Striat Talk Berkeley-San Francisco 2012 Consensus Document


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Striat Talk Berkeley-San Francisco 2012 Consensus Document

  1. 1. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft Strait Talk Berkeley-San Francisco Consensus Document – Final Draft, 04/11/12INTRODUCTIONFifteen student delegates equally representing Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States,underwent six days of discussion and debate via Interactive Conflict Resolution sessions. At theconclusion of the week, this consensus document has been produced to advocate and encourageboth practical solutions and conceptual frameworks to reduce misunderstandings of cross-Straitrelations. This consensus document represents the opinions of the fifteen delegates based on theirdiscussion on the controversial issues of cross-Strait relations. It should not be taken asrepresentative of the views of Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States.This consensus document seeks to reduce tensions and improve relations across the Strait in fourdimensions. The first dimension involves increasing mutual understanding through culturalexchanges between Mainland China and Taiwan. The second dimension seeks furthering ofeconomic ties between the two sides of the Strait to increase incentives for mutual cooperation. Thethird dimension concerns security. The security goal of fostering long-term trust and reducingdangerous miscalculations is accomplished through mutual understanding and cooperation betweenMainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. The fourth and final dimension proposes a way totranscend the current political reality by creating a shared economic framework that consistsprimarily of Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.Through this consensus document, we would like to appeal to a wide range of individuals includingpolicymakers, government officials, scholars, business leaders, media, NGOs, students, and citizensconcerned about the future of cross-Strait relations.Finally, we would like to affirm three guiding principles on which we built our exercise ofconsensus-building. • The nature of the cross-Strait issue is primarily between Mainland China and Taiwan but this issue has international ramifications. • Both sides of the Strait should work together towards peace, stability, economic development and social well-being through mutual understanding, cooperation, and trust. • The United States is an important external actor of cross-Strait relations.Thereby the 2012 Berkeley-San Francisco Strait Talk delegation proposes the following: 1
  2. 2. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft Security & U.S Role 1. Promote Mutual Security 2. Increase Military Cooperation 3. Encourage Multilateral Politics Cooperation in the South The Sino- China Sea 4.Promote U.S. Educational Union Initiatives 1. Deepen Economic Economics & Social Cooperation 1. Increase Free 2. Establish a Confederation Building Flow of Capital 2. Create Special Arrangement to Trust Economic Free Loosen Free Trade Trade Zones Barriers 3. Establish a Joint- 3. Establish Organs Economic Think such as an Executive, Tank Legislature, & Judiciary Identity & Culture 1. Affirm Greater Chinese Culture 2. Establish the Cross-Strait Exchange Committee 3. Increase Student Exchanges 4. Promote Cultural Awareness through Media & EducationIDENTITY AND CULTUREHow best can both sides of the Taiwan Strait work together to promote cultural exchange while atthe same time Mainland China maintains its consistency as a nation and Taiwan preserves itsunique identities?One of the long standing challenges in cross-Strait relations is the tension between the Taiwanesesearch for its unique identities and the Mainland Chinese commitment to affirming its socialcohesion and integrity as a nation. Peacebuilding across the Taiwan Strait, therefore, requires amutually respectful way in which the two sides can work together toward reconciling thesehistorical processes.In what follows, we would like to propose measures by which both sides of the Strait may choose tobuild on the existing trends in cultural exchange and initiate new ones. The underlying rationale ofour proposal is a shared vision for developing a robust, multi-layered approach to restore andactivate historical ties that bring diverse cultural identities together to transform the historicalmemories and experiences that continue to divide them. 1. Recognition of Greater Chinese Culture We advocate the recognition of a greater Chinese culture that encompasses the cultures and identities of Mainland China and Taiwan. This recognition affirms the common Chinese 2
