Pros and cons of today

1,212 views
1,013 views

Published on

Published in: Technology, Business
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
1,212
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
5
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Pros and cons of today

  1. 1. PROS AND CONS OF TODAY’S SURVEILLANCE (PROGRESS OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY) Posted by Andrew Arismunandar in ITGS 11 on Friday, October 4th, 2013 at 5:54 am Surveillance has developed through many changes all over the years. From human cautioness to technology that can watch your every move. Surveillance has it’s merits as it helps authority to capture criminals and terrorists, from recent tragedies. However surveillance has changed into something more advanced, as it has the ability to track your personal information such as friends, family and even your bank account. This has been proven with the recent NSA leak, as the NSA has the technology to have full information of individuals from the US and even other countries. Technology has taken surveillance into the next level. This is the peak of surveillance where we question ourselves whether surveillance is actually necessary, as power of the technology that was leaked by Edward Snowden has shown. Right now it shows two ways of how surveillance will be used years from today. The benefit of using surveillance with current technology is that if it is used correctly, the NSA has the ability to predict a terrorist attack thus preventing innocent lives lost (similar to the Precrime system in the film Miniority Report). As previous renditions of surveillance such as CCTV cameras will only assist identifying criminals right after they have finished the job. The government spying on your privacy won’t be problem unless you’re a criminal trying to harm others. After all it is the government’s job to make sure that everyone is safe and this is them taking the next step. The NSA knows that everyone is scared when they know that the government has more access to our privacy than ever before and they think it is for the good of the public for them not to know. But they should’ve known better that it is for the public to decide, as the people’s voice counts as well not just the government. But yet again what about the first time when they announced the CCTV cameras? Wouldn’t people freak out as much as they did today, when they know someone is watching your every move? But what about now? We see CCTV cameras everyday and it doesn’t bother so much since we are comfortable by now. Not to mention it has helped the police to capture terrorists a lot easier and much efficiently before they can initiate their next attack. It could be the same case with the PRISM surveillance program and that it will take time for the public to get used to. Since we’re talking about how the PRISM technology is taken to a larger scale, what about PRISM technology in a smaller scale? If you pay attention enough, there is an application called “Remote Desktop”. This allows an admin to watch individual computer activities and can even control the computer itself by manipulating with the controls of that particular computer and even block the computer itself. Although it only works with a particular server, the computer to be online and also if the admin has permission from the computer itself. This technology can be very useful to track students or employees to make sure that they are working on their computers. It is stricter but it helps people to be productive and make sure that they work. Even if they somewhat reveal their personal information but should they bother to do such a thing when they are working or aware that they are currently watched by someone superior? This has been proven that we are slowly going into the next stage of surveillance.
  2. 2. However there are disadvantages with such advanced technology. That is the ones who wields it. Admins are humans too, which means that there are chances for them to abuse the technology for his or her’s personal needs. The problem arises when they have the ability to cause damage as well as much as what they are trying to prevent. Such as that admins can steal through the use of their personal information or to plan out a perfect murder by using the information that they collected throughout their stalking. It’s even worse the fact that the government is using it as well. When someone with authority wields more power over the people the damage done could be much worse. Such as corruption will be much more efficient and also blackmail. But I digress. These advantages will be something that we will overcome overtime. We are aware of this issue and so as the government. Although it is good to cautious about our government, but yet again there are honest people as well that are working within the government. Honest men like Edward Snowden will leak important information to the public when necessary, the point is that there are men like Edward Snowden that works for the government, which is something that we need to remember as well. Also to keep in mind that as our technology moves forward, we might use AIs instead to do the surveillance work. If you’re thinking that a rebellious AI in movies such as Eagle Eye or 2001: Space Odyssey might happen, it will the matter of intelligence we put in the machine (which is another topic entirely and for another discussion). However it is possible to make things simpler such as having the AI report on someone that is going to Facebook instead of working on their school work or office work, well when it comes to a smaller scale that is. Only the future can tell for now for what the government will do with the PRISM program. In conclusion I would say that this is the next step of surveillance, it’s either we move forward to a possible better future. I do realize that people are afraid of how advanced what we created has become, but it is necessary for people to take risks in order to move forward. So I firmly believe that surveillance technology will bring more benefit than good. Donate for the Cryptome archive of files from June 1996 to the present 24 February 2000: Link to Presentation and Analysis Volume 1/5, by Peggy Becker, October 1999. Volume 1 re below. 20 August 1999 Source: Hardcopy of 61 pages. Thanks to Sten Linnarsson. This is part 1 of 4 of "Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information technologies of political control)."
  3. 3. Part 2: "The legality of the interception of electronic communications: A concise survey of the principal legal iss international, European and national law," by Prof. Chris Elliott: http://cryptome.org/dst-2.htm Part 3: "Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey of the technology assessment issues," http://cryptome.org/dst-3.htm Part 4: "The state of the art in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) of automated processing for intelligence broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to COMINT targeting and sel recognition," by Duncan Campbell: http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/stoa_cover.htm [dead] Campbell's report: http://cryptome.org/jya/ic2000.zip (981KB) EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT STOA DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK OF ABUSE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Part 1/4 The perception of economic risks arising from the potential vulnerability of electronic commercial media to interception Survey of opinions of experts Interim Study Working document for the STOA Panel Luxembourg, May 1999 PE 168.184/Int.St./part 1/4
  4. 4. Directorate General for Research Cataloguing data: Title: Part 1/4 of: DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK OF ABUSE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Workplan Ref.: EP/IV/B/STOA/98/1401 Publisher: European Parliament Directorate General for Research Directorate A The STOA Programme Author: Mr Nikos BOGONIKOLOS - ZEUS E.E.I.G. Editor: Mr Dick HOLDSWORTH, Head of STOA Unit Date: May 1999 PE number: PE 168. 184/Int.St./1/4 This document is a working Document for the 'STOA Panel'. It is not an official publication of STOA. This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European Parliament. CONTENTS PART A: OPTIONS Introduction General overview of the outcome of the survey (interim stage) Views on privacy collected from the survey General privacy issue The market for privacy
  5. 5. The role of industry The need for European legislation Options for action on surveillance and privacy PART B: ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE General Examples of Abuse of Economic Information PART C: TECHNICAL FILE 1. INTRODUCTION Surveillance and Privacy Dataveillance Techniques Risks Inherent in Data Surveillance Controls 2. SURVEILLANCE: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES - Current technologies 1. Visual Surveillance 2. Audio Surveillance 3. Phone Tapping and Encryption 4. Voice and Word Pattern Recognition 5. Proximity Smart Cards 6. Transmitter Location 7. E-mail at Workplace 8. Electronic Databases 9. The Internet 3. THE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS FOR THE TRANSMISSION AND COLLECTION OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION 3.1 CALEA System 3.2 ECHELON Connection 3.3 Inhabitant identification Schemes 4. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION SELECTED BY SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS A. From telecommunication systems B. From new information technologies (Internet) C. Some examples of data collection on the Internet 5. PROTECTION FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
  6. 6. A. Encryption (Cryptography) Private sector initiatives B. Key - recovery Encryption and the global information infrastructure Key-Recovery: Requirements and proposals 6. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS IN LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT A. Privacy regulation Multinational data protection measures Data protection directive in Europe Privacy regulation in the United States B. Protection of Privacy in the telecommunications sector C. Cryptography Cryptography policy in USA Cryptography policy guidelines from OECD E. U. cryptography policy Other national and international activities related to cryptography policy D. Key recovery E. European Initiatives DLM-FORUM- Electronic Records Promoting Safe Use of Internet REFERENCES PART A: OPTIONS Introduction The present study, 'Development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic information' presents the interim results from a survey of the opinions of experts, together with additional research and analytical material by the authors. It has been conducted by ZEUS E.E.I.G. as part of a technology assessment project on this theme initiated by STOA in 1998 at
  7. 7. the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament. This STOA project is a follow-up to an earlier one entitled: "An appraisal of technologies of political control" conducted for the same Committee. The earlier project resulted in an Interim Study (PE 166.499) written by OMEGA Foundation, Manchester, and published by STOA on January 1998 and later updated (September 1998). In the earlier study it was reported that within Europe all fax, e-mail and telephone messages are routinely intercepted by means of what is called the ECHELON global surveillance system. The monitoring was said to be "routine and indiscriminate". The ECHELON system formed part of the UKUSA system, but unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON was said to be designed for primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. In the present study the authors were requested to investigate the use of surveillance technology systems, for the collection and possible abuse of sensitive economic information. The principal method selected was a procedure of data collection and processing based on a modified DELPHI method (to be referred to here as "the survey"). Under this method, a list of potential sources of data was prepared. These were some 49 experts from universities, industrial and commercial undertakings in the informations and telecommunications technology sector, as well as a smaller number of persons in international or governmental organisations. The experts were drawn from 11 Member States of the European Union, plus Cyprus, Norway and Switzerland. The next step was the collection of the data. This was mostly achieved by direct interviews of the experts, with the use of a questionnaire. The views (data) were processed and a convergence examination performed. The convergence procedure was based on a recursive approach for the exclusion of the non-reliable data. The last step was the drawing of the analytical results. General overview of the outcome of the survey The predominant view among the experts was that since nowadays almost all economic information is exchanged through electronic means (telephone, fax, e-mail), and, in addition, all digital telecommunication devices and switches have enhanced wiretapping capabilities, for these reasons they suggested that we must focus on the protection of the data when transmitted (using encryption products), on the use of government-approved encryption products and on the adoption of common standards concerning encryption and key-recovery products. The position could be summed up in the statement that 'since it is difficult to prove that economic information has been captured by ECHELON system and passed on by the NSA, we have to consider privacy protection in a global international networked society'. In summary, therefore, we see that two perceptions of this question emerge: (1) a concern about the possible threat to privacy and economic and civil rights potentially posed by global clandestine electronic surveillance systems operated by large and powerful secret government agencies, and (2) anxiety about the problems of commercial and personal privacy which arise now that so much commercial and other communications traffic is conducted over the Internet.
