Eye's Delight (Qurratul-^Ayn)

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Shafi^iyy usool explained by a Malikiyy scholar

Shafi^iyy usool explained by a Malikiyy scholar

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  • 1. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c SUBMISSION PRODUCTIONS PRESENTS: ‫ﻗﺮّة اﻟﻌﲔ‬ THE EYE’S DELIGHT A TRANSLATION BASED ON THE EXPLANATION OF THE PAGES OF IMAMUL- HARAMAYN Shaykh ^Abdullah Muhammad famous as: Al-Hattab Ar-Ra^iniyy Al-Malikiyy
  • 2. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c 2|Page
  • 3. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c 2 ND EDITION 3|Page
  • 4. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c TRANSLATOR’S COMMENTS: This knowledge differs from other types of religious knowledge, such as the knowledge of belief and the knowledge of the detailed practical rules, in that it is very heavily tied to the rules of the Arabic language. This is because the laws of our religion are derived from an Arabic Qur’an, and the reliable sayings of our Prophet r, who spoke the most eloquent Arabic. Translating this text is for servicing the Muslims who do not know Arabic, so that they may have some idea about this precious and extremely important knowledge. Otherwise, a text whose subject is so heavily bound to the rules of Arabic is better left in Arabic. Thus, let the reader keep in mind that whenever linguistic issues arise, such as matters pertaining to what is definite or indefinite, singular or plural, issues of syntax, derivations, etc, what is always meant is what is established in the Arabic language, not English. This document is a mere translation for seeking the reward from Allah the exalted, and facilitating an understanding for English speaking seekers of knowledge. Keep in mind also, that this knowledge, like any other, has its own terminology, and when translating, the intended meanings of the scholars of this field must be observed, and in many cases given priority over the linguistic meanings. Furthermore, some of their terminology, if translated, does not convey the intended meanings, and hence is not even translated, rather transliterated, such as “mujtahid”, which literally means “one who puts great effort”. On the other hand, beginners who do not have certain background information should not read the likes of this book. In other words, translating the meanings has priority over word for word translation, and if this is the case with such a book, how do some translate the Book of Allah literally?? We furthermore advise the readers to remember that the knowledge is taken through the route of qualified scholars, and not by merely reading on one’s own. Most people today are lacking in the basics of belief and practical rules, and so the chances of many issues in this book being misunderstood or not understood at all are great. We have subtitled this document: “a translation based on the explanation of the Pages of Imamul-Haramayn” t. This is to give ourselves the room to add few words for clarification, since the Arabic language is abundant with omitted implications. We also subtracted some matters that do not benefit the English reader. Examples are such as when the explainer clarifies that a certain verb in the original Arabic text is passive or not, or when he uses two words with the same meaning in clarifying an issue. Furthermore, as a reminder to the reader and to the staunch critic of translations, there is almost no escape from changing the word order of some of the sentences, and forget not that Arabic sentences may extend to the point of being considered “run-on sentences” if translated, so we have broken such sentences into smaller sentences. Yet, we claim to have put diligent effort and contemplation into not deviating from the words of the author or the explainer, and have only done so when seeing it as a necessity. Hence, since practically 99 percent of this document is the words of the author and the explainer, we have attributed the books to them, and for those few aforementioned adjustments, we have placed these “translator’s comments”. We have also followed the method of the Muslim scholars in placing the explained text at the top of the page and at the end of the book. We ask Allah for guidance, good intentions, and lack of mistakes. Amin 4|Page
  • 5. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c TRANSLATOR’S COMMENTS: ......................................................................................................................................4 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................6 (the judgments) ............................................................................................................................................................ 10 (knowledge and ignorance) ......................................................................................................................................12 (the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh) ................................................................................................... 15 (the categories of speech) ........................................................................................................................................ 16 (literal speech) .............................................................................................................................................................. 18 (figurative speech) ....................................................................................................................................................... 18 (the command) ..............................................................................................................................................................21 WHO IS INCLUDED UNDER THE ORDER AND PROHIBITION, AND WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 (prohibition).................................................................................................................................................................. 25 (the inclusive) ............................................................................................................................................................... 27 THE INCLUSIVE, THE SPECIFIC, THE GENERAL, THE CLARIFICATION, THE EXPLICIT, AND THE APPARENT ................................................................................................................................................................................ 27 (the specific) ................................................................................................................................................................. 29 (the general).................................................................................................................................................................. 32 (the clarification)......................................................................................................................................................... 33 (the explicit) .................................................................................................................................................................. 33 (the apparent) .............................................................................................................................................................. 34 THE DOINGS ..................................................................................................................................................................... 35 ABROGATION ................................................................................................................................................................... 37 SECTION PERTAINING TO CONFLICT................................................................................................................. 42 THE CONSENSUS ............................................................................................................................................................ 45 CONVEYED INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................................... 47 THE ANALOGICAL DEDUCTION............................................................................................................................. 50 PROHIBITION, PERMISSIBILITY, AND REFERRING BACK TO THE ORIGIN ....................................... 54 THE CONFLICT OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 56 HE WHO PASSES RULINGS AND HE WHO SEEKS RULINGS ................................................................... 57 JUDGEMENT DEDUCTION AND IMITATION .................................................................................................... 59 THE TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE PAGES...................................................................................... 62 5|Page
  • 6. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c INTRODUCTION   The extremely knowledgeable shaykh and imam, the sea of knowledge and person of great understanding, the answerer of religious questions in Allah’s safe and honorable land1, Abu ^Abdillah Muhammad Al-Hattab said: Praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds. May the most perfect and complete supplication and peace be upon our master Muhammad, and upon his family and all of his companions. Thereafter: Surely the book: The Pages, in the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh by the shaykh and imam, the author of the beneficial books, Abul-Ma^ali ^Abdul-Malik Ibn ^Abdillah, Imamul-Haramayn, is a book whose size is small, but its knowledge is plenty, its benefit is great, and the blessings in it are apparent. It has been explained by several scholars, may Allah accept their deeds. Some of them have given broad explanations, and others have given abridged explanations. Among the best explanations is that of the shaykh of our shaykh, the beneficial and exceedingly knowledgeable scholar, Jalalud-Din Abu ^Abdillah Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Al-Mahalliyy Ash-Shafi^iyy. It is abundant with benefits and cases. The students of knowledge have busied themselves with it and benefitted from it, except that it is so exaggeratedly summarized, that it is almost a riddle, so there is no guidance to its benefits except through toil and special care. Unfortunately, ambition has weakened, troubles and sadness have increased, and assistance from the brothers has decreased. So I prayed to Allah in seeking the right decision about making an explanation of The Pages with clear expressions that draw attention to the cases and benefits presented in the aforementioned explanation, in a way that this explanation would be an explanation of The Pages and an explanation of the aforementioned explanation. By that, there would be benefit for the beginner and others, if Allah willed. I will not deviate from the expressions of the aforementioned text, except to make something clearer, or for an additional benefit. I entitled it: The Eye’s Delight, the Explanation of the Pages of Imamul-Haramayn. Allah the glorified is the sought one for reaching the hopes. He is enough for me, and the best to rely upon. Let us present a summarized biography of the author. He is the shaykh, imam, the head of the Shafi^iyy scholars, one of the mujtahids within the school, the author of the beneficial books, Abul- Ma^ali ^Abdul-Malik, the son of Shaykh ^Abdullah Ibn Yusuf Ibn Muhammad Al-Juwayniyy, in reference to the town of Al-Juwayn, a large area of Naysabur. He was nicknamed Diya’ud-din. He was born in the month of Muharram 419. He died in a village within the metropolitan area of Naysabur called Bushtaniqan on Wednesday night on the 25th day of the month of Rabi^ Ath-Thani 478. He lived in Makkah and Al-Madinah for four years teaching the knowledge and giving religious answers, 1 The land that is owned and honored by Allah: Makkah. 6|Page
  • 7. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c  <In the name of Allah, the merciful to believers and non believers in the present life, and the merciful only to believers in the Afterlife.> There after: These are pages… and as a result was nicknamed: Imamul-Haramayn1. He was the most knowledgeable scholar of Naysabur. Naysabur. The school called An-Nidhamiyyah was built on his behalf. He has authored that which has not been preceded by its likes. May Allah engulf him in His mercy and enable the Muslims to benefit from his blessings. Amin The Author, may Allah have mercy upon him, said: (‫< ﺒﺴﻡ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻴﻡ‬in the name of Allah, the merciful to believers and non-believers in the present life, and the merciful only to believers in the Afterlife>) I author. It is appropriate to imply something suitable for that deed for which the basmalah2 was established as an initiation. Hence, the one who is eating implies, “With the name of Allah, I eat”, and the reader implies, “With the name of Allah, I read”. This is more appropriate than implying, “I start”, because it notifies that the entire deed is being commenced with the name of Allah, and “I start” only notifies that the beginning of the deed is with the name of Allah. The reason for delaying the implication until after mentioning the basmalah is because the most important goal is to actually start with the name of Allah the exalted, as well as the expression of restriction. The author started with the basmalah following the example of the great Qur’an, and applying the hadith: {‫< } ﻜل ﺃﻤﺭ ﺫﻱ ﺒﺎل ﻻ ﻴﺒﺩﺃ ﺒﺒﺴﻡ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻴﻡ ﻓﻬﻭ ﺃﺒﺘﺭ‬Every religiously important matter that does not start with ‫( ﺒﺴﻡ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺤﻴﻡ‬in the name of Allah, the merciful to believers and non believers in the present life, the merciful only to believers in the Afterlife) is incomplete>. This hadith is narrated according to this expression by Al-Khatib in his book Al-Jami^. The author settles with the basmalah, and did not say the hamdalah3, either because he praised Allah with his tongue, and that is sufficient, or because what is meant by the hamd4 is its linguistic meaning, which is to praise Allah; and the basmalah includes the meaning of praising Allah, or because what is meant by the hamd is to mention Allah the exalted. This is mentioned in the narration of the Musnad of Imam Ahmad: {‫< }ﻜل ﺃﻤﺭ ﺫﻱ ﺒﺎل ﻻ ﻴﻔﺘﺢ ﺒﺫﻜﺭ ﺍﷲ ﻓﻬﻭ ﺃﺒﺘﺭ‬Every religiously important matter that does not start with mentioning Allah is incomplete>; or the Prophet said {‫}ﺃﻗﻁﻊ‬ <Cut off>. The narrator doubted. The hadith was narrated with a number of versions. An-Nawawiyy said that it is a hasan hadith. After being content with the basmalah instead of mentioning the hamdalah, the author said: (There after: These are) few (pages), as signified by the use of the “sound plural”, because according to Sibawayh, the sound plurals give the meaning of being few in number. He expressed 1 The imam of the two holy cities. 2 Saying “bimillah”, which means: (in the name of Allah) 3 To say “al-hamdu lillah”, which means: (praise is due to Allah) 4 Hamd means “praise”. More precisely, it is verbal praise of the one who benefits out of will and generosity. 7|Page
  • 8. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c …that pertain to knowing about divisions of Usulul-Fiqh (the Foundations of Fiqh), which is a term composed of two singular parts. The foundation is that which something else is built upon. himself as such to make it easy on the student and to encourage him, just as Allah the exalted said about the obligation of fasting the month of Ramadan: {( )}1     <a limited number of days>, to make it easy for the accountable people and to encourage them. It was said that what is meant by “a limited number of days” is: the tenth day of Muharram and three days out of every month, because that is what was obligatory in the first days of Islam, then it was abrogated. The signaling by the use of the word (These) is to that which he already documented if he made the introduction after he finished authoring, or else to that which was prepared in his mind. And so, these are pages (that pertain to knowing about divisions2); which is the plural of “division”, which here refers to a class of cases that have a common ruling. These divisions pertain to the knowledge (of Usulul-Fiqh (the Foundations of Fiqh)), the beginner and others benefit from it, (which is a term); i.e. “the Foundations of Fiqh”, that has two meanings. The first of them is the meaning given by the genitive structure of the words; the meaning understood from each of its individual expressions upon relating one to the other. The second is its technical meaning, which is the science for which this genitive construction has been assigned; the meaning that replaces the first meaning. This second meaning will be later mentioned by the author when he says: (The Foundations of Fiqh are its general references…), etc. The first meaning is that which he clarified when saying: (composed of two singular parts ); in reference to the composition (ta’lif) which is for achieving harmony and proportion between 3 two parts. This is more specific than “tarkib”, which is the mere putting together of two words. However, it is said that they both have the same meaning. As for saying: (singular), he means singularity as opposed to being constructed, not singularity as opposed to duality or plurality, because singularity can be used as an antonym for both cases. The second meaning could not be valid here, because one of the two terms that he described as being singular is (foundations), which is in plural form. Furthermore, there is an indication in his words that he did not intend singularity as opposed to plurality when he said: (The foundation is that which something else is built upon). So, “foundation” is the singular form of the first part, and it is that which something else is built upon, such as the foundation of a wall, which is its base, and the foundation of a tree, which is its end that is firm 1 Al-Baqarah 184 2 Or chapters. The Arabic term is fusul. It is the plural of fasl. 3 The two terms are “usul" and “fiqh” 8|Page
  • 9. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The branch is that which is built upon something else. Fiqh is the knowledge of the religious judgments that are taken by way of judgment deduction (ijtihad). in the ground. This is the most likely definition of “foundation”, because it is confirmed by the senses, as noticed by the examples of the foundation of the wall and the foundation of the tree. So, the Foundations of Fiqh are its references upon which it is built. This is better than the statement of some: “the foundation is that which is needed”, because the tree is need of its fruit as far as reaching the state of completion is concerned, but the fruit is not the foundation of the tree. It is also better than the statement of some: “the foundation is that which something is from”, because “one” comes from “ten”, and ten is not the foundation of one. Then, after defining the foundation, he digressed and defined its opposite by saying: (The branch is that which is built upon something else). That is such as the branches of a tree in respects to its foundations, and the branches of fiqh in respects to its foundations. (Fiqh), which is the second part of the expression “Foundations of Fiqh”, has a linguistic meaning: “comprehension”, and a religious meaning, which (is the knowledge of the religious judgments that are taken by way of judgment deduction (ijtihad)). This is such as the knowledge that having the intention during wudu’ is obligatory, that the witr prayer is recommended, that having the intention at night is a condition for fasting, that zakah is due on the money of the child and not due on permissible jewelry, that killing with a heavy object necessitates execution, and the likes of such cases in which there is difference of opinion. That is different from that which is not taken by way of judgment deduction, such as knowing that the five prayers are obligatory and that fornication is forbidden. It is also different from the rules of the creed, like the knowledge about Allah, the glorified and exalted, and His attributes, and the likes of such cases whose evidences are definite and clear-cut. These matters are not called “fiqh”, because all of that is common knowledge between the elite and the common folk. And so, fiqh according to this definition does not apply except to the fiqh of a mujtahid. The fact that something dedicated and specified1 for the fuqaha’ (scholars of fiqh) does not include the mujtahids does not matter, because the reference in that issue is the normal usage, and the reference in this issue is specific terminology. What is meant by (knowledge) in this context is “speculation”. It was called “knowledge” because what is meant is the speculation of the mujtahid, which because of its strength, is close to knowledge. Also, by “(the religious judgments)” we exclude the mental judgments, such as knowing that one is half of two; and we exclude what is confirmed through senses, such as knowing that fire is hot. What is meant by “(judgments)” when we say, “(knowledge of the religious judgments)” is all of the judgments. Therefore, the definite article is for including the entire genus. What is meant by “knowing all of the judgments” is being equipped for that. Thus, the statement of Malik t - and he is among the greatest of the scholars of fiqh- “I don’t know”, in response to 32 questions out of 48, does not negate what we have said, because he is equipped with what is needed to reach the knowledge of 1 Waqf, which is for someone to dedicate a possession of his for a specific use, or for specific beneficiaries, in a way that that item no longer belongs to the dedicator, and cannot be used in a way other than how its dedicator specified. Its status as a waqf will remain until Judgment Day. 9|Page
  • 10. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c There are seven judgments: the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the forbidden, the disliked, the valid, and the invalid. The obligatory is that which is rewardable for doing and punishable for leaving out. those issues by referring back to contemplation. Using the term “knowledge” in reference to this state of being equipped is common. You say, “So and so knows grammar,” and you do not mean that all of its cases are present in his heart to the detail, rather, that he is equipped for that. (the judgments) Then he clarified the judgments meant by his statement: “(the religious judgments)”. He said: (There are seven judgments: the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the forbidden, the disliked, the valid, and the invalid). So fiqh is the knowledge of these seven, i.e. knowledge of their particular cases: the obligations, the recommendations the permissible matters, the prohibitions, the disliked matters, the valid deeds, and the invalid deeds. What is meant is like the knowledge that such and such a thing is obligatory, for example, and that such and such a thing is recommended, and such and such is permissible, and that this is forbidden, and that is disliked, and this is valid and that is invalid. Knowing the definitions of these aforementioned judgments is not what is intended, because that is part of the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh, not the knowledge of fiqh. Referring to these matters as “judgments” is a figure of speech, because they are actually what pertain to the judgment. There are five religious judgments: the obligation, the recommendation, the permissibility, the disliked and the prohibition. For the author to count them as seven is his own terminology. That which most of the scholars are upon is that there are five judgments, not seven, just as we have said. This is because the valid would be either obligatory or otherwise, and the invalid is included under the prohibition. Some said that there are nine judgments, adding the facility and the ^azimah, which both return to the five judgments also, and Allah knows best. Then he began to define the judgments that he cited by mentioning that which is inherent in each one, and so he said: (The obligatory is that which is rewardable for doing and punishable for leaving out); meaning that (the obligatory), as far as an act being described as being obligatory, (is that which is rewardable for doing and punishable for leaving out). The reward for doing the deed and the punishment for leaving it out is something inherent in the obligation as far as the deed being described with being obligatory, and it is not the reality of the obligation itself. The prayer, for example, is an issue conceived and imagined in itself, and it is not the actual gaining of reward or punishment by being done or left out. So, the aforementioned definition is not the definition of the reality of the obligation, as it is not possible to define its reality because of the many types of obligatory matters and their various realities. What is instead intended is the clarification of the description that they all share, in a way that the term “obligation” would be applied to them, which is what he mentioned about the reward for doing them and the punishment for leaving them out. Likewise is said about the rest of the judgments. If it were said, “Your statement: (punishable for leaving out) dictates definite punishment for everyone who leaves out an obligation, and that is not something necessary,” the answer is: It is sufficient for “the punishment for leaving it out” to be true, that the punishment would be inflicted on 10 | P a g e
