Inside Bitcoins_AlanReiner


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Inside Bitcoins_AlanReiner

  1. 1. Inside Bitcoins Conference, Dec 10-11, 2013 Best Practices for Using and Securing Bitcoins 10 December, 2013 Alan Reiner Founder & CEO Armory Technologies, Inc. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  2. 2. List of Topics • • • • • • Introduction Bitcoin storage methods Bitcoin Basics The wedding of cryptography and money Security Practices The future of Bitcoin best practices Learn to hold your own Bitcoins and let the power of decentralized money shine! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  3. 3. Who Am I? • Alan Reiner – “etotheipi” on the • Mathematician, Statistician, SW Developer, Perfectionist – With a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 2011 – Contribute to documentation, standards, security discussions, etc, on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A huge nerd! (you have to be to do what I do) – Sub-category: “ultra-paranoid crypto-nerd” © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  4. 4. What is Armory? • Armory Bitcoin Wallet is a free, open-source desktop application for securing Bitcoins yourself – One of four such applications featured on • Known for “security at all costs” – Sometimes “convenience” is one of those costs... – Currently a tool tailored to advanced/power users – Recently funded, will develop beginner's interface
  5. 5. What is Armory? • Even after two years, Armory is still one of the only ways for non-experts to use “cold storage” – Sign transactions from an air-gapped computer • Also innovated many other features – Multiple-wallet interface – Wallets that only have to be backed up one time – Printable paper backups (with fragmenting!) • Not for Beginners! – Need Bitcoin-Qt running in background (for security!) – Need to download blockchain – Lots of advanced features I created Armory because the best practices I wanted were not available elsewhere © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  6. 6. Bitcoin Basics • Bitcoin has the potential to revolutionize payments – The same way email changed written communications • Bitcoin is complicated – But it will get easier... hopefully • Bitcoin creates both tremendous opportunities and tremendous risks – Harness the opportunities, mitigate the risks: win-win • Positive: Take control of your own money (and save)! • Negative: Take control of your own money (and lose it)! (If you are using Bitcoin to remove third-parties from the equation, you have to take over the responsibilities of those third-parties!) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  7. 7. It's Just a Baby • The infrastructure around Bitcoin is still being built • Relatively speaking, Bitcoin is still in its infancy – Started only five years ago (2009) – Relatively unknown for years • Lots of venture capital flowing in to turn it into something much bigger • Still a lot of soul-searching to do by the community Bitcoin may end up being the TCP/IP of money – advanced payment systems will be built off of it, but only developers have to interact with it directly © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  8. 8. Why Bitcoin? • Show me another payment system that you can pay someone $10,000,000 USD: – To and from anywhere in the world – 24/7 without restrictions – Nearly instantaneously – Irreversible – With $0.00 in fees* – Can't be frozen or seized (without direct access to your wallet) • Bitcoin is not perfect, but it certainly is powerful! • There is no other payment system like this! • If only we could make it safe and usable... *Certain types of transactions may require fees, but it rarely exceeds $0.01 USD. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  9. 9. Why Bitcoin? • Decentralized – Not controlled by any one entity: run by all users of the system simultaneously! • Limited Supply – There will only ever be 21,000,000.00000000 Bitcoins – The entire schedule of Bitcoin generation was announced in 2009 and cannot be changed – Predetermined inflation, no printing/debasing • Secure! (theoretically) – Built from standard, trusted crypto algorithms Bitcoin shares many of the same properties as gold (no one issues gold, the supply is limited, easy to identify, fungible, durable) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  10. 10. Bitcoin Storage Options • With Bitcoin, now “data” is “money” – A 32-byte secret (private key) can control $millions – Raises the stakes of computer and network security – Money now stored directly on phone, computer, paper, etc • Store Bitcoin yourself + Full control over your money + Cannot be seized or stolen if secured properly - It's easy to lose 32 bytes if you're careless! • Let someone else hold your Bitcoin + - May be more diligent about security than you May hold BTC properly but use poor user auth Counterparty risk No Bitcoin insurance © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  11. 