  8. 8. Managers of businesses engaged in electronic commerce may perhaps be concerned about global clandestine surveillance systems: what is certain is that they are worried in a more familiar way about threats to commercial security posed by the nature of the new electronic business media and their possible vulnerability to interception by competitors and fraudsters. Reflecting the feedback from the survey, the present study tends to reflect Perception 2, whereas the earlier one of 1998 tended to reflect Perception 1. Advances in information and communication technologies have fostered the development of complex national and international networks which enable thousands of geographically dispersed users to distribute, transmit, gather and exchange all kinds of data. Transborder electronic exchanges -- private, professional, industrial and commercial -- have proliferated on a global scale and are bound to intensify among businesses and between businesses and consumers, as electronic commerce develops. At the same time developments in digital computing have increased the capacity for accessing, gathering, recording, processing, sorting, comparing and linking alphanumeric, voice and image data. This substantial growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have arisen the need at securing privacy protection in transborder data flows. Today, it is not necessary to define new principles for the protection of data (and privacy) in an expanding global electronic environment. It is necessary to define the appropriate means of putting the established principles into practice, particularly on the information and communication networks. An active education strategy may be one of the ways to help achieve on-line and privacy protection and to give all actors the opportunities to understand their common interests. Common technological solutions can assist in implementing privacy and data protection guidelines in global information networks. The general optimism about technological solutions, the pressure to collect economic information and the need for political and social policy decisions to ensure privacy must be considered. The growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have arisen the need at securing privacy protection in transborder data flows and especially the use of contractual solutions. Global E-Commerce has changed the nature of retailing. There were great cultural and legal differences between countries affecting attitudes to the use of sensitive data (economic or personal) and the issue of applicable law in global transaction had tope resolved. Contracts might bridge the gab between those with legislation and the others. Since Internet symbolised global commerce, faced with a rapid expansion in the numbers of transactions, there is a need to define a stable lasting framework for business. Internet is changing profound the markets and adjusting new contracts. To that reality is a complex problem. Views on privacy collected from the survey
  9. 9. In this section the experts' views on the various privacy issues are reported. The information was mostly collected by direct interviews of the experts, based on a predefined questionnaire. General privacy issues Privacy can be a contentious subject because it means different things to different people. The definition given is: "Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves how, when and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" A clear problem expressed is that in an electronic environment, it becomes hard to differentiate between a private and public place and therefore what should be protected and what should not. It was argued that is unreasonable for the society to subsidise the cost of individuals to maintain their privacy, pointing out that most people will choose utility over security (and consequently privacy) It was suggested that privacy in many ways sacrifices other goods (time, effort and energy among them) in order to obtain it. Three basic tools necessary for privacy protection were outlined: notice (to the data supplier), consent (to the consumer), and accountability. Although accountability may be essential to ensuring privacy, it unfortunately conflicts with the anonymity, privacy implies. For any commerce to take place on the Internet, therefore, some level of anonymity and therefore privacy must be sacrificed. The question to be answered is " how much and who will decide". The market for privacy When the European Commission adopted the privacy directive (95/46/EC), it stated that privacy protection is a central precondition to consumers' acceptance of electronic commerce. Accordingly, a critical issue experts argued, was whether there was a "market failure' in the electronic environment that required some sort of government intervention to ensure data privacy. Some experts responded that data privacy is not purely a public good, and so at some point someone will have a market incentive to protect it. Some corporations that have tried to market their strong privacy protection have yet to see any results and have concluded that: "privacy doesn't sell". Other industries have marketed privacy successfully (such as the cellular telephone industry) which could mean that the public demands for privacy are forthcoming and will eventually be profitable. They feel that a question to be answered is: Who governs the responsibility of the information collector, or does society have to impose a sense of responsibility?" The role of industry
  10. 10. Most experts expressed the view that the information industry should be primarily self- regulated: the industry is changing too rapidly for government legislative solutions, and most corporations are not simply looking at National or European but at global markets, which national governments cannot regulate. Indeed several experts expressed the fear that any European attempt to allow USA to oversee (via global surveillance systems) data would lead to abuses by the government or other competitive companies. They noted that many companies (such as Citibank) already inform consumers and clients that, unless told otherwise, they will disclose information to their affiliates. They suggested that a simple seal on the home page of a Web site, declaring that a company adheres to certain industry privacy standards might cease the fears of the public and offer some level of accountability. Alternatively, they suggested that the media could act as an effective watchdog, informing consumers and companies of what information is being collected about them and how that information is being used. They also noted that multinational companies could better negotiate for themselves across national boundaries than governments can. Electronic commerce is unlikely to gain popularity until the issues of notice, consent and recourse have been resolved. The market will force companies wishing to participate in this medium to address and solve these concerns. The need for European legislation Experts took the view that the European Parliament must now ask how, in a world of the Internet, one reconciles the objectives of protecting both: privacy and free flow of information. In recent years there have been disclosures that unauthorised individuals have examined financial information from the Internal Revenue Service in USA. Several experts pointed to the flap over the decision by the Social Security Administration in USA to provide companies account information on-line. Each of these examples suggests that protecting data privacy may be a great challenge for the European Parliament. Experts agreed that the European Parliament should play a role in creating a standard for disclosure. Several experts went further and argued the need of a privacy agency within the European Union to act as an ombudsman and to represent privacy interests, so that in debates between European Union and USA there is someone whose responsibility would be to protect privacy. Whatever several experts believe the appropriate role for national governments to be in ensuring privacy in an electronic environment, some "private regulation" is already occurring on the Internet by the computer engines, who write code and decide computer standards. In fact experts suggested that when encryption software becomes ubiquitous it will push Internet commerce because it allows for potentially anonymous transactions, which will solve privacy issues by default.
  11. 11. It was pointed out that a group of high-tech companies in co-operation with standardisation organisations should agree on a web-based standard that would allow companies and consumers to interact with data collectors and inform them of what information they would be comfortable having disclosed to other parties. Options for action on surveillance and privacy The policy options for consideration by the committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament which emerged from the survey are: Authorities in the EU and Member States should: engage in a dialogue involving the private sector and individual users of networks in order to learn about their needs for implementing the privacy guidelines in the global network; undertake an examination of private sector technical initiatives; encourage the development of applications within global networks, of technological solutions that implement the privacy principles and uphold the right of users, businesses and consumers for protection of their privacy in the electronic environment. Drafting methods for enforcing codes of conduct and privacy statements ranging from standardisation, labelling and certification in the global environment through third-party audit to formal enforcement by a regulatory body. Definitions of the transactions which must remain anonymous, and technical capabilities for providing anonymity need to be specified. Enforcement for the adoption of adequate standards (cryptography and key encryption) from all E.U. member states. Multilateral agreements with other countries could then be negotiated. Drafting of common guidelines of credit information use (in each member state of the E.U. different restriction policies exist). It must be dear how those restrictions could apply to a globally operating credit reference agency. Drafting of common specifications for cryptography systems and government access key recovery systems, which must be compatible with large scale, economical, secure cryptographic systems. Enforcement for the adoption of special authorisation schemes for Information Society Services and supervision of their activities by National Authorisation Bodies. Drafting of a common responsibilities framework for on-line service providers, who transmit and store third party information. This could be drafted and supervised by National PTTs. The European Parliament should examine critically proposals from the US for the elimination of cryptography and the adoption of encryption controls supervised by US Agencies.
