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    • Student Economic Review, Vol.19, 2005 THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTOR TOWARDS CONTESTABILITY AMONGST AIRPORTS Jessica Loughnane Senior Sophister The dramatic evolution of the aviation sector in the last two decades is examined by Jessica Loughnane in this essay. The role that low-fares airlines have played in this liberalisation is examined as is their effect on the Dublin-London air route. A look is also taken at the barriers to contestability that remain within the aviation sector.Introduction The aviation sector has undergone fundamental transformation in recentyears. Liberalisation of the European and US skies alongside the emergence ofcompetitive, innovative low-cost airlines1 has resulted in a radically new aviationmarket defined by efficiency, productivity and competitive practices. Theconsequences of these improvements have had far reaching effects. Air travel is nolonger reserved for the privileged few who could afford the inordinately expensiveflights of the previous era, and the destinations available to consumers havemultiplied greatly to include every corner of the world. This is a radical departurefrom the historically costly and inefficient aviation sector of the previous fortyyears, which had opted out of ‘normal market economics’. A combination ofreduced airfares and a more efficient, productivity-orientated outlook from airlineshas greatly affected the role of airports. Airlines are now price sensitive; airportscan no longer charge rates in the knowledge that airlines will simply pass on theadded cost to passengers. A competitive market has emerged among airports as aresult of deregulation and increased scrutiny by airlines of the cost structure withinairports. The dominance of the traditional hub airports during the previous era hasbeen eroded; low cost airlines have taken an innovative approach to air travel andhave chosen to base their activities in cost conscious ‘peripheral’ airports within anhour or two of the most popular European cities via ground transport. Ryanairnotoriously started this trend by using airports such as Beauvais, Charleroi, and1 Such as Ryanair, a highly successful European low-cost carrier, which copied to some extent themodel of Southwest, an American low-cost airline that had achieved market dominance in the USA. 127
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORFrankfurt-Hahn, airports a few hours from Brussels, Paris and Frankfurtrespectively. Due to the rapidly changing economic environment of the airlines,numerous spillover effects have touched the airport sector. The changing nature of the market structure for airports cannot beanalysed in isolation. One must examine the evolution of the aviation sector as awhole in order to fully comprehend the radical transformation of this industry inrecent years. This essay endeavours to outline the background against whichaviation took place prior to deregulation, and the effects that this had on all sectorsin the industry. The deregulation of domestic skies within the EU has resulted in aradically altered market structure, enabling low cost carriers to emerge, theimportance of which cannot be underestimated for the industry but in particular forairports. Low cost airlines have played a pivotal role in ensuring competitivepractices are adopted among airports, in particular the role of Ryanair is discusseddue to its first mover advantages within Europe and the market dominance it hasachieved.The aviation industry before deregulation The Chicago conference of 1944 set the tone of the aviation sector untilthe mid 1980s. Aviation was conducted on a bilateral basis with predeterminedcapacity and price levels for national ‘flag-carriers’. Thus the sector becamecharacterized by numerous market distortions in the form of governmentinterventions and regulations, exceedingly high fares, large quantities ofgovernment subsidies and loss-making airlines. The situation was aptly describedby Dr. Barrett as a ‘Noah’s Ark system’ with two airlines, two airports and twogovernments in agreement over fares, frequency of flights and routes (2005).Resistance to change came from many quarters. Airlines wished to maintain thestatus quo as huge economic rents and supernormal profits were created by thelack of competition in the sector; existing airlines had created an oligarchic marketin which they could dominate (Barrett 2000). Bizarrely this lack of competitionalso created a scenario whereby airports allowed national airlines to gain de factocontrol of the airports via slot allocation committees who distributed slots for takeoff and landing on the basis of ‘grandfather rights’.2 It is estimated that at currentslot prices, an airline, like Aer Lingus, that operates in Heathrow gains anestimated monopoly rent of 10% per slot (Kirlazidis 1994). Airports did not2 Airlines through the system of grandfather rights cultivated a strategic advantage over any potentialentrants, for example, Aer Lingus have grandfather rights in Heathrow Airport which initially hinderedRyanair’s access to Heathrow and therefore London, however Ryanair developed a strong market inStanstead Airport after deregulation and now dominate this route.128
