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Software Security in the Real World
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Software Security in the Real World

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  • Great slides Mark. I'm guessing that the series of skipper/coastguard/skipper/coastguard/rock slides (also used in Naked Security) would be from this story: http://www.snopes.com/military/lighthse.htm
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  • Transcript

    • 1. Hot News
      • Excitement for Internet fans as Google opens in Outer Mongolia
      • Microsoft Engineers look for inspiration (giant wall)
      • Microsoft Sp3 Engineer takes his work home (giant plaster pic.)
      • Excitement as Windows is used for new military applications
    • 2.  
    • 3.  
    • 4. Today's Agenda
      • Human Nature (5 mins)
      • State of the Industry (10 mins)
      • Application and Software Security Assessment 101 (10 mins)
      • Threat Modeling (15 mins)
      • Closing Thoughts (5 mins)
    • 5.  
    • 6.  
    • 7.  
    • 8.  
    • 9.  
    • 10.  
    • 11.  
    • 12. A Little Local Knowledge Goes a Long Way
    • 13. State of the Industry
      • Increased Regulations
        • GLBA, SOX, FFIEC
        • Payment Card Industry (PCI)
      • Commercial Awareness
        • MS Trustworthy Computing
        • FTC Fined Guess Jeans $13 million
      • Vendors And Service Providers Are In “Startup Mode”
        • Immature Market (Early Adopters)
        • Grab for Land
        • More Sellers Than Buyers
        • Lots of Misinformation and Marketing
        • People Coming Up With Problems for Their Solution
      • Secure Software != Security Software
    • 14. Changing IT Industry
      • Sailing with the Wind
      • Time is the Enemy
      • Growth at All Costs
      • Revolutionary Offers
      • Horizontal for Breadth
      • Geographical Coverage
      • Catching the Next Wave
      • Sailing into the wind
      • Waste is the Enemy
      • Cash Flow at All Costs
      • Evolutionary Offers
      • Vertical for Depth
      • Domain Expertise
      • Grow Organically
      Lost Customer Satisfaction and Loyalty Poor Process Short Cuts Poor QA Software Bugs Repeated Work Inadequate Policy Poor Designs Margin In Margin Out
    • 15. Is the Problem Getting Better or Worse ?
      • U.S. Average Defect Rate – 6 defects per thousand lines of code
        • (Software Assessments, Benchmarks, and Best Practices by Capers Jones)
      • Software defects rates have increased by 15% in 1999-2000 compared to 1997-1998
        • (Meta Group,January 2002)
    • 16. Software Vulnerabilities Increasing Causing Expensive Downstream Fixes Unit Cost of Fix Number of Reported Vulnerabilities (1)
      • CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University (Note: does not include unreported vulnerabilities which would be a much higher number)
      • NIST Report: “Economic Impact of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing”
      35x 30x 5x 25x 20x 15x 10x
    • 17. Why is The Problem Getting Worse?
      • Security World Had its Eye Off The Ball
      • Software is Getting Bigger
      • To Build RedHat Linux from Scratch Would Cost $1 Billion Dollars and 8,000 Person Years
      • Will Declarative Security Help?
    • 18. Application and Software Security Assessment 101
      • What’s the Difference Between Application Security and Software Security?
        • Software Security
          • Building Software is a Process
            • People
            • Process
            • Technology
        • Application Security
          • When Software is Built and Deployed, it Becomes an Application
          • Applications are Instances of Technology
        • One is Tactical, One is Strategic
        • Your Choice, Assess an Issue or Asses the Problem?
      • Techniques
        • Penetration Testing
        • Code Review
        • Process Reviews
        • Threat Modeling
    • 19. Penetration Testing
      • If you fail a penetration test you know you have a problem, if you pass a penetration test you have no idea you don’t have a really bad problem”
        • Gary McGraw, Author of Building Secure Software
      • One Perspective
        • Time Trail
        • Display of Human Skills
      • Second Perspective
        • Pragmatic
      • One Fact – After Software is Built ! (Application Testing)
      • No Shortage of Low Hanging Fruit
    • 20. Code Review
      • Source Code is Software DNA
      • Earlier in Development Lifecycle
        • Uses the Software DNA
      • Bugs vs. Flaws
        • Implementation Bugs
          • Buffer Overflows
          • Cross Site Scripting
        • Design Flaws
          • No Data Access Layer
          • Authorization Models
      • Misconceptions
        • Expensive
        • Time Consuming & Slow
        • Have to Look at All the Code
      • Automated Tools
        • Static Analysis
        • Dynamic Analysis
        • The Brain
        • Bugs vs. Flaws Again
        • Recent ASP.NET Example
      • Challenges with Modern Managed Code
    • 21. Process Reviews
      • Security Must Be Part of the Development Process
        • CLASP (Common Lightweight Application Security Process)
        • Microsoft SDL
      • Policy
        • Architecture and Design
        • Technology Standards
        • Coding Standards
      • Process
        • Threat Modeling
        • Design and Architecture
        • Code Review
        • Metrics and Measurement
    • 22. Threat Modeling
      • Structured approach for identifying, evaluating and mitigating risks to system security
      • Model the system as the attacker sees it but …
        • … with the advantage of knowing the internals
      • Attackers look for entry points to access the system, components of interest, and a path to the attack target
    • 23. Why Should You Use Threat Modeling?