  12. 12. Annual statistics and reporting on abuse of economic information by any means must be reported to the Parliament of each member state of the E.U. Measures for encouraging the formal education systems of each member state of the E.U. or the appropriate European Training Institute/Organisation to take up the general task of educating users in the technology and their rights. PART B: ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE General Nowadays almost all economic information is exchanged through electronic means (telephone, fax, e-mail). In addition, all digital telecommunication devices and switches have enhanced wiretapping capabilities. As a conclusion we have to consider privacy protection in a global international networked society. And when we speak about electronic protection and privacy in the exchange of economic information, we actually speak for electronic commerce over the Internet. The information society promises economic and social benefits for all: citizens, companies and governments. Advances in information and communication technologies have fostered the proliferation of private, professional, industrial and commercial transborder electronic exchanges on a global scale which are bound to intensify among businesses and between businesses and consumers as electronic commerce develops. New methods for processing the vast accumulation of data -such as data mining techniques- make it possible, on the basis of demographic data, credit information, details of on-line transactions etc, to identify new kinds of purchasing patterns or unusual relationships. Indeed, compliance with rules governing the protection of privacy and personal data is crucial to establishing confidence in electronic transactions, and particularly in Europe, which has traditionally been heavily regulated in this area. The development of the global information society makes the convergence of government policies, the transparency of rules and regulations and their effective implementation on economic and social life. In particular, in the context of electronic commerce, the development of on-line commercial activities hinges to a large extent, not only on the faith consumers have in business in terms of guaranteed product delivery or security payment systems, but also on the confidence that users and consumers will have in the ways that businesses handle their personal data. To operate with confidence on the global networks, most consumers need assurance that their on-line activities and electronic transactions will not be collected or used without their knowledge or made available to parties other than their initial correspondents. Neither linked to other data about them in order to compile behavioural profiles without their consent. The importance of information and communication systems for society and the global economy is intensifying with the increasing value and quantity of data that is transmitted and stored on
  13. 13. those systems. At the same time those systems and data are also increasingly vulnerable to a variety of threats such as unauthorised access and use, misappropriation, alteration and destruction. Proliferation of computers, increased computing power, interconnectivity, decentralisation, growth of networks and the number of users, as well as the convergence of information and communication technologies, while enhancing the utility of these systems, also increase system invulnerability. Cryptography is an important component of secure information and communication systems and a variety of application have been developed that incorporate cryptographic methods to provide data security. Although there are legitimate governmental, commercial and individual needs and uses for cryptography, it may also be used by individuals or entities for illegal activities, which can affect public safety, national security, the enforcement of laws, business interests, consumers interests or privacy. Governments together with industry and the general public, are challenged to develop balanced policies to address these issues. Cryptography uses an algorithm to transform data in order to render it unintelligible to anyone who does not possess certain secret information (the cryptographic "key"), necessary for decryption of the data. Within the new concept of cryptography, rather than sharing one secret key, the new design uses two mathematically related keys for each communication party: a "public key" that is disclosed to the public and a corresponding "private key", that is kept secret. A message that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by the corresponding private key. An important application for public key cryptography is "digital signature", which can be used to verify the integrity of data or the authenticity of the sender of data. In this case, the private key is used to "sign" a message, while the corresponding public key is used to verify a "signed" message. Public key cryptography plays an important role in developing information infrastructure. Much of the interest in information and communication networks and technologies centres on their potential to accommodate electronic commerce; however open networks such as the Internet present significant challenges for making enforceable electronic contracts and secure payments. Since Electronic Commerce on one hand is one of the key strategies of the European Union and the privacy protection on the other hand, one of its main principles, E.U. in 1998 released three "key" working documents: Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of Electronic Commerce in the internal market [ COM(1998) 586 final]. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on a common framework for electronic signatures [COM (1998)297 final].
  14. 14. Ensuring security and trust in electronic communication: "Towards a European framework for digital signatures and Encryption" [COM(1997) 503 final]. Increasing the number of people with authorised access to the critical infrastructure and to business data, will increase the likelihood of attack, whether through technical means, by exploitation of mistakes or through corruption. Further "key-recovery" requirements to the extent that they made encryption can have the effect of discouraging or delaying the deployment of cryptography in increasingly vulnerable computing and communication networks. As the Internet and other communications systems reach further into everyday lives, national security, law enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined. Governments want to restrict the free flow of information; software producers are seeking ways to ensure consumers are not bugged from the very moment of purchase. The US is behind a world-wide effort to limit individual privacy and enhance the capability of its intelligence services to eavesdrop on personal conversations. The campaign has had two legal strategies: the first made it mandatory for all digital telephone switches, cellular and satellite phones and all developing communication technologies to build in surveillance capabilities; the second sought to limit the dissemination of software that contains encryption, a technique which allows people to scramble their communications and files to prevent others from reading them. The first effort to heighten surveillance opportunities was to force telecommunications companies to use equipment designed to include enhanced wiretapping capabilities. The end goal was to ensure that the US and its allied intelligence services could easily eavesdrop on telephone networks anywhere in the world. In the late 1980s, in a programme known internally as 'Operation Root Canal', US law enforcement officials demanded that telephone companies alta their equipment to facilitate the interception of messages. The companies refused but, after several years of lobbying, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994. CALEA requires that terrestrial carriers, cellular phone services and other entities ensure that all their ' equipment, facilities or services' are capable of expeditiously. . . enabling the government...to intercept... all wire and oral communications carried by the carrier...concurrently with their transmission.' Communications must be interceptable in such a form that they could be transmitted to a remote government facility. Manufacturers must work with industry and law enforcement officials to ensure that their equipment meets federal standards. A court can fine a company US$10,000 per day for each product that does not comply. The passage of CALEA has been controversial but its provisions have yet to be enforced due to FBI efforts to include even more rigorous regulations under the law. These include the requirement that cellular phones allow for location-tracking on demand and that telephone companies provide capacity for up to 50,000 simultaneous wiretaps. While the FBI lobbied Congress and pressured US companies into accepting a tougher CALEA, it also leaned on US allies to adopt it as an international standard. In 1991, the FBI held a series of secret meetings with EU member states to persuade them to incorporate CALEA into
  15. 15. European law. The plan, according to an EU report, was to 'call for the Western World (EU, US and allies) to agree to norms and procedures and then sell their products to Third World countries. Even if they do not agree to interception orders, they will find their telecommunications monitored by the UK-USA signals intelligence network the minute they use the equipment.' The FBI's efforts resulted in an EU Council of Ministers resolution that was quietly adopted in January 1995, but not publicly released until 20 months later. The resolution's text is almost word for word identical to the FBI's demands at home. The US government is now pressuring the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to adopt the standards globally. The second part of the strategy was to ensure that intelligence and police agencies could understand every communication they intercepted. They attempted to impede the development of cryptography and other security measures, fearing that these technologies would reduce their ability to monitor the emissions of foreign governments and to investigate crime. These latter efforts have not been successful. A survey by the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) found that most countries have either rejected domestic controls or not addressed the issue at all. The GILC found that 'many countries, large and small, industrialised and developing, seem to be ambivalent about the need to control encryption technologies'. The FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) have instigated efforts to restrict the availability of encryption world-wide. In the early 1970s, the NSA's pretext was that encryption technology was 'born classified' and, therefore, its dissemination fell into the same category as the diffusion of A-bomb materials. The debate went underground until 1993 when the US launched the Clipper Chip, an encryption device designed for inclusion in consumer products. The Clipper Chip offered the required privacy, but the government would retain a 'pass-key' - anything encrypted with the chip could be read by government agencies. Behind the scenes, law enforcement and intelligence agencies were pushing hard for a ban on other forms of encryption. In a February 1993 document, obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), they recommended 'Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if they are incorporated into all encryption products'. To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of government-approved encryption products, or adherence to government encryption criteria, is required.' The Clipper Chip was widely criticised by industry, public interest groups, scientific societies and the public and, though it was officially adopted, only a few were ever sold or used. From 1994 onwards, Washington began to woo private companies to develop an encryption system that would provide access to keys by government agencies. Under the proposals - variously known as 'key escrow', 'key recovery' or 'trusted third parties' - the keys would be held by a corporation, not a government agency, and would be designed by the private sector, not the NSA. The systems, however, still entailed the assumption of guaranteed access to the intelligence community and so proved as controversial as the Clipper Chip. The government used export incentives to encourage companies to adopt key escrow products: they could export stronger encryption, but only if they ensured that intelligence agencies had access to the keys.