  • 11. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The recommended is that which is rewardable for doing and not punishable for leaving out. The permissible is that which is neither rewardable for doing nor punishable for leaving out. The forbidden is that which is rewardable for leaving out and punishable for doing. The disliked is that which is rewardable for leaving out and not punishable for doing. one sinner while the rest are forgiven. It may also be said: What is meant by his saying: (punishable for leaving out): the deserving of punishment, as said by several scholars, and that does not negate the forgiveness. The aforementioned definition has been criticized, according to a claim that it does not prevent the inclusion of many optional matters, because the adhan is an optional matter, and if the people of a town leave it out then they are fought, and that is enough of a punishment. Likewise is the ruling for leaving out the prayers of the two holidays according to some. Also, the testimony of the one who leaves out the witr prayer is rejected, etc. The answer is: What is meant is the torture of the Afterlife, and the aforementioned punishment is not because of leaving out the adhan in itself, but because of what results from it: the disbanding of the religion1, which is forbidden. Furthermore, rejection of testimony is not a punishment, it is merely due to the lack of qualification of a religious status whose condition is certain perfections gathered by doings and abstentions, so that includes the obligations and other than the obligations. Do not you see that the slave’s testimony is rejected without that being a punishment for him? It is because of his deficiency in what pertains to the ranks of reliability. Although what is correct is that the adhan in a metropolis is a communal obligation2, and the mujtahids within our school have documented that there is no fighting for leaving out the prayers of the two holidays. These two questions have also been presented about the definition of the forbidden, and the answer is as was just presented. (The recommended3) is taken from “an-nadb”, which linguistically means, “to seek”, and religiously, as far as being attributed with being recommended, it (is that which is rewardable for doing and not punishable for leaving out). (The permissible), as far as being described with permissibility, (is that which is not rewardable for doing), and he means: nor for leaving out; (nor punishable for leaving out), and he means: nor for doing. The meaning is that neither reward nor punishment pertains to doing it or leaving it out. There is no escape from the addition of what we have added, so that the forbidden and the disliked would not be included in its definition. (The forbidden), as far being described with being forbidden, (is that which is rewardable for leaving out) - out of obedience- (and punishable for doing), and the two questions with their rebuttals have already been presented. (The disliked), as far as being described with being disliked, (is that which is rewardable for leaving out) - out of obedience- (and not punishable for doing). 1 By leaving out a sign among the religious symbols 2 The explainer, Ar-Ra^iniyy, is a Malikiyy, so he gave the case according to the ruling of his school. According to the Shafi^iyys, it is recommended. 3 In Arabic is called mandub 11 | P a g e
  • 12. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The valid is that which pertains to fulfillment, and is recognized. The invalid is that which does not pertain to fulfillment, and is not recognized. Fiqh is more specific than knowledge. Knowledge is to know the known thing as it is in reality. We have restricted the outcome of being rewarded for leaving out the forbidden and the disliked by saying, “out of obedience”, because the person gets out of the range of what is forbidden and what is disliked by leaving them out, even if he did not realize it, let alone if he intended to leave it out. However, reward is not warranted unless obedience was intended. If it were said, “Likewise, reward is not warranted in reference to doing the obligations and the recommendations unless obedience was intended”, then the answer is: This is true. However, since many of the obligations are not even valid in the first place unless obedience is intended- and that is every obligation that is not valid without an intention- there was no need to mention the restriction. This is true, even if some obligations are lifted by merely doing them; such as support of dependants, returning items taken by force, returning trusts, fulfilling debts, and other things that are valid without an intention, but there is no reward deserved unless obedience is intended, and Allah knows best. (The valid), as far as being described with validity, (is that which pertains to fulfillment), which is the achievement of the goal; such as the permissibility of benefitting from an item in a selling contract, and the permissibility of sexual pleasure from marriage; (and is recognized) in the religious law. Recognition would be by gathering what is religiously considered1, whether it was a dealing or an act of worship. Fulfillment pertains to the deeds of the accountable, and recognition is the doing of the one who establishes the religious law. It is said that they have the same meaning. (The invalid), as far as being described with invalidity, (is that which does not pertain to fulfillment, and is not recognized). It did not gather what is needed to be religiously considered, whether it was a dealing or an act of worship. According to the religious terminology, the dealing is attributed with fulfillment and recognition, and the worship is attributed only with recognition. (knowledge and ignorance) (Fiqh), according to the previously mentioned religious definition, (is more specific than knowledge), because of the validity of applying the term “knowledge” to fiqh, grammar, and other things. So every fiqh is knowledge, but not every knowledge is fiqh. Likewise is the case according to the linguistic meaning of fiqh, for it means comprehension, and knowledge more general. (Knowledge), according to the terminology, (is to know the known thing); i.e. to realize that which its case is that it would be known, whether existent or not, (as it is in reality). That is such as realizing, i.e. conceiving the human being to be a living creature that utters, or realizing that the world, which is everything other than Allah, is an occurrence. This is Qadi Abu Bakr Al-Baqillaniyy’s definition, and some have rejected it because it has circular logic; because “known” is a term derived from “knowledge”, and so “known” would not be known except after knowing the meaning of 1 Referring to the conditions and integrals. The condition of the deed is what must be fulfilled before initiating the deed, and then it must last throughout the deed, like wudu for the prayer. The integral is what is a part of the deed and cannot be left out, like the prostration of the prayer. The acts of worship and the dealings have integrals and conditions that one must learn before commencing, and invalidators that must be avoided. 12 | P a g e
  • 13. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Ignorance is to conceive something differently from how it is in reality. Necessary knowledge is that which is not dependent upon contemplation and inference. “knowledge”, since the derivative contains the meaning of its origin as well as an additional meaning. They also said that this definition does not include the knowledge of Allah, the glorified, and that his statement: (as it is in reality) is redundant; there is no need for it, because knowing something would not be except as such. (Ignorance is to conceive something differently from how it is in reality), like to conceive the human as a creature that neighs, or the realization of the philosophers that the world is eternal. What is meant by conception in this context is general conception, inclusive of both unembellished, simple conception1 and critical conception2. Some have described this as “composed ignorance”, and they made “simple ignorance” to be the mere lack of knowledge of something, such as our lack of knowledge of what is under the seven earths, or what is in the depth of the seas. This is not included in the definition of the author, and is not called ignorance according to him. The definition that includes both types is to say, “Ignorance is the absence of knowledge of that which is sought, i.e. that which its case is that it would be sought and hence realized. That would be either because it was never realized from the beginning, and that is the simple ignorance, or because it was realized differently from how it is in reality, which is the composed ignorance. It is called “composed”, because there are two types of ignorance involved: ignorance of the conceived issue, and ignorance of being ignorant. Knowledge that comes into existence is the knowledge of the creations, and it is of two types: “necessary” and “acquired”. As for the eternal knowledge, that is the knowledge of Allah the glorified and exalted. It is not described as being necessary or acquired. (Necessary knowledge is that which is not dependent upon contemplation and inference). It takes place by the mere directing of the self towards the issue. The human being is compelled by its realization, and cannot push it away from himself. That includes the knowledge that takes place by any of the five senses, in reference to the apparent sensory ability, so to exclude “extrasensory perception”. Those senses are: Hearing: which is the power embedded in the nerves in the bottom of the ear canal, through which sounds are realized by way of airwaves adapted to the manner of the sound3. Those airwaves reach the ear canal and upon that, Allah creates the realization of the sound in the self. Sight: which is the power deposited in the hollow nerves that meet at the brain and separate ending at the eyes, through which colors, shapes, and other things whose realization is created by Allah upon using this ability are realized. 1 Such as the mere conception of a door 2 Such as conceiving that door to be opened or closed 3 This means that the sound itself does not actually travel, because it is a property of bodies, and the properties do not disconnect from their entities, as the scholar have clarified. Properties do not exist by themselves and are not entities with motion or stillness. Thus, the sound does not move, rather, the air around the body adapts to the sound of the body and then the air travels. Likewise is said about smells. Thus, for someone to say, “The sound reached me”, for example, would be a figure of speech, because what actually reached the person is airwaves that adapted to the manner of the sound, and Allah knows best. 13 | P a g e
  • 14. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c As for acquired knowledge, it is that which is dependent upon contemplation and inference. Contemplation is to think about the situation of the pondered subject. Inference is the seeking of a reference. Smell: which is the power embedded in the two protrusions at the front of the brain which resemble the nipples of the breast, through which scents are realized by way of air adapted to the manner of the odor. The air reaches the nostrils and Allah creates the realization of the smell after that. Taste: This is the power spread throughout the nerves on the tongue, through which flavors of those things that have flavors are realized. Upon being mixed with salivary fluid in the mouth and contacting the nerves, Allah creates the realization. Sensation: This is a power spread throughout all of the body, through which heat, cold, moisture dryness and the like are realized. Upon connection and touching, Allah creates the realization. In some copies, sensation was mentioned before smell and taste. These five senses are obvious and their existence is confirmed. As for the extrasensory perception confirmed by the philosophers, it is not confirmed for Ahlu-s-Sunnah, because its references do not comply with the Islamic fundamentals. The author’s talk leads to denying that the knowledge obtained though these senses is the actual senses themselves. In some copies, after the mentioning of the five senses, is “or tawatur”; in conjunction with his saying: “That includes the knowledge that takes place by any of the five senses”. The meaning is that necessary knowledge, such as the knowledge that takes place through any of the five senses, also includes the knowledge that takes place through that which is narrated by tawatur. Examples are like the knowledge of the existence of the Prophet r, and the occurrence of miracles by his hand, and the inability of the creation to discredit his miracles. Among the necessary knowledge is that knowledge which takes place by natural disposition, like knowing that all of something is greater than some of it, and that negation and confirmation cannot exist simultaneously. (As for acquired knowledge, it is that which is dependent upon contemplation and inference), such as knowing that the world is an event. That is dependent on contemplation about the world, and witnessing its changes. The mind goes from its state of changing and arrives at the judgment of it being an event. (Contemplation is to think about the situation of the pondered subject), so to reach either knowledge or speculation about a true or speculative issue. “Thinking” is applying the self in relation to concepts, which is different from applying the self in relation to physical matters, because that would be called “imagining”. (Inference is the seeking of a reference) so to reach a true matter. And so, contemplation is more general than inference. Speculation pertains to true and speculative matters, whereas inference is specific to true matters. 14 | P a g e
  • 15. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The Reference is the guide to that which is sought. Speculation is to deem two matters possible while one of them is more apparent than the other. Doubt is to deem two matters possible without one being more evident than the other. The Foundations of Fiqh are its general references and the method of deriving judgments from them. (The Reference), linguistically, (is the guide to that which is sought) because it is a signal for it. According to the terminology, it is that which upon looking into it correctly, enables the arrival at a sought matter that could be true or false. (Speculation is to deem two matters possible, while one of them is more apparent than the other), according to the speculator. The author’s statement: (Speculation is to deem two matters possible) is excused, because the speculation is not “deeming the possibility” in itself, it is the more probable of the two speculated issues. The unlikely one is just a fancy. (Doubt is to deem two matters possible without one being more evident than the other), according to the doubter. And so, the equal uncertainty about the confirmation or negation of Zayd standing is doubt. If one of the two possibilities became more probable, then it is speculation, and the fancy is the unlikely possibility. (the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh) (The) knowledge of the (Foundations of Fiqh), for which these pages (are) dedicated, refer to (its) i.e., fiqh’s (general references), like the talk about the unrestricted order and prohibition, the doing of the Prophet r, the consensus, the analogical deduction, the inclusive, the specific, the general, the clarification, and other matters. The subject of the first is that it pertains to the true obligation, and of the second is that it pertains to the prohibition, and of the rest is that they are evidences, and other issues that shall come. His saying: (references) means: the references that lead to fiqh. These references are different from the references that lead to fiqh in a specific and detailed way; in a way that every reference leads to the ruling of a specific, particular case, either through a text or deduction. Examples are: {(‫< 1 })وأَ ِﻗﳰُﻮا اﻟﺼ َﻼة‬Establish the prayer>; {( َ ‫< 2})وَﻻ ﺗَﻘْﺮَ ﺑُﻮا اﻟﺰ‬Do not approach fornication>; the َ َ َ Prophet’s prayer in the Ka^bah r as narrated by the Two Shaykhs; the consensus that the granddaughter gets 1/6 of the inheritance if the direct daughter was alive and there was no third relative that effects their shares; the comparison of rice with wheat in establishing the prohibition of selling it for other rice unless they were equal in measure and exchanged in the same session, as narrated by Muslim; and considering oneself in the state of purification upon doubting if he became impure afterwards. All of these references are not from the Foundations of Fiqh, even if some of them are mentioned in its books, meaning the books of the Foundations of Fiqh, for the sake of giving examples. The author said: (and the method of deriving judgments from them), i.e., from the general references in relation to the detailed references and their particular cases upon conflict; giving priority to the specific over the inclusive, and to the restricted over the absolute, and other issues. 1 Al-Baqarah, 43 2 Al-Israa’, 32 15 | P a g e
  • 16. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The divisions of the Foundations of Fiqh are: the categories of speech, the command, the prohibition, the inclusive, the specific, the general, the clarification, the explicit, the apparent, the doings, the abrogative, the abrogated, the consensus, the conveyed information, the analogical deduction, the forbidden, the permitted, the arrangement of the references, the qualities of those who deduce judgments and of those who seek judgments, and the rules pertaining to the mujtahids. As for the categories of speech, the least of which (Arabic) speech would be composed of is two nouns, or a noun and a verb, or a verb and a particle, or a noun and a particle. Conflict only takes place between these references because they are speculative, since there is no conflict between two definitive references. Mentioning the method of deriving judgments from these references leads to talking about the characteristics of he who refers to them: the mujtahid. These three issues, I mean by that: the general references of fiqh, the method of deriving judgments from them, and the characteristics of the one who uses those references, are the science for which this name was assigned, I mean by that: “the Foundations of Fiqh”. There is implication of praise in this name, because it is the knowledge upon which fiqh is built. This is the second meaning for what has previously been indicated. His saying: (The divisions of the Foundations of Fiqh) is a subject. Its predicate is: (are: the categories of speech, the command, the prohibition, the inclusive, the specific), and among that is the absolute and the restricted, (the general, the clarification, the explicit, the apparent), and in some copies, “the interpreted” was added after the apparent, and that will come, (the doings) of the Messenger r, (the abrogative, the abrogated, the consensus, the conveyed information)-with the meaning of plurality, (the analogical deduction, the forbidden, the permitted, the arrangement of the references, the qualities of those who deduce judgments and of those who seek judgments, and the rules pertaining to the mujtahids). These are the chapters in general, and they shall come with details, if Allah the exalted so willed. (the categories of speech) (As for the categories of speech), they are divided according to different viewpoints. The first is in reference to its composition. (The least of which (Arabic) speech would be composed of is two nouns). An example is “‫< ”ﷲ أﺣد‬Allah (is) one>; (Or a noun and a verb), as demonstrated by: “‫< ”ﻗﺎم زﯾد‬Zayd stood>; (Or a verb and a particle), as demonstrated by: “‫(< ”ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎم‬He did) not stand>. Some have confirmed this without considering the pronoun that is implied in the Arabic verb, which refers to Zayd for example, as a word, because it is implied and not pronounced. However most of the scholars consider it to be a word; (Or a noun and a particle), which is in the vocative context, as demonstrated by “‫< ”ﯾﺎ زﯾد‬O, Zayd>. Most of the grammarians said that the likes of: “‫”ﯾﺎ زﯾد‬ <O, Zayd> is complete speech because its implication is “I call upon Zayd”. However, the goal of the author, may Allah have mercy upon him, and others among the scholars of the Foundations of Fiqh, is to clarify the different types of sentences and to distinguish between the single expression and that which is composed. For this reason, they did not adhere to the precision of the grammarians. 16 | P a g e
  • 17. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Speech is divided into: the command, the prohibition, the statement and the interrogation. It is also divided into: wishing, offering, and vowing. From another point of view it is divided into: the literal and the figurative. The literal is that which its usage remained as it was put, and it was said that it is that which its’ usage is according to the jargon of those who use certain terminology. The figurative is that which transcended its original usage. (Speech), according to the terminology, (is divided), from another point of view, (into: the command), which is that which refers to the seeking of a doing, for example: “stand”; (the prohibition), which is that which refers to seeking an abstention, for example: “do not stand”; (the statement), which is that which is possibly true or false, for example: “Zayd came”, and “Zayd did not come”; (and the interrogation), which is a question, for example: “Did Zayd stand?” The answer would be either “yes” or “no”. (It), meaning speech, (is also divided into: wishing), meaning to seek that which there is no hope of receiving, or that which is difficult. The first is like to say, “If only youth would return one day”. The second is like for a hopeless person to say, “Woe is me, if only I had money with which I could make Hajj”. Wishing does not pertain to that which will definitely occur, like to say: “I wish tomorrow would come”, unless what was intended is that it would come now, then it would be included under the first category. The synopsis is that wishing pertains to that which is impossible and to that which is possible if achieving it was difficult; and (offering), which is to seek with gentleness, like to say, “Why don’t you come and visit us?” Similar to it is insistence, except that is seeking with firmness; (And vowing), which is swearing, like to say: “By God, I will do such and such”. (From another point of view, it), meaning speech, (is divided into: the literal and the figurative. The literal), which in Arabic is called the “haqiqah”, literally refers to that which must be preserved and protected. According to the terminology, it (is that which its usage remained as it was put) i.e., as it was originally established in the language. (And it was said that it is that which its usage is according to the jargon of those who use certain terminology), even if it did not remain as it was originally put in the language. An example is the “salah” as used according to the people of the religious law, for it refers to that known, specific format. So it did not remain as originally established linguistically, because it means, “to supplicate for goodness”. Likewise the “dabbah” according to the common folk refers to the four legged beast like a donkey, so it did not remain as originally established linguistically, which is anything that walks upon the Earth. (The figurative) is called in Arabic: “majaz”, which literally would be “a place of crossing”. According to the terminology, it (is that which transcended) i.e., went beyond (its original usage). This is according to the first definition of “literal”. According to the second definition, it is that which is not according to the jargon of those who use certain terminology. 17 | P a g e
  • 18. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Literal usage would be either linguistic, religious, or normal. Figurative usage is either by use of addition, subtraction, transfer1, or metaphor. (An example of) figurative speech through addition is like the saying of Allah: {(    )} <Nothing resembles Him>.    (literal speech) (Literal usage would be either linguistic), in reference to what the people of the language have established, such as the “lion” in reference to the predatory animal; (religious), in reference to that which comes from the One who sent down the religion, such as the “salah” for the specific worship; (or normal) in reference to the usage of the people of the general norm, like the “dabbah” for the four legged beast. Linguistically it refers to anything that walks on the face of the earth. It may also refer to the usage of the people of a specific norm, such as the “subject” according to the grammarians. This division of literal usage is only true according to the second meaning of “literal” and not the first, because the first definition negates all but the linguistic literal usage. Hence, the religious terminology such as “salah”, “hajj”, and the like; and the normal terminology like “dabbah” are all figurative according to that. In the author’s confirmation of the literal religious and literal normal usage is a reference that the second definition of “literal” is the weightful one, even if initially mentioning the first definition dictates its preference. Also, for the author to make “literal” and “figurative” usage divisions of speech, and not divisions of individual expressions, is a sign that for the singular term to be literal or figurative, it must first be used. (figurative speech) (Figurative usage is either by use of addition, subtraction, transfer1, or metaphor. (An example of) figurative speech through addition is like the saying of Allah: {( ٌ‫< 3,2})ﻟ َ ْﺲ ﳈَ ِﺜْ ِ ِ ﳾء‬Nothing resembles Him>.) The kaf is an addition, so not to confirm a similar for َْ َ Him, the exalted. This is because if it were not an addition, it would mean “similar”. Then, the apparent expression would call for the negation of the similar of the similar of the Creator, and in that is the confirmation of a similar for Him, which is mentally impossible and the opposite of what is intended by the verse, since what is meant is the negation of any similar. Hence, the kaf is an addition with the purpose of emphasis. A group of scholars said that the kaf is not additional, and that what is meant by the word “‫< ”ﻣ ﻞ‬similar> in the verse is “the self”, just as it is said: “The likes of you does not do such a thing”, with the intention of emphasizing the negation of that doing from the addressee. So if the doing 1 The common use of an Arabic word with a new meaning because of some relation between that word and its new meaning. 2 Ash-Shura, 11 The letter kaf (‫ )ك‬in the verse originally means “like”, but in this verse, it comes with the meaning of giving 3 emphasis to the sentence, and does not actually add a meaning that is not already present. So the figurative usage exists in the fact that the kaf was stripped of its original meaning of “comparison” and “resemblance”, and used with a different meaning, which is the meaning of “emphasis”. It is called an additional letter, not because it was not originally part of the Qur’anic verse, but because supposing it was removed from the sentence, the sentence would still mean, “nothing is like Him”. Therefore, calling it an “addition” is terminology, and not literal. 18 | P a g e