      • Prioritize usage of a security budget
        • Drive security requirements and specifications
        • During design and development
        • During testing
        • Integrated with the SDLC
      • Characterize strengths and weakness
        • Leverage strengths
        • Countermeasure weaknesses
      • Risk Management
        • Avoid risks
        • Mitigate risks
        • Accept risks
        • Transfer risks
      • Find bugs earlier than technical testing
        • Find issues early in the lifecycle
        • Economics of insecure software again!
      • Make informed decisions
        • Methodical approach to decisions
        • Feeding testing plans
        • Before any security testing
    • 24. Threat Modeling & The Software Development Life Cycle
      • Define
        • Avoid common threat scenarios via patterns
      • Design
        • Avoid common design mistakes
        • Ensure appropriate countermeasures are designed
        • Define testing requirements
      • Develop
        • Explore gap between design and implementation
        • Execute threat driven testing requirements
      • Deploy
        • Validate countermeasures
        • Validate implementation
      • Maintain
        • Examining production systems
        • Modeling changes to production systems
    • 25. Our Methodology
      • Begins with a high level architecture discussion with the application architect to understand software functionality, security requirements and deployment environment (shared libraries, use of operating systems etc.)
      • Code walk through
        • Helps define target code base for code inspection
      • Document threat model
        • Expose key components as likely targets of an attack
          • Storage locations for sensitive information
          • Configuration files
          • Data flows
          • Security significant features
          • Usage of cryptography
        • Threats
        • Countermeasures
        • Vulnerabilities
    • 26. Glossary of Terms
      • System
        • Software that performs or provides a specific business function
        • Every system has an outer perimeter called the system boundary
      • Component
        • Unit of functionality
      • Trust Boundary
        • Exists at any location where one component exposes a public interface to another
        • By definition, every system boundary is a trust boundary
      • Trust Relationship
        • Interconnection of two components across a trust boundary
        • Based on the policy that governs interactions between the components
      • Threat
        • A potential weakness in an information system
      • Countermeasure
        • Mitigating strategy or component that can help prevent a threat from being realized
      • Vulnerability
        • A threat for which there is no countermeasure or mitigating circumstance in place
        • Vulnerabilities can open a system to attacks via exploits
    • 27. Step 1: Identify Security Requirements
      • Goal
        • Define security requirements and worst case scenarios through the understanding of use cases (and abuse cases)
      • Review information such as:
        • Compliance requirements
        • Functional specifications
        • Coding standards
        • Security standards
        • Deployment standards
        • Information security policies
        • Industry best practices
      • Meeting with the major stakeholders such as the project manager, lead architects, developers and testers
    • 28. Step 2: Understand the Application
      • Goal
        • Identify the major components in the system, where the system boundaries lie, and what the trust relationships and boundaries are
      • Obtain a thorough grasp of the design and architecture decisions that were made while building the application
      • Review information such as:
        • End-to-end deployment scenarios
        • Application overview
        • Key components / services
        • Communication pathways and protocols (HTTP(S), Remoting, RMI, …)
        • External / black box components and interconnections
        • Data flows
        • Entry and exit points
    • 29. Step 3: Identify the Threats
      • Goal
        • Identify and classify potential weaknesses in the system that could lead to an exploit
      • Threats are categorized based on the following major classes:
        • Configuration Management
          • Issues stemming from insecure deployment and administration
        • Cryptography
          • Lack of adequate protection for secrets and other sensitive data
        • Authentication
          • Lack of strong protocols to validate the identity of a component outside the trust boundary
        • Authorization
          • Lack of mechanisms to enforce access control on protected resources within the system
        • Session Management
          • Lack of mechanisms to maintain session independence between multiple logged in users
        • Data Validation
          • Lack of input and output validation whenever data crosses system or trust boundaries
        • Exception Management
          • Failure to deal with exceptions effectively and in a secure manner and any resulting unauthorized disclosure of information
        • Auditing / Logging
          • Failure to maintain detailed and accurate application logs that can allow for traceability and non-repudiation
    • 30. Step 4: Identify the Countermeasures
      • Goal:
        • Determine the existence of mitigating techniques and / or policies that can help prevent the threats discovered in Step 3 from being realized
      • Identify countermeasures that may have been designed or that exist in the application
      • Includes both technical and policy measures
      • Threats that have no countermeasure in place are considered vulnerabilities
    • 31. The Threat Model
      • Microsoft Visio Drawing
        • Superimposes threat and mitigation information onto architecture diagram
      • Accompanying documentation with more detailed information
      • Abuse Case / Threat Prioritization
      • Threat-to-Code Mapping
        • Via code walk through
      • Testing and source code review helps determine if the countermeasures effectively mitigate the risks from the identified threats
    • 32.  
