –  Discover	  potenAal	  security	  threats	  posed	  by...
Trivia	  •  Whats	  the	  *Droid	  name	  used	  in	  this	  paper?	  
MalloDroid	  •  Analyzed	  13,500	  popular	  free	  apps.	  •  Revealed	  1,074	  (8%)	  of	  apps	  potenAally	  vulnera...
MalloDroid	  •  These	  INTERNET	  capable	  apps	  uAlize	  the	  SSL/TLS	  for	  secure	     communicaAon.	  •  MalloDro...
MalloDroid	  •  Out	  of	  the	  100	  selected	  apps,	  the	  following	     idenAfiers	  were	  scanned	  for:	      –  ...
Android	  &	  SSL	  •  Several	  packages	  for	  accessing	  the	  network:	     java.net,	  javax,net,	  android.net	  a...
Android	  &	  SSL	  Byproduct	  
MITM	  •  Argument	  here	  is	  that	  mobile	  has	  an	  increased	  chance	  of	     vulnerability	  when	  considerin...
What	  Happened	  •  Banking/Paypal	  credenAals	  were	  leaked.	  •  Bitcoin-­‐miner	  API	  keys	  were	  leaked.	  •  ...
Case	  of	  SSLPinning	  
Case	  for	  Appropriate	  Feedback	  
Survey	  	  •  The	  end	  result	  was	  approximately	  half	  of	  the	       surveyed	  populaAon	  didn’t	  really	  ...
Nailed	  It	  •  13,500	  popular	  free	  apps	  examined.	  	  •  Introduce	  some	  new	  component.	  •  1,074	  of	  ...
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Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android


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This presentation contains multiple pointers to academic research pertaining to Android and its security model. I presented these works to a weekly Security and Privacy reading group.

The academic proceeding can be found here:

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Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android

  1. 1. Why  Eve  and  Mallory  Love   Android  An  Analysis  of  Android  SSL  (In)Security  
  2. 2. WARNING  •  The  views  presented  in  this  presentaAon  are  my  own  and   do  not  express  the  views  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University.  •  The  content  presented  in  this  presentaAon  was  extracted   from  mulAple  academic  conference  proceedings.  •  Most  pictorial  references  were  shamelessly  collected  from   the  internet  and  presented  without  reference.  If  you  find   your  image  and  wish  to  request  that  I  provide  a  reference,   please  email  me  at  the  address  provided  on  my  website:   michaelrushanan.org.  
  3. 3. Building  Our  Story  •  There  once  was  a  mobile  device  called  Android…  •  2012  market  share  forecasts  of  48%  and   400,000+  apps  (or  so  says  our  authors)…  •  Everyone  believed  Android  to  be  safe  because  it   uAlized  Java  for  its  applicaAon  development   language,  runs  inside  an  isolated  (sandboxed)   virtual  machine,  follows  a  unix-­‐based  permissions   model,  exposes  a  wonderful  API  for  secure   methods  and  cryptography.    
  4. 4. Developers  Are  Idiots  •  Or  completely  malicious  geniuses!  •  Case  in  point:   –  ApplicaAon  Developers  seemingly  don’t  understand  the  less-­‐is-­‐ more  paradox  for  se`ng  permissions.   –  Manufacturers  allow  devices  to  stagnate  by  not  supporAng   latest  OS  releases.   –  The  android  runAme  supports  a  range  of  APIs  by  exposing   runAme  arguments  for  validaAng  the  current  API.   –  *SIGH*  People  sAll  implement  their  own,  already  provided,   methods.  For  example,  extending  the  SSLSocketFactory  class.  
  5. 5. My  Advice  to  the  UI  Class   String   BRICK   Required  to  be  able  to  disable  the  device  (very   dangerous!).       String   CAMERA   Required  to  be  able  to  access  the  camera   device.       String   READ_SMS   Allows  an  applicaAon  to  read  SMS  messages.        
  6. 6. Why  Should  Fruit  Ninja…  •  Have  access  to  your  phone  state?  •  Be  able  to  read  SMS?    •  Access  your  camera?  
  7. 7. Android  Security  •  Trend  Micro  reported  17  malicious  apps   discovered  in  the  Google  Play  Store.  •  Six  of  these  apps  contained  a  reused  snippet   of  code  –  Plankton.  Ten  the  year  prior.  •  Plankton…   –  Enables  the  app  to  connect  to  a  set  of  command   and  control  servers.   –  Collects  user’s  browsing  history,  bookmarks,  and   device  informaAon  (that  really  doesn’t  sound  that  bad).  