  16. 16. Under US law, computer software and hardware cannot be exported if it contains encryption that the NSA cannot break. The regulations stymie the availability of encryption in the USA because companies are reluctant to develop two separate product lines -- one, with strong encryption, for domestic use and another, with weak encryption, for the international market. Several cases are pending in the US courts on the constitutionality of export controls; a federal court recently ruled that they violate free speech rights under the First Amendment. (... The NSA is one of the shadowiest of the US intelligence agencies. Until a few years ago, it existence was a secret and its charter and any mention of its duties are still classified. However, it does have a Web site (www.nsa.gov:8080) in which it describes itself as being responsible for the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the US government. One of its bases, Menwith Hill, was to become the biggest spy station in the world. Its ears -- known as radomes -- are capable of listening in to vast chunks of the communications spectrum throughout Europe and the old Soviet Union In its first decade the base sucked data from cables and microwave links running through a nearby Post Office tower, but the communications revolutions of the Seventies and Eighties gave the base a capability that even its architects could scarcely have been able to imagine. With the creation of Intelsat and digital telecommunications, Menwith and other stations developed the capability to eavesdrop on an extensive scale on fax, telex and voice messages. Then, with the development of the Internet, electronic mail and electronic commerce, the listening posts were able to increase their monitoring capability to eavesdrop on an unprecedented spectrum of personal and business communications. This activity has been all but ignored by the UK Parliament. When Labour MPs raised questions about the activities of the NSA, the Government invoked secrecy rules. It has been the same for 40years.... ) (Simon Davis report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk) The FBI has not let up on efforts to ban products on which it cannot eavesdrop. In mid-1997, it introduced legislation to mandate that key-recovery systems be built into all computer systems. The amendment was adopted by several congressional Committees but the Senate preferred a weaker variant. A concerted campaign by computer, telephone and privacy groups finally stopped the proposal; it now appears that no legislation will be enacted in the current Congress. While the key escrow approach was being pushed in the USA, Washington had approached foreign organisations and states. The linchpin for the campaign was David Aaron, US ambassador to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), who visited dozens of countries in what one analyst derided as a programme of 'laundering failed US policy through international bodies to give it greater acceptance'. Led by Germany and the Scandinavians, the EU has been generally distrustful of key escrow technology. In October 1997, the European Commission released a report which advised: 'Restricting the use of encryption could well prevent law-abiding companies and citizens from protecting themselves against criminal attacks. It would not, however, totally prevent criminals
  17. 17. from using these technologies.' The report noted that 'privacy considerations suggest limit the use of cryptography as a means to ensure data security and confidentiality'. Some European countries have or are contemplating independent restrictions. France had a longstanding ban on the use of any cryptography to which the government does not have access. However, a 1996 law, modified the existing system, allowing a system of "tiers du confidence", although it has not been implemented, because of EU opposition. In 1997, the Conservative government in the UK introduced a proposal creating a system of trusted third parties. It was severely criticised at the time and by the new Labour government, which has not yet acted upon its predecessor's recommendations. The debate over encryption and the conflicting demands of security and privacy are bound to continue. The commercial future of the Internet depends on a universally-accepted and foolproof method of on-line identification; as of now, the only means of providing it is through strong encryption. That put the US government and some of the world's largest corporations, notably Microsoft, on a collision course. (Report of David Banisar, Deputy director of Privacy International and Simon Davies, Director General of Privacy International). The issue of encryption divides the member states of the European Union. Last October the European Commission published a report entitled: "Ensuring security and Trust in Electronic Commerce", which argued that the advantages of allowing law enforcement agencies access to encrypted messages are not clear and could cause considerable damage to the emerging electronic industry. It says that if citizens and companies "fear that their communications and transactions are being monitored with the help of key access or similar schemes unduly enlarging the general surveillance possibility of government agencies, they may prefer to remaining in the anonymous off-line world and electronic commerce will just not happen". However, Mr Straw said in Birmingham (JHA Informal JHA Ministers) that: "It would not be in the public interest to allow the improper use of encryption by criminals to be totally immune from the attention of law enforcement agencies". The UK, along with France (which already has a law obliging individuals to use "crackable" software) and the USA, is out on a limb in the EU. "The UK presidency has a particular view and they are one of the access hard-liners. They want access: "them and the French", commented an encryption expert. They are particularly about "confidential services" which ensure that a message can only be read by the person for whom it is intended who has a "key" to access it. The Commission's report proposes "monitoring" Member States laws' on "confidential services" to ensure they do not contravene the rules of the single market. Examples of Abuse of Economic Information In the course of collecting the data for and preparing this Interim Study various examples were cited of abuse of privacy via global surveillance telecommunication systems. A number of them is given in [54]. For the final version of the study, we shall see whether the experts have further comments to make on these examples, or whether they have new examples to suggest. The consultation of experts in our survey so far yielded the following comments:
  18. 18. Since Internet has come to play a significant role in global commerce, then (as in Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 cited below) Internet also became a tool of misleading information and a platform for deceitful advertisement. On the positive side, Internet is a "golden highway" for those interested in the process of information. However, apart from global surveillance technology systems, additional tools have been developed for surveillance. The additional tool used for information transferred via Internet or via Digital Global telecommunication systems is the capture of data with Taiga software. Taiga software has the possibility to capture, process and analyse multilingual information in a very short period of time (I billion characters per second), using key-words. The examples given below are taken from the sources named: Example 1 On January 15, 1990, the telephone network of AT&T company, in all the North-east part of USA faced serious difficulties. The network NuPrometheus had illegally owned and distributed the key-code of the operational system of AT&T Macintosh computer (Apple company). J.P. Barlow: "A not terribly brief history of the Electronic Frontier Foundation," 8 November 1990 Example 2 On January 24, 1990, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in USA, accused a huge police operation under the encoded name "Sun Devil", in which 40 computers and 23,000 diskettes were seized from teenagers, in 15 towns within USA. Teenager Craig Neidorf supported by EFF, not to be punished in 60 years prison and 120,000 USD penalty. Craig Neidorf had published in Phrack (a hackers magazine) part of the internal files of a telephone company. M. Godwin: "The EFF and virtual communities," 1991 Example 3 On June 25, 1998, in Absheim, an aircraft A-320 of the European Company "Airbus Industries" crashed during a demonstration flight. The accident was reportedly caused by dangerous manoeuvres. One person died and 20 were injured. Very soon afterwards, and before the announcement of the official report, in the aerospace and transport Internet newsgroups there appeared many hostile messages against the Airbus undertaking and against the French company Aerospatiale as well, with which Airbus had close cooperation. Messages declared that the accident was to be expected because European engineers
  19. 19. are not so highly qualified as American engineers. It was also clearly stated, that in the future similar accidents were to be expected. Aerospatiale's representatives took these hostile messages very seriously. They tried to discover the sources of messages and they finally realised that senders' identification data, addresses and nodes were false. The source messages came from USA, from computers with misleading identification data and transferred from anonymous servers in Finland. B. Martnet and Y.M. Marti: "L'intelligence econimique. Les yeux et les oreilles de 1' enterprise, Editions d'organisation". Paris 1995 Example 4 In October 31, 1994, in USA, an accident occurred to an ATR aircraft (of the European Consortium Aeritalia and Aerospatiale). Owing to this accident, a ban on ATR flights for two months was imposed. This decision became catastrophic on a commercial level for the company, because ATR was obliged to carry out test flights in fog conditions. During this period, in Internet newsgroups (and especially in the AVSIG forum, supported by Compuserve), the exchange of messages was of vital significance. The messages supporting the European company were few, while the messages against ATR were many. At the beginning of January 1995, there appeared a message from a journalist in this forum asking the following: "I have heard that ATR flights will begin soon. Can anybody confirm this information?" The answer came very soon. Three days after, unexpectedly, permission to continue ATR flights was given. The company learned this, as soon as the permission announced. But if they had actively participated in the newsgroups, they would have gained some days to inform their offices and their clients. "Des langages pour analyser la poussiere d' info", Liberation, 9 June 1995 Example 5 The government of Brasil in 1994, announced its intention to assign an international contract (Amazonios). This procurement was of great interest since the total amount available for the contract was 1,4 billion USD. From Europe, the French companies Thomson and Alcatel expressed their interest and from USA, the huge weapon industry Raytheon. Although the offer of the French companies was technically excellent and allegedly better documented, the contract was eventually assigned to the USA company. It was reported in the press that this was achieved with a new offensive strategy used by USA. When the government of Brazil was about to assign the contract to the French companies, American Officials (allegedly with the personal involvement of President Bill Clinton) readjusted their offer, according to the offer of the European companies, and asserted that French companies influenced the committee, an accusation which was never proved. On the other hand, the European companies were reported