  3. 3. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft identity, therefore enhancing social harmony and coexistence. It also acknowledges the uniqueness of the cultures of diverse ethnic groups within each entity. Both Mainland China and Taiwan should simultaneously respect their common Chinese cultural heritage and be conscious of the differences originating from unshared and distinct periods of history. 2. The Cross-Strait Cultural Exchange Committee (CSCEC) To achieve the goals stated above, we propose to establish the Cross-Strait Cultural Exchange Committee, which serves to promote cross-Strait cultural communication, exchange, and education through new initiatives and coordination of pre-existing cultural organizations and groups. a. Organizational structure: i. The CSCEC presides over the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF). Committee members are selected by designated agencies from both sides of the strait. The committee members should be composed of relevant government officials, professors specializing on cross-Strait issues, artists, writers, and NGO leaders. ii. The CSCEC is open to visits from officials from both sides. b. Guidelines for the Committee: i. Both Parties should be mutually respectful, including cultural and political views. ii. Any activity that the committee undertakes is directed to the goal of promoting cross-Strait understanding. iii. The chairmanship of the committee rotates between Mainland China and Taiwan for a specified period of time. iv. Unanimous decision has to be made regarding issues of dispute. 3. Student exchange We believe that a major step in solving cross-Strait issues is developing understanding of the needs of both sides. To do this, we propose the development of student exchange programs. In the status quo there is already student exchange, however it is limited and there are many problems with it. One major problem is the tight restrictions on the number of mainland students that are allowed to study in Taiwan. We propose raising the limit 100% by 2020. a. To further understanding, we advocate joint programs between both sides’ universities. Possible joint programs include scientific research, internships, and art. Such programs would allow students to study abroad more easily in the other side of the Strait and also allow for the credits to be transferred between universities. b. We propose the development of a new program. The program would be named “Cross-Strait Diplomacy.” Students would attend universities in both Mainland China and Taiwan and be taught by professors from both sides of the strait. This would allow students to deepen their understanding of cross-Strait issues and gain the ability to see issues from both sides. Classes would include history classes that would focus on multi-angled analysis of historical events and interactive conflict resolution, as well as other relevant classes. This would train a new generation of future leaders who would be equipped with the means and will to solve cross-Strait issues. Both sides of the strait would recognize degrees granted by the other side of the strait. By doing this students would be able to study in both Mainland China and Taiwan without facing difficulties, such as transferring credits. 3
  4. 4. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft 4. Public Education a. To increase mutual understanding at the grassroots level, we advocate using public exhibits, such as setting up particular museums that highlight Taiwanese culture in China, exhibits of Taiwanese indigenous culture, and exhibitions of the Taiwan history. Likewise, we advocate establishing museums dedicated to Mainland Han and ethnic minorities in Taiwan to have reciprocal cultural exchange. Through reciprocity, both sides can further develop their understanding of the other side. b. Currently, there are many projects that work on joint textbook writing projects, such as between Japan and China. We advocate using this approach to solve cross-Strait issues. Leading scholars on both sides will write textbooks together, giving students an unbiased view of history. Basic guidelines for this initiative include: respect for both sides; multi-angled analysis of historical events, prominent professors from both Mainland China as well as Taiwan, and third party professors as mediators from countries without a stake in cross-Strait relations. Experts from both sides must reach a comprehensive consensus, or agree to a juxtaposition of different interpretations integrated into a single text. Another option is offering optional classes at the high school or college level in order to give mainland students the opportunity to learn traditional characters. This will bridge the gap between the two societies. c. We suggest both sides cooperate on a documentary project to further cross-Strait understanding by each side. The documentary would aim to help introduce each society to the other side. The documentary would not be produced by either government, but by individuals from each side of the Strait. This bilateral project will not only further understanding, but also provide an opportunity for cooperation. d. We also advocate establishing a cross-Strait scholarship in order to help promote cultural exchange and further understanding. Students would write essays expressing their desire to study on the other side of the strait and winners would be awarded a scholarship. By having students study across the strait each entity would be able to learn from the other side. 5. Media Exposure To bridge the gap between Taiwan and Mainland China, we propose to create TV shows or programs to enable the public to learn about citizens’ perspectives on both sides. We further advocate that Taiwanese TV programs, which are already easily accessible to Mainlanders via the internet, be