  8. 8. Malicious  App  Stats  
  9. 9. WARNING:  It’s  About  to  Get  Real  •  Prior  to  jumping  straight  into  current  Android   research,  I’d  like  to  point  out  something.  
  10. 10. ExtrapolaAng  the  Experimental   Method  for  evaluaAng  Android  Apps  •  You  take  a  handful  of  apps,  usually  the  free   ones.  •  Introduce  some  new  component.  •  Perform  some  analysis.  •  Uncover  some  horrible  truth.  •  Consider  implicaAons  and  make  suggesAons.  
  11. 11. A  Study  of  Android  ApplicaAon   Security  •  William  Enck  et  al.  
  12. 12. Android  App  Security  •  “1,100  Popular  Free  Apps  examined.”  •  “ded  decompiler  used  to  recover  Android  applicaAon  source  code   directly  from  installaAon  image.”  •  “Horizontal  study  of  smartphone  applicaAons  based  on  staAc   analysis  of  21  million  lines  of  recovered  code.”  •  “Uncovered  pervasive  use/misuses  of  personal/phone  idenAfiers,   and  deep  penetraAon  of  adverAsing  and  analyAcs.”  •  “Conclude  by  considering  the  implicaAons  of  these  preliminary   findings  and  offer  direcAons  for  future  analysis.”  
  13. 13. Android  App  Security  •  ded  is  a  Dalvik  decompiler  that  is  used  to  recover  an  applicaAons   Java  source  from  the  installed  image.   –  Madness:  DVM-­‐to-­‐JVM  bytecode  retargeAng.   –  TranslaAng  class  and  method  structures.  Inferring  types.  •  DVM:   –  .class  files  converted  to  .dex.   –  MulAple  classes  are  included  into  a  single  .dex  file.   –  Dupilcate  objects  and  constants  used  in  mulAple  class  fields  are   included  ONCE  in  the  .dex.   –  Java  bytecode  is  converted  into  an  alternaAve  instrucAon  set  used  by   DVM.   –  DVM  executables  installed  onto  a  mobile  device  are  subject  to  further   opAmizaAons  (reording  byte  order,  inline  linking  of  simple  data   structures  and  funcAon  libraries).  
  14. 14. Trivia  •  What  is  IMEI?  •  IMSI?  •  ICC-­‐ID  
  15. 15. This  is  a  really  big  paper…  •  So  we’ll  menAon  the  stuff  that  is  interesAng:   –  Authors  purport  a  wide  misuse  of  privacy  sensiAve   informaAon:     •  IMEI   •  IMSI   •  ICC-­‐ID   –  Usage  of  ad  and  analyAc  network  libraries  were   integrated  with  51%  of  applicaAons  studied  (eh,  they   were  free  apps).   –  Many  developers  fail  to  securely  use  Android  APIs.   They’re  idiots,  remember?  
  16. 16. Points  that  Repeat  •  Leaking  informaAon  to  logs:  Log  API  (logcat).  •  Unprotected  Broadcast  Receivers  –  we’ll  talk  more   about  this  later.  IPC  mishaps  101.  •  Intent  InjecAon  Apacks.  •  Denial  of  Service  with  Null  Checks  on  IPC  input   (applicaAon  crashes).  •  DelegaAng  control  (we’ll  talk  about  this  in  a  second).  •  Tapjoy…    •  SDCard  usage  (external  vs  internal  storage).  •  NaAve  code  usage  (JNI…  NDK).  
  17. 17. SCanDroid:   Automated  Security  CerAficaAon  of  Android   ApplicaAons  •  Adam  Fuchs  et  al.             *This  applica8on  to  prove  a  research  goal  name  usage  deal  is  also  repeated.    
  18. 18. Android  App  Security  •  Unless  I  missed  it,  no  collecAon  of  apps  were  pulled  from  the  Market.  •  “Enforcing  permissions  is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  security  violaAons,   since  permissions  may  be  misused,  intenAonally  or  unintenAonally,  to   introduce  insecure  data  flows.  SCanDroid,  a  tool  for  reasoning   automaAcally  about  the  security  of  Android  ApplicaAons.”  •  ScanDroid  staAcally  analyzes  data  flows  through  Android  applicaAons…  it   can  decide  whether  it  is  safe  for  an  applicaAon  to  run  with  certain   permissions,  based  on  the  permissions  enforced  by  other  applicaAons.  •  A  soluAon  to  the  failing  permissions  model.  •  With  data  flow  analysis,  the  precision  of  reasoning  by  the  user  is  no  longer   limited.  
  19. 19. SCanDroid  •  ScanDroid  (Program  Analysis):   –  Parses  manifest  file,  and     –  Analyzes  data  flow.   –  Uri  and  Intent-­‐based  addr.  