  20. 20. to have indications that the intention of the government of Brazil to assign the contract to the European companies became known to Americans with the use of FBI's surveillance technologies. "La nouvelle machine de querre americaine", LeMonde du reseingnement no 158, 16 February 1995 Example 6 In January 1994 Edouard Balladur, French Prime Minister, went to Ryadh (Saudi Arabia), feeling certain to bring back a historic contract for more than 30 million francs in sale of weapons and, especially, Airbus. He returned disappointed. The contract went to the McDonnell- Douglas American company, rival of Airbus. The French were report to believe that this was at least in part due to electronic surveillance by the ECHELON system, which had given to the Americans the financial conditions and incentives authorised by Airbus. French press reports said the National Security Agency is the most secret and most significant of the thirteen secret agencies of the United States. It receives about a third of the appropriations allocated with clandestine intelligence: 8 of the 26,6 billion dollars (160 18 billion francs) registered appropriations in the 1997 budget. With its 20.000 employees in United States and some thousands of agents throughout the world, the NSA (which forms part of ministry for Defence since its creation in 1956) is more important than the CIA, even if the latter is better known to the public. Its site at Fort Meade contains, according to sources familiar with the place, the greatest concentration of data processing power and mathematicians in the world. They are employed to sort and analyse the flood of data acquired by ECHELON on the networks of international telecommunications. "Echelon est au service des interets americains", Liberation, 21 April 1998 PART C: TECHNICAL FILE 1. INTRODUCTION Surveillance and Privacy Surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons. It has traditionally been undertaken by physical means (e.g. prison guards on towers). In recent decades it has been enhanced through image amplification devices such as binoculars and high-resolution satellite cameras. The basic born [sic] physical surveillance comprises watching (visual surveillance) and listening (aural surveillance). Monitoring may be undertaken remotely in space, with the aid of image amplification devices like field glasses, infrared binoculars, light amplifiers and satellite cameras
  21. 21. and sound amplification devices like directional microphones; and remotely in time with the aid of image and sound recording devices. Electronic devices have been developed to augment physical surveillance and offer new possibilities such as closed-circuit TV (CCTV), VCR, telephone bugging, Proximity cards, Electronic Database, etc. In addition to physical surveillance, several kinds of communications surveillance are practiced, including mail covers and telephone interception. The popular term electronic surveillance refers to both augmentations to physical surveillance (such as directional microphones and audio bugs) and to communication surveillance, particularly telephone taps. The recent years have seen the emergence and refinement of a new form of surveillance no longer of the real person, but of the person's data shadow or digital persona. Data surveillance or Dataveillance is the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons. Dataveillance is significantly lees expensive than physical and electronic surveillance, because it can be automated. As a result, the economic constraints on surveillance are diminished and more individuals and larger populations are capable of being monitored. Like surveillance, more generally, Dataveillance is of two kinds: "personal Dataveillance", where a particular person has been previously identified as being of interest, "mass Dataveillance", where a group or large population is monitored, in order to detect individuals of interest, and / or to deter people from stepping out of line. Surveillance technology systems are mechanisms, which can identify, monitor and track movements and data. During the last few decades since information technology has become immensely sophisticated real benefits have been achieved in the development of surveillance technology systems. On the other hand, negative impacts have been considerable: The application of IT to the surveillance of people through their data. IT technology may have substantial implications in privacy. People often think of privacy as some kind of right. Unfortunately, the concept of a "right" is a problematic way to start, became a right seems to be some kind of absolute standard. What's worse, is very easy to get confused between legal rights on one hand and natural or moral rights on the other. It turns out to be much more useful to think about privacy as one kind of thing (among many kinds of things) that people like to have lots of. Privacy the interest that individuals have in sustaining a "personal space" free from interference by other people and organizations. To a deeper level privacy turns out not to be a single interest but rather has several dimensions:
  22. 22. privacy of the person privacy of personal behavior privacy of personal communications privacy of personal data With the close coupling that has occurred between computing and communications, particularly since the 1980's the last two aspects have become closely linked, and are commonly referred as information privacy. Information privacy is the interest an individual has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing the handling of data about themselves. The term 'data privacy' is sometimes used in the same way. 'Data' refers to inert numbers, where information implies the use of data by humans to extract meaning; hence 'information privacy' is arguably the more descriptive way of the two alternatives. 'Confidentiality' is an incidental and wholly inadequate substitute for proper information privacy, protection, where: 'Confidentiality is the legal duty of individuals who come into the procession of information about others, especially in the course of particular kinds of relationships with them'. Dataveillance Techniques A variety of Dataveillnce techniques exists. Front-end verification (FEV), for example, comprises the checking of data supplied by an applicant (e.g. for a loan or government benefit) against data from a variety of additional sources, in order to identify discrepancies. FEV may be applied as a person dataveillance tool where responsible grounds exist for suspecting that the information the person has provided may be unreliable; where, on the other hand, it is applied to every applicant, mass dataveillance is being undertaken. Data matching is a facilitative mechanism of particular value in mass dataveillance. It involves trawling through large volumes of data collected for different purposes, searching for discrepancies and drawing influences from them. Personal dataveillance of previously identified individuals integration of data hitherto stored in various locations within a single organization screening or authentication of transactions against internal norms front-end verification of transactions that appear to be exceptional, against data relevant to the matter at hand. and sought from other databases or from third parties.
  23. 23. front-end audit of individuals who appear to be exceptional against data related to other databases or from third parties. cross-system enforcement against individuals, where a third party reports that the individual has committed a transgression in his or her relationship with the third party. Mass dataveillance of groups of people. screening or authentication of all transactions, where or not they appear to be exceptional, against internal norms front-end verification of all transactions, whether or not they appear to be exceptional against data relevant to the matter at hand, as sought from other internal databases or from third parties. front-end audit of individuals, whether or not they appear to be exceptional against data relevant to the matter at hand, as sought from other internal databases or from third parties. single-factor file analysis of all data held or able to be acquired, whether or not they appear to be exceptional, variously involving transaction data compared against a norm, permanent data or other transaction data. profiling or multi-factor file analysis of all data held or able to acquire, whether or not they appear to be exceptional, variously involving singular profiling of data held at a point in time, or aggregative profiling of transaction trails over time. Facilitative mechanisms could be: computer data matching, in which personal data records relating to many people are compared in order to identify cases of interest data concentration, homely the combination of personal data interchange networks and hub systems. Risks inherent in Data Surveillance Data surveillance's broader social impacts can be grouped as follows: In personal dataveillance low data quickly decisions [sic] lack of subject knowledge of, and consent to, data flows blacklisting denial of redemsion [sic]
  24. 24. In mass surveillance a. Risks to the individuals: arbitrariness a contextual data merger complexity and incomprehensibility of data witch hunts ex-ante discrimination and guilt prediction selective advertising inversion of the onus of proof covert operations unknown accusations and accusers denial of due process b. Risks to society: prevailing climate of suspicion adversarial relationships focus of law enforcement on easily detectable and provable offences inequitable application of the law decreased respect for the law and low enforcers reduction in the meaningfulness of individual actions reduction in self-reliance and self-determination stultification of originality increased tendency to opt out of the official level of society weakening of society's moral fibre and cohesion destabilization of the strategic balance of
  25. 25. power repressive potential for the totalitarian government. By way of example, individuals can suffer as a result of misunderstandings about the meaning of data on the file, or because the file contains erroneous data, which the individual does not understand and against which he / she has little or not chance of arguing without the help of a specialized lawyer. Such seemingly small, but potentially very frustrating and infuriating personal problems can escalate into widespread distrust by people of government agencies and the legal system as a whole Of course, many of the risks referred are diffuse. On the other hand, there is a critical economic difference between conventional forms of surveillance and Dataveillance. Physical surveillance is expensive because it requires the application of considerable resources. Although (with few exceptions), this expense has been sufficient to restrict the use of surveillance. Admittedly the selection criteria used by the surveillance agencies have not always accorded with what the citizenry might have preferred, but at least its extent was limited. The effect was that in most countries the abuses affected particular individuals who had attracted the attention of the state, but were not so pervasive that artistic and potential freedoms were widely constrained. Dataveillance changes all that. Dataveillance is relatively very cheap and getting cheaper all the time, thanks to progress in information technology. The economic limitations are overcome and the digital persona can be monitored with thoroughness and frequency and surveillance extended to whole populations. Nowadays, a number of particular populations have attracted the bulk of the attention, because the state already processed substantial data - holdings about them. There are social welfare recipients and employers of the state. Now that techniques have been refined, they are being pressed into more general usage, in the private as well in the public sector. Controls If dataveillance is burgeoning, controls are needed to ensure that its use is not excessive or unfair. There is a variety of natural or intrinsic controls, such as self-restraint and morality. Unfortunately morality has been shown many times to be an entirely inadequate influence over people's behaviour. There is also the economic constraint, whereby work that isn't worth doing tends not to get done, because people perceive better things to do with the same scarce resources. Regrettably this too is largely ineffective. Cost/benefit analysis of dataveillance measures is seldom performed, and when it has been the quality has generally been appalling. This reflects the dominance of political over economic considerations -- both politicians and public servants want action to be seen to be being taken, and are less concerned about its effectiveness than its visibility. If intrinsic controls are inadequate, extrinsic measures are vital. For example, the codes of ethics of professional bodies and industry associations could be of assistance. Regrettably, these are generally years behind the problems, and largely statements of aspiration rather than operational
