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Taisa Secao3 A

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  • 1.
    • So Klein was looking for a theory to explain this kind of “obvious” decision-making
  • 2. Klein’s starting point: Soelberg (1967)
    • Soelberg teached his students at MIT Sloan School of Management how to perform the rational choice strategy, in which the decision maker:
    • Identifies a set of options;
    • Identifies the way of evaluating these options;
    • Weights each evaluation dimension;
    • Does the rating;
    • Picks the option with the highest score.
  • 3. Soelberg taught his students how to apply the rational choice strategy
    • And in his PhD thesis he studied the decision strategies his students used to select their jobs as they graduated.
    • But he was wrong; his students did not systematically compare options. Soelberg found that they were using their gut feelings, and he could predict with 87% accuracy their ultimate choice, three weeks before they did their decision .
  • 4. Soelberg’s thesis
    • Students had a gut choice, then…
    • …then they would find another option to compare, then…
    • … then they would construct a justification for their gut decision.
    • So Klein also hypothesized that fireground commanders would be comparing, instead of lots of options, just two.
  • 5. KLEIN: “Can you tell us about difficult decisions you’ve faced?” “I don’t make decisions.” “I don’t remember when I’ve ever made a decision.”
    • Klein’s 2-choice hypothesis started to collapse; fireground commanders did not seem to be comparing options at all.
    • It seemed “unhappy news” for the researchers. The subjects insisted that commanders never made decisions.
  • 6.
    • Commanders agreed that there were options.
    • But it was just obvious what to do in any situation.
    • There are OPTIONS, but no DECISIONS?
    • what’s going on here?
  • 7. Maybe if we change definitions?
    • “A decision is a choice point where reasonable options exist, and the commander might have selected another option.”
    • As opposed to a “selection between previously compared alternatives”
  • 8.
    • As it turned out, the commanders were not refusing to compare options; they did not have to.
    • When facing a complex situation, commanders would immediately respond in appropriate fashion without conscious thought.
    • They were primed to act .
  • 9.
    • Recognition-primed decision making
    • Decision-makers would look at several options, but never compare them.
    • HOW?
  • 10.
    • Recognition-primed decision making
    • Decision-makers would look at several options, but never compare them.
    • HOW?
    • Commanders thought about one option at a time, evaluated it, then turned to the next possible rescue technique (named as a singular evaluation approach) .
  • 11.
    • But there was a second puzzle:
    • If they did not compare one course of option with another, how did they evaluate the options?
    • How did they know, without comparing, that a course of action was any good?
  • 12.
    • But there was a second puzzle:
    • If they did not compare one course of option with another, how did they evaluate the options?
    • How did they know, without comparing, that a course of action was any good?
    • They used a simulation heuristic , running the action through in their minds .
  • 13.
    • They used a simulation heuristic , running the action through in their minds .
    • If they spotted a potential problem, they would move on to the next option, then the next, until something that would seem to work in that particular situation.
  • 14.
    • “ Before we did this study, we thought that
    • Novices  impulsively jumped at the first options
    • Experts  carefully deliberated about the course of action
    • Now, it seems that experts have one course of action, and novices have to think it through.”
  • 15.
    • There are times for deliberating about options  usually when experience is inadequate & logical thinking is a substitute for recognizing a typical situation.
    • This explains Capablanca’s remark about chess: “You figure it out what to do. I see only one move. The best one.”
  • 16.
    • “Decision-makers recognize the situation as typical and familiar, and proceed to take action. They [immediately] understand
    • What types of goals make sense,
    • Which cues are important,
    • What to expect next,
    • Immediate access to a typical course of action .
  • 17.
    • Decision-makers do not start with goals or expectancies and figure out the nature of the situation.
    • Instead, they find themselves immersed into a situation, and rapidly gather information in order to make a diagnosis.