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Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
Taisa Secao3 A
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Taisa Secao3 A

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  • 1. <ul><li>So Klein was looking for a theory to explain this kind of “obvious” decision-making </li></ul>
  • 2. Klein’s starting point: Soelberg (1967) <ul><li>Soelberg teached his students at MIT Sloan School of Management how to perform the rational choice strategy, in which the decision maker: </li></ul><ul><li>Identifies a set of options; </li></ul><ul><li>Identifies the way of evaluating these options; </li></ul><ul><li>Weights each evaluation dimension; </li></ul><ul><li>Does the rating; </li></ul><ul><li>Picks the option with the highest score. </li></ul>
  • 3. Soelberg taught his students how to apply the rational choice strategy <ul><li>And in his PhD thesis he studied the decision strategies his students used to select their jobs as they graduated. </li></ul><ul><li>But he was wrong; his students did not systematically compare options. Soelberg found that they were using their gut feelings, and he could predict with 87% accuracy their ultimate choice, three weeks before they did their decision . </li></ul>
  • 4. Soelberg’s thesis <ul><li>Students had a gut choice, then… </li></ul><ul><li>…then they would find another option to compare, then… </li></ul><ul><li>… then they would construct a justification for their gut decision. </li></ul><ul><li>So Klein also hypothesized that fireground commanders would be comparing, instead of lots of options, just two. </li></ul>
  • 5. KLEIN: “Can you tell us about difficult decisions you’ve faced?” “I don’t make decisions.” “I don’t remember when I’ve ever made a decision.” <ul><li>Klein’s 2-choice hypothesis started to collapse; fireground commanders did not seem to be comparing options at all. </li></ul><ul><li>It seemed “unhappy news” for the researchers. The subjects insisted that commanders never made decisions. </li></ul>
  • 6. <ul><li>Commanders agreed that there were options. </li></ul><ul><li>But it was just obvious what to do in any situation. </li></ul><ul><li>There are OPTIONS, but no DECISIONS? </li></ul><ul><li>what’s going on here? </li></ul>
  • 7. Maybe if we change definitions? <ul><li>“A decision is a choice point where reasonable options exist, and the commander might have selected another option.” </li></ul><ul><li>As opposed to a “selection between previously compared alternatives” </li></ul>
  • 8. <ul><li>As it turned out, the commanders were not refusing to compare options; they did not have to. </li></ul><ul><li>When facing a complex situation, commanders would immediately respond in appropriate fashion without conscious thought. </li></ul><ul><li>They were primed to act . </li></ul>
  • 9. <ul><li>Recognition-primed decision making </li></ul><ul><li>Decision-makers would look at several options, but never compare them. </li></ul><ul><li>HOW? </li></ul>
  • 10. <ul><li>Recognition-primed decision making </li></ul><ul><li>Decision-makers would look at several options, but never compare them. </li></ul><ul><li>HOW? </li></ul><ul><li>Commanders thought about one option at a time, evaluated it, then turned to the next possible rescue technique (named as a singular evaluation approach) . </li></ul>
  • 11. <ul><li>But there was a second puzzle: </li></ul><ul><li>If they did not compare one course of option with another, how did they evaluate the options? </li></ul><ul><li>How did they know, without comparing, that a course of action was any good? </li></ul>
  • 12. <ul><li>But there was a second puzzle: </li></ul><ul><li>If they did not compare one course of option with another, how did they evaluate the options? </li></ul><ul><li>How did they know, without comparing, that a course of action was any good? </li></ul><ul><li>They used a simulation heuristic , running the action through in their minds . </li></ul>
  • 13. <ul><li>They used a simulation heuristic , running the action through in their minds . </li></ul><ul><li>If they spotted a potential problem, they would move on to the next option, then the next, until something that would seem to work in that particular situation. </li></ul>
  • 14. <ul><li>“ Before we did this study, we thought that </li></ul><ul><li>Novices  impulsively jumped at the first options </li></ul><ul><li>Experts  carefully deliberated about the course of action </li></ul><ul><li>Now, it seems that experts have one course of action, and novices have to think it through.” </li></ul>
  • 15. <ul><li>There are times for deliberating about options  usually when experience is inadequate & logical thinking is a substitute for recognizing a typical situation. </li></ul><ul><li>This explains Capablanca’s remark about chess: “You figure it out what to do. I see only one move. The best one.” </li></ul>
  • 16. <ul><li>“Decision-makers recognize the situation as typical and familiar, and proceed to take action. They [immediately] understand </li></ul><ul><li>What types of goals make sense, </li></ul><ul><li>Which cues are important, </li></ul><ul><li>What to expect next, </li></ul><ul><li>Immediate access to a typical course of action . </li></ul>
  • 17. <ul><li>Decision-makers do not start with goals or expectancies and figure out the nature of the situation. </li></ul><ul><li>Instead, they find themselves immersed into a situation, and rapidly gather information in order to make a diagnosis. </li></ul>

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