shown on Mainland China’s channels. Although Mainland dramas already appear on Taiwanese channels, entertainment programs are few. In the spirit of reciprocity, we propose that the further expansion of Mainland China entertainment shows be shown on Taiwanese channels. Since news would be highly controversial we propose that entertainment and cultural shows, such as sightseeing, travel, and cooking, can be a starting point. Our goal is to further the mutual understanding of both sides of the Strait. We envision one day the expansion of programs that deal with cross-Strait issues will realize.ECONOMICHow can we deepen economic ties while allowing Chinese and Taiwanese political identities to bepreserved at the same time? 1. Different Goals in the Interdependent Relationship across the Strait a. Due to the different sizes of the economies involved, deeper trade ties means that one side will have more leverage over the other side’s economy. This needs to be taken into consideration when looking at reciprocal efforts. b. In cross-Strait trade, Taiwan benefits the most economically but the situation also puts Taiwan in a higher risk. i. The concern that many Taiwanese have is their political system will not be 4
  5. 5. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft respected as economic ties increase. c. Cross-Strait trade improves cross-Strait relationship in general. i. This would ease tensions across the Strait as both sides gain an understanding and overcome misconceptions of each other. Thus, the economy is a mutually beneficial place where both can overcome their differences to find common ground and mutual trust. 2. Same Path to Different Goals a. Cross-Strait trade shows that economic cooperation is a promising area where Mainland China and Taiwan can further develop close relationships, given that: i. Political changes can be independent from economic ones. ii. Both sides want to strive for further prosperity. b. Trust between the two entities and economic benefits are the path that allows the two to reach their differing goals. i. The current example of ECFA shows that trust between the two sides is being strengthened. As both sides make a joint effort toward a combined goal of economic prosperity, the two entities are able to gain a greater understanding of each other. 3. Vision a. Our vision is to increase mutual trust by addressing the different goals with the same mechanism through economic prosperity. Both sides of the Strait can find common ground to engage each other through mutual economic benefits. Trust needs to first be built in cooperation on the economic and trade regulations before moving to other sectors. 4. Economic Cooperation: Free Capital Flow as an Example a. Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) has been an unprecedented development in cross-Strait relations. i. There are still areas where this agreement can be taken further and an opportunity for trust between the two entities can increase. More economic cooperation can lead to more trust and willingness to address not only economic issues but also other issues in the future. b. We looked specifically at how to increase free capital flow across the Strait without going through a third party and hence investment can be made more efficiently. i. ECFA can allow direct investment, but an adjustment period is needed to build trust and experiment how it would take place in reality. 1. The two sides need to agree on the amount of trade they will reach, up from zero percent of the amount each company or individual can invest. 2. The two sides also need to discuss and agree on: a. Investment in certain important strategic sectors, such as public utilities b. A transparent system that monitors the financial flows ii. Insurance – for example, clauses where both sides have the ability to have an easy exit would lower the risks for both sides to enter and to give space for trust to build. 5. Making Free Trade Possible a. Increased interdependence between the two entities could actually be made stronger if Taiwan was able to diversify their trade more. 5
  6. 6. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft i. The relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan can be re- conceptualized if the economic imbalance was addressed. b. Free Trade Agreements (FTA) have been signed between many other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but Taiwan is unable to do so due to political sensitivity. c. We propose a cross-Strait free economic zone to be established within the mainland to facilitate Taiwanese free trade: i. Products made in Taiwan and shipped from Taiwan cannot currently participate in any FTAs. However, products can be firstly shipped to the economic zone located in China. ii. Through this zone, Taiwan can have de facto free trade with other countries that mainland has FTAs with. iii. This benefits both sides, since Taiwan would have economic benefits from free trade and China would be able to develop a deeper relationship with Taiwan to build more trust. 