  26. 26. guidelines and actionable statements of what is and is not acceptable behaviour. Over twenty years after the information privacy movement gathered steam, there are few and very limited laws which make dataveillance activities illegal, or which enable regulatory agencies or the public to sue transgressing organisations. A (limited) statute exists at national level, but none at all at the level of State Governments. In any case, statutory regimes are often weak due to the power of data-using lobbies, the lack of organisation of the public, and the lack of comprehension and interest by politicians. The public has demonstrated itself as being unable to focus on complex issues; public apathy is only overcome when a proposal is presented simply and starkly, such as 'the State is proposing to issue you with a plastic card. You will need to produce it whenever anyone asks you to demonstrate that you have Permission to breathe'. There is a tendency for dataveillance tools to be developed in advanced nations, which have democratic traditions and processes (however imperfect). There is a further tendency for the technology to be exported to less developed countries. Many of these have less well-developed democratic traditions, more authoritarian and even repressive regimes. The control mechanisms in advanced western democracies are inadequate to cope with sophisticated dataveillance technologies; in third world countries there is very little chance indeed of new extrinsic controls being established to ensure balance in their application. It appears that some third-world countries may be being used as test-beds for new dataveillance technologies. 2. SURVEILLANCE: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES - Current technologies Surveillance is using some of the most advanced and sophisticated technology to keep track of individuals; where they go, what they do and even what they say. Visual and audio surveillance are almost everywhere, and, modern electronic technology gives the possibility of keeping track of individual's moments without cameras or microphones, just with surveillance of their data (Dataveillance ) 1. Visual Surveillance Closed-circuit TV (CCTV) is the most common electronic visual surveillance technique. Recording can be in two modes: real-time or time-lapse. Real-time is regular TV (at 30 frames (second) showing full motion). Time-lapse selects only a few frames per time period, perhaps one or two per second, to record. The advantage of time-lapse is that it allows one tape to record for a much longer time than real time recording Video electronics can be very sophisticated indeed and the recent trend is digital video. This allows using the QUAD recording system, a method of compressing four separate camera images into a single frame, so that the guard could see all four views on the monitor screen and record them on a VCR (Video Cassette Recorder) at the same time. These systems allow detailed
  27. 27. surveillance and plant monitoring, so that responsibles can observe everything happening within the facility. In the previous years may be, only the entrance (or specific spaces) would be under video surveillance. Now it is possible to have surveillance everywhere. Using hard disks instead of videotape allows keeping a record of several month's worth of time-lapse video. Cameras also are much more sophisticated today than years ago. New circuits allow the camera to ignore bright, light-emitting objects within their fields of view. Miniaturization allows easier concealment, infra-red cameras allow surveillance in darkness. Video surveillance is portable as well. The old days of concealing a camcorder in a briefcase or duffel bag have given way to subminiature cameras concealed in neckties and other items. Decoy items (items containing the surveillance equipment) include baseball caps, belt buckles, briefcases, eyeglasses and wristwatches. CCTV is very quickly becoming an internal part of crime control policy, social control theory and Community consciousness. It is promoted by police and politicians as primary solution for urban dysfunction. They are now used in many areas, including roads, trains, railway platforms, car parks, loading docks, shopping centers, individual retail stores, banks, automatic teller machines, petrol stations, lifts, lobby areas, cash handling and storage areas and employee recreation rooms. Within the aims of the contract, this study looks at its usage in five main industrial contexts: retail stores, financial services, manufacturing, warehousing and distribution, larger office buildings and leisure and entertainment complexes. Video surveillance is used in these industries for several reasons: to minimize the risk of theft, especially in the retail industry for purposes of deterring and detecting crime protect premises from threats to property such as sabotage, arson and vandalism to monitor individual employee work performance to improve customer service by observing peak periods and planning the allocation of staff throughout the day to assist in staff training to enhance health and safety standards to ensure that employees comply with legal obligations to protect employers from liability claims
  28. 28. to monitor production processes. Most surveillance systems are being installed to prevent theft, either by outsiders or employees, but, video surveillance systems often are used for a range of purposes beyond what was originally intended. Surveillance systems which are initially installed for the purpose of protecting property against an external security threat can be used for other purposes, such as to monitor employees' productivity and work behavior. The routine use of video surveillance has the potential to undermine employees' sense of privacy and dignity in the workplace. Surveillance is associated with increased levels of stress, undermining morale and creating distrust and suspicion between employees and management. While it may be an effective instrument to protect an employer from external security threats, it is not appropriate as a means of monitoring individual employee performance. Covert surveillance with a smaller number of hidden cameras may in fact be a much popular and at the same time cheaper option than a general security system. Some of the justifications offered for covert video surveillance are: employers have a right to protect their business interests covert surveillance affect fewer employees than overt surveillance and is much cheaper if employees are unaware of surveillance, there is less risk of individual disputation covert surveillance is often the most effective means of detecting unlawful activity. 2. Audio Surveillance Audio surveillance is no longer merely an arcane art practiced by spies and private detectives. Today, it's common place and spreading. Tape recorders are a fact of life, and they're often used to document a transaction. Trying to telephone some companies and some government agencies there is a recording sign says: "This transaction is being recorded to help us assure ...". In some companies the real purpose of tape recording conversation is to check how may the handle an hour, and to have evidence in case the customer says something that can used against him. In prisons, officials often use electronic equipment to record all telephone conversations. Some of these are between lawyer and client, but all they go onto tape. It depends on the ethics of the guards whether they listen or not. They are "high tech voice recorders" that put every conversation on a CD disk. A model made for correctional use is the "Laser voice", using optional disk voice recording.
  29. 29. "Tube mike" is an electric device for "bugging" a room, motor vehicle, or other premises. It is a plastic tube passed through a small hole in a wall to conduct sound from the room to a small microphone at the other end. This could be characterized as "non- access surveillance". "Tube microphones" come in all sizes. Some are relatively large plastic tubes (about 1/2'' in diameter), but for tight spaces or maximum concealment there are "needle microphones" pressed against a wall to hear sounds in the next room. If there is access to a room, a bug could be planted almost anywhere, even in the subject's clothing. "Radio mikes" transmit whatever they pick up to a nearby receiver eliminating the need for tell-tale wires. Their only drawback, if they're totally self-contained, is battery life. Other models fit into wall plugs, and take their power from the house current One type of portable radio mike is the size and shape of a credit card, with a range of several hundred feet and a 30-hour battery life. Placed into the beast pocket of the subjects jacket, it permits monitoring a conversation held outdoors. The value of this is that many people think its possible to overhear a conversation held on the street or in a park, and that walking will defeat any prospect of a bug planted nearby. In the open market there are several models of "gimmicked telephones" that use in the built in microphone to pick up any conversation in the room even when the telephone is not in use. All the types of audio surveillance with miscellaneous bugging devices described before, are used today mainly in police and internal security agencies (such as FBI, NSA etc) or in companies security departments. Telephone tapping still exists, but with today's Electronic Switching System (ESS) its no longer necessary to go out and physically tap a person's telephone line. 3. Phone Tapping and Encryption Whenever a telephone line is tapped the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject and although proper, confidential and privileged ma be overheard. The phone tapping normally used for surveillance of communications to combat "serious crime" and to protect "national security". On the other hand often companies keep records of phone numbers calls and the duration of such calls. In some companies these records are used to gauge job performance, while in others it simply allows employees to review calls and reimburse the employer for calls of a purely personal nature. 4. Voice and Word Pattern Recognition
  30. 30. Since it is no possible for an Agency or organization to employ a staff large enough to listen to all telephone conversations, read all faxes, etc, word recognition has to be computerized. In this case a central computer could monitor all (or a group) of telephone conversations and recognize those in which the agency had an interest by using voice patterns and key words. A wide variety of techniques are used to perform speech recognition. Typically speech recognition starts with the digital sampling of speech. The next stage is acoustic signal processing. Most techniques include spectral analysis e.g. LPC (Linear Predictive Coding), MFCC (Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients) cochlea modeling and many more. The next stage is recognition of phonemes, groups of phonemes and words. This stage can be achieved by many processes such as DTW (Dynamic Time Warping), HMM (Hidden Markov modeling), expert systems and combination of techniques. Most systems utilize some knowledge of the language to aid the recognition process. Some systems try to "understand" speech. That is try to convert the words into a representation of what the speaker intended to mean or achieve by what they said. Voice and pattern recognition used as an advanced tool and a helpful technique (thanks to the IT) for surveillance of communications to combat "serious crime" or to protect "national security" 5. Proximity Smart Cards Originally, electronic cards were substitutes for keys, which were too easy to reproduce. A metal key blank and a file where all that were necessary to duplicate a key, but more sophisticated equipment is necessary to duplicate even the simplest sort of electronic card. The first type of electronic card used barium ferrite as magnetic dots embedded in the magnetic layer. This was a significant advance over punched cards, that were relatively easy to duplicate. In the early 1970s, magnetic stripe cards were produced (by IBM), which are still used in credit cards and are somewhat more secure. However, they're still too easy to forge and should pass through a magnetic stripe reader. In the early 1980s, the advent of Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technology, resulted in what quickly become known as "smart card" which could hold a variety of codes and information to make misuse or duplication almost impossible. This was the first "proximity card", which did not require direct contact through a card recorder. The proximity card is basically a "transponder" an electronic device that replies to a radio signal that "interrogates" it. The extended range model doesn't require even placing it near the card reader, as it transmits to a receiver several feet away. Use of proximity smart card as Transport card / E-purse