  • 19. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c (An example of) figurative speech through subtraction is like the saying of Allah: {( )} <Ask the     village> does not occur from he who is similar the addressee, then more so is its negation from him. Shaykh Sa^dud-Din1 said, “Saying that the kaf is an addition is taking by the face value of the verse. What is best is that is not additional, and that the negation of the similar is by an indirect expression, which is more eloquent. This is because Allah the glorified definitely exists, and the negation of the similar of the similar necessarily dictates the negation of any similar2, because had He had a similar, then He would have been the similar of that similar, and then the negation of the similar of the similar would be invalid. Hence, the verse’s meaning is from the standpoint of negating something by negating its implication. It is like to say, “The brother of Zayd has no brother”. The brother of Zayd is the focus, and having a brother is the result. It is necessary for the brother of Zayd to have a brother, which is Zayd. So if you negate the result, which is the brother of the brother of Zayd, then you have negated the focus, which is the brother of Zayd, because if he had a brother, then that brother would have had a brother, which is Zayd3.” ((An example of) figurative speech through subtraction is like the saying of Allah: {( )} 4 <Ask the village>), meaning “the people of the village”. This type of      figurative speech is also called “the hidden figure of speech”. Its condition is that there would be a reference in that which was explicitly stated that leads to that which was omitted, such as the mental indication in this case, which points to the fact that the buildings are not asked since they are inanimate. If it were said, “The definition of “figurative speech” is not true for the figurative speech through addition and subtraction, because the expression was not used in a way differently than its original usage.” The answer is, “What has been presented is included from the viewpoint that the negation of the similar of the similar was used to negate the similar5, and the directing of the question to the village was used to refer to asking the people of the village. So the original usage of the expression was exceeded and the expression was used with another meaning. The author of At-Talkhis said: “It is figurative speech from the viewpoint that the word was transferred from its original syntax to another position. The original case of the word “‫< ”ﻣﺛل‬similar> is the accusative6, because it is the predicate of what was negated by {(‫ﻟ َ ﺲ‬)}< “laysa”; the verb of negation>, but it َ changed to the genitive case7 because of the addition of the kaf. The original case of 1 At-Taftazaniyy 2 i.e. the existence of Allah , which is impossible. 3 This is not the correct saying, because attributing a similar to Allah in invalid in the first place. 4 Yusuf, 82 5 According to the saying of At-Taftazaniyy, which is actually the incorrect saying 6 nasb 7 jarr 19 | P a g e
  • 20. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c (An example of) figurative speech through transfer is like the term gha’it (defecation) in reference to that which comes out of the human. (An example of) figurative usage through metaphor is like the saying of Allah: {(‫...<1 }) ِ ﺪَارًا ُﺮِﯾﺪُ أَنْ ﯾ َ ْﻨﻘَﺾ‬a wall that wants to fall>. ّ {(‫< })ا ْﻟﻘ َْﺮﯾ َﺔ‬the village> is genitive, but it changed to the accusative because of the omission of the first part of the genitive construction.” ((An example of) figurative speech through transfer), meaning transfer of the expression from its meaning to another meaning because of the correlation between the meaning it was transferred from and the meaning it was transferred to, (is like the term gha’it (defecation) in reference to that which comes out of the human). This term was transferred to this meaning from its original meaning, which is the tranquil, low area in the Earth, in which one answers the call of nature. That place is sought for cover. And so, they named the excrement that comes from the human after the place in which the matter is done. Then, that spread to the extent that nothing comes to mind from this term in the norm except that meaning. So, it is a literal usage in the norm and a figurative one in respects to its linguistic meaning. So the saying of whoever said that calling this a figure of speech is based on the saying of those who denied the literal usage in the norm is not correct. There is no negation between the usage being literal in the norm and linguistically figurative, as you already know. ((An example of) figurative usage through metaphor is like the saying of Allah: {(‫ﯾ َْﻨﻘَﺾ‬ ّ ْ‫...< }) ِ ﺪَ ارًا ُﺮﯾﺪُ أَن‬a wall that wants to fall>.) In this verse, Allah likened its tilting and leaning ِ towards falling to a willful falling, which is the attribute of the living, not the inanimate, because the will of the inanimate is normally impossible. The figurative usage based on resemblance is called “metaphor”. The expression of the author deludes to thinking that figurative usage by transfer is a category different from the others, and this is not the case. Transfer encompasses all the types of figurative speech, because its meaning is “the changing of the expression from one meaning to another”. The saying of Allah: {( ٌ‫ﻟ َ ْﺲ ﳈَ ِﺜْ ِ ِ ﳾء‬)} <Nothing resembles Him> is transferred from the reference of negating َْ َ the similar of the similar, to the negation of the similar. His saying: {(‫اﻟْﻘ َْﺮﯾ َﺔ‬ ِ‫< })وَاﺳْ ﺄَل‬Ask the village> is transferred from the reference of asking the village to asking the people of the village. The term “gha’it” <defecation> is transferred from the reference of the tranquil place to the reference of the excrement of the human. His saying: {(‫...< }) ﺪارا ﺮﯾﺪ أن ﯾﻨﻘﺾ‬a wall that wants to fall> is transferred from the reference ّ of the actual will, which is the will of the living thing, to an image that resembles the concept of having a will. Therefore, all figures of speech are a transfer of the expression from its first established meaning to another meaning. However, it could take place by the expression remaining as it is without change. This is the figure of speech that takes place in particular terms, like the transfer of the expression “lion” from the predatory animal to the brave human, and the transfer of the of the term “gha’it” from the tranquil place to the human excrement. On the other hand, it could take place with a change that occurs in the term because of an addition or a subtraction. This figurative speech takes place in composed expressions. The figurative speech that takes place in particular terms is called: “linguistic 20 | P a g e
  • 21. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The command is the seeking of a doing in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who commands) by way of a saying. The word structure that refers to it is: {‫( }اﻓﻌل‬if^al) <do>. figure of speech”, and the figure of speech that takes place in composed expressions is called the “mental figure of speech”, which is the referral of the predicate to something other than what it is truly for, and Allah knows best. (the command) When he finished talking about the divisions of speech, he followed that up with the subject of the command. And so he said: (The command is the seeking of a doing in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who commands) by way of a saying), in such a way that abstention is not permissible. His statement: (by way of a saying) excludes the seeking that takes place by way of a signal, or allusion, or understandable indications. His saying: (from someone who is lower (than he who commands)) excludes seeking from a peer or a superior. Such matters are not called commands. The first one is called a petition, and the second is called a request or a question. This is the saying of a group of scholars of the Foundations of Fiqh. The preferred saying is that neither superiority, which is for the seeker to be of higher status than he who is sought from, nor dominance, which is for the seeking to take place in a presumptuous way, are not considered in the command. The difference between superiority and dominance is that superiority is for the commander himself to be of higher status than the commanded, and dominance is for him to make himself higher, by arrogance or otherwise, and in reality he may not be. And so, superiority is the attribute of the commander, while dominance is the attribute of his speech. His saying: (in a mandatory fashion) excludes the command put in an optional fashion, in such a way that desistance is permissible. According to the talk of the author, the recommendation has not been ordered to be done. In this, there is difference of opinion based upon whether the expression of the command is used literally only for an obligation, or is it used literally in that amount which is shared between the obligation and the recommendation, which is the seeking of a doing. It was said that it is literally used for the recommendation, and other things were also said. (The word structure that refers to it), meaning the structure that refers to the command, (is: {‫( }اﻓﻌل‬if^al) <do>). This specific structure is not intended, rather, the fact that the expression refers to a command by its structure. Examples are such as: “‫< ”اﺿرب‬hit>, “‫< ”أﻛرم‬honor>, “‫< ”اﺳﺗﺧرج‬extract>, “‫< ”ﻟﯾﻧﻔق‬let him spend>, and the saying of Allah: {( ِ‫ا ْﻟﻌﺘِﯿﻖ‬ َ ِ‫}) ُﰒ ﻟْ َﯿﻘْﻀُ ﻮا ﺗَﻔَﳦَ ُ ْﻢ وﻟْﯿُﻮﻓُﻮا ﻧ ُﺬُ ورَ ﱒُ ْ وﻟْﯿَﻄﻮﻓُﻮا ِ ﻟْ َﺒ ْﺖ‬ َ َ 1 <Let them do what the pilgrim does when exiting the state of ihram, let them fulfill their oaths, and let them circumambulate the old house>. 1 Al-Hajj 29 21 | P a g e
  • 22. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c When used unrestrictedly and without any outside indications, it is taken (to refer to an obligation). However, if there is a reference indicating that what is meant by it is a recommendation or permissibility, then it is taken as such. (When used unrestrictedly and without any outside indications) that divert away from the obligation, then (it is taken (to refer to an obligation)) such as the saying of Allah: {(‫<1})وأَ ِﻗﳰُﻮا اﻟﺼﻼة‬Establish the prayer>. (However, if there is a reference indicating that what is َ َ َ meant by it is a recommendation), such as: {(‫َﲑًا‬ ْ ْ‫< 2})ﻓ َﲀَ ﺗِﺒُﻮﱒُ ْ إِنْ َ ِﻠﻤْﱲ ِﻓﳱِﻢ‬Perform the contract for ُْ them to purchase their liberty if you know that they are capable in performing dealings>, for the fact that the obligation is not meant is necessitated by the context, because the contract for the slave to buy his freedom is a dealing; (or) a (permissibility, then it is taken as such). An example is: {(‫< 3})و ِإذَا َ ﻠَﻠْﱲ ﻓ َﺎﺻﻄَ ﺎدوا‬If you exit the state of ihram, then hunt>. Hunting is one of the ways of acquiring, ُ ْ ُْ َ and it is permissible. The scholars have agreed on the fact that hunting and doing a contract for the slave to buy his freedom are not obligatory4. The apparent meaning of the author’s talk is that the exception made in his saying: (However, if there is a reference) pertains to that which is separated from the expression, because the “reference” in this context is actually the “indication”, and it is possible to be taken as that which is connected to the expression. This is because the “indication” is specific to that which is connected to the expression, and the “reference” is that which is separated from it, because whatever has a disconnected indication is free of an indication. An example of a connected indication is the saying of Allah: {(‫< })ﻓ َﺎﻵَنَ َ ﴍوﻫُﻦ‬Now have contact with them>, after His saying: {(‫5}) ُأ ِﻞ ﻟ َﲂ ﻟ َْﯿ َ َ اﻟﺼﯿَﺎم اﻟﺮﻓ َﺚُ إِﱃ ِﺴَ ﺎ ِﲂ‬ ُِ ْ ُْ َ ِ ُْ <During the night of the fasting day, sexual contact with your women is made lawful>. An example of a disconnected indication 6 is the saying of The Exalted: {(‫< 7})وأ َﺷْ ﻬِﺪُ وا ِإذَا ﺗَﺒَﺎﯾَﻌْﱲ‬Have witnesses for your selling ُْ َ and buying contracts>. The indication is that the Prophet r sold without seeking a witness, so it is known that the order is for a recommendation. 1 Al-Baqarah, 43 2 An-Nur, 33 3 Al-Ma’idah, 2 4 It is known from these points that one must follow the valid schools, for how would he be sure that he can distinguish between the commands that imply obligations, and those that imply other than obligations? 5 Al-Baqarah, 187 6 i.e., a reference 7 Al-Baqarah, 282 22 | P a g e
  • 23. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c It does not necessitate repetition, nor for the deed to be done only once, according to the correct saying, unless a reference indicates that what is intended is repetition. It does not necessitate immediate action1. The order to initiate a deed is an order to do the deed, and to do whatever would leave the deed incomplete if not done, like the order to perform prayer is an order to perform the purification that leads to the prayer. If it is done, then the one who was ordered is relieved of the responsibilty. (It), i.e., the verb structure that refers to the command, but when free of anything that refers to the restriction of repetition, or that it should be done only once, (does not necessitate repetition, nor for the deed to be done only once, according to the correct saying). The contrary of the correct saying is that it dictates repetition, the result of which is that the commissioned will engulf every moment of his life to the utmost ability with fulfilling that order, since the order in itself is not restricted to a final point, due to the lack of that which preponderates a certain limit over another. It was also said that it dictates the doing of the deed once1, and some scholars did not comment. All of those who said that it does not necessitate repetition agree that if it were related to a certain occurrence, such as, “If someone fornicates, lash him”, it then dictates repetition. (It), meaning the structure that refers to the command, (does not necessitate immediate action), he means: it also does not necessitate delay, unless there is a reference alluding to one of them, because the goal is to initiate a doing without any specification to one time over the other. It was said that it necessitates immediate action, and all who said that it necessitates repetition said that it necessitates immediate action. (The order to initiate a deed is an order to do the deed, and to do whatever would leave the deed incomplete if not done, like the order to perform prayer), for surely it (is an order to perform the purification). The Prayer is not valid without the purification (which leads to the prayer. If it is done) – the verb is in the passive tense, and the pronoun refers back to that which was ordered- (then the one who was ordered is relieved of the responsibilty), i.e. the responsibility of the order, and the deed is then described with fulfillment. In some copies of the text, the author said, “If the commissioned does it, then he exits from the responsibility.” The meaning is that if the accountable person was ordered with doing something, and then he does that matter as he was ordered, then he is judged with having exited from the responsibility of that order, and that deed is described with fulfillment. This is the preferred saying. According to a saying, it is judged as being fulfilled by a new address.2 1 After the first necessary time 2 An example is like the one who prays in a way that he has to make up that prayer, like in some cases of praying with tayammum. By performing the prayer in the first place, he has fulfilled the order. However, he must still make up; reperform that prayer, and so the fulfillment of that makeup is by a different address. Yet other scholars have defined fulfillment in a different way: by the exiting out of the responsibility of performing a makeup. According to this saying, the deed is not fulfilled until the makeup is done. 23 | P a g e
  • 24. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c WHO IS INCLUDED UNDER THE ORDER AND PROHIBITION, AND WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED The address of Allah pertains to the believers. The absent-minded, the child, and the insane are not included in the address. The blasphemers are addressed with the branches of the religious law1, and with that without which they are invalid, which is Islam, because of the saying of The exalted: {( َ‫( < }) ﻗَﺎﻟُﻮا ﻟ َ ْﻢ ﻧ َﻚُ ﻣِﻦَ ا ْﻟﻤُﺼﻠﲔَ * ﻣَﺎ ﺳَ ﻠَﻜَﲂ ِﰲ ﺳَ ﻘَﺮ‬They will be asked) What lead you to Hell?* They will say, “We ُْ َ did not pray”>. The order to do something is a prohibition from its opposite. The meaning of this title is that it is a clarification of who is included under the address of accountability in what pertains to the order and the prohibition, and who is not included. He said: (what is not included) to draw attention to the fact that whoever is not included under the address of accountability does not have the judgment of those who are sane. (The address of Allah pertains to the) accountable (believers). They are those who are sane, pubescent, and not absent minded, and the females are included under the address of the males as an annexation. As for (the absent-minded, the child, and the insane), they (are not included in the address), due to the lack of accountability. This is because the condition of the address is having the understanding, and they do not understand the address. The absent-minded one is ordered to mend that forgetfulness when he remembers by making up that which he left- whether the prayer, or guaranteeing that property of others which he destroyed- because of the existence of their reasons: the destruction and the entering of the prayer time. (The blasphemers are addressed with the branches of the religious law1) according to the correct saying, (and with that without which they are invalid, which is Islam) by unanimous agreement. His statement: (because of the saying of the Exalted: {( َ‫( < 2}) ﻣَﺎ ﺳَ ﻠَﻜَﲂ ِﰲ ﺳَ ﻘَﺮ * ﻗ َﺎﻟُﻮا ﻟ َْﻢ ﻧ َﻚُ ﻣِﻦَ ا ْﻟﻤُﺼﻠﲔ‬They will be asked), "What lead you to Hell?” * َ ُْ They will say, “We did not pray.” >) is an evidence for the correct saying. It was said that they are not addressed with the branches of the religious law, because those branches are not valid from them before Islam, and they are not punished for those branches after Islam. The answer is that the benefit of them being addressed is the fact that they will be punished for leaving it out. The reason for the lack of validity while they are in a state of blasphemy is the dependency on the intention, the validity of which is dependent on Islam. The reason for not being punished for them after Islam is to make embracing Islam more appealing to them. (The order) in itself (to do something is a prohibition from its opposite), meaning that the relation between the order and the ordered matter is itself the same relation between abstention and the opposite of that matter. This is whether the matter had one opposite, like the opposite of 1 The creed is the foundation of the religious law, and everything else is a branch. More specifically, the blasphemer is addressed with doing the obligations and avoiding the sins. The fact that he is not a Muslim does not grant him permission to eat in Ramadan, for example, as opposed to the misconception of many. 2 Al-Muddaththir, 42,43 24 | P a g e
  • 25. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The prohibition from something is an order with its opposite. The prohibition is the seeking of an abstention in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who prohibits) by way of a saying. stillness, which is movement; or if it had more than one opposite1, like the opposite of standing, which is sitting, leaning, or lying. Hence, “seeking” has one relationship between two things: doing the matter and refraining from its opposite. Thus, by the first consideration, it is an order and by the second, it is a prohibition. It was said that the order to do something is not in itself the prohibition from its opposite, however it is inclusive of the prohibition. It was also said that it is not the prohibition in itself, nor is it inclusive of it, and the author of Jam^ul-Jawami^2 ascribes this to the author. As for what is understood from the order and the prohibition, there is no doubt that they are different. Also, there is no dispute that the uttered command is different from the uttered prohibition, and what is correct is that it is not inclusive of the prohibition, and it was said that it is. So, if someone said, “Be still”, it is as if he said, “Do not move”, because the stillness would not take place except by refraining from moving. (prohibition) As for (the prohibition) in itself to refrain (from something), it is said that it (is an order with its opposite). If it only had one opposite then the issue is clear, and if it had more than one opposite, then it is an order to do one of them without specification. It was also said that the prohibition in itself is not an order to do its opposite at all. As for the uttered prohibition, it is not at all the uttered command, and it does not encompass it according to what is most correct. It was said that it does encompass it, for if someone said, “Do not move”, it is as if he said, “Be still”, because leaving out moving does not take place except by being still. (The prohibition is the seeking of an abstention in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who prohibits) by way of a saying), in correspondence with what was presented about the command, except that here it is said: (the seeking of an abstention) excludes the command. And his saying: “(in a mandatory fashion)” means: in such a way that it is not permissible to do. This excludes the prohibition in what pertains to the disliked matter, because it is permissible to be done. Also, superiority and domination are not considered. However, the absolute restriction dictates immediate action and repetition. Thus, instant desistance and continuous forbearance are mandatory at all times, because this holds true of an absolute prohibition. Furthermore, the absolute prohibition indicates the religious invalidity of the prohibited matter according to what is most correct to the Malikiyys and the Shafi^iyys; whether that prohibited matter was an act of worship, such as fasting on the holiday; or a dealing, such as the prohibited types of selling. By saying “the absolute prohibition”, we have maneuvered away from that which may be 1 Some may be surprised by the concept of something having more than one opposite. What is meant by the opposites are those matters than cannot exist simultaneously in the same time and place. 2 Tajud-Din As-Subkiyy 25 | P a g e
  • 26. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The word structure that refers to the command may be used, but what would be meant by it is permissibility, a threat, impartiality, or creating. associated with the prohibition, but does not dictate invalidity, as in some instances of prohibited selling1. This case is missing from the copy of Al-Mahalliyy. (The word structure that refers to the command may be used, but what would be meant by it), i.e. the command, (is permissibility) as previously mentioned, or (a threat), such as: {(‫ْﱲ‬ ُِْ‫< })اﲻﻠُﻮا ﻣَﺎ ﺷ‬Do what you want>, or (impartiality), Like to say, “Be patient or don’t be patient”, َْ (or creating), such as: {(‫< })ﻛﻮﻧُﻮا ﻗِﺮَ دة‬Become monkeys>. ًَ ُ 1 An example of a valid deed that is forbidden to do is selling after the second Adhan of Jumu^ah, for selling what is lawful to be sold, such as clothing or food, is valid as long as the conditions and integrals are fulfilled. Thus, the prohibition of selling after the second adhan on Jumu^ah is an extraneous case, not something originally related to selling and buying in itself. Another example of something that is valid but forbidden is divorcing the wife during her menstrual cycle, or during a non-menstruating period in which he had sexual intercourse with her. The divorce takes place despite that the man is sinful for not waiting for a non-menstruating time in which he did not have intercourse with her. 26 | P a g e
  • 27. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE INCLUSIVE, THE SPECIFIC, THE GENERAL, THE CLARIFICATION, THE EXPLICIT, AND THE APPARENT The inclusive is that which includes two or more things without restriction to a particular limit; from your statement: “I included Zayd and ^Amr in my giving”, or, “I included all of the people in my giving”. It has four ways of being expressed: the singular term modified by the definite article, the plural term modified by the definite article, the ambiguous term, such as “who(ever)” in reference to that which has a mind; “what(ever)” in reference to that which does not have a mind; “which(ever)” in both cases; (the inclusive) (The inclusive is that which includes two or more things), i.e. (without restriction to a particular limit). It is taken (from your statement: “I included Zayd and ^Amr in my giving”, or “I included all of the people in my giving”), meaning, “I encompassed them”. And so, in “inclusion” there is encompassment. In some copies he said, “like: I included Zayd and ^Amr”. This is not valid, because “I included Zayd and ^Amr” is not the inclusion that he wants to clarify. His saying: (that which includes two or more things) is a main idea that includes duality, like to say: “two men”; and it includes the names of the numbers, such as “three”, “four”, and the like. Our saying, (without restriction to a particular limit) is a subtopic that excludes duality and the names of numbers, because although they encompass two or more things, however, they end at a particular limit1. (It has four) types of (ways of being expressed), meaning that there are four ways established in the language for expressing inclusivity. The first type is (the singular term modified by the definite article), not the definite article in reference to that which is known, nor the one that expresses reality. This one expresses inclusivity, as proven by the validity of excluding from what it modifies, for example: {(‫ِ ﻟﺼﱪ‬ ِْ ‫< 2})إِن اﻹ ْﺴَ ﺎنَ ﻟَﻔِﻲ ﺧُﴪ* إِﻻ ا ِ ﻦَ آ َﻣ ُﻮا وَﲻﻠُﻮا اﻟﺼﺎ ِﻟ َﺎت وﺗ َﻮَاﺻَ ﻮْا ِ ﻟْﺤَﻖ وﺗ َﻮَاﺻَ ﻮْا‬Surely َ َ ِ َِ َ ٍْ ِْ the human is in a state of loss* except for those who believed>. The second type is (the plural term), i.e. the term that refers to a group, which has been (modified by the definite article) that does not refer to that which is known, such as: {( َ‫< 3})ﻓ َﺎﻗ ُﻠُﻮا اﻟْﻤُﴩﻛِﲔ‬Kill the pagans>. ِْ ْ The third type is (the ambiguous term, such as “who(ever)” in reference to that which has a mind), for instance, “Whoever enters my house is safe”. Another example is: (“what(ever)” in reference to that which does not have a mind), such as, “I accept whatever comes to me from you”. Another example is: (“which(ever)” in both cases), i.e., in the case of that which has a mind, and in the case of that which does not have a mind. An example is, “Whichever of my 1 Therein is yet another indication that one must follow the valid schools of fiqh, for how would he be sure that while reading on his own, he does not misunderstand what is truly specific to be inclusive, or vice versa? 2 Al-Asr, 2,3 3 At-Tawbah, 5 27 | P a g e
