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TRADITIONAL FRAUD PREVENTION
IS COSTING YOU CUSTOMERS
Alex Kilpatrick, PhD
CTO, BeehiveID
Let’s say you are a banker
• $9,999.99 - Definitely suspicious
• $9,999.00 - Definitely suspicious
• Asking about limits - suspicious
• $9,875.21, $9,923.12, $9,782.97 -
Maybe suspicious
• $5,000, $5,000, $5,000 – Maybe
suspicious
• 16 year old depositing $8,768 in cash -
Maybe suspicious
• Paranoid behavior – Maybe suspicious
• Corporate check – Definitely not
suspicious
• $102.32 – Definitely not suspicious
Binary Classification
Conservative / Liberal
Rich / Poor
Good Guy / Terrorist
Athletic / Sedentary
Male / Female
Young / Old
Healthy / Sick
Good customer / Scammer
-3 + x1 + x2 >= 0
Reality
REAL-WORLD CLASSIFICATION
IS NEVER
AS CLEAN AS WE WANT
Remember
Positive - ScammerNegative – Good customer
False Positive – We classify someone as a
scammer when they aren’t
Lose customers
False Negative – We classify someone as a good
customer when they are a scammer
Lose money
New Disease - Alexitis
• Very rare – only affects 1 in a million
people
• Luckily, we have a test that is 99%
accurate
• If they have Alexitis, test is positive 99% of
the time
• If they don’t have Alexitis, test is negative
99% of the time
I’ve just tested positive for
Alexitis. What are the
chances I actually have
it?
99%, right? I’m screwed!
Would you believe .01%?
Has
Alexitis
Does not have
Alexitis
Total
Test Positive 1
(true positive)
10,000
(false positive)
10,001
Test Negative 0
(false negative)
989,999
(true negative)
989,999
Total 1 999,999 1,000,000
Paradox of the False Positive
Conditional Probability
If you live in the United States, you
probably speak English
If you speak English, you probably don’t
live in the United States
IF YOU ARE TESTING FOR
SOMETHING THAT RARELY OCCURS,
YOUR TOOLS HAVE TO BE
REALLY, REALLY GOOD
Remember
THE INTERNET IS BUILT
ON PACKETS,
NOT CONNECTIONS
Remember
IP Geo-Location
Nigeria
I am worried about scams, so I won’t accept
mail from Nigeria
IP Geo-Location
891889-11
But the mail only has codes, not country
names
IP Geo-Location
891889-11
No problem! I can look it up in a table
891888 United States
891889 Nigeria
891890 France
891891 Luxemborg
IP Geo-Location
891889-11
Problem 1: Database gets stale
891888 United States
891889 Germany
891890 France
891891 Luxemborg
IP Geo-Location
891889-11
Problem 2: Mail Forwarding
891888 United States
891889 Nigeria
891890 France
891891 Luxemborg
891890-19
IP Geo-Location
891889-11
Problem 2: Other Carriers
891888 United States
891889 Nigeria
9999 FedEx
891891 Luxemborg
9999
9999
9999
9999
9999
9999
9999
9999
IP Geolocation
• With “honest” users, IP Geolocation can be
somewhat accurate
• Nation: 95% - 99%
• City: 50% - 80%
• In terms of fraud prevention, it will only
catch the most clueless of fraudsters
• Essentially useless for mobile data
Proxy Detection
891889-11
I’ll make a blacklist
891888-12 REJECT
891890-19 REJECT
891891-12 REJECT
891890-19
Proxy Detection
• Can catch known proxies
• Suffers from same database issues as
IP Geolocation
• ANY machine on the internet can be a
proxy
Cookies
Once I find out your are a scammer, I sneak
into your house and put an X on your
envelopes, with invisible ink
891889-11
891899-11
X
X
Cookies
• Will work if the scammer does nothing to
prevent it
• Can be prevented with a single click
• Useful for tracking customers, almost
useless for tracking fraudster
Behavior Detection
Scam mail usually comes in between 3:45
and 4:00
3:45
3:52
3:55
Behavior Detection
• Very difficult to measure accurately
• Highly subject to false positives
• Almost any behavior that appears
suspicious can also have a legitimate
purpose as well
Browser Fingerprinting
I am going to measure the unique
characteristics of the paper, so I can
recognize the bad letters
Browser Fingerprinting
• Somewhat effective technique for tracking people
online
• Measures unique characteristics of your browser
(fonts, plug-ins, etc.) that are reported to web server
• Not well known among general public
• Generally not completely unique
• Will lead to false positives
• Not useful for mobile
• Trivial to circumvent
• Clean browser install
• Virtual machine
TRANSACTIONAL DATA:
DATA THAT IS CONTEXTUAL TO A
SINGLE TRANSACTION
Transactional Data Strengths
• Does not require user involvement or
knowledge
• Usually quick
• Can encompass many data points
• Does not affect the user experience
• Can be tested on sample data
Transactional Data Weaknesses
• Generally easy to workaround
• Significant false positive rate
• Difficult to aggregate across platforms
WITH TRANSACTIONAL FRAUD
PREVENTION, YOU ARE RELYING ON
INFORMATION THE SCAMMER
ULTIMATELY CONTROLS
Remember
Identity-Based Fraud Prevention
• In the real world, we want to know who we
are dealing with
• Personal recommendations are extremely
important
• Social context is extremely important
• However, online we have no identity
framework to leverage
FUNDAMENTALLY WE HAVE
BEEN SOLVING THE WRONG
PROBLEM
WE DON’T HAVE A TRANSACTION
PROBLEM, WE HAVE AN IDENTITY
PROBLEM
however
“No man is just of his own free
will [...] he will always do wrong
when he gets the chance. If
anyone who had the liberty [of
the ring of Gyges] neither
wronged nor robbed his
neighbor, men would think him
a most miserable idiot.”
- Plato
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BREEDS POLITENESS
AND GOOD BEHAVIOR
Short Version
Anonymous Comment Facebook Comment
Source: David Kelts
Extreme Identity: DoD Top Secret
Clearance
• Takes 1-2 years
• Involves ~ 40 pages of
documentation
• Leverages numerous federal
databases
• Involves dozens of interviews
with people who have known
you for
Privacy
Identity
Friction
Identity
Strong identity means lower privacy and higher friction
Both bad…
Identity Farms
Cost of a phone-
verified Facebook
profile: $0.70-
$1.50
Global market for
fake identities:
$800M
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121551/bot-
bubble-click-farms-have-inflated-social-media-
currency
Identity Reputation Trust
Genuine UserFake User
Solution: Federated Identity
User1234
Verified Identity
• John Smith
• 123 Main Street
• Single
• (212) 555-1212
BeehiveID
Website
One Identity
Per Person
No Information
Sharing
Transportable
Owned by
User
Federated
Identity
BeehiveID Advantages
• Ultra-low friction
• Selfies are easy!
• Uniqueness through biometrics
• NO private information whatsoever
• Supports trust through
connections between people
• One-step integration
Summary
• Classification problems are inherently fuzzy
• When the thing you are looking for is rare, you have to
be really precise
• Transactional data is dependent upon data effectively
provided by the scammers
• Results in high false positives, losing customers
• Is easy to circumvent by scammers
• Identity is the foundation of trust in the real world, and
can be used from trust online, with the right tools
• Must be low-friction
• Must preserve privacy
QUESTIONS?
INFO@BEEHIVEID.COM

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Traditional Fraud Prevention is Costing you Customers

  • 1. TRADITIONAL FRAUD PREVENTION IS COSTING YOU CUSTOMERS Alex Kilpatrick, PhD CTO, BeehiveID
  • 2. Let’s say you are a banker
  • 3.
  • 4. • $9,999.99 - Definitely suspicious • $9,999.00 - Definitely suspicious • Asking about limits - suspicious • $9,875.21, $9,923.12, $9,782.97 - Maybe suspicious • $5,000, $5,000, $5,000 – Maybe suspicious • 16 year old depositing $8,768 in cash - Maybe suspicious • Paranoid behavior – Maybe suspicious • Corporate check – Definitely not suspicious • $102.32 – Definitely not suspicious
  • 5. Binary Classification Conservative / Liberal Rich / Poor Good Guy / Terrorist Athletic / Sedentary Male / Female Young / Old Healthy / Sick Good customer / Scammer -3 + x1 + x2 >= 0
  • 7. REAL-WORLD CLASSIFICATION IS NEVER AS CLEAN AS WE WANT Remember
  • 8. Positive - ScammerNegative – Good customer False Positive – We classify someone as a scammer when they aren’t Lose customers False Negative – We classify someone as a good customer when they are a scammer Lose money
  • 9. New Disease - Alexitis • Very rare – only affects 1 in a million people • Luckily, we have a test that is 99% accurate • If they have Alexitis, test is positive 99% of the time • If they don’t have Alexitis, test is negative 99% of the time
  • 10. I’ve just tested positive for Alexitis. What are the chances I actually have it?