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANEengage in a competitive market to ensure airlines used their facilities. Airportswere viewed as public utilities3 rather than as a business and therefore theinefficiencies and high costs caused by bilateral trade agreements were endured asno alternative market structure was entertained by national governments. Nationalgovernments were slow to impose change to facilitate a competitive market in thisarea as aviation was intrinsically linked to foreign policy, national defense andnational identity and this accounts for the willingness of governments to fundailing national airlines and to tolerate an uncompetitive market. Thus nationalgovernments used non-economic rationale to justify their continuing support andregulation of the aviation sector (Barrett 2000).Liberalisation of Air Travel The move towards deregulation developed first in the US with the AirlineDeregulation Act of 1978. This removed government intervention in the sector byallowing airlines to determine their own prices and route free from anyinterference. This created an opportunity for Southwest airlines to develop into adominant low-cost carrier within the US domestic line and thus providing theinspiration for other similar European companies such as Easyjet and Ryanair(Barrett 2004). Deregulation in Europe occurred at a slower pace, airlines hadachieved regulatory capture4 over member states, entrenching and strengtheningtheir incumbent advantages. New entrants were excluded through marketdistorting factors such as unfair slot allocation at airports and governmentsubsidies. This changed however when liberalization was instigated in 1986 witha case brought before the European Court of Justice, ‘Nouvelles Frontieres’. Thiscase was highly instrumental in ensuring deregulation of the aviation sector as theCourt came to the conclusion that air transport within the Single Market could notbe treated any differently to other sectors of industry regardless of any specialsignificance that member states may attach to it. The case ensured that any‘barriers’ to trade in existence within the industry were to be eliminated, at least onpaper, such as trade distorting government subsidies (Kyrou 2000). Prior to EUliberalisation, some important bilateral agreements took place ensuring open skiesbetween countries such as Britain and the Netherlands in 1984 and Ireland and theUK in 1986. The rest of Europe deregulated at a more gradual pace in three3 A public utility provides basic services to a market such as electricity or water; this company usuallyenjoys a monopoly position due to economies of scale etc. In recent times however there has been agrowing trend towards privatising these companies, such as Eircom and British Rail.4 A situation whereby the government instead of regulating the activities of an industry in the interest ofall parties involved, the government is actually influenced by one particular firm giving it an unfairadvantage, for example Aer Lingus, CIE and taxi drivers in the 1990s. 129
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORstages, 1987, 1990 and 1993 (Graham 2001). An agreement was also reached withEFTA and the EU to create a free trade area between the two in aviation.Contestable Markets Airline markets are thus very near to providing a good example ofcontestable markets according to Baumol (1982). The theory of contestablemarkets was developed in the 1980s by Baumol and the key requirements toensure contestability include, entry into and exit from an industry are free, there isa distinct absence of sunk costs,5 and any current production techniques employedby incumbents are available to new entrants. In a contestable market the priceproducers charge is equal to the marginal cost of the product, therefore there is anabsence of supernormal profits. This ensures that an influx of new entrantsattracted by supernormal profits are avoided. Regulatory restrictions on acontestable market are limited. Baumol does not believe that the number of firmsin an industry is indicative of the level of contestability; a perfectly contestablemarket can exist with a small number of firms provided that there are no barriers toentry (Barrett 1994). The EU now has the most deregulated aviation market in theworld; any airline with a valid Air Operators Certificate can operate within the EUat market-determined prices (Gillen & Lall 2004). Any bans on new airlines havebeen eliminated, price