  • 28. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c “where(ever)” in reference to the place; “when(ever)” in reference to time; “what(ever)” in reference to inquiry, compensation, and other matters; and the negation of indefinite terms by way of “‫( ”ﻻ‬no). Inclusiveness is among the attributes of utterances, and it is not permissible to claim inclusivity based on something other than that, such as doings or what is similar to them. slaves comes to you then treat him well;” and, “I’ll give to you whichever thing I want”. Another example is: (“where(ever)” in reference to the place), such as, “Wherever you sit, I sit”. Another example is: (“when(ever)” in reference to time), such as, “Whenever you stand, I stand”. Another example is (“what(ever)” in reference to inquiry), such as, “What do you have?”; or in reference to (compensation), i.e. recompense, such as, “For whatever you do, you will be compensated”. In some copies the author said, “informing” instead of “compensation”, like if you said, “I knew what you knew”, in response to someone who says to you, “What did you know?”; (And) there are ( other matters) that are not mentioned, like “informing” as mentioned in the other copy, and “compensation” as mentioned in this copy1. (And) the fourth type is (the negation of indefinite terms by way of “‫( ”ﻻ‬no)), i.e. for “‫< ”ﻻ‬no> to come before the indefinite term. If that indefinite term negated by “‫ ”ﻻ‬was built on a fath, such as to say: “‫< ”ﻻ رﺟل ﻓﻲ اﻟدار‬Not a man is in the house.>, then it would be an explicit statement of َ 2 inclusivity . If it were not in a state of bina’3, then it would be an apparent statement of inclusivity, such as “‫< ”ﻻ رﺟل ﻓﻲ اﻟدار‬There is not one man in the house4>. ٌ (Inclusiveness is among the attributes of utterances), i.e. expressions. The utterance is an infinitive with the meaning, “that which is uttered”, (and it is not permissible to claim inclusivity based on something other than that), i.e. other than expressions (such as doings or what is similar to them), i.e. what is similar to doings. The “doing” is as the Prophet’s combining between two prayers while traveling r, as narrated by Al-Bukhariyy. This does not prove the inclusiveness of combining while on any type of travel, whether it was long or short, because this act took place in one of the two cases. An example of what is similar to doings, is the specific verdicts, such as the Prophet’s ruling r in giving the right of preemption to a neighbor, as narrated by An-Nasa’iyy from the route of Al-Hasan with someone missing from the chain. Thus, not every neighbor is applied to this right, because of the possibility of something specific about that neighbor5. 1 Among that which gives meaning of inclusion is the genitive construction. 2 Meaning that every man is included in the negation. 3 A syntactical term pertaining to the word having an indeclinable ending; the ending of the word does not change, despite whatever agents precede it. 4 But it is possible that that there could be two men in the house. This sentence is not explicit in negating the existence of every man in the house. 5 So, beware of the statement of some who deter people from following the schools and say, “Follow the Qur’an and the Sunnah.”Applied to this statement of theirs is what Imam ^Aliyy said about what the Khawarij said when they quoted a verse of the Qur’an out of context, “A word of truth, but what is intended by it is invalid.” This statement of those people is dangerous from more than one angle. One point is that they encourage people not to merely read these texts, but to deduce rulings without being qualified. Another is that they undermine the authority and respect that the Mujtahid scholars deserve. Then, if they are cornered into confessing that there is no escape from following the schools, they say, “What I mean is that the Muslim should not follow one school over another.” This is also invalid, because it is enough to refer to one qualified scholar. 28 | P a g e
  • 29. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The specific is contrary to the inclusive. Specification is to distinguish part of the sentence, and is divided into: connected (specification) and disconnected (specification). The connected specification (takes place by way of): the exception, the condition, and the restriction by a description. The exception is the exclusion of that which had it not been excluded it would have been included in the speech. (the specific) (The specific is contrary to the inclusive), so it is said about its definition: “that which does not include two or more things without a limit, rather it only pertains to a specific limit”, whether one, two, three, or more than that, for example: “one man”, “two men”, “three men”, (etc). (Specification is to distinguish part of the sentence) that was included in an encompassing expression. This is like excluding those who have a treaty with the Muslims from His saying: {( َ‫< 1})ﻓ َﺎﻗ ُﻠُﻮا اﻟْﻤُﴩﻛِﲔ‬Kill the pagans>. (And) it, i.e. the specifying factor which is understood from the term ِْ ْ term “specification”, (is divided into: connected (specification)), which is that which does not act independently, rather it would be mentioned with the general expression, (and disconnected (specification)), which is that which does act independently and is not mentioned with the inclusive expression, rather it would be alone. According to what the author mentioned, (the connected specification) is of three types. The first ((takes place by way of): the exception). For example, “‫ < ”ﻗﺎم اﻟﻘوم إﻻ زﯾدا‬The people stood except Zayd >. The second is the restriction by way of (the condition). For example, “Honor the tribe of Tamim if they come”, i.e. honor those among the tribe who come. (And) the third is (the restriction by a description). An example is, “Honor the scholars from the tribe of Tamim”. (The) true (exception), which is the connected one, (is the exclusion of that which had it not been excluded it would have been included in the speech), such as the previous example. The “connected exception” is that the excluded matter is part of that from which it was excluded. By this, we have avoided the “disconnected” type, which is when the excluded matter is not a part of that from which it was excluded, like: “‫< ”ﻗﺎم اﻟﻘوم إﻻ ﺣﻣﺎرا‬The people stood except for a donkey>. ّ This type is not among the specifying factors, although the author is going to mention it as a digression. In the disconnected exclusion, it is conditional that there would be some kind of relation between the excluded matter and that issue from which it was excluded, as we have demonstrated. And so, it is not said, “‫< ”ﻗﺎم اﻟﻘوم إﻻ ﺛﻌﺑﺎﻧﺎ‬The people stood except for a snake>2. ّ 1 At-Tawbah, 5 2 The relation is that the donkey usually accompanies the people, as opposed to a snake. 29 | P a g e
  • 30. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The exception is valid with the condition that something remains from that which it was excluded, and among its conditions is that it would be connected to the speech. It is valid to advance the exception (and mention it) before what it has been excluded from, and that it would be of the same type as that which it is excluded from, or of a different type. It is valid for the condition to precede its consequence. The generalized is made to comply with that which is restricted by a description, like the slave restricted by the description of… (The exception is valid with the condition that something remains from that which it was excluded), even if it were one thing. Therefore, if the excluded matter engulfed that from which it was excluded, the exclusion would not be valid, and it would be cancelled. If someone said, “‫< ” ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﺷرة إﻻ ﺗﺳﻌﺔ‬By Allah, I owe ten except for nine>, this is valid and he is liable for one. ّ However if he said, “‫< ”إﻻ ﻋﺷرة‬except for ten>, it would not be valid, and he is liable for ten1; (and among its conditions), i.e. the exception, (is that it would be connected to the speech), i.e. by being uttered, or that it would have the judgment of being connected. Thus, the interruption of a cough, breathing, or the likes of which is not considered a disruption in the norm does not have an effect. Hence, if it is not connected to the speech, then that which is excluded is not valid. So if one said, “The people came”, then after the lapse of a time which is considered a disruption in the norm he says, “except Zayd”, it is not valid. It was narrated from Ibn ^Abbas, may Allah accept his and his father’s deeds: “The interrupted exception is valid until a month”, and it was said “a year”, and it was said “forever”2. (It is valid to advance the exception, (and mention it) before what it has been excluded from). This is like saying, “‫< ”ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎم إﻻ زﯾدا أﺣد‬Except Zayd, no one stood>. (And it is valid that it would be of the same type as that which it is excluded from), and that is the exception which is considered to be among the specifying factors, as previously mentioned, (or of a different type), and that is the disconnected exception, as previously mentioned3. (It is valid for the condition), which is the second of the connected specifying agents, to be uttered after its consequence, as previously mentioned, as well as (to precede its consequence) in the uttered expression, such as to say, “If the tribe of Tamim comes to you then honor them.” However, in practicality, the condition must precede its consequence or be associated with it. (The generalized is made to comply with that which is) made a basis for it; that which is (restricted by a description), which is the third of the connected specifying factors. So the restricted, with its confines, limits the general, (like the slave restricted by the description of 1 The benefit of this case shows up in such issues as testimony and divorce, for one may might say, “I divorce my wife thrice except for two”, which is one divorce, or, “I divorce her three times except for three”, which is still three divorces, and not zero divorces, as one might misconceive. 2 Al-Bayhaqiyy said, “What is meant is if he said, ‘God willing’”. A similar statement was said about Abu Hanifah, and it is not valid. Al-Baqillaniyy said that this is not a valid narration from Ibn ^Abbas, because someone of his high level of eloquence would not say such a thing. 3 Like to say, “The visitors arrived except for their luggage”. According to this is the saying of Allah: {(‫< }) ﻓَﺴَ َﺪُ وا إِﻻ ِإﺑْ ِﻠ ﺲ ﰷَ ن ِﻣﻦ اﻟْﺠِ ﻦ‬All of them (the angels) prostrated, except for Iblis; he was a jinn> {Al-Kahf, 50}. Thus, there َ َ َ is no proof from the Book of Allaah that Iblis was an angel, as falsely said by those who thought so because he was excluded from the angels who prostrated. 30 | P a g e
  • 31. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c …having belief in some issues. So the generalized is made to comply with the restricted. It is permissible to specify the Book by the Book, and to specify the Book by the Sunnah, and to specify the Sunnah by the Book, having belief in some issues), such as the expiation of killing. The slave was generalized in some issues, such as the expiation of dhihar1, (So the generalized is made to comply with the restricted) for the sake of precaution. Then he began to talk about the second category of specifying factors, I mean by that the disconnected type. He said: (It is permissible to specify the Book by the Book) according to what is most correct. An example is {( ٍ‫< 2})وَاﻟْﻤُﻄَ ﻠﻘَﺎت ﯾ ََﱰَﺑﺼﻦَ ﺑِﺄَﻧْﻔُﺴﻬِﻦ ﺛ ََﻼﺛ ََﺔ ﻗُﺮُ وء‬The divorced women must wait ِ ْ ُ for three cycles>. This is inclusive of the pregnant women. It was specified by His saying: {(‫< 3})وأُوﻻَ ت اﻷَﲪَﺎلِ أ َ َ ﻠُﻬُﻦ أ َنْ ﯾ َﻀَ ﻌﻦ ﲪﻠَﻬُﻦ‬The waiting period of the pregnant women expires when they give َْ َ ْ ْ ْ ُ َ birth>. Another example is His saying: {(‫< 4})وَﻻ ﺗ َْﻨﻜِﺤُﻮا اﻟْﻤُﴩِﰷَ ت ﺣَﱴ ﯾُﺆﻣِﻦ‬Do not marry the pagan women ْ ِ ْ َ until they believe>. This includes the women of the People of the Book, because the People of the Book are pagans. This is proven by the saying of the Exalted: {( ِ ‫< 5}) وﻗ َﺎﻟ َﺖِ ا ْﳱَ ُﻮد ﻋُﺰَ ْﺮٌ ا ْﻦُ ا ِ وﻗ َﺎﻟ َﺖِ اﻟﻨﺼﺎرَى ا ْﻟﻤَﺴ ﯿﺢُ ا ْﻦُ ا‬The Jews said that Ezra is the son of Allah, and the ِ َ َ ُ َ Christians said that the Messiah is the son of Allah…>, until His saying: {( َ‫ُﴩﻛُﻮن‬ ِْ ‫6}) َﻻ ِإ َ َ إِﻻ ﻫُﻮَ ﺳ ﺒْ َ ﺎﻧ َُﻪ ﲻَ ﺎ‬ ُ <No one is God but Him, He is greatly glorified from what they associate with Him>. This has been specified by the saying of the Exalted: {(‫…< 7})وَاﻟْﻤﺤْﺼﻨ َﺎت ﻣِﻦَ ا ِ ﻦَ أُوﺗُﻮا ا ْﻟﻜ َﺎبَ ﻣِﻦْ ﻗ َ ْ ﻠِﲂ‬the free women among ُْ ِ ُ َ ُ those who have been given the book before you>. This means: they are lawful for you. (And), as in compliance with the majority of the scholars, it is permissible (to specify the Book by the Sunnah), whether the Sunnah was by tawatur or it was an ahad narration. An example is the specification of the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 8})ﯾ ُﻮﺻِ ﯿﲂ ا ُ ِﰲ أَوْ َﻻد ُِْﰼ‬Allah specifies for your children ُُ the amount of their inheritance>. This includes the blasphemous child. It is restricted by the hadith in the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﻻ ﻴﺭﺙ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﻡ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﻓﺭ ﻭ ﻻ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﻓﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﻡ‬The blasphemer does not inherit from the Muslim, and the Muslim does not inherit from the blasphemer>. (And) it is lawful (to specify the Sunnah by the Book), such as the specification of the hadith of the Two Books of Sahih, [[‫]]ﻻ ﻴﻘﺒل ﺍﷲ ﺼﻼﺓ ﺃﺤﺩﻜﻡ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﺤﺩﺙ ﺤﺘﻰ ﻴﺘﻭﻀﺄ‬ <Allah does not accept the prayer of anyone of you who is in a state of impurity unless he makes 1 Such as for a man to say to his wife, “You are to me like my mother’s back”, meaning: just as I do not lay my mother on her back I do not lay you on your back; i.e. I will not have sexual intercourse with you. This was a statement of divorce to the Arabs before the revelation of the religious law to the Prophet. It is invalid and a major sin in the Islamic law. 2 Al-Baqarah, 228 3 At-Talaq, 4 4 Al-Baqarah, 221 5 At-Tawbah, 30 6 At-Tawbah, 31 7 Al-Ma’idah, 5 8 An-Nisa’, 11 31 | P a g e
  • 32. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c and to specify the Sunnah by the Sunnah, and to specify the text by the analogical deduction, and we mean by the text: the (revealed) saying of Allah (in the book of the Qur’an), and the saying of the Messenger ‫ .ﷺ‬The general is that which is in need of clarification. wudu’>. It was specified by {(‫ﻛﻨْﱲ ﻣَﺮْ ﴇ‬ َ ُْ ُ ْ‫< 1})وإِن‬If you were sick…>, until His saying: {(‫< })ﻓ ََْﲅ ﲡَ ِﺪُ وا ﻣَﺎء ﻓ َ َﯿَﻤ ُﻤﻮا‬If َ ً you do not find water then seek (soil [so to make dry purification])>. This is despite the Sunnah about dry purification that came after the revelation of the verse. (And) it is permissible (to specify the Sunnah by the Sunnah), such as the specification of the hadith in the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺴﻘﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﻌﺸﺭ‬One tenth is due on the crops that have been irrigated by the sky>. It was specified by another hadith in the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﻟﻴﺱ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺨﻤﺴﺔ ﺃﻭﺴﻕ ﺼﺩﻗﺔ‬There is no Zakah in what did not reach the amount of five wasqs2>. (And) it is permissible (to specify the text (nutq) by the analogical deduction, and we mean by the text: the (revealed) saying of Allah (in the book of the Qur’an), and the saying of the Messenger r). This is because the analogical deduction is referred back to a text from the Book of Allah or the Sunnah of His Messenger r, so it is as if that text is the specifying factor. An example of specifying the Book by the analogical deduction is the saying of the Exalted: {( ٍ‫< 3})اﻟﺰا ِﻧﯿَﺔ وَاﻟﺰاﱐ ﻓ َﺎ ْ ِ ُ وا ﰻ وَا ِ ﺪ ﻣِﳯْ ُﻤَﺎ ﻣ َﺔ َ ْ َة‬Whip both the female and male fornicator 100 lashes>. Its َ ِ ٍ ُ ِ ُ inclusiveness that incorporates the slave woman was specified by the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 4}) ﻓَﻌﻠ َﳱْ ِﻦ ﻧِﺼﻒ ﻣَﺎ َﲆ اﻟ ُْﻤﺤْﺼﻨَﺎت ﻣِﻦَ ا ْﻟﻌﺬَاب‬They get half of the punishment given to the free women>. Its ِ َ ِ َ َ ُ ْ َ inclusiveness was also specified by the slave who was compared to the slave woman. (the general) (The general) in the Arabic language is called “al-mujmal”, and it comes from: “‫< ”أﺟﻣﻠت اﻟﺷﻲء‬I gathered the thing>, and its opposite is “the detailed”. According to the terminology, it (is that which is in need of clarification), i.e. it is the expression in which understanding its intended meaning is dependent upon an outside factor, such as the indications of the circumstance, or some other expression or disconnected reference. And so, the term that can have more than one meaning is “general” because it is in need of that which clarifies which of its two or more meanings is intended. An example is the saying of the Exalted: {( ٍ‫< 5})ﺛ ََﻼﺛ ََﺔ ﻗُﺮُ وء‬three quru’>. It could possibly refer to the periods of purity, and it 1 An-Nisa’, 43 2 One “wasq” is the amount of 60 “sa^”, which equals 4 “mudds”, and one mudd is the fill of two average sized hands cupped together. 3 An-Nur, 2 4 An-Nisa, 25 5 Al-Baqarah, 228 32 | P a g e
  • 33. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Clarification is to take something out of the confines of ambiguity into the scope of conspicuousness. The explicit is that which bears only one meaning; and it was said that it is that which its meaning is as it was revealed. It is derived from: “‫( ”ﻣﻧﺻﺔ اﻟﻌروس‬minassatul-^arus), which is the chair. could refer to the menstrual cycles. This is because of the term “ qar’ ”, which is shared between purity and menstruation1. (the clarification) (Clarification) refers to the elucidation that is the result of the clarifying agent. It also refers to that by which the clarification takes place, which is the reference2. It also refers to the place of the elucidation and what it indicates, which is the thing being referred to3. The author defined it in view of the first meaning by saying: It (is to take something out of the confines of ambiguity into the scope of conspicuousness), i.e. obviousness and lucidity. This definition has been criticized because of two matters: The first is that this definition does not include the elucidation that exists before the confirmation of any ambiguity, because that would not be taking something out of the confines of ambiguity. The second is that “elucidation” is an abstract concept that would not be described with dwelling in confines. Thus, the mentioning of “confines” is a figure of speech, and figures of speech are avoided in definitions. The answer is that his statement: (to take something out of the confines of ambiguity) is the mere mentioning of the ambiguity, and making an issue clear. What is meant by (the confines) is the issue in which the ambiguity is most likely to exist, and Allah knows best. (the explicit) (The explicit is that which bears only one meaning), such as “Zayd” when saying: “I saw Zayd” (; and it was said) about the definition of the explicit, (that it is that which its meaning is as it was revealed), i.e. its meaning is understood by its mere revelation and is not dependant on some type of interpretation4. (It), i.e. “the explicit” in its Arabic term: nass, (is derived from: “ ‫ﻣﻧﺻﺔ‬ ‫( ”اﻟﻌروس‬minassatul-^arus), which is the chair) that you sit upon so that you would be apparent for those who see. His statement: (derived from: “‫( ”ﻣﻧﺻﺔ اﻟﻌروس‬minassatul-^arus)) is excused, because the origin of the derivations is not derived from something else according to what is correct, rather other things are derived from it. The word “‫ ;ﻣﻧﺻﺔ‬minassah” is derived from the word “ ّ‫ ;ﻧص‬nass”, which linguistically is “elevation”. If the meaning of the expression was clear and explicit, then it was elevated over some other meaning. Thus, he did not mean by his statement: (derived from: “‫”ﻣﻧﺻﺔ اﻟﻌروس‬ (minassatul-^arus)) the technical derivation, he meant that they share the same original letters. The 1 In Arabic there is a class of words called “al-Addad; the opposites”. These are words that have two opposite meanings. 2 i.e. the clarifying agent itself 3 The knowledge that takes place because of the reference. 4 Some claim that the texts that speak about the attributes of Allah are all of this type, which is not true, as the explainer will demonstrate. 33 | P a g e
  • 34. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The apparent is that which can bear two meanings, one of which is more obvious than the other; and because of a reference is interpreted, and hence is called “apparent with a reference”. term “nass” also has another meaning according to the scholars of fiqh: that reference from the Book or the Sunnah that refers to a religious ruling, whether it was explicit or apparent1. (the apparent) (The apparent is that which can bear two meanings, one of which is more obvious than the other), like the word “lion” when saying, “I saw a lion today”. It is apparently in reference to the predatory animal, because that is its literal meaning, and it possibly refers to a brave man. “The apparent” is actually the weightful possibility. If it were taken according to the outweighed possibility, then it is called “interpreted2”. It would only be “interpreted” in light of a reference3, as he said: (and because of a reference is interpreted), i.e. taken according to its less apparent meaning, (and hence is called) upon that interpretation: (“apparent with a reference”), just as it is also called “interpreted”. An example is the saying of the Exalted: {( ٍ‫< 4})وَاﻟﺴﻤَﺎء ﺑَﻨَ ْ َﺎﻫَﺎ ِﺑﺄﯾْﺪ‬We built the sky with “ayd”>. َ َ Apparently, it is the plural of “yad; hand”, which is impossible to be ascribed to Allah5. Therefore, this meaning has been turned away from for the meaning of “power”, because of the definite mental evidence6. 1 i.e. “text” 2 mu’awwal 3 Meaning that it is not permissible to interpret it without proof, but sometimes, the proof necessitates that it be interpreted, as will come. 4 Adh-Dhariyat, 47 5 The explainer means that it is impossible to ascribe an organ to Allah. As for the attribute called “yad”, it is confirmed in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His messenger. The explainer is not denying that. 6 This case is related to the famous debate between Ahlus-Sunnah and the people who liken Allah to the creations. The Likeners believe that all verses that apparently attribute organs, places and motion to Allah must be taken by their apparent meanings. Ahlus-Sunnah said that such verses and hadiths must be interpreted to have a meaning that negates bodily qualities. Know that there are two reasons why these texts should be interpreted and not taken by the apparent meanings. One is that leaving them without interpretation makes the texts contradictory, for Allah and His messenger have confirmed that Allah does not resemble the creation. Hence, organs, places and motion are negated. A second reason is that those apparent texts can bear more than one possible meaning, and the creed must be based on something definitive, not speculative. Thus, what is definitive is to confirm the actual Arabic term, such as “yad”, “wajh”, and “istawa”. What is speculative is to say the istawa means this or that. Thus, what is correct and obligatory is to confirm the Arabic word, and to confirm that Allah does not resemble the creation. What is wrong and forbidden is to confirm the apparent meaning that has bodily connotation. What is permissible is to assign a befitting meaning- not the organ meaning, or not to specify any specific meaning, and to leave it to Allah. 34 | P a g e