11. Third-Party Risk • The history of Bitcoin is filled with users trusting third-parties to hold their money - Currently, there is no equivalent of FDIC for Bitcoin Date Service Service Type BTC Lost / Stolen June 2011 Mt. Gox Exchange June 2011 MyBitcoin Wallet USD Value (at time of loss) 2,000 $47,000 79,000 $1,100,000 May 2012 Bitcoinica (#1) Exchange 38,000 $91,000 July 2012 Bitcoinica (#2) Exchange 40,000 $305,000 Sep 2012 Bitfloor Exchange 24,000 $250,000 Oct 2013 Wallet 4,100 $1,200,000 Nov 2013 GBL (China) Exchange 4,100 $4,100,000 Sometimes users get some of their own money back. Sometimes. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  12. 12. Holding Your Own Bitcoin • Holding your own is like harnessing fire – Can be extremely useful... and dangerous! – Keep your fires small until you are experienced • Sometimes the biggest threat to users is themselves – Users are not used to truly irrecoverable data! – Not everyone makes backups – No one expects their hardware to fail Educate yourself, learn the tools, learn the risks, and experiment (with small amounts) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  13. 13. Holding Your Own (cont) • Most users should not be holding life-changing amounts of Bitcoin themselves • Most users should not be trusting third-parties to protect life-changing amounts of BTC for them • Wait... so, what are users supposed to do ?!? Answer: Most users should not be putting lifechanging amounts of money into Bitcoin yet! • Bitcoin is still the Wild West of money • People like me are building safer tools & infrastructure – But we're not done yet © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  14. 14. Cryptography & Bitcoin A Short, Non-Technical Introduction © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  15. 15. Public-Private Key Crypto • On the internet, there are two main concerns: – Privacy of communications (encrypt & decrypt) – Authenticity of communications (sign & verify) • Bitcoin protocol does not use encryption – The Bitcoin protocol only uses “authentication” – “Are you authorized to move this money?” • All users create a private key (secret) and a public key (distributed) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  16. 16. Public and Private Keys • Think of Bitcoin as a decentralized, public bank - is like a bank account number - is the signing authority on that bank account • All users make keypairs for “account” management - give to payers to deposit money in your “account” - keep it secret so only you can authorize payments A Bitcoin address is just a representation of a public key: Such as: “1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa” © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  17. 17. Example Network • All Bitcoins have a public “unlock” condition • Most coins have a simple unlock condition: provide a signature that verifies against a specified public key • If you have the private key, you can create those signatures! (so your wallet includes them in your balance) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  18. 18. A Bitcoin Transaction Bitcoin might make a lot more sense after this demo... © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  19. 19. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Initial Conditions • Assume the Bitcoin network has 21 coins • All coins are locked using public keys A, B and C (so far) • Alice and Bob have all the private keys associated with those coins (and a couple extra unused keys)
  20. 20. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions
  21. 21. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions
  22. 22. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Who owns what?
  23. 23. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Payment Request • Bob will request 4 BTC from Alice • Bob's wallet will select unused private key E, and then create a payment address (based on the public key E) • Bob sends the address to Alice requesting payment
  24. 24. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Create Transaction • Alice's wallet selects some coins that she knows she can sign for (at least 4 BTC) • She will use the 6 BTC associated with A (think of it like a $6 bill) • Alice creates a transaction spending the 6 BTC – She also selects an unused key (D) to send the 2 BTC back to herself (change)
  25. 25. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice uses private key A to sign the transaction • The signature is mathematically linked to every detail of the transaction – If the transaction changes at all, the signature will break (the math stops working)
  26. 26. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Bitcoin Transactions • Alice “broadcasts” the transaction to the Bitcoin network • Users of the network verify: – – – The 6 BTC is unspent The sig corresponds to public key A The sig is valid for this particular transaction
  27. 27. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013 Final Condition • The original 6-BTC bill is destroyed and 2 new bills totaling 6 BTC created • All users update their databases