competition has been introduced and collusion betweenairlines is now strictly prohibited. Liberalisation is highly successful; one only hasto look at the radical reduction in fares resulting from the deregulation of theAnglo-Irish skies, in 1987 passenger numbers had increased by 92% since 1985and fares fell by approximately 70% (Barrett 2004). Despite these numerousadvances, factors remain which hinder the aviation industry from reaping the fullbenefits of contestability.Barriers to Contestability Despite Baumol’s assertion that the aviation sector is a very closeexample of contestable market, obstacles to contestability do exist, these mainlyoccur as a result of the lack of competitive practices among airports. Although theemergence of low-cost airlines is radically altering the airport sector byencouraging competitive behavior, barriers remain to hinder the liberalization5 A sunk cost is irretrievable; it constitutes an opportunity cost associated with the decision toparticipate in an industry. It acts as a barrier to trade in an industry like aviation as it discouragespotential entrants.130
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANEprocess and hamper the expansion of the new low-cost carriers. Structural barriersto contestability among airports include hub airport dominance, ground handlingmonopolies and CRS. Mergers, predatory pricing and state aid constitute strategicbarriers. Slot allocation at airports remains problematic. Grandfather rights ensurethat incumbent airlines continue to dominate hub-airports and this restricts theability of new entrants to enter into these markets. Alternatives to slot allocationcommittees include distributing slots via a lottery, or franchising the slots andlastly auctioning the slots to the highest bidder and thus ensuring the most efficientuse of a scarce resource (Miller 2004). Although slot scarcity is a problem, low-cost airlines such as Ryanair have circumvented this issue by using ‘secondary’airports in the vicinity of hub-airports to service their passengers. TheCommission, despite taking a generally ‘laissez faire’ attitude towards slotallocation has formulated some regulation in regard to the issue. While stillmaintaining the principle of ‘historic precedence’, airlines must use their slotallocations or the airlines will forfeit the right to use them. The approach of theEU has little impact on the negative effects of slot allocation, as reform should bedirected at the manner in which allocation is carried out. EU regulation stillenables airlines to keep competitors out of certain airports by using their slotsinefficiently. Airlines can maintain their slots with the use of smaller aircraft,uneconomical passenger numbers, and by using profits from other routes tomaintain route domination in areas that make a loss. These strategies enableairlines to hinder competition and are therefore a barrier to contestability. Anyattempts to reform the allocation of slots have been met with heavy criticism fromincumbent airlines; this is because traditional, dominant carriers view their share ofslots as an asset to their company. Airlines at hub-airports view slots as part oftheir ‘inheritance’. The stance of the airlines on this issue obviously creates aparadoxical situation whereby the airports undertake the costly investment in theinfrastructure of the facility but the airlines claim ownership without any realjustification (Kirlazidis 1994). Another obstacle to contestability is ground handling monopolies. Oftenincumbent airlines with grandfather rights hold exclusive rights to provide ground-handling services to its competitor. This allows airlines with such privileges tounfairly further consolidate its advantageous position by charging competitors highprices for such services. Tendering for such services would eradicate thisinequality and ensure that the most cost-efficient company would provide theservice. Reform of slot allocation and ground-handling monopolies are afundamental aspect to ensuring the full benefits of deregulation are reaped withinthe EU. Ground-handling services remain a barrier to contestability, as ‘self-handling’ is rarely permitted in airports and therefore some airlines have created amonopoly provision of services. Despite formally declaring the need to ensure fair 131