    • 33. Using a Threat Model
      • Root Cause Analysis
        • Identify and capture issues
          • Threats
          • Vulnerabilities
        • Trace them back to why they manifested themselves
          • No threat model in design phase?
          • Lack of definition
            • No policies or requirements?
        • Information will vary depending on:
          • When the threat model was created
          • Level of detail in the model
      • Use the results
        • Develop countermeasure etc but also…
        • Think strategically
        • Look for common mistakes
          • Is education needed?
          • Should you be using reusable components and patterns?
        • Remember People, Process & Technology
        • Track trends via metrics and measurement
    • 34. Developing Test Plans
      • Countermeasures & vulnerabilities should have a test plan
        • Create test cases to prove or disprove vulnerabilities and countermeasures
          • Manual / Human
          • Penetration Testing
          • Code Review
          • Other
      • Remodel after changes
        • Did one fix create a bug in another location?
        • Do low risk threats combine to create one high risk threat?
    • 35. Threat Modeling Gotchas
      • Don’t focus only on tangible value …
        • Technological
        • Financial
      • But also intangibles
        • Reputation
        • Dealing with intangible assets tends to be extremely hard
          • Most teams tend to either ignore them entirely or go overboard
      • Threats
        • Don’t get carried away
        • Don’t get threats and vulnerabilities mixed
      • Vulnerabilities
        • Explore known vulnerabilities classes
    • 36. Closing Thoughts
      • Don’t Blame the Player, Blame the Game
      • Cure the Disease, Not The Symptoms
        • Think Strategically
        • Find and Fix Root Causes
      • Don’t Wait Until Its Too Late
        • In Production Costs Many Time More To Fix
        • You Can Run But You Can’t Hide
      • Technology Decisions Really Do Matter
        • .NET, J2EE
      • Think About Software Security vs. Application Security
    • 37. You Want More Information Right?
      • Threats and Countermeasures (http://www.threatsandcountermeasures.com)
      • Books
        • Writing Secure Code (Mike Howard, David LeBlanc)
        • Building Secure Software (John Viega, Gary McGraw)
      • CLASP
        • An Excellent Process Methodology
      • Foundstone S3i Classes
        • Building Secure Software
        • Writing Secure Code – Java
        • Writing Secure Code – ASP.NET
        • Writing Secure Code – C/C++ (Unix or Windows)
        • Writing Secure Code - ColdFusion
    • 38. If Cars Were Built Like Applications….
      • 70% of all cars would be built without following the original designs and blueprints. The other 30% would not have designs.
      • Car design would assume that safety is a function of road design and that all drivers were considerate, sober and expert drivers.
      • Cars would have no airbags, mirrors, seat belts, doors, roll-bars, side-impact bars, or locks, because no-one had asked for them. But they would all have at least six cup holders.
      • Not all the components would be bolted together securely and many of them would not be built to tolerate even the slightest abuse.
      • Safety tests would assume frontal impact only. Cars would not be roll tested, or tested for stability in emergency maneuvers, brake effectiveness, side impact and resistance to theft.
      • Many safety features originally included might be removed before the car was completed, because they might adversely impact performance.
      • 70% of all cars would be subject to monthly recalls to add major components left out of the initial production. The other 30% wouldn’t be recalled, because no-one would sue anyway.
      • The after-market for safety devices would include such useful products as training wheels, screen doors, elastic seatbelts and devices that would restrict the car’s top speed to 3mph, if found to be unsafe (which would be always).
      • Useful safety could be found, but could only be custom retro-fitted, would take six months to fit and would cost more than the car itself.
      • A DOT inspection would consist of counting the wheels and making recommendations on wheel quantity.
      • Your only warning indicator would be large quantities of smoke and flame in the cab.
      • You could only get insurance from one provider, it would be extremely expensive, require a duplicate DOT inspection, and you might still never be able to claim against the policy.
    • 39. Check Your Hotel Bill ;-) Before After