  • 35. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE DOINGS The doing of the (religious) lawgiver would either be for gaining a higher status and obedience (to Allah), or not. If it was for gaining a higher status and obedience, then if there was a reference proving that (the act) is specific to him, it is taken as such. If there is no reference then it is not taken as such, because Allah said: {( ٌ‫< }) ﻟَﻘَﺪْ ﰷَ نَ ﻟ َﲂ ِﰲ رَﺳُ ﻮلِ ا ِ أُﺳْ ﻮَ ة ﺣَﺴ ﻨَﺔ‬By God, In the Messenger of Allah is a good َ ٌ ُْ example for you>. It would be taken as an obligation according to some of the mujtahids within our school, and some of them said it is taken as a recommended deed, and some did not say one way or the other. This is a title, and what is meant by it is the clarification of the judgment of the doings of the Messenger r. This is why the author said: (The doing of the (religious) lawgiver), i.e. the Prophet r (would either be for gaining a higher status and obedience (to Allah), or not), or otherwise. “Gaining a higher status” and “obedience” have the same meaning. (If it was for gaining a higher status and obedience, then if there was a reference proving that (the act) is specific to him, it is taken as such). An example is fasting for two consecutive days without breaking the fast, for when the Companions wanted to fast consecutive days without breaking the fast in between, he r prohibited them from that and said: [[‫< ]]ﻟﺴﺕ ﻜﻬﻴﺌﺘﻜﻡ‬My situation is not like yours>. This hadith is agreed upon1. (If there is no reference) that it is specific to him, like the optional night prayers, (then it is not taken as such, because Allah said: {( ٌ‫< 2}) ﻟَﻘَﺪْ ﰷَ نَ ﻟ َﲂ ِﰲ رَﺳُ ﻮلِ ا ِ أُﺳْ ﻮَ ةٌ ﺣَﺴ ﻨَﺔ‬By God, In the Messenger of Allah is a good example for َ ُْ you>), i.e. a righteous model. The term {(‫ }) أﺳﻮة‬in the verse can be pronounced with a dammah on the hamzah, or a kasrah3. Both dialects have been recited in the seven recitations of Al-Qur’an4. Its meaning is, “a good reference for imitation”. The containment in the verse is figurative, like the saying of the Exalted: {( َ‫< 5})ﻟَﻘَﺪْ ﰷَ نَ ِﰲ ﯾ ُﻮﺳُ ﻒ و ِإﺧْﻮَ ﺗِﻪ آ َ تٌ ِﻠﺴﺎ ِﺋﻠِﲔ‬By God, In Yusuf and his brothers were signs for those َ ِ َ َ who seek answers>. If the deed was not specific to him r, then it is inclusive of the entire nation. In that case, if the ruling of that doing were known, whether it was an obligation or a recommendation, then the issue is clear. If its ruling is not known, (it would be taken as an obligation, according to some of the mujtahids within our school), both in reference to him r, and in reference to us, because that is most precautious. According to that so judges Malik and most of his companions, (and some of them said it is taken as a recommended deed), because that is the least certain matter, (and some did not say one way or the other), because of the conflict of references in that matter. 1 Meaning that it is narrated by the Two Shaykhs. 2 Al-Ahzab, 21 3 i.e. “uswah” or “iswah” 4 This does not mean that there are only seven recitations. There are 14 recitations. Three are narrated by tawatur, seven are mash-hur, and the rest are anomalous, it is not permissible to recite them. 5 Yusuf, 7 35 | P a g e
  • 36. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If the deed was not for gaining a higher status and obedience, then it is taken to be a permissibility. The saying accepted by the (religious) lawgiver is the saying of the (religious) lawgiver, and his acceptance of a doing is like his doing. Whatever was done during his time, but in his absence and he knew about it without disapproving of it, then its judgment is the judgment of what was done in his presence. (If the deed) of he who comes with the religious law r (was not for gaining a higher status and obedience), like standing, sitting, eating, drinking and sleeping, (then it is taken to be a permissibility) in reference to him and in reference to us. This is in what pertains to the basis of the deed. As for the description of the deed, some of the Malikiyys said that it is taken as a recommendation. What supports that is what came from many of the Salaf in imitating him in that. Some of them said that it is taken as a permissibility. Based on what the author said, the restriction of his doings r, to that which is obligatory, recommended and permissible is known. Hence, the forbidden does not occur from him r, because he is infallible, nor does the disliked, and not even that which is different from what is best1, because that rarely happens from a pious person of his nation, so how about from himr2? (The saying) of someone, which takes place in the presence of, and was (accepted by the (religious) lawgiver) r (is the saying of the (religious) lawgiver), i.e. is like his saying. An example is his acceptance r of Abu Bakr As-Siddiq’s saying t about giving the spoils of the war casualty to the one who killed him. This hadith is agreed upon. (And his acceptance), i.e. the one who comes with the religious law, (of a doing) that was done by someone in his presence (is like his doing), i.e. like the doing of the one who comes with the religious law, like his acceptance r of Khalid Ibn Walid’s eating the lizard. This hadith is agreed upon. This is the ruling because he r is infallible from approving the forbidden. (Whatever was done during his time), i.e. his era r, (but in his absence, and he knew about it without disapproving of it, then its judgment is the judgment of what was done in his presence). An example is his knowledge about Abu Bakr’s swearing not to eat while being angry, but then he ate when he saw a benefit in that, as taken from the hadith of Muslim in the chapter pertaining to meals. 1 Which is less than being disliked. 2 This is the weak saying among the scholars of Ahlus-Sunnah. What is correct, and what the majority has taken, is that a prophet would never commit blasphemy, or a major sin, or a minor sin that shows a low character. As for a minor sin that does not show low character, for that is possible to occur, as Allah said about Adam: {(‫رَ ﺑﮫ‬ ُ‫ﱠ‬ ‫})وﻋﺻﻰ َآدم‬ َُ َ َ َ <Adam disobeyed his Lord> (Taha, 121), and said to Muhammad:{( ‫ ﹶﻧﹺ‬ ‫ﺮ‬ ‫ﻐ‬‫ﺍﺳ‬ )} <repent for your sin> ‫ﺒﻚ‬‫ ﻟﺬ‬ ‫ﻔ‬ ‫ﺘ‬ ‫ﻭ‬ (Muhammad, 19). As for the disliked, if the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬ did it by the order of Allah to clarify its ruling for the people, then it is not disliked in reference to him, or else, it would be. 36 | P a g e
  • 37. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c ABROGATION The meaning of naskh (abrogation) is removal. It is said (in Arabic): “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت اﻟﺷﻣس اﻟظل‬the sun abrogated the shadow>” if it removed it. It was said that it means: “to transfer” because of their saying: “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب‬I copied what is in the book>” if one transferred it by copying the shapes of its writing. Its definition is: the subsequent address that refers to lifting a judgment established by a previous address, in a way that had it not been for it, the previous one would (have remained) established, and it is delayed after it. (The) linguistic (meaning of naskh (abrogation) is removal. It is said (in Arabic): “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت اﻟﺷﻣس اﻟظل‬the sun abrogated the shadow>” if it removed it) and lifted it by the spreading of its light. In this context, removing and lifting have the same meaning. (It was said that it means, “to transfer” because of their saying: “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب‬I copied what is in the book>” if one transferred it by copying the shapes of its writing). There is some question about referencing this meaning of transfer for the word “naskh”, because in reality, copying a book is not transferring what is in the original, rather it is initiating something similar to what is in the original by putting it in another place, so contemplate on that. This is also not a case of difference in opinion, it is an elucidation of what the word “naskh” means in the language. He mentioned that it is used with two meanings: “removing” and “transferring”. Some said that it has a third meaning, which is “to change something”, as said by some: “‫< ”ﻧﺳﺧت اﻟرﯾﺢ ءاﺛﺎر اﻟدﯾﺎر‬The wind changed the traces of the campsites>. It seems, however, that this meaning goes back to the first, which is “removal”, for that is more general. There is difference about the usage of the two meanings mentioned by the author. It was said that both meanings are literal usages and as such, the word is shared between them. It was said that it is literal in reference to “removal”, and figurative in reference to “transfer”. Some have given a third saying: that it is literal in reference to “transfer”, figurative in reference to “removal”, and this is farfetched. (Its definition), i.e. its meaning according to the religious terminology, (is: the subsequent address that refers to lifting a judgment established by a previous address, in a way that had it not been for it), i.e. had it not been for the subsequent address, (the) judgment of the (previous one would (have remained) established, and it), i.e. the subsequent address (is delayed after it), i.e. the previous address. What the author has mentioned, may Allah have mercy upon him, is the definition of the abrogative, not abrogation. However, the definition of abrogation can be taken from it: “the lifting of a judgment established by a previous address by another address, that had it not been for it, the judgment would have remained established, and it was delayed after it”. By “lifting the judgment”, we mean lifting its relation to the doing of the accountable. Our statement: “the lifting of a judgment” is a main idea that includes abrogation and otherwise, the clarification of which will come. Our statement “established by an address” is a subtopic by which the lifting of a judgment established by non-accountability is excluded, because that is not abrogation, and 37 | P a g e
  • 38. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The abrogation of the text while its ruling remains (affirmative) is permissible, had it been, then the religious law in its entirety would be abrogation, because all of the obligations like the prayer, Zakah, fasting and Pilgrimage lift the state of non-accountability. Our statement: “by another address” is a second subtopic by which is excluded the lifting of the judgment because of insanity or death. Our statement: “had it not been for it, the judgment would have remained established” is a third subtopic by which is excluded that which is the aim of a goal, or the reason of some issue, and the second address explicitly mentions the reaching of the goal or the expiration of the issue. That would not be abrogation of the first address, because if the second address that refers to the issue had not come, the judgment would not have remained established for the reaching of the goal or the expiration of the issue. An example is the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 1}) َ أ َﳞَﺎ ا ِ ﻦَ آﻣ ُﻮا ِإذَا ﻧ ُﻮدِيَ ِﻠﺼﻼة ﻣِﻦْ ﯾ َﻮْ م اﻟْﺠﻤﻌﺔ ﻓ َﺎﺳْ ﻌَﻮْا إِﱃ ذﻛﺮ ا ِ وذَرُ وا ﻟْا ﺒ ْﯿ َﻊ‬O those who have believed, if on َ َ ِِْ َ َُُِ ِ ِ َ ََ Friday the prayer has been called to, then endeavor to the remembrance of Allah, and leave out buying>. Thus, the prohibition of selling expires by the conclusion of the Friday prayer. Hence, it is not said that the saying of the Exalted: {( ‫< }) ﻓ َِﺈذَا ﻗُﻀِ َﺖِ اﻟﺼﻼة ﻓ َﺎﻧ ْ َﴩوا ِﰲ اﻷَرْض وَاﺑْﺘَﻐﻮا ﻣِﻦْ ﻓ َﻀْ ﻞ ا‬If the prayer is concluded, ِ ُ ِ ْ ُِ ُ َ then spread throughout the land and commence with that which is good (such as following the funeral, selling and buying, etc.) > abrogates the first verse, rather it clarifies the extent of the prohibition. Likewise the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 2})ﺣُﺮم َﻠَﯿْﲂ ﺻَ ﯿْﺪُ اﻟْﱪ ﻣَﺎ دﻣْﱲ ﺣُﺮُ ﻣًﺎ‬It is forbidden for you to hunt edible ُْ ُ َ ُْ َ land animals as long as you are in the state of ihram>. It is not said that it is abrogated by the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< })و ِإذَا َ ﻠَﻠْﱲ ﻓ َﺎﺻﻄَ ﺎدوا‬If you exit the state if ihram then hunt>, because the prohibition is ُ ْ ُْ َ because of the state of ihram, and then that state expired. Our statement, “and it was delayed after it” is a forth subtopic by which is excluded that which is connected to the address, whether a description, condition, or exception, because that would be specification, as previously mentioned, and that is not abrogation. (The abrogation of the text while its ruling remains (affirmative) is permissible), i.e.: Permissible is the abrogation of the script of the verse in the book of the Qur’an, and the abrogation of its recitation as a part of the Qur’an, while its judgment and the accountability of practicing it are established. An example is the verse of stoning: [‫< ]اﻟﺷﯾﺦ و اﻟﺷﯾﺧﺔ إذا زﻧﯾﺎ ﻓﺎرﺟﻣوھﻣﺎ أﻟﺑﺗﺔ‬Stone the shaykh and female shaykh if they committed adultery>. ^Umar t said, “Do not destroy yourselves because of the verse of stoning”3. Then he recited it and said, “For surely, we used to recite it”. This is narrated by Malik in Al-Muwatta’. He said, “the shaykh and the female shaykh means: the non-virgin male and female.” Other than Malik has narrated this with the expression: [‫< ]اﻟﺷﯾﺦ و اﻟﺷﯾﺧﺔ إذا زﻧﯾﺎ ﻓﺎرﺟﻣوھﻣﺎ أﻟﺑﺗﺔ ﻧﻛﺎﻻ ﻣن ﷲ و ﷲ ﻋزﯾز ﺣﻛﯾم‬As an exemplary punishment from Allah, stone the male and female shaykh if they committed adultery, and Allah is mighty and wise>. The basis of the hadith is narrated by the Two Shaykhs without the mentioning of the expression of the abrogated 1 Al-Jumu^ah, 9 2 Al-Ma’idah, 96 3 Which means do not deny the ruling of stoning because its recitation has been abrogated from the Qur’an. 38 | P a g e
  • 39. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c and the abrogation of the ruling while its text remains (established), and the abrogation of both matters simultaneously. Abrogation is divided into: (that which has a) substitute, and (that which has no substitute); verse. What is meant by the “non-virgin” is the one who has had sexual intercourse within a valid marriage contract1. Its opposite is the virgin, and Allah knows best. (And) also permissible is (the abrogation of the ruling while its text remains (established)), such as the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 2})وَا ِ ﻦَ ﯾُﺘَﻮَﻓﻮْ نَ ﻣ ْﲂ وﯾَﺬَرُ ون أ َزْ وَا ًﺎ وَﺻِ ﯿﺔ ِﻷَزْ وَا ِ ِ ﻢ ﻣ َﺎ ًﺎ إِﱃ اﻟْﺤَﻮْ ل‬The widows of the dead have an obligatory ِ َ َ ْ ً َ َ ُْ ِ mourning period of one year>. It was abrogated by the verse before it, I mean the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 3}) ﯾ ََﱰَﺑﺼﻦَ ِﺑﺄَﻧْﻔُﺴﻬِﻦ أَرْ ﺑَﻌﺔ أَﺷْ ﻬُﺮ وﻋ ْ ًا‬They must wait for four months and ten days>. Examples of such are ‫َ َ ٍ َ َﴩ‬ ِ ْ plenty. (And the abrogation of both matters); the ruling and the recitation (simultaneously), is permissible. This is like the hadith of Muslim: “Among what was revealed in the Qur’an was that 10 breast-feedings make the child unmarriageable, then it was abrogated and reduced to five”; i.e. the recitation was abrogated and the ruling remained, like the verse of the shaykh and the female shaykh, as said by Ash-Shafi^iyy and others. The Malikiyys and others said that a single breast-feeding makes the child unmarriageable, and that there is no evidence in the hadith of ^A’ishah, may Allah accept her deeds, because its apparent meaning is abandoned. This is because it says, “The Messenger of Allah r died and that was among what was recited in the Qur’an”, and this implies abrogation after his death r, and then for it to be Qur’an would not be confirmed. Furthermore, the fact that it is the narration of one person is not evidence4, because if some depreciating factor affects it, then its application would be stopped. Thus, when this narration did not come except as an ahad narration, while usually the likes of such a narration would be mutawatir, it became suspicious and depreciated. Additionally, odd recitations are not used as evidence according to what is correct, because they are not actually Qur’an, and whoever narrated them did not narrate them under the guise of them being hadith, rather that they are Qur’an, which is a mistake. If a mistake took place in a narration, it is not used as evidence, and Allah knows best. (Abrogation is divided into: (that which has a) substitute), just as the abrogation of facing Jerusalem for facing the Ka^bah, (and (that which has no substitute)), as in the abrogation of the saying of the Exalted: {( ً‫< 5}) ِإذَا َ ﺟ ْﱲ اﻟﺮﺳُ ﻮل ﻓَﻘَﺪ ُﻣﻮا ﺑ َْﲔ ﯾَﺪَيْ ﳒَ ْﻮَاﰼُ ْ ﺻَ ﺪﻗَﺔ‬If you have confided in the َ َ َ ُُ َ Messenger, then give charity>6. 1 He is called in Arabic “muhsan”. 2 Al-Baqarah, 240 3 Al-Baqarah, 234 4 Both the Shafi^iyys and the Malikiyys agree that the narration of one trustworthy person is used as evidence in the matters of practical rules. 5 Al-Mujadalah, 12 6 This was abrogated before its application. 39 | P a g e
  • 40. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c …and to: that which is tougher, or to that which is lighter. It is permissible to abrogate the Book by the Book, to abrogate the Sunnah by the Book, and to abrogate the Sunnah by the Sunnah. (And ) abrogation (to: that which is tougher) is permissible, such as the abrogation of choosing between fasting Ramadan and paying food as a redemption, to the requirement of fasting; (or) abrogation (to that which is lighter), such as in the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 1})إِنْ َﻜُﻦْ ﻣ ْﲂ ﻋِﴩونَ ﺻَ ﺎ ِﺮُ ونَ ﯾ َْﻐ ِﻠﺒﻮا ﻣِﺎﺋَﺘَﲔ‬If among you there are 20 patient ones, they will overcome two ِْ ُ ُ ْ ُْ ِ hundred>. Then He said: {(‫ﻣ ْﲂ ﻣ َﺔ ﺻَ ﺎ ِﺮَ ةٌ ﯾَﻐ ِﻠ ُﺒﻮا ﻣِﺎﺋَﺘَﲔ‬ ِْ ْ ٌ ِ ُْ ِ ْ‫< 2})ﻓَﺈِنْ َﻜُﻦ‬If among you there are 100 patient ones, they will overcome 200>. (It is permissible to abrogate the Book by the Book), such as in the two verses of the waiting period of the woman and the two verses of the patient ones. It is also permissible (to abrogate the Sunnah by the Book), such as the abrogation of facing Jerusalem, which is confirmed by the doings in the Sunnah and narrated in the Two Books of Sahih, by the saying of the Exalted: {( ِ‫< 3})ﻓ َﻮَل و ْ َﻚَ ﺷَ ﻄْ ﺮَ اﻟْﻤَﺴ ِ ﺪ ا ْﻟﺤَﺮَام‬Turn your face toward the sacred Mosque, O Muhammad>. ِ ْ َ (And) it is permissible (to abrogate the Sunnah by the Sunnah), just as in the hadith of Muslim: [[‫< ]]ﻜﻨﺕ ﻨﻬﻴﺘﻜﻡ ﻋﻥ ﺯﻴﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻘﺒﻭﺭ ﻓﺯﺭﻭﻫﺎ‬I forbade you from visiting the graves. Now visit them>. The intent of the author is in reference to what is other than abrogating the mutawatir Sunnah by the ahad Sunnah, for he explicitly mentions its impermissibility, and the fact that it is actually permissible will come. He also refrained from explicitly clarifying the judgment of abrogating the Book by the Sunnah, however his present talk implies that it is permissible in reference to the mutawatir Sunnah, and not by the ahad, and the permissibility of that has been differed upon, as well as its actual occurrence. The author of Jam^ Al-Jawami^ said, “What is correct is that abrogating the Qur’an by the Sunnah is permissible, i.e. whether the Sunnah was mutawatir or ahad.” He then said, “…and the truth is that it did not occur except by the mutawatir.” The explainer4 said in his explanation of Jam^ Al- Jawami^: 1 Al-Anfal, 65 2 Al-Anfal, 66 3 Al-Baqarah, 144 4 He means Al-Mahalliyy 40 | P a g e
  • 41. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c It is permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir by that which is mutawatir from either one of those two, and to abrogate that which is ahad by that that which is ahad, or by that which is mutawatir. It is not permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir by that which is ahad. “It was said that it took place with the ahad, like the hadith of At-Tirmidhiyy and others: [[‫< ]]ﻻ ﻭﺼﻴﺔ ﻟﻭﺍﺭﺙ‬There is no will for an heir>, for it abrogates the saying of the Exalted: {( َ‫< 1})ﻛﺘِﺐَ َﻠَﯿْﲂ ِإذَا ﺣَﴬ أ َ َ ﺪَﰼُ ُ اﻟْﻤَﻮْت إِنْ َﺮَكَ َﲑًا اﻟ ْﻮَﺻﯿﺔ ِﻠْﻮَا ِ َ ْﻦِ وَاﻷﻗْﺮَ ﺑِﲔ‬If death has approached any of َْ ُ ِ ْ ُ ََ ُْ ُ you, and you have left behind assets, then making a will for your parents and close relatives has been prescribed for you>. I say: we do not submit to this, or the likes of it not being mutawatir, because of the mujtahids who judged it as abrogation and their closeness to the time of the Prophet r2.” In some of the copies of The Pages, it says, “the abrogation of the Book by the Sunnah is not permissible”. What he means is if it was not mutawatir, the reference for which will come. He chose the saying that it is not permissible, and it was already mentioned that it is permissible to specify the Book by the Sunnah, so it is as if he saw that specification is an easier matter than abrogation. (It is permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir), whether from the Book or the Sunnah, (by that which is mutawatir from either one of those two, and to abrogate that which is ahad by that that which is ahad, or by that which is mutawatir. It is not permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir), like the Qur’an and the mutawatir Sunnah, (by that which is ahad), because it is less in strength. It was already mentioned that what is correct is that it is permissible, because the place of the abrogation is the ruling, and that which is derived from the mutawatir text is speculative, so it is like the ahad, and Allah knows best3. 1 Al-Baqarah, 180 2 Meaning that it reached them by tawatur and they accordingly ruled. 3 Therein is yet more indication for the position of those who follow the schools, for he who does not have enough knowledge might rely on a hadith with an abrogated ruling, instead of referring back to the schools who have already done the work that this unqualified person is attempting to perform. There are many cases of abrogation, as well as cases in which the scholars have differed about whether the ruling is abrogated or not. Therefore, let the person who wants to worship Allah in a valid way refrain from abandoning the mujtahids and the four schools, or following any one of the four, thinking that his possession of a book of the Qur’an and the books of hadith empower him to deduce rulings. 41 | P a g e
  • 42. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c SECTION PERTAINING TO CONFLICT If two texts conflict which each other, then they would not be devoid of both either being: inclusive, specific, or one is inclusive and the other is specific, or both of them are inclusive from a certain viewpoint, and specific from a another viewpoint. If they are both inclusive and it is possible to merge them, then they are merged. If they cannot be merged, then no weight is given to one over the other if the date (of the texts) is unknown. This is a section for clarifying what is done in case of conflict between references. The conflict is called in Arabic: “ta^arud”, from “‫< ”ﻋرض اﻟﺷﻲء ﯾﻌرض‬The thing happened>. It is as if both of the texts “happened” to the other upon their differing. (If two texts conflict which each other), i.e. two texts from the sayings of Allah the glorified and exalted, or from the statements of His messenger r, or one of them is the saying of Allah and the other is the saying of the Messenger of Allah r, (then they would not be devoid of both either being: inclusive, specific, or one is inclusive and the other is specific, or both of them are inclusive from a certain viewpoint, and specific from a another viewpoint. If they are both inclusive and it is possible to merge them, then they are merged). That would be by each of them being interpreted in a specific way, because it is not possible to merge between them while taking each of them according to its own generality, because that is impossible, since it leads to merging between two opposite matters. Thus, the mentioning of “merging between them” is actually a figure of speech for specifying each of them to a certain situation. An example is the hadith of Muslim: [[‫< ]]أﻻ أﺧﺑرﻛم ﺑﺧﯾر اﻟﺷﮭود اﻟذي ﯾﺄﺗﻲ ﺑﺷﮭﺎدﺗﮫ ﻗﺑل أن ﯾﺳﺄﻟﮭﺎ‬Should I not inform you about the best of witnesses? He is the one who comes with his testimony before he is asked for it>. This is in conjunction with the hadith of the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﺧﯾرﻛم ﻗرﻧﻲ ﺛم اﻟذﯾن ﯾﻠوﻧﮭم ﺛم اﻟذﯾن ﯾﻠوﻧﮭم ﺛم ﯾﻛون ﺑﻌدھم ﻗوم ﯾﺷﮭدون ﻗﺑل أن ﯾﺳﺗﺷﮭدوا‬The best of you are from my century, then those who come after them, then those who come after them, then after them there will be people who testify before being asked>. The first one is interpreted to refer to the one who has a witness and does not know about that, and the second is interpreted to refer to the one who knows. Some have interpreted the first one to be in reference to the right of Allah, such as divorce and freeing a slave, and the second is in reference to other than that. (If they cannot be merged), i.e. the two texts, (then no weight is given to one over the other) in reference to their application (if the date (of the texts) is unknown), i.e. until a preponderant for one of them becomes clear. An example is the saying of the Exalted: {( ْ‫< 1})أَوْ ﻣَﺎ ﻣﻠﻜَﺖ َأﯾْﻤَﺎﳖُ ُﻢ‬It is permissible to have sexual intercourse with your slave women>, and the saying ْ ََ of the Exalted: {(‫ﲡَ ْ ﻤﻌﻮا ﺑ َْﲔ اﻷﺧ َْﲔ‬ ْ ُْ َ ُ َ ْ‫< 2})وأَن‬You cannot marry two sisters the same time>. The first verse َ makes the joining of two sisters under the ownership of slavery permissible, and the second verse 1 Al-Ma^arij, 30 2 An-Nisa, 23 42 | P a g e
  • 43. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If the date is known, then the previous text is abrogated by the subsequent. Likewise (is done) if they are both specific. forbids having two sisters lawful for one’s sexual pleasure at the same time1. Consequently, ^Uthman t was neutral when asked about that, and said, “One verse made them lawful and one verse made them forbidden.” Then the scholars ruled that it is prohibited based on another reference, which is that the original case of sexual intercourse is that it is prohibited. (If the date is known, then the previous text is abrogated by the subsequent), such as in the case of the two verses of the waiting period of the widow and the two verses of the patient ones. What is meant by “the subsequent” is in reference to its revelation, not the order of recitation. (Likewise (is done) if they), i.e. the two texts, (are both specific), i.e. if it is possible to merge between them then they are merged, such as in the hadith: “that he r made wudu’ and washed his feet”. This is famous in the Two Books of Sahih and other books. In another hadith, it is narrated: “that he r made wudu’ and sprayed water on his feet while they were in sandals”. An-Nasa’iyy, Al- Bayhaqiyy and others narrated this. They have been merged by saying that the spaying was while he was renewing a wudu’2, because of what was narrated from some routes that this is the wudu’ of the one who did not enter the state of ritual impurity. It was said that what was meant by the hadith in which he washed his feet was the religious wudu’, and in the hadith of spraying what was meant was the linguistic wudu’, which is “cleaning”. It was also said that he washed his feet while they were in sandals, and that was called “spraying” as a figure of speech. If there was no way to merge between them, and the date was unknown, then the application of both of them is halted until a preponderant for one of them becomes apparent. An example is what was narrated that he r was asked about what is permissible for the man while his wife is menstruating. He said: [[‫< ]]ﻣﺎ ﻓوق اﻹزار‬What is above the izar>. Abu Dawud narrates this. It was also narrated that he said: [[‫< ]]اﺻﻧﻌوا ﻛل ﺷﻲء إﻻ اﻟﻧﻛﺎح‬Do everything except sexual intercourse>. Muslim narrates this. Included in that is the enjoyment of what is below the izar. And so, two hadiths are in conflict in this issue. Some gave weight to the prohibition because it is more precautious, and others gave weight to the permissibility because it is the origin in what pertains to the married woman. The first saying is what is famous according to the Shafi^iyys and us, and it was said by Abu Hanifah and a group of scholars. It happened that in the explainers talk, upon mentioning the second hadith, he said, “Included in that is the “[wat’]” above the izar, and so the two hadiths are in conflict in this issue.” It seems that this is a slip, because what is above the izar3 can be enjoyed without any difference in opinion4. An- 1 Having two sisters in one marriage contract is invalid, and it is valid to marry one and to own the other, or to own both, but it is invalid to have sexual intercourse with both of them. 2 Meaning that he already had wudu’ and was making a new one on top of it. 3 Meaning above the naval and below the knee 4 This is if he meant by the Arabic term “[wat’]” sexual pleasure less than intercourse. If he meant by that term the actual sexual intercourse, then there is also no disagreement that the intercourse is forbidden even with a barrier while the wife menstruates. 43 | P a g e