  31. 31. Transportation companies use the proximity smart cards to replace metro, bus, train tickets and boarding cards, etc. The proximity smart card results in considerable time saving by greatly increasing passenger flow without diminishing security With the contact part of the card, the proximity smart card is perfectly suited to financial transactions involving small amounts of money: automatic vending cafeterias, local shops, parking fees, cinemas, recreation / amusement parks, cultural and sports centers etc. Use of proximity smart card as Access control / ID card The company Proximity smart card contains data used to identify cardholders, as well as his own different access rights. The contactless part of the card is used to access building and other protected areas. The contact portion can be used for network access, such as the Internet. With the electronic purse function it can be used in the company restaurant, at automatic vending machines, just like a traditional multi-service card. One application, although, extends the proximity card's usefulness by turning it into a tracking device. Proximity readers installed along the walls of a building allow tracking each card within the facility. If somebody is carrying one of these cards within a building so equipped, the central computer can sense exactly where he (she is at all times). There is a record of which area the employee (or visitor) is in, when he leaves, and where else within the building he may go. If the employee goes to the cafeteria, the computer will log when he lefts his work station, how long it took him to get to the cafeteria, which root he took, how long he remained in the cafeteria, when he started back and by which route, and when he arrived back in his work area. Likewise if he went to the bathroom. The computer can record whether he/she went to the men's room or the ladies' room. Many countries are actively considering adopting national ID cards for the variety of functions. These include the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. There are ID cards (credit cards) used for digital cash service which is supposed to be "anonymous". But, it appears that the bank and the merchants could find the identity of the users. The customer is identified to the trader and ultimate to the bank by the 300 previous transactions. Each of these will soon be superseded by further transactions and drop off end of the list. These can be monitored by the bank and could be used for marketing purposes. This is the audit trail and could be sold to business users for third party marketing. 6. Transmitter Location When a telephone or mobile phone used, the location of the user could be identified. The science of location radio uses three methods of finding a transmitter. The oldest is triangulation, in which
  32. 32. several receiving stations with directional antennas take bearing on a transmission and communicate the bearing to a central plotting room. Technicians trace each bearing on a map of the area and the intersection of the bearing pinpoints the location of the transmitter. The second method requires several receives as well, and works by measuring the relative strengths of signals received. A computer analyses the strengths and determines the location of the transmitter The third method also requires a computer-controlled chain of receives and measures the minute differences in the time the signal arrives at each receiver. Formerly classified, these techniques are now available on the civilian market for law enforcement and private security. One application is locating stolen cars by pinpointing radio transmitters installed in the vehicle for this purpose. Location of cellular phones in another application. Police today are using (in some countries) this application to pinpoint the location of cellphone users. Purportedly, this is to speed emergency response when a citizen calls for help (at home or in the road). Once the equipment is in place, it can, and must, serve other purposes. Criminal investigators will be able to pinpoint a specific cellphone each time the caller uses it, this will help an investigation into a stolen cellphone, or help locate wanted persons unwise enough to use cellphone or mobile phone. Another device, sold only to police, is the "cellphone ESN Reader", which reads the numbers of the targeted cellphone. This detects and records the cellular phone number, called number and ESN of the target phone of a ranges of up to two miles. Theoretically, the technology can locate every cellphone and every mobile phone in the country every time someone makes a call on it (for cellphones) or just open it (for mobile phones). 7. E-mail at workplace Personal messages the employee sent over his company's e-mail are not private. They are not, and court decisions have held that they're not. It is a safe assumption that companies will keep an increasingly watchful eye on their internal email, and scrutinize what employees are saying to each other. It is easy to see that some companies may find that scrutinising staff e-mail can have more than one advantage for a company management. Originally instigated to avoid liability, reading employee's e-mail can also serve to alert management of dishonesty, disloyalty or even matters like union activity. 8. Electronic Databases The computer age has brought surveillance into a new era in which information about almost anybody is available to almost anybody.
  33. 33. Databases from Human Identification There are a lot of government databases containing information about almost every resident in United States and in many European Countries as well. A variety of person identification techniques are available, which can assist in associating data with them. Important examples of these techniques are: names (what the person is called by other people) codes (what the person is called by the organization) knowledge (what the person knows) biometrics (what the person is, does, or looks like e.g. appearance, natural physiography, etc.) Data bases for financial surveillance Financial records are gathered privately by several giant companies that specialize in this sort of information. These "credit reporting bureaus" purportedly maintain credit records, but in fact keep far more than credit information in their databases. Other databases for human identification There exist specialized databases available mainly to private investigators. These call information from telephone directories, city directories, voter registration records and many other public and private records to provide a profile of the person being investigated. 9. The Internet The Internet, which began as a Computer communication network between Universities and laboratories decades ago, has turned into a vast public forum accessible to anyone with a computer. International organizations, Public authorities, Companies, Universities, Research centers and individuals have access and exploit the Internet. On the other hand Internet became: an entertainment tool a huge Information source an important marketing tool
  34. 34. a big virtual electronic market with a considerable number of economic transactions every second IT technology at the same time, restricted the individuals' right to privacy since they could be identified through their ID number or through their records or transactions. The growing rift between the needs of Internet Commerce and the individual's right to privacy gave rise to the development of new tools. In January 1999 Intel announced its plans for the development of a microchip containing embedded electronic serial numbers that allow individual computers to be readily identified. The identities, similar to the unique vehicle identification numbers on cars and trucks would be a caller ID technology for computer. But critics see it is on an ominous development, ushering in a new period of electronic surveillance. Privacy experts fear the new Intel chip could mean the death of anonymity on the Internet. But this would appear to really variously endanger privacy on the Internet by creating a permanent ID number for every Intel user on the Net. 3. THE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS FOR THE TRANSMISSION AND COLLECTION OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION As the Internet and other communication systems reach further into the everyday lives, national security, low enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined. Governments want to restrict the free flow of information and software producers are seeking ways to ensure consumers are not bugged from the moment of purchases. All developing communication technologies, digital telephone switches cellular and satellite phones HAVE SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. On the other hand the development of software that contains encryption, a telephone which allows people to scramble their communications and files to prevent others from reading them gourd earth [sic]. 3.1 CALEA system The first effort to heighten surveillance opportunities (made by USA) was to force telecommunication companies to use equipment desired to include enhanced wiretapping capabilities. In the late 1980s in a program known internally as "Operation Root Canal" US low enforcement officials demanded that telephone companies alter their equipment to facilitate the interception of
  35. 35. messages. The companies refused but, after several years of lobbying, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement ACT (CALEA) in 1994. CALEA requires that terrestrial cellular phone services and other entities ensure that all their equipment, facilities or services are capable of expeditiously, enabling the government to intercept all wire and oral communications varied by the carrier concurrently with their transmission. Communications must be interceptable in such a form that they could be transmitted to a remote government facility. Manufactures must work with industry and low enforcement officials to ensure that their equipment meets federal standards. The passage of CALEA has been controversial, but its provisions have yet to be enforced due to FBI efforts to include even more rigorous regulations under the law. These include: the requirement, the cell phones allow for location - tracking on demand and that telephone companies provide capacity for up to 50.000 simultaneous wiretaps. CALEA finally has been accepted as an International standard in US. In 1991 the FBI contacted EU member states in order to propose to them do incorporate CALEA into European Law. This plan according to an EU report, was to call for the Western World (EU, US and allies) to agree to norms and procedures and then sell their products to Third World countries. There is a council resolution that was adopted on 17 January 1997 on the lawful interception of communications (961C329/a). The US government is now in negotiations with the International Telecommunications Unit (ITU) to adopt the standards globally. 3.2 ECHELON Connection The previous STOA Interim Study (PE 166.499) entitled "An Appraisal of technologies of political control" made certain statements concerning the ECHELON global surveillance system. This is reported to be a world-wide surveillance system designed and coordinated by the US NSA (National Security Agency) that intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and international telephone communications carried via satellites and has been operating since the early 1980s - it is part of the post Cold War developments based on the UK-USA agreement signed between the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948. The five agencies said to be involved are: the US National Security Agency (NSA), the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in New Zealand, Government Communications Headquarters Signals Directorate (DSD) in Australia. The system was brought to light by the author Nicky Hager in his 1996 book Secret Power: New Zealand's role in the International Spy Network. For this, he interviewed more than 50 people who work or have worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of ECHELON. It is said that "The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual's e-mail or fax link. Rather, the system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and using computers to identify and extract messages from the mass of unwanted ones".