6. Collaboration through Joint Research a. Since ECFA is still in its early stage and further recommendations’ consequences are unknown, a joint think tank made up of representatives from both sides to investigate and research the ramifications would signal that the two sides can cooperate directly. b. This can lead into the future where a joint research and development facility can be built made up of scientists, engineers, and researchers from both sides to work together to create new innovations.CROSS-STRAIT SECURITY ISSUES AND THE U.S. ROLEHow can we achieve mutual security in cross-Strait relations without negatively influencing thecore interests of Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States?Cross-Strait relations and the role of the United States must address many additional aspects inorder to better provide applicable and feasible proposals for cooperation and consensus building. Arange of security issues relating to peaceful coexistence among the major stakeholders in theTaiwan must be considered in such a way as to promote trust building between the U.S. andChinese militaries. Moreover, changes in the U.S. must occur in order to create long term sustainedpositive relations with the Asian nations.We acknowledge the nature of the cross-Strait issue is primarily between Mainland China andTaiwan but this issue has international and regional impacts, and that the United States is integral tothe security dimension in cross-Strait relations. In order to implement our vision of sustained longterm trust between all sides, security institutions must be established to reduce dangerousmiscalculations by furthering cooperation between Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States.This vision can be achieved through military cooperation, confidence building and securitymechanisms, and increased mutual understanding through education.We must consider the various stakes involved in the cross-Strait security dynamics. Chinese coreinterests relate to issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, domestic stability, and concern over theU.S. military presence in Asia. Taiwan core interests, relating to security, include fear of militaryintimidation from China and loss of cultural identity and civil liberties. Moreover, U.S. strategicinterests involve maintaining peaceful cross-Strait relations on the one hand and affirming the legalcommitment to protect Taiwan in the event of invasion by China on the other. However, the overallsecurity interests of the U.S. are directly influenced by peaceful cross-Strait relations. Thiscontributes to sustained peace and stability in East and South East Asia. 1. Creating mutual security between Mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. 6
  7. 7. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft a. We propose that both Mainland China and Taiwan acknowledge that war is not in the best interest for both sides because its economic and political consequences would create lose-lose situation. b. We encourage that Mainland China should state not to use force for preemptive reunification and Taiwan should state that they will not declare independence. c. We encourage both sides of the Strait to increase military transparency as to decrease misperceptions. d. We advocate that both sides of the Strait work toward military reduction through mutual reduction mechanisms with yearly monitoring and evaluations for continued participation in the mechanism that i. Mainland Chinese military reduces offensive weapon posture toward Taiwan by removing or relocating missiles directly targeting Taiwan ii. Accompanied with the reduction of tension, Mainland China is encouraged to enable Taiwan to have more international space economically iii. The U.S. and Taiwan are encouraged to reduce offensive weapon transfers across the Strait in response to China’s goodwill gesture iv. Taiwan reduces, and works toward eliminating, offensive military by transforming it primarily into a defensive force emphasizing defensive tactics and weapons only. Defensive weapon refers to weapons with short range not able to pose a direct threat to the other side, i.e. ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, long range bombers v. In the situation where either Mainland China or Taiwan wish to leave this mechanism, each party reserves the right to leave the mechanism upon written notification. 2. Building Trust Between Mainland China and the United States a. We support a more transparent, accountable and responsible government through political reform within Mainland China, in such a way that the basis of Taiwan and the U.S. fear and concern with the cross-Strait security situation is lessened and transformed without political and military pressure from Taiwan and the U.S. b. We advocate trust building through advancement of military cooperation between Mainland China and the United States, through unified military conduct in maritime matters, anti-piracy, disaster relief, search/rescue, and space to relieve tension across the Strait. i. Taiwan may be included at the mutual consent of the two primary parties- Mainland China and U.S. in a way that does not inhibit the development of trust and confidence between the militaries of the two. ii. In areas of high technological or strategic sensitivity such as space, due diligence must be exercised on all sides to prevent foreign affairs from conflicting with domestic legislation which could serve as a barrier to cooperation. 3. Multilateral Approach a. To reflect the reality of a more internationalized environment, we propose that Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States work with countries in the South China Sea to develop cooperative economic zones to decrease military competition. i. In areas of mutual contention, respective entities should agree to shelve core issues and develop selected areas of mutual economic interest, share the benefits in an equitable manner, and work on peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputes. Examples of such initiatives include extraction of energy resources in disputed maritime matters, space and coordination in respect to changing climate and fishing patterns. 7