  • 44. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If one of them is inclusive and the other is specific, then the general is restricted by the specific. If both were inclusive from a viewpoint and specific from another viewpoint, then the inclusiveness of those two texts is restricted by the specification of the other. Nawawiyy said in the explanation of the hadith of Muslim, “In fact, a group of many scholars have conveyed the consensus about it.” If the date is known, then the previous one would be abrogated by the subsequent, as mentioned in the hadith of visiting the grave. (If one of them is inclusive and the other is specific, then the general is restricted by the specific), like the hadith of the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﻓﯾﻣﺎ ﺳﻘت اﻟﺳﻣﺎء اﻟﻌﺷر‬One tenth is due on the crops that have been watered by the sky>. This is in conjunction with the other hadith of the Two Books of Sahih: [[‫< ]]ﻟﯾس ﻓﯾﻣﺎ دون ﺧﻣﺳﺔ أوﺳق ﺻدﻗﺔ‬There is no Zakah in what did not reach the amount of five wasqs>. For that reason, the first one is specified by the second, whether or not they came together, or one of them preceded the other, or the date was unknown1. (If both were inclusive from a viewpoint and specific from another viewpoint, then the inclusiveness of those two texts is restricted by the specification of the other), if that were possible, or else preponderance is needed. An example of what is possible to be specified is the hadith of Abu Dawud and others: [[‫< ]]إذا ﺑﻠﻎ اﻟﻣﺎء ﻗﻠﺗﯾن ﻓﺈﻧّﮫ ﻻ ﯾﻧﺟس‬If the water reached the amount of two qullahs, then it surely does not become filthy>. This is when in conjunction with the hadith of Ibn Majah and others: [[‫< ]]اﻟﻣﺎء ﻻ ﯾﻧﺟﺳﮫ ﺷﻲء إﻻ ﻣﺎ ﻏﻠب ﻋﻠﻰ رﯾﺣﮫ و طﻌﻣﮫ و ﻟوﻧﮫ‬Nothing makes water filthy ّ except what overcomes its smell, taste or color>. The first is specific in reference to the two qullahs, and inclusive of that which is changed and that which is not changed. The second is specific in reference to that which is changed, and inclusive of that which is two qullahs and what is less than that. Thus, the inclusiveness of the first is restricted by the specification of the second, and hence is judged that whatever is less than two qullahs becomes filthy even if it did not change. This is the school of the Shafi^iyys. The Malikyys gave weight to the second because it is explicit and the first one only conflicts with it by that which is understood from it2, and what is meant in this case is the presentation of an example3. An example of that which it is not possible to restrict the generality of each by the specification of the other is the hadith of Al-Bukhariyy: [[‫< ]]ﻣن ﺑدّل دﯾﻧﮫ ﻓﺎﻗﺗﻠوه‬Execute whoever changes his religion>, and the hadith of the Two Books of Sahih: “that he r prevented the killing of women”. So the first is inclusive of men and women and specific to apostates, and the second is specific to women and inclusive 1 This is the point missed by the people who categorically deny acceptable innovations in the religion. The hadith: [‫ ﹶﹶ ﹲ‬   ‫ ,]ﹺ ﱠ ﹸ ﱠ ﹺﺪ‬which literally says that every innovation is misguidance, is general. Its generality is specified ‫ﻋﺔ ﺿﻼﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﻛﻞ ﺑ‬ by the hadith [‫ﰲ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻡ ﺳﻨﺔٍ ﺣﺴﻨﺔ ً ﻓﻠﻪ ﺃﺟﺮﻫﺎ‬ ‫]ﺳﻦ‬ <Whoever starts a good sunnah in Islam has its reward…>. Thus, the first hadith means: Every innovation (that does not comply with the religion) is misguidance, or: most innovation is misguidance. This is why An-Nawawiyy said about the hadith: “A specified, general (text).” 2 Not what is explicitly mentioned in it 3 Because the aforementioned rulings are not based merely on the presented texts, so presenting these texts is only to give an example of the case at hand. 44 | P a g e
  • 45. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE CONSENSUS As for the consensus, it is the agreement of the scholars of an era about the judgment of an issue. By “the scholars”, we mean the scholars of judgment deduction (fuqaha’), and by the “issue”, we mean the religious issue. The consensus of this nation, and not that of another one, is evidence, because of his saying, may Allah raise his rank and protect him from what he feared for his nation: ‫ﻻ ﺗﺟﺗﻣﻊ أﻣﺗﻲ‬ ‫< ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﻼﻟﺔ‬My nation will not gather on a misguidance>. The religious law came with the infallibility of the nation. The consensus is an evidence for the following era, and for any era to come. It is not conditional for it to be evidence that the first era would come to an end according to the correct saying. of the female original blasphemers who have no treaty with the Muslims and the female apostates. Therefore, these hadiths conflict with each other in the issue of the female apostate; is she executed or not? Thus, preponderance is sought. Weight was given to the establishment of the inclusiveness of the first, and the specification of the second to the female original blasphemers who have no treaty with the Muslims, based on a hadith narrated about executing the female apostate, and Allah knows best. (As for the consensus), it is the third of the four religious references, I mean: the Book, the Sunnah, the consensus and the analogical deduction. In Arabic, it is “ijma^”, and linguistically, it means “determination”, as in the saying of the Exalted: {(‫< 1})ﻓَﺄَﲨﻌﻮا َأﻣْﺮَﰼ‬Determine your matter>. According to ُْ ُ ِ ْ the terminology, (it is the agreement of the scholars of an era) from the nation of Muhammad r (about the judgment of an issue). Hence, for the common folk to agree with them is not considered2, according to what is known, and era means “a time”. (By “the scholars”, we mean the scholars of judgment deduction (fuqaha’)), meaning the mujtahids, so for the scholars of the Foundations of Fiqh to agree with them is not considered. (And by the “issue”, we mean the religious issue), because that is the subject of the contemplation of the scholars of judgment deduction, as opposed to other than religious issues, such as linguistic issues, for that is the subject of the contemplation of the scholars of the language. (The consensus of this nation, and not that of another one, is evidence, because of his saying, r: [[‫< ]]ﻻ ﺗﺟﺗﻣﻊ أﻣﺗﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﻼﻟﺔ‬My nation will not gather on a misguidance>). At- Tirmidhiyy and others narrate this. (The religious law came with the infallibility of the nation) because of this hadith and others. (The consensus is an evidence for the following era), and the one after it, (and) the consensus is an evidence (for any era to come), whether that was the era of the Companions or the era of those who came after them. (It is not conditional for it to be evidence), i.e. for the consensus to be evidence, (that the first era would come to an end) by its people dying (according to the correct saying), because the references about the consensus being evidence do not mention that. Therefore, if the mujtahids of an era agreed on a judgment, they do not 1 Yunus, 71 2 If this is clear, then be mindful that the agreement of the people of a town or country is not evidence. It is possible that most of them are mistaken about a case. Their agreement is not the consensus that is religiously considered. 45 | P a g e
  • 46. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c (However), if we say that the lapsing of the era is a condition, then the consideration is given to the one who was born during their lifetime, became knowledgeable, and became among the people of judgment deduction. Then it would be permissible for them to retract that judgment. The consensus is verified by their sayings and their doings; and by the sayings of some of them and the doings of others, while that becomes widespread and the rest do not comment on it. The statement of one of the Companions is not evidence (given priority) over someone other than him according to the new saying. have the right, nor do others, to oppose that. It was said that it is a condition for it to be evidence that the mujtahids of that era would all die. This is because of the possibility that something that opposes the deduction of one of them would occur, and thus he retracts. The answer is that we prevent his retraction by virtue of the consensus that took place before it. ((However), if we say that the lapsing of the era is a condition, then the consideration) for the establishment of the consensus (is given to the one who was born during their lifetime, became knowledgeable, and became among the people of judgment deduction). So if he opposed them, then their previous consensus would not be concluded. (Then it would be permissible for them), according to that saying, (to retract that judgment) that they agreed upon. According to the correct saying, the opposition of whoever was born during their time has no effect, and it is not permissible for them to retract. (The consensus is verified by their sayings), i.e. by the sayings of the mujtahids about a judgment among the different judgments; that it is lawful, forbidden, obligatory, recommended, or otherwise. This is called the “stated consensus”; (and) it is also valid by (their doings), in such a way that they would do something, and their doing proves its permissibility, or else they would have united on a misguidance, and they are infallible from that as previously mentioned. The scholars said that this type of consensus would almost never occur, because if the nation did something, there would certainly be someone who spoke about its judgment. It was said that their consensus about the confirmation of the Qur’an documented in book-form is a consensus by action, which is not true, because it was preceded by a conference between the Companions, may Allah accept their deeds. It was said that an example of the “consensus by action” is the nation’s agreement about circumcision, for it is valid by the consensus of action. As for its obligation or recommendation, that is based on their sayings and is a matter of difference of opinion. (And) the consensus is valid (by the sayings of some of them and the doings of others, while that) saying or doing (becomes widespread; and the rest) of the mujtahids (do not comment on it) while having knowledge about it, and they do not object to it. This is called “the silent consensus”. The apparent meaning of the author’s talk is that this is a type of consensus, and in that, there is difference of opinion. It was said that it is evidence but not a consensus, and it was said that it is not a consensus, nor evidence. (The statement of one of the Companions is not evidence (given priority) over someone other than him) among the Companions, and that is by agreement; nor over someone who is not a companion, and that is (according to the new saying). According to the old saying, it is evidence, and this is the saying of Malik t because of the hadith: [[‫< ]]ﺃﺼﺤﺎﺒﻲ ﻜﺎﻟﻨﺠﻭﻡ ﺒﺄﻴﻬﻡ ﺍﻗﺘﺩﻴﺘﻡ ﺍﻫﺘﺩﻴﺘﻡ‬My Companions are like the 46 | P a g e
  • 47. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c CONVEYED INFORMATION As for conveyed information, it is subject to truth or falsehood. Information is divided into two categories: ahad, and mutawatir. The mutawatir necessitates (confirmed) knowledge, and it is what is narrated by a group, the likes of which would not conspire to a lie, and so on, until reaching that which is being informed about. (The original event) must have been seen or heard, and not deduced. The ahad necessitates application and does not necessitate (definite) knowledge because of the possibility of error in it. It is divided into two categories: mursal and musnad. The musnad is that which has a continuous chain of narration. The mursal is that which does not have a continuous chain of narration. stars; whichever of them you followed, you are guided>. Ibn Majah narrates this. As for mentioning “one of the Companions”, nothing implied should be understood from it, because the difference of opinion is in reference to that about which they have disagreed. Mentioned in this chapter is the subject of conveyed information. This is what is found in some copies, and most of the copies do not have this as an independent chapter, and have rather settled with starting with his statement: (As for the conveyed information…). He first mentioned its definition, then its categories: (It is subject to truth or falsehood), meaning that it is subject to either of these two situations, not that both of them would be existing in it at the same time. Also, for it to be subject to both situations is in reference to looking at it as far as itself is concerned; i.e. as far as being “information” is concerned, such as if you said: “Zayd stood”. “Truth” is for it to comply with reality, and “falsehood” is the lack of its compliance with reality. Its truthfulness or falsehood could be certain based on some outside issue. The first is like the information from Allah the exalted, and the information from His messenger r. The second is like if you said, “Two opposites exist at the same time and the same place”, because that is mentally impossible. Hence, the fact that some information is definitely true or definitely false does not exclude it from being “information”. (Information is divided into two categories: ahad, and mutawatir. The mutawatir) is that which (necessitates (confirmed) knowledge, and it is what is narrated by a group, the likes of which would not conspire to a lie, and so on, until reaching that which is being informed about. (The original event) must have been seen or heard, and not deduced), like the information about witnessing the existence of Makkah, or hearing the information from Allah the exalted from the route of the Prophet, as opposed to information from a deduced matter1 (The ahad), which is that which did not reach the level of tawatur, (necessitates application) of that for which it is a reference, (and does not necessitate (definite) knowledge, because of the possibility of error in it), even if that was because of absent- mindedness or forgetfulness. (It), i.e. the ahad information, (is divided into two categories: mursal and musnad. The musnad is that which has a continuous chain of narration), because its 1 Such as the information from the philosophers that the world is eternal, which is wrong. 47 | P a g e
  • 48. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If the one who omitted a narrator from the chain is not a companion, then it is not evidence, except for the mursals of Sa^id Ibn Al-Musayyab, because they have been researched and it was found that they are actually connected (musnad) to the Prophet, ‫ .ﷺ‬That which was narrated by the use of saying, “from so and so, from so and so” is considered a continuous chain of narration. If the shaykh recited, then it is permissible for the narrator to say, “haddathani <he told me>”, or “akhbarani <he informed me>”; and if he read on the shaykh, he then says, “akhbarani <he informed me>”, and he does not say, “haddathani <he told me>”1. narrators in their entirety are mentioned in the chain. (The mursal is that which does not have a continuous chain of narration), because some of its narrators have been dropped from the chain. (If) in the mursal narration, (the one who omitted a narrator from the chain is not a companion), like for a follower of the companion or someone after him to say, “The Messenger of Allah r said…,” (then it), i.e. that mursal narration, (is not evidence) according to Ash-Shafi^iyy, because of the chance of that omitted narrator being unreliable; (except for the mursals of Sa^id Ibn Al-Musayyab), and his name can also be pronounced: “Al-Musayyib”. He was among the greatest of the followers of the Companions. If he dropped a companion from the chain and attributed the information to the Prophet r, his mursal narration is evidence, (because they have been researched), i.e. their situations have been researched, (and it was found that they are actually connected (musnad) to the Prophet r). This means that the companion that he dropped in fact narrated it, and he would usually be his father in-law, Abu Hurayrah t. Malik, Abu Hanifah, as well as Ahmad, according to the more famous of two narrations from him, and a group of scholars said that the mursal narration is evidence, because the reliable narrator does not drop someone out of the chain except when he is certain about his reliability. As for the mursal narrations of the Companions, they are evidence, because usually they only narrate from other companions, and all of the Companions are reliable in their narration. So, if the Companion said, “the Messenger of Allah r said…”, in reference to that which he did not hear from him r, then it is considered that he heard it from another companion, and consequently has the judgment of a musnad narration. Our statement “usually” is because some hadiths in which a companion narrated from the route of a follower of the Companions have been found, as opposed to whoever has denied the occurrence of that. This pertains to what is known that the companion did not hear from the Prophet r. If that is not known, and the Companion said, “The Messenger of Allah r said…”, then it is considered that he heard it from him r. (That which was narrated by the use of saying, “from so and so, from so and so” is considered a continuous chain of narration). So being narrated in this fashion does not take it out of the category of being musnad to the category of being mursal. Consequently, the hadith narrated like that is musnad because of the apparent continuity of its chain, and it would not be mursal. (If the shaykh recited) to the narrators while they were listening, (then it is permissible for the narrator to say, “haddathani <he told me>” or “akhbarani <he informed me>”. 48 | P a g e
  • 49. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If the shaykh gave him permission to narrate without reciting, then the narrator says, “He permitted me”, or “akhbarani ijazatan <he informed me by permission>. And if he), i.e. the narrator (read on the shaykh, he), i.e. the narrator, (then says, “akhbarani <he informed me>”, and he does not say, “haddathani <he told me>”), because he did not tell him by speaking to him. Some scholars made that permissible. That is the saying of Malik and Sufyan, and most of the scholars of Al-Hijaz, and according to that is the terminology of the people of hadith, because what is meant is the informing about the narration from the route of the shaykh. This is the case if it were said with no restriction. As for saying, “He told me by me reciting to him”, there is no difference about its permissibility, and Allah knows best. (If the shaykh gave him permission to narrate without) the shaykh (reciting) on him, and without him reciting on the shaykh, (then the narrator says, “He permitted me”, or “akhbarani ijazatan <he informed me by permission>). The permissibility of narrating by permission is understood from this, and that is correct, and Allah knows best. 49 | P a g e
  • 50. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE ANALOGICAL DEDUCTION As for the analogical deduction, it is the referral of the branch back to the origin, because of an issue that they have in common in respects to the ruling. It is divided into three categories: comparison based on reason, comparison based on reference, and comparison based on resemblance. The comparison based on reason is that which its reason necessitates its ruling. (As for the analogical deduction), which is the fourth of the religious references. In Arabic it is called “qiyas”, which linguistically means “to measure”, for example: “‫< ”ﻗﺳت اﻟﺛوب‬I measured the cloth>; as well as “to compare”, such as their saying: “‫< ”ﯾﻘﺎس اﻟﻣرء ﺑﺎﻟﻣرء‬one person is compared to the other>. According to the terminology, (it is the referral of the branch back to the origin because of an issue that they have in common in respects to the ruling). The meaning of referring the branch to the origin is: submitting it to the origin and making it equal to the origin in the judgment. This is like comparing rice to wheat in the case of usury, because of the commonality between them, which according to the Malikiyys, is that they are both nutritious1 and can be hoarded, and according to the Shafi^iyys, is because they are both food. (It), i.e. the analogical deduction, (is divided into three categories: comparison based on reason, comparison based on reference, and comparison based on resemblance. The comparison based on reason), which is the first category, (is that which its reason necessitates its ruling), i.e. calls for its ruling. This means that it is not mentally appropriate that the ruling would not apply to it. However, had it not applied, that would not lead to an impossibility, as is the case of the religious issues. The mental necessity is not intended, meaning that it is not mentally impossible for the ruling not to be applied to the case. This is like the analogical deduction of the prohibition of hitting the parents based on the prohibition of muttering in complaint, showing dissatisfaction towards them2. There has been difference of opinion about this type. Among the scholars are those who considered that the reference for the ruling is based on analogical deduction, and among them are those who consider that it is not based on analogical deduction, rather that the expression in itself refers to the ruling3. 1 Meaning that the body can survive if it ate only one of those grains without anything else. 2 To say “uff”, which is called “ta’fif” 3 The scholars have documented what is called: “mafhum al-khitab”; “the implication of the address”. It is defined as everything that is understood from the address but is not explicitly stated therein. It has several categories. Among them is “fahwa al-khitab”; “the significance of the address”. It is that to which the text draws attention, such as the verse: {(‫< })و ﻣﻦ أﻫﻞ اﻟﻜ ﺎب ﻣﻦ إن ﺗﺄﻣ ﻪ ﺑﻘ ﻄﺎر ﯾﺆدﯾﻪ إﻟﯿﻚ‬Among the People of the Book are those whom if you entrusted him with a kantar, he would return it>. This signifies that he is reliable with what is less that. Among them is “lahn al- khitab”, which refers to the Arabs’ ordinary way of speaking. According to the terminology, it is what the address refers to while taking into account that which is omitted, and without its implication the address would be incomplete. An example is: {(‫< }) ﻓﻘﻠﻨﺎ اﴐب ﺑﻌﺼﺎك اﳊﺠﺮ ﻓﺎﻧﻔﺠﺮت ﻣ ﻪ اﺛ ﺎ ﻋﴩة ﲔا‬We revealed to Musa: hit the stone with your staff, then twelve springs erupted from the stone>. The implication is that he hit the stone, and then the springs erupted. Among them is “dalil al-khitab”; “the reference of the address”, which is for the ruling to be related to one of two attributes of a thing, and thus whatever is related to other than that attribute is not included in the 50 | P a g e
  • 51. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The comparison based on reference is to use one of two similar things as a reference for the judgment of the other, which is for the reason to be a reference for the ruling without necessitating the ruling. The comparison of resemblance is for the ruling of the branch that has ties to two origins to be in accordance with whichever it is most similar. The condition of the branch is that it would be appropriate for that origin in reference to the issue that unites them in the ruling. The second category of the different types of analogical deduction is (the comparison based on reference), which (is to use one of two similar things as a reference for the judgment of the other; which is for the reason to be a reference for the ruling without necessitating the ruling), i.e. calling for the reason, just as in the first category. This type is the most frequent of the types of analogical deduction. It is for the ruling in it to be for some deduced reason, and that it would be permissible for the ruling based on that reason to be applied to the branch, and it is permissible that it would not apply. This type is weaker than the first, because the reason in it is a reference for the ruling, but that reason is not so obvious that it is mentally inappropriate for the ruling to be not applied to the branch. This is like the analogical deduction that the money of the child is like the money of the pubescent as far as the obligation of Zakah, because what is common between them is that it is “growing money”. It may also be said that it is not obligatory, just as Abu Hanifah said1. (The comparison of resemblance) is the third of the categories of analogical deduction. It (is for the ruling of the branch that has ties to two origins to be in accordance with whichever it is most similar), such as the murdered slave. As far as blood money is concerned, he has similarity to the free person, in reference to the fact that he is a human being, and to the animal, in reference to the fact that he is an asset. He is closer in resemblance to an asset than to a free person. This is proven by the fact that he can be sold, inherited, dedicated as an unalienable endowment2, the price of his damaged parts that decrease his value must be guaranteed, and his value must be guaranteed, even if it exceeds the value of the blood money due for the killing of a free man. This type is weaker than the one before it, and for that reason, there has been difference in opinion about its acceptance, and it would not be resorted to while it is possible to resort to the types mentioned before it, and Allah knows best. The analogical deduction has four integrals: the origin, the branch, the reason, and the ruling of the origin upon which the analogical deduction is based. Each of these has conditions: (The condition of the branch is that it would be appropriate for that origin in reference to the issue that unites them in the ruling). That would either be because the reason of the branch is identical to the reason of the origin in itself, like the comparison of date-soaked water to wine. Its reason is intoxication; Or it may be identical to it in its type, such as the analogical ruling. An example is in the hadith: [[‫ﺴﺎﺌﻤﺘﻬﺎ‬ ‫]]ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻐﻨﻡ‬ <Zakah is due on the goat or sheep that grazes>. Among goats and sheep are those that graze and those that do not graze. The ruling was related to one of the two attributes. 1 This is merely an example, because the Shafi^iyys did not rely only on this, but also the generality of some hadiths and the sayings of companions. 2 Waqf, which was previously defined. 51 | P a g e