  • 11. 99%, right? I’m screwed! Would you believe .01%? Has Alexitis Does not have Alexitis Total Test Positive 1 (true positive) 10,000 (false positive) 10,001 Test Negative 0 (false negative) 989,999 (true negative) 989,999 Total 1 999,999 1,000,000 Paradox of the False Positive
  • 12. Conditional Probability If you live in the United States, you probably speak English If you speak English, you probably don’t live in the United States
  • 13. IF YOU ARE TESTING FOR SOMETHING THAT RARELY OCCURS, YOUR TOOLS HAVE TO BE REALLY, REALLY GOOD Remember
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16. THE INTERNET IS BUILT ON PACKETS, NOT CONNECTIONS Remember
  • 17. IP Geo-Location Nigeria I am worried about scams, so I won’t accept mail from Nigeria
  • 18. IP Geo-Location 891889-11 But the mail only has codes, not country names
  • 19. IP Geo-Location 891889-11 No problem! I can look it up in a table 891888 United States 891889 Nigeria 891890 France 891891 Luxemborg
  • 20. IP Geo-Location 891889-11 Problem 1: Database gets stale 891888 United States 891889 Germany 891890 France 891891 Luxemborg
  • 21. IP Geo-Location 891889-11 Problem 2: Mail Forwarding 891888 United States 891889 Nigeria 891890 France 891891 Luxemborg 891890-19
  • 22. IP Geo-Location 891889-11 Problem 2: Other Carriers 891888 United States 891889 Nigeria 9999 FedEx 891891 Luxemborg 9999 9999 9999 9999 9999 9999 9999 9999
  • 23. IP Geolocation • With “honest” users, IP Geolocation can be somewhat accurate • Nation: 95% - 99% • City: 50% - 80% • In terms of fraud prevention, it will only catch the most clueless of fraudsters • Essentially useless for mobile data
  • 24. Proxy Detection 891889-11 I’ll make a blacklist 891888-12 REJECT 891890-19 REJECT 891891-12 REJECT 891890-19
  • 25. Proxy Detection • Can catch known proxies • Suffers from same database issues as IP Geolocation • ANY machine on the internet can be a proxy
  • 26. Cookies Once I find out your are a scammer, I sneak into your house and put an X on your envelopes, with invisible ink 891889-11 891899-11 X X
  • 27. Cookies • Will work if the scammer does nothing to prevent it • Can be prevented with a single click • Useful for tracking customers, almost useless for tracking fraudster
  • 28. Behavior Detection Scam mail usually comes in between 3:45 and 4:00 3:45 3:52 3:55
  • 29. Behavior Detection • Very difficult to measure accurately • Highly subject to false positives • Almost any behavior that appears suspicious can also have a legitimate purpose as well
  • 30. Browser Fingerprinting I am going to measure the unique characteristics of the paper, so I can recognize the bad letters
  • 31. Browser Fingerprinting • Somewhat effective technique for tracking people online • Measures unique characteristics of your browser (fonts, plug-ins, etc.) that are reported to web server • Not well known among general public • Generally not completely unique • Will lead to false positives • Not useful for mobile • Trivial to circumvent • Clean browser install • Virtual machine
  • 32. TRANSACTIONAL DATA: DATA THAT IS CONTEXTUAL TO A SINGLE TRANSACTION
  • 33. Transactional Data Strengths • Does not require user involvement or knowledge • Usually quick • Can encompass many data points • Does not affect the user experience • Can be tested on sample data
  • 34. Transactional Data Weaknesses • Generally easy to workaround • Significant false positive rate • Difficult to aggregate across platforms
  • 35. WITH TRANSACTIONAL FRAUD PREVENTION, YOU ARE RELYING ON INFORMATION THE SCAMMER ULTIMATELY CONTROLS Remember
  • 36. Identity-Based Fraud Prevention • In the real world, we want to know who we are dealing with • Personal recommendations are extremely important • Social context is extremely important • However, online we have no identity framework to leverage
  • 37. FUNDAMENTALLY WE HAVE BEEN SOLVING THE WRONG PROBLEM WE DON’T HAVE A TRANSACTION PROBLEM, WE HAVE AN IDENTITY PROBLEM however
  • 38. “No man is just of his own free will [...] he will always do wrong when he gets the chance. If anyone who had the liberty [of the ring of Gyges] neither wronged nor robbed his neighbor, men would think him a most miserable idiot.” - Plato
  • 39. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY BREEDS POLITENESS AND GOOD BEHAVIOR Short Version
  • 42. Extreme Identity: DoD Top Secret Clearance • Takes 1-2 years • Involves ~ 40 pages of documentation • Leverages numerous federal databases • Involves dozens of interviews with people who have known you for
  • 43. Privacy Identity Friction Identity Strong identity means lower privacy and higher friction Both bad…