  8. 8. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft 4. Long-Term Trust-Building in the United States a. We encourage that the U.S. educational system should respond to the changing nature of world economics and politics in Asia-Pacific region. We present the following measures to this end: b. We advocate that the United States provide more comprehensive education to U.S. citizens in K-12 education about U.S. relations with Mainland China, Taiwan, and Asia to foster long-term understanding and mutual respect. i. Emphasis can be placed on different subjects including culture, customs, and international relations. ii. This should be encouraged at both the state and federal levels. States with high Asian population may be first movers. iii. History or politics classes could be the first to add Asian studies into their semester syllabi. Two lessons per semester would be a much needed addition to the curriculum while at the same time keeping costs to schools and communities at a minimum. c. We stress that the need for more educational exchanges at the middle and high school level should be advocated between the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan. Students should not wait until the college level to learn about the world.A NEW FRAMEWORK: SINO-UNIONHow can we develop a political framework that promotes peaceful cooperation between bothMainland China and Taiwan’s political systems?Given the improvement in cooperation on economics and culture, we, as the collective voice of thefuture, aspire for the establishment of a Sino-Union, a confederation arrangement that can fostergreater prosperity between both sides and deepen economic and social ties that will benefit thefuture generations across the Strait.The current political reality that exists across the Taiwan Strait is that Mainland China desiresreunification, while Taiwan simultaneously seeks to maintain the freedom to determine its ownfuture. The question becomes, how can Taiwans need to increase its participation in theinternational community, and Mainland Chinas need to move closer towards its aim for greatercohesion between the two sides both be met? 1. Basic Profile of the Sino-Union a. We envision the establishment of the Sino-Union, a confederation arrangement that engages societies deeply associated with Chinese culture. The Sino-Union is inspired by the best practices of cooperative confederations arrangements developed throughout history. We envision that the Sino-Union initially brings together Mainland China, Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong as its founding members, and with consideration given to entities such as Singapore and Mongolia, upon unanimous agreement of the Original Parties. b. The primary goal of the Sino-Union is to deepen economic and social cooperation while enhancing mutual trust between all relevant parties. To meet this goal, the Sino-Union will primarily seek to deepen economic ties while also cultivating cooperation on multiple fronts, such as environmental protection and cultural exchange. The ultimate aim is to increase trade and prosperity among the parties to the Sino-Union. c. The Sino-Union brings together distinct economic entities, without prejudice to political realities. Given that the mission of the Sino-Union first and foremost focuses on increasing economic and social ties, Parties to the Sino-Union may join under self- chosen official or unofficial appellations. 8
  9. 9. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft d. Given that cooperation is of special importance to Mainland China and Taiwan, there must be special agreement between the two sides across the Strait before joining the Sino-Union. 2. Sino-Union ObjectivesFor all Parties to the Sino-Union, greater cooperation and economic involvement will promoteincreased mutual trust between all of the Members. It will also promote growth within each ofParties, which can later encourage participation by additional interested entities (upon unanimousconsent of all Original Parties to the Sino-Union). a. Mainland China i. Cultivate a greater sense of unity among all Parties to the Sino-Union ii. Further Mainland China’s efforts towards a harmonious society and peaceful rise within the international community iii. Create more job opportunities for the Mainland Chinese workforce from Taiwanese investment to Mainland China iv. Promote greater cultural linkages between societies with Chinese cultural roots v. Promote sustainable development and increase environmental protection