  • 52. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The condition of the origin is that it would be confirmed by a reference agreed upon by the two opponents. The condition of the reason is that it would constantly exist in its results; so it should not become invalid verbally or conceptually. deduction in the obligation of punishment for damaging an organ based on the obligation of punishment for taking a life, because of their commonality, which is that they are both assaults. It could be said that there is no need for this condition because of what is mentioned in the definition of the analogical deduction: (the referral of the branch back to the origin because of an issue that they have in common in respects to the ruling). (The condition of the origin is that it), i.e. its ruling (would be confirmed by a reference agreed upon by the two opponents), in such a way that they agree about the reason of its ruling, so that the analogical deduction would be evidence against the opponent. Therefore, if the ruling of the origin were agreed upon by them, but for two different reasons, the analogical deduction would not be valid. If there was no opponent, then the condition is the confirmation of the ruling of the origin by a reference to which the one making the analogical deduction refers. (The condition of the reason is that it would constantly exist in its results), in a way that whenever the qualities that are used to express the reason in the issue are found, the ruling would be found. (So it should not become invalid verbally), in such a way that those qualities that are used to express the reason exist in the issue, but the ruling does not exist; (or conceptually), in such a way that the idea which is used as a reason in the issue exists, but the ruling does not exist. Accordingly, whenever the reason is verbally or conceptually invalid, then the analogical deduction is invalid. An example of the first is to say that killing with a blunt, heavy object is an intentional killing of transgression, and execution is obligatory like killing with a sharp object. This is invalidated by the killing of a child by his parent, because execution is not obligatory even though it is an intentional killing of transgression1. An example of the second is to say that Zakah is due on livestock because it fulfills the need of the poor. It is said that this is invalidated by the existence of that concept, which is fulfilling the need of the poor, in precious jewels. The source of the invalidation verbally or conceptually is the existence of the reason without the ruling. The only reason there is a difference between them is because in the first case, since the reason was composed of several qualities it was investigated from the point of view of the expression, and since the second case was just one matter, then it was investigated from the point of view of its concept. It is as if this is merely as issue of terminology. 1 Among the conditions of execution for murder is that the murderer would not be a parent of the victim, not even a grandparent. 52 | P a g e
  • 53. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The condition of the ruling is that it would be like the reason in reference to negation and confirmation. The reason is that which attracts the ruling. The ruling is that which is attracted by the reason. (The condition of the ruling is that it would be like the reason), i.e. adherent to it, (in reference to negation and confirmation), i.e. in reference to existence and nonexistence. Thus, if the reason is found then the ruling is found, and if it were absent then the ruling would be absent. This is if the ruling had one reason, like the prohibition of wine. Its reason is intoxication, so whenever intoxication is found, the ruling is found, and whenever it is absent then the ruling is absent. As for the ruling having several reasons, then the absence of the ruling is not necessary because of the lack of one of those reasons, such as execution. It is obligatory because of apostasy, adultery after sexual intercourse in a valid marriage contract, murdering someone with similar status1, abandoning the prayer, and other than that, and Allah knows best. (The reason is that which attracts the ruling), i.e. the appropriate peculiarity for basing the ruling upon it, such as fulfilling the need of the poor, for that is an appropriate peculiarity for the obligation of Zakah. (The ruling is that which is attracted by the reason), i.e. it is the matter that is valid to be established by the reason. 1 Among the conditions of execution for murder is that the victim would not be socially lower than the murderer, such as to be a slave or a blasphemer. Thus, a free man is executed for the murder of a free man, a slave is executed for the murder of another slave, and a blasphemer is executed for the murder of a blasphemer. 53 | P a g e
  • 54. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c PROHIBITION, PERMISSIBILITY, AND REFERRING BACK TO THE ORIGIN As for prohibition and permissibility, some people say that the origin of things is prohibition, except what the religious law made premissible; if there was no reference in the religious law proving permissibility, then the origin is kept, which is prohibition. Some people say the opposite, which is that the origin of things is permissibility except what the religious law prohibits. “Referring back to the origin” means: to go back to the origin upon the lack of a religious reference. Upon completing the mentioning of the religious references upon which there is agreement, he began to mention the references about which there is difference. Among that is that it is said that the origin of things is either forbiddance or permissibility. He said: (As for prohibition), i.e. the forbidden, (and permissibility, some people say that the origin of things) after the revelation (is prohibition), i.e. things are adherent to prohibition because that is their origin, (except what the religious law made premissible). The exclusion in this case is “disconnected”, because according to him, the origin of that which the religious law made permissible is also prohibition. (if there was no reference in the religious law proving permissibility, then the origin is kept, which is prohibition). (Some people say the opposite), i.e. the opposite of this saying, (which is that the origin of things) after the revelation (is permissibility, except what the religious law prohibits), i.e. forbids. What is correct is to give details, which is to say that the origin of harmful matters is prohibition, and the origin of beneficial matters is permissibility. Allah the exalted said: {(‫< 1})ﻫُﻮَ ا ِي َ ﻠ َﻖَ ﻟ َﲂْ ﻣَﺎ ِﰲ اﻷَرْض ﲨَ ِﯿﻌًﺎ‬He created all of what is on the Earth for you>. He mentioned this in ِ ْ ُ the context of graciousness, and grace is only in that which is permissible. Also, according to what Ibn Majah narrated, he r said: [[‫< ]]ﻻ ﻀﺭﺭ ﻭ ﻻ ﻀﺭﺍﺭ‬There is no harm and no detriment (in our religion)>. This means that it is not permissible2. This is the ruling of things after the revelation. As for before the revelation, there was no ruling to pertain to anything, because of the lack of a messenger clarifying those rules. Among the references in which there has been difference in opinion is what is called “referring back to the origin 3”. Since this referral has two meanings, one of which its acceptance is agreed upon, he signaled to it by saying: (Referring back to the origin), which is used as an evidence upon the lack of a religious evidence, as will come, (means: to go back to the origin), i.e. the nonexistent basis (upon the lack of a religious reference). If the mujtahid did not find a reference after researching to his utmost ability, such as if he did not find a proof about the obligation of fasting the month of Rajab, he 1 Al-Baqarah, 29 2 According to this, there is no harm in wiping the face after making supplication, hoping that the blessings that descend will contact the face, for there is no text prohibiting it, and there is no harm in it. 3 Istishab: This word literally means “to seek companionship” 54 | P a g e
  • 55. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c then says that it is not obligatory because of referring back to the origin, i.e. the nonexistent basis. Likewise is the case of an obligatory prayer other than the five, for the origin of that is its nonexistence. As for the referral according to its second, differed upon meaning, it is the establishment of an issue at a later time because of its establishment at an earlier time. It is an evidence according to the Shafi^iyys and the Malikiyys, but not the Hanafiyys. 55 | P a g e
  • 56. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE CONFLICT OF REFERENCES As for the references, that which is clear is given priority over that which is ambiguous, as is that which necessitates (definite) knowledge (given priority) over that which necessitates speculation. The text (is given priority) over the analogical deduction, and the clear analogical deduction (is given priority) over the less obvious. If found in the text that which changes (the situation of) the origin, (it is then applied), or else the origin is referenced. Upon finishing talking about the references, he began talking about the preponderance between them. He said: (As for the references, that which is clear is given priority over that which is ambiguous). This is such as the apparent in comparison with the interpreted, and the expression having its literal meaning as opposed to its figurative meaning, (as is that) reference (which necessitates (definite) knowledge (given priority) over that) reference (which necessitates speculation). Thus, the mutawatir is given priority over the ahad, unless the first was inclusive, for it would then be restricted by the other, as previously mentioned about specifying the Book by the Sunnah. (The text) from the Book or the Sunnah ((is given priority) over the analogical deduction), unless the text was inclusive, for it would then be restricted by the analogical deduction, as previously mentioned. (And the clear analogical deduction), such as the comparison based on reason, ((is given priority)1 over the less obvious) analogical deduction2, such as the comparison of resemblance. (If found in the text), i.e. the text from the Book or the Sunnah, (that which changes (the situation of) the origin), i.e. the nonexistent basis, which is expressed by the term: “referring back to the origin”, as previously mentioned, then the issue is clear: ((it is then applied)) and the origin is rejected. The same is the case in reference to the analogical deduction or the consensus, (or else), i.e. if none of those issues was present, (the origin is referenced), i.e. the nonexistent basis is applied, as previously mentioned. After finishing talking about references, he began to talk about judgment deduction. He first mentioned the conditions of the mujtahid. He said: 1 Because it is that in which there is no difference between the two matters, or the possibility of their difference is weak and farfetched. An example is what was narrated about the prohibition of urinating in still water. The prohibition of pouring urine into it is based on analogical deduction. 2 It is that which the possibility of the difference between the two matters having an effect is strong. An example is like comparing the blind sheep to the one eyed sheep in reference to what is acceptable as a religious sacrifice. The blind sheep is fed and thus would be fatter than the one eyed sheep that is taken to the pasture to graze and may not find the best patches, and thus would be leaner. This is a difference with a strong possibility of having an effect. So is the blind sheep not sufficient like the one eyed sheep? The blind sheep is not sufficient because the scholars looked at the issue from the view of the beauty of the animal and its level of perfection and lack of defects. 56 | P a g e
  • 57. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c HE WHO PASSES RULINGS AND HE WHO SEEKS RULINGS Among the conditions of he who passes rulings is that he would be a scholar in the foundations and branches of fiqh; that which is disagreed about and that which complies with his school, and that he would perfectly possess the tools needed for judgment deduction; being knowledgeable about that which he needs in reference to grammar and language, and knowing (the status of) the narrators, (Among the conditions of he who passes rulings), and he is the mujtahid, (is that he would be a scholar in the foundations and branches of fiqh; that which is disagreed about and that which complies with his school). What he means by the foundations is the references of fiqh previously mentioned in the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh. For him to include the knowledge of the Foundations of Fiqh in “fiqh”, as his expression implies, is excused. It is possible that he meant by the term “foundations”, the basic cases which are like general rules1 from which other rules stem. However, upon that, he would have missed mentioning the condition of knowing about the Foundations of Fiqh, unless that would be included in his statement: (that he would perfectly possess the tools needed). What he meant by (branches): the cases that are spread throughout the books of fiqh. What he meant by (that which is disagreed about): the cases in which the scholars have had difference. What he meant by (that which complies with his school): that upon which his opinion has settled. This is if his statement was taken to refer to the absolute mujtahid. If it was taken to refer to the restricted mujtahid, then what he means by (his school) is that upon which the opinion of his imam has settled. The benefit in knowing the differences in opinion is that he would be able to deduce what complies with one of them, and not produce a different saying because that would be a breach of the consensus of those before him, since they did not say that saying. (And) among the conditions of he who passes rulings is (that he would perfectly possess the tools needed for judgment deduction). It is possible that what he means by saying: (that he would perfectly possess the tools needed for judgment deduction) is the exquisiteness of his intellect and the quality of his understanding. According to that, what is mentioned afterwards would be an additional condition. It is possible that what he means by saying (that he would perfectly possess the tools needed for judgment deduction) that which he subsequently mentioned. According to that, what is mentioned is an elucidation of his saying: (being knowledgeable about that which he needs in reference to grammar and language, and knowing (the status of) the narrators) of the hadith, so that he would take from he who is acceptable among them and not those who have been criticized. If he took from the books of hadith in which their authors adhered to only mentioning the sahih, like Al-Muwatta’, Al-Bukhariyy and Muslim, he would not need to know about the status of the narrators. 1 An example of which is that “the existence of doubt does not remove certainty”. This is a general rule applied to many cases. According to that, whoever was sure he made wudu’, but then doubted if he broke it, considers that he still has it, and can pray, even if he really did break it, because doubt is not a evidence in our religion. If he later remembers, then his doubt became certainty, and thus he remakes his prayer. Likewise, if he was sure he broke his wudu’, and doubted if he remade it, he must not pray until remaking it, because the doubt is not evidence. 57 | P a g e
  • 58. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c …and the interpretation of the verses and hadiths that pertain to judgments. Among the conditions of he who seeks rulings is that he would be among the people of imitation; so he imitates the one who passes rulings in the rulings he passes. (And) he must know (the interpretation of the verses and hadiths that pertain to judgments), so that he would agree with them in his deduction and not oppose them. What is meant is to know what is related to the fiqh of those verses and the fiqh of those hadiths, not knowing their stories. It is not a condition that he would have memorized the Qur’an, or the verses of rulings, or that he would be completely knowledgeable about the hadiths and the narrations of the Companions that relate to rulings. Ash-Shafi^iyy t said, “All of the hadiths are not gathered in any one individual.” What is meant is that he would be knowledgeable about an amount of hadiths that relate to rulings; that which is famous to the people of knowledge, and that he would be knowledgeable about the fiqh of those hadiths. It is not a condition that he knows the hadiths that are narrated by less than two people, nor that he would know the interpretation of the rare vocabulary narrated in the hadiths, even though knowing that makes him more proficient. (Among the conditions of he who seeks rulings is that he would be among the people of imitation1), i.e. not among the people of judgment deduction, because he has not fulfilled its conditions. (So, he imitates the one who passes rulings), i.e. the mujtahid (in the rulings he passes). By this, he has signaled to two cases: The first is that the imitation of any person is not permissible. Rather he must follow a mujtahid if he finds one. The second is that he follows him in the ruling he passes and does not follow him in his actions. Hence, if the ignorant one saw the scholar doing something, it is not lawful for him to follow him in that until he asks him about it, since perhaps he is doing it for a reason that is not apparent to the imitator. 1 This includes the scholars who are not mujtahids. It should not be understood from this that the one who is a scholar does not have to follow any other scholar. In fact, the Sunniyy scholars who were not mujtahids would follow one school, as opposed to those who discourage that. Imam Muslim, for example, was a Shafi^iyy scholar. At-Tahawiyy was a Hanafiyy. If it were asked, “Did the Prophet follow a school?” The answer is that he was the Prophet, the one who conveyed the evidence upon which the schools were based, so no he did not, but that does not invalidate the necessity of following the schools. If it were asked, “Did the companions follow schools?” The answer is that when in the presence of the Prophet ‫,ﷺ‬ they asked him and he would answer, but when he was absent, and after his death, they resorted to the Companions who were mujtahids to deduce answers for them, and likewise did the followers of the Companions. So, yes, they did follow schools. 58 | P a g e
  • 59. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c JUDGEMENT DEDUCTION AND IMITATION It is not permissible for the scholar to imitate. Imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying without evidence, and according to this, accepting the saying of the Prophet ‫ ﷺ‬is called imitation. Some said that imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying while not knowing from where he got his saying. If we say that the Prophet used to make analogical deduction, then it is permissible to call the acceptance of his saying imitation. As for ijtihad (judgment deduction), it is the utmost effort put forth for reaching the goal. It is known from that, that it is not permissible for anyone among the people of judgment deduction to imitate another, just as he drew attention to by his statement: (It is not permissible for the scholar), i.e. the mujtahid (to imitate) another1, because of his ability to deduce judgments. This is what is correct and it was said that it is permissible. (Imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying without) him mentioning any (evidence, and according to this, accepting the saying of the Prophet r) in the rulings that he mentions (is called imitation). This is because it is obligatory to take what he says about the rulings even if he did not mention the proof of that ruling. This is because the reference for the acceptance of his sayings was established, I mean by that: the miracle that proves the truthfulness of his message. (Some said that imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying while not knowing from where he got his saying), i.e. you do not know the source of that saying from the speaker. (If we say that the Prophet used to make analogical deduction), i.e. he deduced judgments and did not rely only on revelation, (then it is permissible to call the acceptance of his saying imitation) because of the possibility that what he said was from deduction. However, if we say that he does not deduce judgments, and that he only speaks from revelation, as proven by the saying of the Exalted: {( َ ‫< 2})وﻣَﺎ ﯾَﻨْﻄِ ﻖ ﻋَﻦِ اﻟْﻬَﻮَى * إِنْ ﻫُﻮَ إِﻻ و ْ ٌ ﯾ ُﻮ‬He does not utter from conjecture * It is َ ُ َ nothing but a revealed revelation>, then the acceptance of his saying is not called imitation, because of its derivation from the revelation. There is difference in opinion about this case, I mean by that, the issue of his judgment deduction r. What is correct is the permissibility of judgment deduction for the Prophet r, and its occurrence from him. That is what Ibn Hajib and others have preponderated. It was said that it is permissible in issues pertaining to opinion and war. Also, what is correct is that his deduction is never wrong3. Then after mentioning that judgment deduction is obligatory on whoever fulfilled its conditions, he defined it by saying: (As for ijtihad (judgment deduction), it is the utmost effort put forth), i.e. the extent of one’s ability (for reaching the) intended (goal), in reference to attaining 1 It is appropriate to emphasize here that the intent is the mujtahid. Thus, any scholar who is not a mujtahid must follow a mujtahid, just as the layman must follow a mujtahid. 2 An-Najm, 3-4 3 Among what some scholars used as evidence that the Prophet deduces rulings, is the fact that the scholars deduce rulings. Therefore, if it is valid that they can deduce rulings, it is more so valid that the Prophet can deduce rulings, because he has more knowledge than them. However, he is never wrong in his deduction. 59 | P a g e
  • 60. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c If the mujtahid was perfectly qualified for deducing judgments, if he deduces a judgment within the branches of the religion and is correct, he gets two rewards, and if he deduces a judgment and is mistaken, he gets one reward. Some said that every top scholar who deduces judgments in the branches is correct. It is not permissible to say that everyone who infer conclusions in the creedal basics is correct, because that leads to deeming as being correct the misguided people such as the Christians, Zoroastrians, blasphemers and mulhids. knowledge. It is to exert his utmost capacity in contemplation of the religious reference to reach a speculation about the religious judgment. (If the mujtahid was perfectly qualified for deducing judgments), the one we mentioned previously: the “absolute mujtahid”, and lower than him is the “mujtahid within the school1”; the one able to produce the reference as a documentation added to the documentations of his imam2, and lower than him is the “mujtahid of passed rulings”; the mujtahid who is very knowledgeable about the school of his imam and able to preponderate one saying over another; (if he), meaning each one of those three types (deduces a judgment within the branches of the religion and is correct, he gets two rewards). One reward is for his deduction, and the other is for being correct.3 (And if he deduces a judgment) in the branches of the religion (and is mistaken, he gets one reward) for his deduction, and the reference for that shall come. He has no sin because of his mistake according to what is correct, unless he was negligent in his deduction, for he is sinful for his negligence with no difference in opinion. (Some) of our scholars (said that every mujtahid who deduces judgments in the branches) that do not have a definite evidence (is correct), based on saying that the law of Allah in reference to him and in reference to those who imitate him is that which his deduction lead him to. This is the saying of Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan and the judge Abu Bakr Al-Baqillaniyy of the Malikiyys, and others. What was conveyed from Malik is that only one of them is correct. As for the branches that have definite evidences from the texts or the consensus, then there is no difference in opinion that there is only one correct saying in reference to them. If the mujtahid was mistaken in those cases because of not knowing the evidence, then he is not sinful according to what is most correct. (It is not permissible to say that everyone who infers conclusions in the creedal basics), i.e. the religious beliefs (is correct, because that leads to deeming as being correct the misguided people such as the Christians) who talk about the trinity, the (Zoroastrians) who say that there are two origins for the world: light and darkness, the (blasphemers) who deny monotheism, the dispatching of the Messengers and the resurrection in the Afterlife- and this is a coordinating conjunction between what is inclusive and what is specific, likewise his saying: (and mulhids), if what is meant is the linguistic meaning, which is the unrestricted deviance from the truth. However, if what is meant is its meaning in the terminology: he who claims that he is from the people 1 They are called “mujtahidu-l-madhhab”, or “ashabu-l-wujuh” 2 Thus, he follows a mujtahid above him. 3 There is a fourth type of mujtahid, who is actually an absolute mujtahid, but is called “muntasib”, which means that he is annexed in to the school of another mujtahid because his deductions are comply with those of another mujtahid. There is also the one who is a mujtahid in a single chapter of knowledge, such as inheritance or Hajj, and there is the “mujtahid al-mas’alah”. 60 | P a g e