  28. 28. What Have We Learned? • Private keys let you “unlock” and “re-lock” coins under other public keys (i.e. send to others) • Public keys let you: – – Receive money See available coins/balance • Transactions usually have 2 parts (payment & change) • Signatures are mathematically linked to the signed data – Handwritten sigs can be (maliciously) transplanted between documents, Bitcoin signatures can't be • Wallets contain a lot of private keys – Uses a new key for every receiving operations © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  29. 29. Cold Storage • Now we can appreciate “cold storage” (aka “offline wallets”) – Only public keys are required to receive payments and verify transactions – Private keys are only required to move the coins It is possible to keep the private keys on an offline computer and receive money to it using the public keys Armory was designed to do exactly this! It is the gold standard of wallet security best practices © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  30. 30. Security Best-Practices (for varying levels of paranoia) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  31. 31. Security vs. Convenience • Nearly all system become more inconvenient as you increase security! – The easiest systems are usually the least secure! – Commit to doing security right • A lot of users don't have the patience for this – Honestly, this is why Bitcoin may not be ready for primetime! If you're going to hold a lot of Bitcoin it's worth sacrificing some convenience to protect yourself © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  32. 32. GPG-Verify Your Installers • Risks: – You download installers from a malicious website – An attacker tampered with the installers on the real website – The installers are replaced during or after download • Mitigation: – All wallet devs sign their installers using known GPG keys • Most devs keep a special offline GPG private key just for this! – Get the developer's GPG public key and verify! If the installer has a valid signature from the correct GPG key, it does not matter where you got it from! There are slides at the end that explain in detail This is very easy in Linux & Mac, but a lot of work in Windows! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  33. 33. Backup Your Wallets • Risks: – The most common reason users lose coins is due to not having an unencrypted backup! • You lose all your Bitcoins if your hard drive fails • You lose all your Bitcoins if you forget your password • Your family cannot inherit your Bitcoins if you get hit by a bus – It is critical your backup be unencrypted! • An encrypted backup is useless if you forget the password • An encrypted backup is useless if you get hit by a bus and your family would like to inherit your fortune For most users, digital security is the most important For most users, physical security is not a concern THEREFORE: Make an unencrypted backup offline and secure it! (paper, DVD or USB key)
  34. 34. Backups: Digital vs. Paper • How much are you willing to bet that your CD or USB key will still work in 5-10 years from now? Armory Paper Backup – If it's more than your wallet value, don't use it • If you use digital backups, make multiple copies – Store together, at least one will work • Paper fades over time, but the data will be recoverable in 50+ years Armory Technologies recommends that you use paper backups whenever possible Copy the data by hand if necessary Most things that destroy paper also destroy digital
  35. 35. Backup Frequency • IMPORTANT: At the time of this writing (Dec 2013): – Bitcoin-Qt wallets must be backed up every 100 transactions – Multibit and Bitcoin Wallet for Android require regular backups unless you always reuse addresses (not good practice!) • Address reuse is bad, but probably better than losing money – Armory and Electrum wallets only require one backup, ever • Infinite private keys generated from a single seed • Print your seed on a piece of paper for reliable storage If you use Armory or Electrum, make a paper backup, one time, then never worry again! In the next few months, all wallet developers will be implementing the one-time-only backup features
  36. 36. Fragmented Backups • Risks: – If you are concerned about physical security, a single-sheet unencrypted backup is a single-point of failure • Mitigation: – Use M-of-N “Shamir's Secret Sharing” – For instance, 3-of-5: print 5 “fragments”, need any 3 – Store each fragment in a different location • Security—Attacker needs to steal multiple fragments • Redundancy—you can lose pieces and it still works! Currently, Armory is the only wallet offering this! It is called “Fragmented Backups” Graphic for 3-of-5 Backup
  37. 37. Fragmented Backups Armory's Fragmented Backup Interface
  38. 38. Wallet Passwords • IMPORTANT: Your wallet password is your encryption key for your wallet! • If you forget your password, your wallet will be permanently encrypted and your coins will be lost! ...unless you have an unencrypted backup • No really: I'm serious your coins will be lost forever – Users are not used to the idea of truly, irrecoverable data – Make an unencrypted backup! If you've ever forgotten a password, make an unencrypted backup!