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORcompetition between airlines in this area, the Commission cites that ‘practicalconstraints’ hinder the ability to implement liberalisation fully in this area.Frankfurt, Milan and Athens pose particular problems in relation to ground-handling monopolies, with official complaints lodged with the Directorate General(Kyrou 2000). Air traffic control (ATC) deficiencies also hinder the full realisation ofcontestability; delays are increasing in European airports, approximately onehundred planes at any given time are delayed waiting to take off or have to circletheir intended destination to receive clearance to land. The root of the problem liesin the fact that ATC in Europe is controlled by forty-two different centres and thisobviously causes greater delays (Kirlazidis 1994). The creation of a singlecontrolling body to supervise and co-ordinate ATC would have a positive impacton the industry within the EU. Mergers and cartels also prevent the full benefits of contestability to berealised. The Directorate General in the EU is responsible for ensuring thatcartels, mergers, alliances, and state aid do not inhibit the free market. The abuseof a dominant position is prohibited in article 826; activities such as predatorypricing7, setting prices too high8, and refusing to allow access to a market9 are allprohibited within the EU. Article 81 prohibits collusion; firms must not undertakerestrictive practices (Kyrou 2000). The Commission does recognise the ill effectsof uncompetitive agreements between airports and airlines and the problems thataffect airlines resulting from deficient airports. The general stance of theCommission in relation to agreements between airports and airlines is highlightedby the case concerning Charleroi airport and Ryanair. The European Commissionin 2004 came to the conclusion that the agreement between the airport and airlineconcerning airport charges and taxes amounted to illegal state aid, which theairline would have to repay. Ryanair had in return for generating increased trafficthrough the airport10 agreed with BSCA (Brussels South Charleroi Airport) that theairline would receive a reduction in airport taxes, a rebate in ground handling6 Article 82 defines what an abuse of a dominant position involves, it was formerly known as article 86.7 Predatory pricing occurs when, for example an airport, wishes to decrease another airport’sprofitability to ensure they exit the market or when an incumbent airport endeavours to inhibit the entryof a new airport.8 In an uncompetitive market, for example airports prior to deregulation, the airport due to lack ofcompetition has the ability to set prices above a market determined price.9 Airports within the aviation sector hold a vital market position; slot allocation provides a goodexample of preventing a new airline to enter the market by ensuring that access to the airport isunobtainable.10 Ryanair has a proven track record in generating passenger numbers at secondary airports, FrankfurtHahn prior to Ryanair’s arrival had passenger numbers of 450,000 in 2001 but once the airlineestablished itself at the airport in 2002 passenger numbers rose to 1.5m.132
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANEservices11, and a commitment from the airport that taxes and regulations such asopening hours would remain static for 15 years. The Commission viewed thisagreement to be in direct conflict with the principles of the Common Market as itdistorted competition among airlines in particular. The Commission’s argument isdisputed by Groteke and Kerber who point out that any airline offering the samechance to maximise capacity at Charleroi and generate similar revenues for theairport from charges and non-aeronautical revenue sources would have reached asimilar agreement with the airport authority (2005). Ryanair as a low cost airlinewith a clear business model seeks out similar business concepts from the airports itchooses to use. The airports it seeks to use must be cost effective, simple indesign, ensure quick turn around times, and limit delays. The Commission usedthe case of Charleroi to highlight that airports are not permitted to charge airlinesdifferent prices, financial support is permitted only in relation to the creation of anew route and any other financial support is viewed as an illegal aid in violationwith the Common Market (Groteke & Kerber 2005). Despite the Commission’smisgivings regarding the relationship between Ryanair and BSCA one only has tolook at the bilateral agreement between Aer Lingus and Sabena12 prior toderegulation to believe that competition has lead to a significant reduction in pricesand hence a increase in consumer welfare. Airports must be allowed discretion and freedom to behave ascommercial enterprises; the Commission must not create a ‘regulatorystraightjacket’ despite the noble desire to create “fair competition for everyone inthe single market of air transport” (Groteke & Kerber 2005). Airports must act ina proactive manner in order to establish a contestable manner. The business modelof airports like Frankfurt Hahn, which spent 27m euro on renovations to ensureRyanair based itself there, should be replicated. As airfares have reduced, theproportion of airport costs in tickets has risen. In order to stop costs fromspiraling, airports must engage in price competition as Charleroi has, andincreasingly airports should tender contracts for services to ensure efficient andcompetitive practices. By relying on low cost carriers to attract more passengersand generate revenues; the bargaining power of these individual airports aregreatly reduced. Ryanair stopped its service to Rimini airport and moved to Aconaairport (one hour south of Rimini) after a dispute regarding costs. Airlines such asRyanair tender contracts for services thus enabling them to move quickly into11 Ryanair at Charleroi paid 1 euro per passenger whereas other airlines using the airport paid anamount between 8 euro and 13 euro.12 Aer Lingus and Sabena airlines agreed not to engage in price competition, thus keeping fares high at650 pounds. 133