  • 44. Identity Farms Cost of a phone- verified Facebook profile: $0.70- $1.50 Global market for fake identities: $800M http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121551/bot- bubble-click-farms-have-inflated-social-media- currency
  • 47. Solution: Federated Identity User1234 Verified Identity • John Smith • 123 Main Street • Single • (212) 555-1212 BeehiveID Website
  • 48. One Identity Per Person No Information Sharing Transportable Owned by User Federated Identity
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 51. BeehiveID Advantages • Ultra-low friction • Selfies are easy! • Uniqueness through biometrics • NO private information whatsoever • Supports trust through connections between people • One-step integration
  • 52. Summary • Classification problems are inherently fuzzy • When the thing you are looking for is rare, you have to be really precise • Transactional data is dependent upon data effectively provided by the scammers • Results in high false positives, losing customers • Is easy to circumvent by scammers • Identity is the foundation of trust in the real world, and can be used from trust online, with the right tools • Must be low-friction • Must preserve privacy

Editor's Notes

  1. Let’s say you are a banker. You are concerned about a few different things. You need your bank to make money so you need deposits and you need to make loans. You need people to come in and make accounts. You know that some people may be doing things that are less than legal, but as long as they are making deposits you might not care. Or maybe you care deeply about that. In any case, you only have so much time to try to figure out why people are using your bank. You need those deposits.
  2. But the government has told you exactly how much you need to care. They give you parameters on what you need to care about – cash deposits > $10,000 for example. But they don’t let you get off that easily – you also have to support “suspicious” activity.
  3. Here are some examples of the complexities of determining suspicious activity. All of these could possibly be classified in any different way, depending upon context. A corporate check could be from a shell company doing money laundering and a $9,999 deposit could be legit. FINCEN’s guidelines: http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/msb_prevention_guide.pdf (fascinating stuff)
  4. Binary classification is the process of separating things into two categories. In the graph on the right, a simple equation can perfectly separate the two classes. We want things to be this way, but unfortunately they rarely are.
  5. In most real-world classification processes, the boundaries are much more fuzzy and the best we can do is catch some of the things on either side,
  6. We can define “positive” and “negative” however we want. But since we are talking about fraud prevention/detection, we will define “positive” as someone being a scammer. That means negative is a good outcome – a good customer. You can think of it kind of like disease detection. Using this definition, we want to avoid false positives because that means we are turning away good customers. We also want to avoid false negatives because it means we are letting in the scammers. Generally, when you try to optimize one, you make the other worse.
  7. 99% accurate is another way of saying 1% inaccurate. If we test 1,000,000 people, only one of them will actually have Alexitis. But since we are 1% inaccurate, we will falsely say 10,000 people have it. (.01 * 1,000,000). Put in math terms, P(Alexitis | Positive) = .01% This is called the paradox of the false positive and it occurs in populations where the probability of an event is low.
  8. Conditional probability is actually quite simple, but most people don’t think about it when they are predicting what outcomes will happen Here’s some other ones:
  9. Here is a very simplified diagram of how the internet works. (ha)
  10. Contrary to popular belief, the internet is not a series of tubes or even a series of wires. You may think of an internet connection as kind of like a phone call, but it is not. It is a series of distributed packets. We’ll be using some mail analogies in the coming slides
  11. LA Times did an experiment where they had both anonymous comments and Facebook comments available for articles. The difference in the level of discourse was “stunning” When people see their real name and face next to a comment, the civility of the discourse changes dramatically.
  12. Ultimately, a security clearance is about trying to figure out who you are