  39. 39. Password Length • Armory and Bitcoin-Qt both use “key-stretching” – Converting your password into the encryption key is a computationally-intense process – Armory's key-stretching is resistant to GPU-acceleration • If someone gets your encrypted wallet, they can guess: – Without stretching: 1,000,000 - 5,000,000 passwords/sec – With stretching: 5 - 50 passwords/sec • If key-stretching is not used, must longer passwords – Recommended 12-16 characters for no key-stretching – Recommended 10-12 characters with key-stretching Use a strong password, make unencrypted backups!
  40. 40. Password Length Time to brute-force your wallet password* Password Length 1 Computer 1,000,000 Computers 6 chars (no stretching) 10 min Instant 8 chars (no stretching) 8 days Instant 12 chars (no stretching) 16,800 years 6 days 6 chars (with stretching) 170 days Instant 8 chars (with stretching) 416 years 4 hours 12 chars (with stretching) 337,000,000 years 337 years If your wallet is valuable enough, a bot-net of 1,000,000 computers could be used to break your wallet encryption *Caveats: used 30-character alphabet to simulate poor entropy of human-generated passwords. Truly random passwords of these lengths will be much more secure.
  41. 41. Do Not Reuse Addresses • Risks: – Bitcoin is actually not very good at anonymity – When you reuse addresses you make it far worse – Reusing addresses can hurt other users' privacy as well • Mitigation: – Bitcoin-Qt, Armory and Electrum do not reuse addresses by default – Some users force reuse due to lack of understanding or simplicity of backups – This is doing more harm than good in Armory & Electrum – Multibit & Android Bitcoin Wallet reuse addresses by default – Usually have an option to explicitly create If you are using Bitcoin-Qt, Multibit or Android Bitcoin Wallet, you may want to reuse addresses anyway if you do not create backups regularly. (lack of privacy is usually preferred to losing coins) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  42. 42. Address Reuse & Privacy • Discussion: – Address reuse is mostly a privacy issue, not a security issue – Reusing the same public-private keypair is expected & safe throughout the rest of internet security – But it is egregiously bad for privacy in Bitcoin • There are contexts in which it is okay, but not standard – Donation addresses: all users donating know it is heavily reused, and accept being linked to it Users do not realize just how much privacy information is leaked by interacting with heavily-reused addresses! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  43. 43. Address Reuse & Privacy • If you are using Armory or Electrum, you have no excuse for reusing addresses! – Both automatically generate new addresses for all operations – you have to go out of your way to reuse – Both produce backups that work forever • No matter how many new addresses you use, a backup made when the wallet was created will always work! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  44. 44. What are Confirmations? • Bitcoin transactions are not instantaneous • Each confirmation is increased consensus that the transaction actually happened – More confirmations means more confidence – The first confirmation is the most important – Six confirmations is generally considered irreversible • Confirmations come on average every 10 minutes – Actually exponential random: usually 30 sec to 45 min © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  45. 45. Confirmation Risks • Do not trust zero-confirmation transactions unless there is pre-existing trust! – Or, you're willing to eat the loss when reversed • Attacks on zero-confirmation tx are easy and cheap – Just not that many people doing it right now • Attacks on oneconfirmation tx require a bit more resources • But they are possible! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  46. 46. Call-to-Verify Addresses • If you are sending large amounts of Bitcoin: – You want to make sure you send it to the right place! – An attacker could replace the correct address with his own on its way to your wallet software • This is a serious security issue! – The “payment protocol” hopes to solve this by using SSL concepts to prevent address tampering – This will not work in all environments (not everyone has an SSL certificate) • Pick up the phone and call the other parties – Make sure they are who you think they are! – Manually verify the address before execution – This is much more reliable with an offline computer
  47. 47. Cold Storage and the Holy Grail © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  48. 48. Hot vs. Cold “Hot” Wallet – The private keys are on an internet-attached system – All wallets are “hot” by default “Cold” wallet (“offline wallet”) – Gold standard of security – Private keys created and never leave the offline computer – Transactions are signed offline
  49. 49. Hot vs. Cold Security • All known, major Bitcoin breaches to date: – Coins stored on a hot wallet – Or unencrypted backups stored on an “hot” computer • Compromising a cold wallet requires one of the following: – Physical access – Extremely advanced USB viruses – User accidentally installing malicious software
  50. 50. Setting up the Offline Computer Online computer • (1) Install Armory Offline computer • (1) Install Armory • (2) Create new wallet • (3) Create paper backup – Copy by hand, if necessary • (4) Create “watchingonly” copy of wallet • (5) Copy to USB drive • (6) Import “watchingonly” wallet Your “watching-only” wallet has only public keys, no private keys!