technologies, such as but not limited to fisheries vi. Promote greater cooperation and coordination between various sectors of society, such as but not limited to disease control and disaster relief b. Taiwan i. Facilitate an economically favorable environment that allows Taiwan to deepen economic ties with its primary trading partner, Mainland China, while simultaneously giving greater access to an increased number of trading partners ii. Allow greater social interaction within the international community iii. Promote greater cooperation and mutual understanding between Taiwan and all Parties to the Sino-Union iv. Promote Taiwan’s technological power in the Sino-Union, with special consideration given to Taiwan’s intellectual property rights v. Initiate a process of consultation in which Taiwan, along with other Parties, explores whether it may join enter the Sino-Union under the name of “Taiwan” vi. Promote the expansion of job opportunities in Taiwan 3. Principles a. Free Trade: To facilitate a gradual reduction of trade barriers (with exceptions and special considerations given to agriculture and labor sectors) between all Parties to the Sino-Union. b. Currency: Every Member State will retain its own current currency. However, in the future, should all the Parties agree, they may consider the option of a new common currency. c. Visas and Travel Documents: Parties to the Sino-Union will gradually loosen restrictions for tourist travel between all Members, with the eventual long-term goal to be visa-free travel between the Parties, and reserving the option to consider expanding to labor in the future. 4. Organs & Functions a. Executive i. Commission: The Commission will consist of one representative from each 9
  10. 10. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draft Party who will together implement decisions and uphold the Union’s treaties and general day-to-day running of the Union. Each member retains a veto power for all decisions. b. Legislature i. Council: The Council will consist of trade representatives from each Party who will together propose legislation. Decisions require unanimous agreement to pass laws. c. Judiciary i. Tribunal: The Tribunal’s jurisdiction will be limited solely to enforcement of civil trade disputes between Parties to the Sino-Union. d. Special Bodies & Policies i. Cooperative Agricultural Policy (CAP): Increasing agricultural production, providing certainty in food supplies, ensuring a high quality of life for farmers, stabilizing markets, and ensuring reasonable prices for consumers. ii. The Sino-Union will also promote cooperation in the areas such as but not limited to: Science & Technology, Environmental Protection, Disease Control, Disaster Relief, and Culture (such as supporting cultural activities and education and research in the fields of cinema, audiovisual, publishing, music, and crafts). 5. Legal Mechanisms a. Exit Option: With ECFA as a major precedent for recent economic trade between relevant parties, "Any Party may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements." 6. Additional a. Headquarters: The exact location of the headquarters to be determined by the collective decision of Parties to the Sino-Union. b. Flag & Symbol: To be determined upon the unanimous agreement of all the original Member States.CONCLUSIONWe hope that this consensus document has provided inspiration to look the issue from a fresh anddifferent perspective. Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States all have different stakes andinterests in the issue. We, however, have analyzed this from the foundation of building mutual trustand respect between the three, especially between Mainland China and Taiwan, to formulatesuggestions from several dimensions to move the dialogue forward. We realize that some of thepoints made above are more feasible than others in this current environment, but we consciouslyincluded aspirational goals to encourage unconventional thinking when facing a seeminglyintractable problem.Our analysis has taken into consideration the complexity of the cross-Strait issue and how thecultural, economic, political, and security aspects are tightly intertwined and constantly interacting.Thus, by promoting cultural and economic exchanges, mutual understanding and trust betweenMainland China and Taiwan will hopefully increase. This can also encourage further dialogue onmore sensitive issues in the future. The security situation has been historically contentious, thus thedevelopment of mutual trust and understanding are necessary to undertake some of our potentialsecurity-based solutions. We have also explored a new way of conceptualizing the political processto foster more discussion and to transform the dialogue and perhaps offer an alternative to thealready proposed solutions that exist today.Significant leadership changes in all three entities this year have the exciting potential to create 10
  11. 11. 04/11/12 Berkeley-SF 2012 Final Draftlimitless possibilities to solutions that may have seemed implausible in years past. Therefore, wehope this spurs people from all levels, from grassroots, to professionals, to top leaders to takeinitiative in revisiting the cross-Strait with new perspectives, more hope, and increased vigor. 11