  36. 36. According to Interim Study (PE 166.499) of 1998, there are reported to be three components to ECHELON: 1. The monitoring of Intelsats, international telecommunications satellites used by phone companies In most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow in Cornwall monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. 2. ECHELON interception of non-Intelsat regional communication satellites. Key monitoring stations are Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany. 3. The final element of the ECHELON system is the surveillance of land-based or under-sea systems, which use cables or microwave tower networks. At present it is thought ECHELON's effort is primarily directed at the "written form" (e-mails, fixes, and telexes) but new satellite telephones system which take over from old land-based ones will be as vulnerable as the "written word". Each of the five centres supply to the other four "Dictionaries" of keywords, phrases, people and places to 'stag" and tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential development on phone calls combined with the standardisation of"tappable" telecommunications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and the USA which presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls. The earlier study (PE 166.499) identified a number of options for the European Union, centred round the proposition that: "All surveillance technologies, operations and practices should be subject to procedures to ensure democratic accountability and there should be proper codes of practice to ensure redress if malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit criteria should be agreed for deciding who should be targeted for surveillance and who should not, how such data is stored, processed and shared. Such criteria and associated codes of practice should be made publicly available." Other points included: - All requisite codes of practice should ensure that new surveillance technologies are brought within the appropriate data protection legislation. - Given that data from most digital monitoring systems can be seamlessly edited, new guidance should be provided on what constitutes admissible evidence. This concern is particularly relevant to automatic identification systems which will need to take cognizance of the provisions of Article 15, of the 1995 European Directive on the Protection of Individuals and Processing of Personal Data.
  37. 37. - Regulations should be developed covering the provision of electronic bugging and tapping devices to private citizens and companies, so that their sale is governed by legal permission rather than self regulation. - Use of telephone interception by Member states should be subject to procedures of public accountability referred to in (1) above. Before any telephone interception takes place a warrant should be obtained in a manna prescribed by the relevant parliament. In most cases, law enforcement agencies will not be permitted to self-authorise interception except in the most unusual of circumstances which should be reported back to the authorising authority at the earliest opportunity. - Annual statistics on interception should be reported to each member states' parliament. These statistics should provide comprehensive details of the actual number of communication devices intercepted and data should be not be aggregated. (This is to avoid the statistics only identifying the number of warrants, issued whereas organisations under surveillance may have many hundreds of members, all of whose phones may be subject to interception). - Technologies facilitating the automatic profiling and pattern analysis of telephone calls to establish friendship and contact networks should be subject to the same legal requirements as those for telephone interception and reported to the relevant member state parliament. - The European Parliament should reject proposals from the United States for making private messages via the global communications network (Internet) accessible to US Intelligence Agencies. Nor should the Parliament agree to new expensive encryption controls without a wide ranging debate within the EU on the implications of such measures. These encompass the civil and human rights of European citizens and the commercial rights of companies to operate within the law, without unwarranted surveillance by intelligence agencies operating in conjunction with multinational competitors. 3. Inhabitant identification Schemes Inhabitant identification schemes are schemes, which provide all, or most people in the country with a unique code and a token (generally a card) containing the code. Such schemes are used in many European Countries for a defined set of purposes, typically the administration of taxation, natural superannuation and health insurance. In some countries, they are used for multiple additional purposes. 4. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION SELECTED BY SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS A. From telecommunication systems Concerning public authorities and organizations:
  38. 38. secret telephone conversations, fax messages and electronic mail sensitive information concerning taxation information concerning various fund transfers especially from one service to the other and financial transactions data used in the critical banking infrastructure systems Concerning business: private business communication, including telephone conversations, fax messages and electronic mail order from fund transfers and other financial transactions (e.g. payments by credit cards by fax) sensitive business information and trade secrets Concerning individuals: private conversations, fax messages, e-mail payments by credit cards secret information concerning taxation B. From new information technologies (Internet) Concerning public authorities and organizations: sensitive information and state secrets tele-banking tax records and other financial information data used in the operation of critical infrastructure systems public contracts received by electronic mail Concerning business: contracts invoices and other official documents secret electronic transactions
  39. 39. risk of international property and license in secret transactions payment orders by credit cards payments received on-line Concerning consumers and individuals: payment by credit cards payment on-line contracts and agreements electronic financial transactions (e.g. tele-banking). C. Some examples of data collection on tSe Internet Data can be collected over the Internet either directly or indirectly; in other words, it can be collected either at the time of contact with a correspondent or without the knowledge of the person concerned, often automatically. The nature of the data collected varies according to the protocol used on the network i.e. according to the type of service. In practice, different protocols are very often used in combination to augment the profitability or quality of exchanges. For example, a Web page may propose an exchange of correspondence or a transfer of documents via links with the e-mail protocol and the protocol used for transferring files, which is more powerful. When electronic messaging is used (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol -- SMTP, and Network News Transfer Protocol -- NNTP), communication is established from one personal mailbox to another, or between a personal mailbox and a mailbox common to a number of correspondents. The information transmitted consists of the name and e-mail address, the server address and the signature file (sig.file) if created by the user of the machine. If a communication is addressed to a joint mailbox, this information is given out to an indeterminate number of correspondents, participation in a discussion group being theoretically free. As a result, any person listed on a distribution list can at the very least obtain the e-mail addresses of all other listed parties, since this information is provided automatically for purposes of communication on a given topic. While most downloading (File Transfer Protocol -- FTP) is done anonymously, with only the network's Internet Protocol -- IP -- address being revealed, the same cannot be said for document presentation (World Wide Web -- WWW, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol -- HTTP). The minimum information revealed at each step in the Web is the name of the network machine making the request and the type of browser being used. Browsers contain an identification -- ID - - file which, is configured by the user or at the user's request, stores various personal data such as the user's name or e-mail address. If a Web server requests this information, it can be automatically given out.
  40. 40. A Web server can also send out information, which is stored by the user's navigator (so-called 'cookies') and retrieved at a subsequent connection to the server. This system indicates that a visitor has been there before, but without revealing his identity: identification requires matching with other information. As a result, when linked to the ID file incorporated into the browser and transmitted to a server, the information recorded in cookies c-an yield valuable user profiles. It can be noted, however, that some navigations -- to a varying and often inadequate extent -- allow use of these cookies to be blocked. 5. PROTECTION FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE A. Encryption (Cryptography) Finally, new information technologies include the privacy of individuals, the security of data in the computer or on the network, and the availability of encryption software to protect data in the event they are intercepted. In this context, privacy refers to controlling the dissemination and use of data, including information that are unintentionally revealed as a by-product of the use of the information technologies themselves. Security refers to the integrity of the data storage, processing, and transmitting systems and includes concerns about the reliability of the hardware and software, the protections against intrusion into the theft of the computer equipment, and the resistance of computer systems to infiltration by unpermitted users, that is, "hacking". Encryption is the practice of encoding data so that even if a computer or network is compromised, the data's content will remain secret. Security and encryption issues are important because they are central to public confidence in networks and to the use of the systems for the sensitive or secret data, such as the processing of information touching on national security. These issues are surpassingly controversial because of governments' interest in preventing digital information from being impervious to official interception and decoding for low enforcement and other purposes. Private sector initiatives A large number of private sector interests, in the United States in particular, are attempting, a view to fostering electronic commerce, to promote technological solutions that will provide a a1 practical response to consumers concerns while still preserving business interests. In other words, they are starting to explore ways and means of making privacy work in communication networks. These initiatives go in the right direction and it would be worthwhile for governments to engage in a dialogue on the basis. As an example, Netscape joined by Microsoft, is leading an industry initiative (40 companies) to cope with privacy issues and proposes standard software intended to enable computer users to control what personal information is obtained when they visit Internet sites and how the information is used, as well as avoid unwanted e-mail. The proposal, called the OPS -- Open Profiling Standard --, which has been submitted to the World Wide Web Consortium -- W3C, provides the users with a way to pre-package the personal registration information Web sites

×