  51. 51. Doing an Offline Transaction Online computer Offline computer • (1) Create transaction – Same as you would with a hot wallet • (2) Save unsigned transaction to USB • (3) Load tx from USB • (4) Review for accuracy! – • (6) Load signed transaction, broadcast to network All benefit is lost if you don't review on the clean, offline computer • (5) Sign the transaction, save to USB
  52. 52. Splitting roles Online computer • The watching-only wallet behaves identically to a regular wallet, but cannot sign/spend – Generate addresses – Confirm incoming transactions – See balances • An attacker getting the online wallet is a breach of privacy, not security Offline computer • This computer cannot display balances – It has no access to the network to know where your money is! – It can review transactions and request confirmation • Remember, the offline wallet is the signing authority. – It does nothing else but read and sign transactions!
  53. 53. Doing it Right • If you are running any kind of online Bitcoin business, offline-wallets are an invaluable tool – Keep bulk of your funds in an offline computer • You can even keep it in a safe-deposit box! – All webservers and on-site computers should only use watching-only wallets! • Securely collect payments to the offline wallet • Track your wallet balance • Track and verify all payments/transactions • No one who gains access to the server can steal it! – Includes employees If you need a hot wallet, keep it small, periodically refill from the cold wallet © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  54. 54. FAQ • There is no special version of Armory for offline – It's an offline computer because the computer is offline • Mix and match versions to your heart's content – The following setup works fine: • Offline: Ubuntu 10.04 using Armory 0.87.2 • Online: Windows XP using Armory 0.90 © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  55. 55. Use Linux • Once you go down the “cold storage” path you are implementing serious security • As of this writing, the best way to move data between online & offline computer is USB drives – Linux has a much better history of resisting USBbased attacks – We are working on better methods for secure transfer • Armory website has Ubuntu “Offline Bundles” – Will install and run on the first boot of a fresh install of Ubuntu 10.04 or 12.04 – The offline computer needs no other software at all! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  56. 56. Extra Credit • Dedicate a small USB key for offline transactions – Minimize exposure to potential viruses • Dedicate a computer for the creating transactions – Minimize exposure to potential viruses – Make it exclusive for Bitcoin processing • Use full-disk encryption to protect privacy – Without it, someone not authorized can still see the wallet value and transaction history – Also adds an extra layer of security Did I mention, make unencrypted backups? © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  57. 57. The Future Coming Soon! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  58. 58. Hardware Wallets • A great tradeoff for security and convenience Trezor Hardware Wallet • Hardware wallets hold the private keys and sign on the device – The private keys cannot be read from it – It will only emit the public keys • The Trezor is the most anticipated HW wallet • Should be released in January, 2014 © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  59. 59. Hardware Wallets • Hardware wallets are an 80% solution – They lack flexibility – Another layer of trust required – More difficult to audit – Connect directly to online computer via USB • The wallets they use are standardized – Should be supported by all major wallet apps • Will be a huge win for convenience & security © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  60. 60. Multi-Signature Transactions • Most coins have a simple unlock condition: – Here's a public key, sign with its private key to move • Much more complex conditions are possible: – Here's 3 public keys, sign with any 2 private keys – This is a 2-of-3 multi-signature transaction © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  61. 61. Multi-Sig vs. Fragmenting • Wait a sec, this sounds familiar! – Haven't we seen M-of-N before? • Yes! Fragmented backups also use “M-of-N” M-of-N Backups M-of-N Multi-Sig Fragmented backups are for securing your backup Multi-signature transactions are network-enforced All transactions still require a single signature, from a single computer Multiple public keys are included in the unlock conditions of the coins The fragments only need to be collected if wallet is lost Network expects multiple sigs for every transaction © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  62. 