  20. 20. Android  Basics  λ  Intents  are  the  preferred  mechanisms  for  asynchronous  IPC  in  Android.   -  sendBroadcast()   -  sendOrderedBroadcast()  λ  You  can  apply  access  permissions  to  broadcasted  intents  so  only  certain   applicaAons  can  register  to  see  the  intents.  If  youre  doing  this,  you  might  just   consider  invoking  the  receiver  directly.   -  android:exported     λ  Allow  use  of  IPC  by  other  apps.   -  android:protecAonLevel   λ  Characterizes  the  potenAal  risk  implied  in  the  permission  and  indicates  the  procedure  the  system   should  follow  when  determining  whether  or  not  to  grant  permission  to  requester.   -  “normal”  =  default  low  risk,  requests  isolated  applicaAon  features.   -  “dangerous”  =  high-­‐risk,  requests  private  user  data  or  control.   -  “signature”  =  granted  only  if  the  requesAng  applicaAon  is  signed  with  the  same  cerAficate  as  the  applicaAon  that   declared  the  permission.     -  “signatureOrSystem”  =  system  grants  only  to  applicaAons  that  are  in  the  Android  system  image  or  as  above.   -  android:permission   λ  ApplicaAons  will  need  to  declare  a  corresponding  <uses-­‐permission>  element  in  their  manifest  to  start,   stop,  or  bind  service.  
  21. 21. TaintDroid:   An  InformaAon-­‐Flow  Tracking  System  for  RealAme   Privacy  Monitoring  on  Smartphones  •  William  Enck  et  al.    
  22. 22. Trivia  •  Where  else  have  we  seen  tainAng  used?  
  23. 23. TaintDroid  •  “30  popular  third-­‐party  Android  ApplicaAons.  •  “TaintDroid,  an  efficient,  system-­‐wide  dynamic  taint  tracking  and   analysis  system  capable  of  simultaneously  tracking  mulAple  sources   of  sensiAve  data.”  •  Monitor  behavior  with  TaintDroid.  •  “68  instances  of  potenAal  misuse  of  users’  private  informaAon   across  20  applicaAons.”  •  “Monitoring  sensiAve  data  with  TaintDroid  provides  informed  use   of  third-­‐party  applicaAons  for  phone  users  and  valuable  input  for   smartphone  security  service  firms  seek  to  idenAfy  misbehavior.”  
  24. 24. TaintDroid  •  An  extension  to  the  mobile  playorm,  not  an   applicaAon  itself.  •  Taints  data  sources  with  a  label,  and  as  the   data  propagates  through  program  variables,   files,  and  interprocess  messages  this  allows   TaintDroid  to  monitor  (variable,  message,   method,  and  file  level).  
  25. 25. TaintDroid  
  26. 26. Permission  Re-­‐DelegaAon   Apacks  &  Defenses  •  Adrienne  Porter  Felt  et  al.    
  27. 27. ExtrapolaAng  the  Experimental   Method  for  evaluaAng  Android  Apps  •  872  survey  applicaAons.  •  Demonstrate  Permission  re-­‐delegaAon.  •  Perform  some  analysis.  •  “More  than  a  third  request  permissions  for  sensiAve  resources  and   also  exposes  public  interfaces  –  at  risk  for  exposing  permission  re-­‐ delegaAon.”  •  “IPC  InspecAon,  a  new  OS  mechanism  for  defending  against   permission  re-­‐delegaAon.  Reduces  an  applicaAon’s  permissions   a{er  receiving  communicaAon  from  a  less  privileged  applicaAon.”  
  28. 28. Permission  Re-­‐DelegaAon  •  Permission  re-­‐delegaAon  is  an  apack  when   lower  priv.  app  can  gain  advanced  priv.  by   communicaAng  with  more  trusted  app    
  29. 29. Permission  Bloat  
  30. 30. Eve  and  Mallory  <3  Android  •  Finally,  we’ll  move  on  to  discussing  the  paper   at  hand.  •  Sascha  et  al.  •  Many  Android  apps  have  a  legiAmate  need  to   communicate  over  the  Internet.  
  31. 31. Eve  and  Mallory  <3  Android  •  Paper  wants  to:   –  Discover  potenAal  security  threats  posed  by   benign  Android  apps  that  use  SSL/TLS  protocols  to   protect  data.   –  Query  users  if  they  really  understand  those  pop   up  messages  concerning  SSL/TLS  warnings   (caveat:  when  they  actually  happen).  
  32. 32. Trivia  •  Whats  the  *Droid  name  used  in  this  paper?  