  • 61. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The reference for those who said, “Not every mujtahid (who deduces judgments) in the branches is correct”, is his saying: {‫( < }ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد ﻓﺄﺻﺎب ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟران و ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد و أﺧطﺄ ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟر واﺣد‬The scholar) who deduces (a judgment) and is correct has two rewards, and the one who deduces and is wrong has one reward)>. The evidence is that the Prophet considered him correct sometimes and mistaken at other times of the Islamic religion while that which contradicts that claim occurs from him, such as the Mu^tazilah and their likes, who denied the attributes of Allah the exalted, such as His speech, His creation of the deeds of the slaves, that He would be seen in the Afterlife, and other things, then it would not be a conjunction between what is inclusive and what is specific1. (The reference for those who said, “Not every mujtahid (who deduces judgments) in the branches is correct”, is his saying: {‫}ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد ﻓﺄﺻﺎب ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟران و ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد و أﺧطﺄ ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟر واﺣد‬ <(The scholar) who deduces (a judgment) and is correct has two rewards, and the one who deduces and is wrong has one reward>). This is narrated by the Two Shaykhs. The expression narrated by Al-Bukhariyy is: [[‫< ]]ﺇﺩﺍ ﺤﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﻓﺎﺠﺘﻬﺩ ﻓﺄﺼﺎﺏ ﻓﻠﻪ ﺃﺠﺭﺍﻥ ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﺤﻜﻡ ﻓﺎﺠﺘﻬﺩ ﺜﻡ ﺃﺨﻁﺄ ﻓﻠﻪ ﺃﺠﺭﻭﺍﺤﺩ‬If the Judge ruled and deduced a judgment and was correct, he has two rewards. If he ruled and deduced a judgment then made a mistake, he has one reward>. He narrated that in the chapter of i^tisam2. The expression narrated by Muslim is similar to it, except that it says: {‫< }ﻓﺎﺟﺗﮭد ﺛم أﺻﺎب‬He deduced a judgment then was correct>, etc. He mentioned this hadith in the chapter of ruling. (The evidence) from the hadith (is that the Prophet r considered him correct sometimes and mistaken at other times). If it were said: “The Prophet’s statement in the hadith: {‫< }ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد‬whoever deduces a judgment> is more general than being perfectly qualified or not, and the author has specified the case to the one who is perfectly qualified”, the response would be- and Allah knows best: Whoever was not perfectly qualified in his judgment deduction is not among the people of judgment deduction, and his duty is to imitate. He would be transgressing in his judgment deduction and hence would be sinful and not rewarded, and Allah knows best. The previously mentioned hadith has a narration from Al-Hakim, according to the expression: {‫< }إذا اﺟﺗﮭد اﻟﺣﺎﻛم ﻓﺄﺧطﺄ ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟر واﺣد ﻓﺈن أﺻﺎب ﻓﻠﮫ ﻋﺷرة أﺟور‬If the judge deduced a judgment and was mistaken, he has one reward, and if he was correct he has ten rewards>. Al-Hakim said that the chain of narration is sahih. 1 It is suitable to mention two related points. The first is that the scholars deduce rulings, not matters of the creed. According to that, no attention is given to the followers of Ibn Taymiyah who justify his claim that Hell will end by saying that Ibn Taymiyah will be rewarded with one reward for his mistake. The second is that there is no deduction in reference to what is explicitly determined in the Book or the Sunnah, and accordingly, the Sunniyy scholars agree about the cases that are explicitly determined. Disagreeing with what is explicit in the Qur’an is deviance and blasphemy. The everlastingness of Hell is stated explicitly therein, and hence is definitely not a subject of deduction. Ibn Taymiyah’s claim that Hell will end is deviance, not a rewardable mistake. Some of his followers do not know that he made this claim, and think that it is a lie on him. 2 Safeguarding; maintenance… 61 | P a g e
  • 62. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c This is the compilation of the explanation of The Pages that Allah made easy. May Allah make it sincere for His sake and beneficial in life and after death. Surely, He is the one who hears, who is knowledgeable about His slaves, and answers the supplications. We seek refuge with Allah from knowledge that does not benefit, a heart without piety, supplication left unanswered, and a self that is never satisfied. I seek refuge with You, O, Allah, from those four things. We ask Allah by the status of His honorable Prophet to correct the corruption of our hearts, and to grant us the ability to do what He accepts from us, to forgive our parents, our shaykhs, their parents, our brothers, companions, beloved ones, all Muslims, and us, by the status of the supplication. Amin 62 | P a g e
  • 63. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c THE TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE PAGES The great shaykh, imam, and extremely knowledgeable scholar, Abul-Ma^ali ^Abdul-Malik Ibn ^Abdillah, famous as IMAMUL-HARAMAYN said:  <In the name of Allah, the Merciful to believers and non-believers in the present life, and the Merciful only to believers in the Afterlife> There after: These are pages that pertain to knowing about divisions of Usulul-Fiqh (the Foundations of Fiqh), which is a term composed of two singular parts. The foundation is that which something else is built upon. The branch is that which is built upon something else. Fiqh is the knowledge of the religious judgments that are taken by way of judgment deduction (ijtihad). There are seven judgments: the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the forbidden, the disliked, the valid, and the invalid. The obligatory is that which is rewardable for doing and punishable for leaving out. The recommended is that which is rewardable for doing and not punishable for leaving out. The permissible is that which is not rewardable for doing, nor punishable for leaving out. The forbidden is that which is rewardable for leaving out and punishable for doing. The disliked is that which is rewardable for leaving out and not punishable for doing. The valid is that which pertains to fulfillment and is recognized. The invalid is that which does not pertain to fulfillment and is not recognized. Fiqh is more specific than knowledge. Knowledge is to know the known thing as it is in reality. Ignorance is to conceive something differently from how it is in reality. Necessary knowledge is that which is not dependent upon contemplation and inference. 63 | P a g e
  • 64. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c As for acquired knowledge, it is that which is dependent upon contemplation and inference. Contemplation is to think about the situation of the pondered subject. Inference is the seeking of a reference. The Reference is the guide to that which is sought. Speculation is to deem two matters possible while one of them is more apparent than the other. Doubt is to deem two matters possible without one being more evident than the other. The Foundations of Fiqh are its general references and the method of deriving judgments from them. The divisions of the Foundations of Fiqh are: the categories of speech, the command, the prohibition, the inclusive, the specific, the general, the clarification, the explicit, the apparent, the doings, the abrogative, the abrogated, the consensus, the conveyed information, the analogical deduction, the forbidden, the permitted, the arrangement of the references, the qualities of those who deduce judgments and of those who seek judgments, and the rules pertaining to the top scholars. As for the categories of speech, the least of which (Arabic) speech would be composed of is two nouns, or a noun and a verb, or a verb and a particle, or a noun and a particle. Speech is divided into: the command, the prohibition, the statement and the interrogation. It is also divided into: wishing, offering, and vowing. From another point of view it is divided into: the literal and the figurative. The literal is that which its usage remained as it was put, and it was said that it is that which its’ usage is according to the jargon of those who use certain terminology. The figurative is that which transcended its original usage. Literal usage would be either linguistic, religious, or normal. Figurative usage is either by use of addition, subtraction, transfer, or metaphor. (An example of) figurative speech through addition is like the saying of Allah: {(‫< })ﻟ ﺲ ﳈﺜ ﳾء‬Nothing resembles Him>. (An example of) figurative speech through subtraction is like the saying of Allah: {(‫< })و اﺳﺄل اﻟﻘﺮﯾﺔ‬Ask the village> (An example of) figurative speech through transfer is like the term gha’it (defecation) in reference to that which comes out of the human. 64 | P a g e
  • 65. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c (An example of) figurative usage through metaphor is like the saying of Allah: {(‫...< }) ﺪارا ﺮﯾﺪ أن ﯾﻨﻘﺾ‬a wall that wants to fall>. ّ The command is the seeking of a doing in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who commands) by way of a saying. The word structure that refers to it is: {‫( }اﻓﻌل‬if^al) <do>. When used unrestrictedly and without any outside indications, it is taken (to refer to an obligation). However, if there is a reference indicating that what is meant by it is a recommendation or permissibility, then it is taken as such. It does not necessitate repetition, nor for the deed to be done only once, according to the correct saying, unless a reference indicates that what is intended is repetition. It does not necessitate immediate action. The order to initiate a deed is an order to do the deed, and to do whatever would leave the deed incomplete if not done, like the order to perform prayer is an order to perform the purification that leads to the prayer. If it is done, then the one who was ordered is relieved of the responsibilty WHO IS INCLUDED, AND WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED UNDER THE ORDER AND PROHIBITION The address of Allah pertains to the believers. The absent minded, the child, and the insane are not included in the address. The blasphemers are addressed with the branches of the religious law, and with that without which they are invalid, which is Islam, because of the saying of the Exalted: {(‫( < })ﻣﺎ ﺳﻠﻜﲂ ﰲ ﺳﻘﺮ* ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﱂ ﻧﻚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺼﻠّﲔ‬They will be asked) What lead you to Hell?* They will say, “We did not pray”>. The order to do something is a prohibition from its opposite. The prohibition from something is an order with its opposite. The prohibition is the seeking of an abstention in a mandatory fashion from someone who is lower (than he who prohibits) by way of a saying. The word structure that refers to the command may be used, but what would be meant by it is permissibility, a threat, impartiality, or creating. THE INCLUSIVE, THE SPECIFIC, THE GENERAL, THE CLARIFICATION, THE EXPLICIT, AND THE APPARENT 65 | P a g e
  • 66. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The inclusive is that which includes two or more things without restriction to a particular limit; from your statement: “I included Zayd and ^Amr in my giving”, or, “I included all of the people in my giving”. It has four ways of being expressed: the singular term modified by the definite article, the plural term modified by the definite article, the ambiguous term, such as “who(ever)” in reference to that which has a mind; “what(ever)” in reference to that which does not have a mind; “which” in both cases; “where(ever)” in reference to the place; “when(ever)” in reference to time; “what(ever)” in reference to inquiry, compensation, and other matters, and the negation of indefinite terms by way of “‫( ”ﻻ‬no). Inclusiveness is among the attributes of utterances, and it is not permissible to claim inclusivity based on something other than that, such as doings, or what is similar to them. The specific is contrary to the inclusive. Specification is to distinguish part of the sentence, and is divided into: connected (specification) and disconnected (specification). The connected specification (takes place by way of): the exception, the condition, and the restriction by a description. The exception is the exclusion of that which had it not been excluded it would have been included in the speech. The exception is valid with the condition that something remains from that which it was excluded, and among its conditions is that it would be connected to the speech. It is valid to advance the exception (and mention it) before what it has been excluded from, and that it would be of the same type as that which it is excluded from or of a different type. It is valid for the condition to precede its consequence. The generalized is made to comply with that which is restricted by a description, like the slave restricted by the description of having belief in some issues. So the generalized is made to comply with the restricted. It is permissible to specify the Book by the Book, and to specify the Book by the Sunnah, and to specify the Sunnah by the Book, and to specify the Sunnah by the Sunnah, and to specify the text (nutq) by the analogical deduction, and we mean by the text: the (revealed) saying of Allah (in the book of the Qur’an), and the saying of the Messenger, may Allah raise his rank and protect him from what he feared for his nation. The general is that which is in need of clarification. 66 | P a g e
  • 67. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Clarification is to take something out of the confines of ambiguity into the scope of conspicuousness. The explicit is that which bears only one meaning; and it was said that it is that which its meaning is as it was revealed. It 1 is derived from: “‫( ”ﻣﻧﺻﺔ اﻟﻌروس‬minassatul-^arus), which is the chair. The apparent is that which can bear two meanings, one of which is more obvious than the other; and because of a reference is interpreted, and hence is called “apparent with a reference”. THE DOINGS (OF THE PROPHET) The doing of the (religious) lawgiver would either be for gaining a higher status and obedience (to Allah), or not. If it was for gaining a higher status and obedience, then if there was a reference proving that (the act) is specific to him, it is taken as such. If there is no reference then it is not taken as such, because Allah said: {(‫< })ﻟﻘﺪ ﰷن ﻟﲂ ﰲ رﺳﻮل ﷲ أﺳﻮة ﺣﺴﻨﺔ‬In the Messenger of Allah is a good example for you>. It would be taken as an obligation according to some of the mujtahids within our school, and some of them said it is taken as a recommended deed, and some did not say one way or the other. If the deed was not for gaining a higher status and obedience, then it is taken to be a permissibility. The saying accepted by the one who comes with the religious law is the saying of the one who comes with the religious law, and his acceptance of a doing is like his doing. Whatever was done during his time, but in his absence and he knew about it without disapproving of it, then its judgment is the judgment of what was done in his presence. ABROGATION The meaning of naskh (abrogation) is removal. It is said (in Arabic): “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت اﻟﺷﻣس اﻟظل‬the sun abrogated the shadow>” if it removed it. It was said that it means, “to transfer” because of their saying: “{‫< }ﻧﺳﺧت ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛﺗﺎب‬i copied what is in the book>” if one transferred it by copying the shapes of its writing. 1 in its Arabic term: nass 67 | P a g e
  • 68. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Its definition is: the subsequent address that refers to lifting a judgment established by a previous address, in a way that had it not been for it, the previous one would (have remained) established, and it is delayed after it. The abrogation of the text while its ruling remains (affirmative) is permissible, and the abrogation of the ruling while its text remains (established), and the abrogation of both matters simultaneously. Abrogation is divided into: (that which has a) substitute, and (that which has no substitute); and to: that which is tougher, or to that which is lighter. It is permissible to abrogate the Book by the Book, to abrogate the Sunnah by the Book, and to abrogate the Sunnah by the Sunnah. It is permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir by that which is mutawatir from either one of those two, and to abrogate that which is ahad by that that which is ahad, or by that which is mutawatir. It is not permissible to abrogate that which is mutawatir by that which is ahad. SECTION PERTAINING TO CONFLICT If two texts conflict which each other, then they would not be devoid of both either being: inclusive, specific, or one is inclusive and the other is specific, or both of them are inclusive from a certain viewpoint, and specific from a another viewpoint. If they are both inclusive and it is possible to merge them, then they are merged. If they cannot be merged, then no weight is given to one over the other if the date (of the texts) is unknown. If the date is known, then the previous text is abrogated by the subsequent. Likewise (is done) if they are both specific. If one of them is inclusive and the other is specific, then the general is restricted by the specific. If both were inclusive from a viewpoint and specific from another viewpoint, then the inclusiveness of those two texts is restricted by the specification of the other. THE CONSENSUS As for the consensus, it is the agreement of the scholars of an era about the judgment of an issue. By “the scholars”, we mean the scholars of judgment deduction (fuqaha’), and by the “issue”, we mean the religious issue. 68 | P a g e
  • 69. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c The consensus of this nation, and not that of another one, is evidence, because of his saying, may Allah raise his rank and protect him from what he feared for his nation: ‫< ﻻ ﺗﺟﺗﻣﻊ أﻣﺗﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﻼﻟﺔ‬My nation will not gather on a misguidance>. The religious law came with the infallibility of the nation. The consensus is evidence for the following era, and for any era to come. It is not conditional for it to be evidence that the first era would come to an end according to the correct saying. (However), if we say that the lapsing of the era is a condition, then the consideration is given to the one who was born during their lifetime, became knowledgeable, and became among the people of judgment deduction. Then it would be permissible for them to retract that judgment. The consensus is verified by their sayings and their doings; and by the sayings of some of them and the doings of others, while that becomes widespread and the rest do not comment on it. The statement of one of the Companions is not evidence (given priority) over someone other than him according to the new saying. CONVEYED INFORMATION As for conveyed information, it is subject to truth or falsehood. Information is divided into two categories: ahad, and mutawatir. The mutawatir necessitates (confirmed) knowledge, and it is what is narrated by a group the likes of which would not conspire to a lie, and so on, until reaching that which is being informed about. (The original event) must have been seen or heard, and not deduced. The ahad necessitates application and does not necessitate (definite) knowledge because of the possibility of error in it. It is divided into two categories: mursal and musnad. The musnad is that which has a continuous chain of narration. The mursal is that which does not have a continuous chain of narration. If the one who omitted a narrator from the chain is not a companion, then it is not evidence, except for the mursals of Sa^id Ibn Al-Musayyab, because they have been researched and it was found that they are actually connected (musnad) to the Prophet, r. That which was narrated by the use of saying, “from so and so, from so and so” is considered a continuous chain of narration. If the shaykh recited, then it is permissible for the narrator to say, “haddathani <he told me>”, or “akhbarani <he informed me>”; and if he read on the shaykh, he then says, “akhbarani <he informed me>”, 69 | P a g e
  • 70. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c and he does not say, “haddathani <he told me>”. If the shaykh gave him permission to narrate without reciting, then the narrator says, “He permitted me”, or “akhbarani ijazatan <he informed me by permission>. THE ANALOGICAL DEDUCTION As for the analogical deduction, it is the referral of the branch back to the origin because of an issue that they have in common in respects to the ruling. It is divided into three categories: comparison based on reason, comparison based on reference, and comparison based on resemblance. The comparison based on reason is that which its reason necessitates its ruling. The comparison based on reference is to use one of two similar things as a reference for the judgment of the other, which is for the reason to be a reference for the ruling without necessitating the ruling. The comparison of resemblance is for the ruling of the branch that has ties to two origins to be in accordance with whichever it is most similar. The condition of the branch is that it would be appropriate for that origin in reference to the issue that unites them in the ruling. The condition of the origin is that it would be confirmed by a reference agreed upon by the two opponents. The condition of the reason is that it would constantly exist in its results; so it should not become invalid verbally or conceptually. The condition of the ruling is that it would be like the reason in reference to negation and confirmation. The reason is that which attracts the ruling. The ruling is that which is attracted by the reason. PROHIBITION, PERMISSIBILITY, AND REFERING BACK TO THE ORIGIN As for prohibition and permissibility, some people say that the origin of things is prohibition, except what the religious law made premissible; if there was no reference in the religious law proving permissibility, then the origin is kept, which is prohibition. Some people say the opposite, which is that the origin of things is permissibility except what the religious law prohibits. 70 | P a g e
  • 71. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c Referring back to the origin means: to go back to the origin upon the lack of a religious reference. THE CONFLICT OF REFERENCES As for the references, that which is clear is given priority over that which is ambiguous, as is that which necessitates (definite) knowledge (given priority) over that which necessitates speculation. The text (is given priority) over the analogical deduction, and the clear analogical deduction (is given priority) over the less obvious. If found in the text that which changes (the situation of) the origin, (it is then applied), or else the origin is referenced. HE WHO PASSES RULINGS AND HE WHO SEEKS RULINGS Among the conditions of he who passes rulings is that he would be a scholar in the foundations and branches of fiqh; that which is disagreed about and that which complies with his school, and that he would perfectly possess the tools needed for judgment deduction; being knowledgeable about that which he needs in reference to grammar and language, and knowing (the status of) the narrators, and the interpretation of the verses and hadiths that pertain to judgments. Among the conditions of he who seeks rulings is that he would be among the people of imitation; so he imitates the one who passes rulings in the rulings he passes. JUDGMENT DEDUCTION AND IMITATION It is not permissible for the scholar to imitate. Imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying without evidence, and according to this, accepting the saying of the Prophet is called imitation. Some said that imitation is the acceptance of someone’s saying while not knowing from where he got his saying. If we say that the Prophet used to make analogical deduction, then it is permissible to call the acceptance of his saying imitation. As for ijtihad (judgment deduction), it is the utmost effort put forth for reaching the goal. If the mujtahid was perfectly qualified for deducing judgments, if he deduces a judgment within the branches of the religion and is correct, he gets two rewards, and if he deduces a judgment and is mistaken, he gets one reward. Some said that every top scholar who deduces judgments in the branches is correct. 71 | P a g e
  • 72. F T ra n sf o F T ra n sf o PD rm PD rm Y Y Y Y er erABB ABB y y bu bu 2.0 2.0 to to re re THE EYE’S DELIGHT he he k k lic lic C C w om w om w w w. w. A B B Y Y.c A B B Y Y.c It is not permissible to say that everyone who infer conclusions in the creedal basics is correct, because that leads to deeming as being correct the misguided people such as the Christians, Zoroastrians, blasphemers and mulhids. The reference for those who said, “Not every mujtahid (who deduces judgments) in the branches is correct”, is his saying: {‫( < }ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد ﻓﺄﺻﺎب ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟران و ﻣن اﺟﺗﮭد و أﺧطﺄ ﻓﻠﮫ أﺟر واﺣد‬The scholar) who deduces (a judgment) and is correct has two rewards, and the one who deduces and is wrong has one reward>. The evidence is that the Prophet considered him correct sometimes and mistaken at other times, And Allah the glorified and exalted is the most (majestically) high and He knows best. 72 | P a g e