62. Multi-Sig vs. Fragmenting M-of-N Backups M-of-N Multi-Sig © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  63. 63. A Critical Puzzle Piece • Multi-signature transactions are critical for large organizations – Wallets are managed by employees, who may steal – All wallets currently have a single point of failure • You can have: – Five board members of a company all create wallets – All money handled by the company goes into 3-of-5 – All money requires 3 signatures to be moved © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  64. 64. Extras Stuff that I wanted to present but couldn't fit © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  65. 65. Who Am I? • Alan Reiner – “etotheipi” on the • Mathematician, Rocket Scientist, Software Developer, Perfectionist – With a sprinkling of cryptography and data mining • Have been part of the Bitcoin community since 2011 – Contribute to documentation, standards, security discussions, etc, on the “Development & Technical Discussion” forum • A huge nerd! (you have to be to do what I do) – Sub-category: “ultra-paranoid crypto-nerd” © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  66. 66. Accomplishments • Be careful who you trust! – But I do have some street cred... • Core Developer of Armory Bitcoin Wallet – Secure wallet software: open-source, popular, trusted – Innovated cold storage, one-time paper backups • Discovered the “whoops-your-wallet-isn't-actuallyencrypted” bug in Bitcoin-Qt 0.4 – Yeah, whoops... • Spoke on multiple discussion panels at Bitcoin conferences, including the “Security” Panel at San Jose 2013. © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  67. 67. Verify Your Installers • GPG is a powerful, thoroughly-trusted crypto tool – Presintalled in Linux & Mac; takes effort in Windows – Because it's hard in Windows, I verify my Windows installers in Linux Steps • (1) Get GPG and file-hashing tool – Linux & Mac: Do nothing, it's all pre-installed! – Windows: Download gpg4win and SHA256 file hash tool (HashCalc is good) • (2) Import the GPG keys to your keyring (only done once) – Most tools have search & import function (Linux & Mac: “gpg --recv-keys <keyID>” – Each developer's “keyID” should be well-known: mine is 98832223 • (3) Download the installers and signed hash files* – Hash the installer file (Linux & Mac: “sha256sum <filename>” ) – The result looks something like this: f98c7a798122167c98c0a798122167f9030a7 – Compare to the hashes in the signed file • (4) Verify the signature on the hashes file – Win: use right-click gpg4win menu; Linux & Mac: “gpg -v sha256hashes.txt.asc” – MAKE SURE THE FINGERPRINT MATCHES THE EXPECTED KEY – Anyone can create a “valid” signature – but not from the developer's key! *If it is a .deb installer (Linux), it may be signed directly, only need “dpkg-sig –verify *.deb”
  68. 68. GPG Keys of Major Wallets • The most sensitive part of using GPG keys is the fingerprint distribution • So here they are! (most GPG apps only show last 8 chars) © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  69. 69. Brainwallets (don't use them!) • Humans are really bad at memorizing things • You will lose coins • Your family will never recover your coins if you die – You literally take your wealth with you to your grave • Any system that requires your brain to be useful is essentially a brainwallet • This is why Armory hates encrypted backups: – If all your wallets are encrypted – And all your backups are encrypted – You have a brainwallet! © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013
  70. 70. Segregate Funds by Security • Risks: – Having all your funds in a single wallet, means all funds have the same security – Usually means funds are super-secure-but-inconvenient, or not properly secured • Mitigation: – Use multiple wallets (Armory & Multibit have native support) – Exercise all the best practices on the majority of your funds – Keeps most of your funds secured, periodically refill lowsecurity wallets
  71. 71. Sweep vs. Import • Definitions: – “Sweeping” an address/key means sending all the coins owned by that key to a new address (one you control) – “Importing” an address means to add the private key to your wallet – usually so it can be reused • When to sweep vs import – Sweep if anyone else has ever had access to the private key – Importing really only makes sense with address reuse • I already told you not to do that! • Serious Security to consider – You import a key that someone else has – That person pays you for services/goods – They sweep the key after you have delivered When in doubt, SWEEP © Armory Technologies, Inc. 2013