  33. 33. MalloDroid  •  Analyzed  13,500  popular  free  apps.  •  Revealed  1,074  (8%)  of  apps  potenAally  vulnerable  to   MITM.  •  Selected  100  apps  of  interest  (no  rhyme  nor  reason).  •  41  of  these  apps  gather  sensiAve  data  (e.g.,  banking   credenAals).  •  Many  of  these  apps  communicate  over  the  internet  for   legiAmate  reasons  –  thus  requiring  the  INTERNET   permission.  
  34. 34. MalloDroid  •  These  INTERNET  capable  apps  uAlize  the  SSL/TLS  for  secure   communicaAon.  •  MalloDroid  is  an  extension  to  AndroGuard   –  Reverse  Engineering,  Malware  and  goodware  analysis  of  Android  apps.   –  Wripen  in  python  to  play  with  DEX  (disassemble,  decompilaAon),  APK,   Binary  xml,  Resources.  •  Performs  staAc  code  analysis:   –  Analyze  the  networking  API  calls  and  extract  valid  HTTP(S)  URLS  from   the  decompiled  apps;   –  Check  the  validity  of  the  SSL  cerAficates  of  all  extracted  HTTPS  hosts;   –  IdenAfy  apps  that  contain  API  calls  that  differ  from  Android’s  default   SSL  usage:   •  Non-­‐default  trust  managers;   •  SSL  socket  factories  or  hostname  verifiers  with  permissive  verificaAon   strategies.  
  35. 35. MalloDroid  •  Out  of  the  100  selected  apps,  the  following   idenAfiers  were  scanned  for:   –  AccepAng  all  SSL  cerAficates.   –  Allowing  all  hostnames  regardless  of  the  cerAficates   Common  Name.   –  NeglecAng  precauAons  against  SSL  stripping.   –  TrusAng  all  available  CerAficate  AuthoriAes.   –  Not  using  SSL  pinning  (eh,  don’t  really  have  to  do   this).   –  Misinforming  users  about  SSL  usage.  
  36. 36. Android  &  SSL  •  Several  packages  for  accessing  the  network:   java.net,  javax,net,  android.net  and   org.apache.hpp.  •  Developers  must  ensure  that  they  use  SSL   correctly:   –  TrusAng  All  CerAficates.  TrustManager  interface  can   allow  trust  of  all  cerAficates  regardless  of  who  signed   them.   –  Allowing  all  Hostnames.  Forgo  checks  of  whether  the   cert  was  issued  for  this  address  or  not.   –  TrusAng  Many  CAs.  134  Root  CAs  by  default.   –  Mixed-­‐Mode/NO  SSL.  SSLStripping…  mostly  a   webview  problem.  
  37. 37. Android  &  SSL  Byproduct  
  38. 38. MITM  •  Argument  here  is  that  mobile  has  an  increased  chance  of   vulnerability  when  considering  a  malicious  MITM  (proxy   SSL).  •  Authors  make  the  argument  that  just  because  an  app   doesn’t  use  SSL  appropriately,  doesn’t  mean  that  there  is   sensiAve  informaAon  there.  •  ExperimentaAon:   –  Targeted  Finance,  Business,  CommunicaAon,  Social  Tools.   –  266  apps  in  quesAon,  cherry  picked  100  again.   –  Used  Samsung  Galaxy  Nexus,  Android  4.0   –  Network  Access  via  MITM  SSL  Proxy  w/  self-­‐signed  cerAficate  or   one  that  was  signed  by  a  trusted  CA.  
  39. 39. What  Happened  •  Banking/Paypal  credenAals  were  leaked.  •  Bitcoin-­‐miner  API  keys  were  leaked.  •  Email/Contact  data…  •  Why?   –  Allowing  all  Hostnames.   –  Allowing  any  CA-­‐signed  cerAficate  
  40. 40. Case  of  SSLPinning  
  41. 41. Case  for  Appropriate  Feedback  
  42. 42. Survey    •  The  end  result  was  approximately  half  of  the   surveyed  populaAon  didn’t  really  understand   what  a  secure  connecAon  (via  SSL/TLS)  was,   and  what  a  feedback  message  about  SSL/TLS   meant.  
  43. 43. Nailed  It  •  13,500  popular  free  apps  examined.    •  Introduce  some  new  component.  •  1,074  of  the  apps  contained  SSL/TLS  code.  100   cherry  picked  apps  resulted  in  41  vulnerable   apps  gathering  a  large  variety  of  sensiAve   data.  •  Banking  and  personal  data  is  sensiAve,  and   suscepAble  to  the  apacks.  •  Using  MalloDroid  with  Androguard.