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORmarket openings; this renders them ‘footloose’ and therefore able to move airports.A ‘regulatory straightjacket’ greatly reduces the ability of airports to act in acompetitive manner.Benefits of Competition illustrated by a Case Study of London’sAirports In order to illustrate the many positive effects associated with airportcompetition it is necessary to look at a case study of the London-Dublin route.Prior to liberalisation in 1986, Heathrow airport dominated the market with alimited contribution from Gatwick airport. Since deregulation this route hasbecome the busiest international route for scheduled services in the world, thedevelopment of airports in competition with Heathrow has greatly enhanced thisroute. Stansted, Luton, Gatwick and London City airport all compete againstHeathrow for market shares. Slot allocations in Heathrow prevent the entry of newairlines into this airport and hence since deregulation there has been a markedincrease in the use of smaller airports in the London region. Figure 1 highlightsthe growing diversification of passengers to the five different London airports.The dominance of Heathrow over this route has been eroded over the period 1985-1998. Ryanair has played an integral role in diverting passengers from thetraditional hub airport, Heathrow, towards ‘secondary’ airports like Stansted(Barrett 2000). Table 1 highlights the contribution that Ryanair has made topassenger growth rates at Stansted and thus demonstrates that low cost airlinesprovide a pivotal lifeline to secondary airports.134
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANEFigure 1: The impact of airline competition of the Dublin-London Routebetween 1985 -1998 100 90 80 70 Heathrow 60 Gatwick 50 Luton 40 Stansted 30 London City 20 10 0 1985 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998Source: based on figures from the UK Civil Aviation Authority.Barrett, 2000, p20.Table 1: Stansted Airport and Ryanair’s contribution to passenger growth from 1990-1999 Total Passengers Ryanair Passengers Ryanair Share % 1990 1.2 - - 1991 1.7 0.2 17 1992 2.3 0.6 26 1993 2.7 0.7 26 1994 3.3 0.8 24 1995 3.9 1.0 26 1996 4.5 1.3 29 1997 5.4 1.5 28 1998 6.8 2.1 31 1999 (est) 7.7 3.2 42Source:Barrett, 2000 pp.21 135
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORThe role of low cost Airlines in creating a competitive airport market The London market highlights the integral role that low cost airlines haveplayed in securing increased competitive practices in the airport service market.Hub airports are not compatible with the demands of these low fares airlines, thelarge airport structure with numerous terminals and business lounges do not suitthe no frills attitude of the likes of Ryanair. Gold plating is considered anunnecessary expenditure that is not supported by consumer demand; the airportstraditionally justified these expenses and increasing costs to airlines as a necessaryresponse to consumer demand. However the increasing transfer of passengersaway from expensive hub airports like Heathrow to the ‘secondary’ airports ofStansted and Gatwick is an example of the willingness of passengers to switch toairports with fewer facilities in order to avail of lower prices. Thoughuncompetitive and inefficient practices are still adopted by Heathrow and Gatwick,annual increases in airport charges between 1997 and 2002 were kept belowinflation rates. European hub airports such as Charles de Gaulle in Paris are close tocapacity and therefore the combination of high charges and the unfair system ofgrandfather rights provides little allurement for low cost airlines. These airlinesprefer to use ‘secondary’ airports in order to decrease costs, create a separateidentity in the market, and service new catchments areas. The economies of scaleinvolved in establishing an airline at an airport may inhibit airlines entering intohub airports due to the costs involved etc, therefore adding to the attraction of lessimportant airports. Low cost airlines require a different level of service fromairports than their competitors, for example fewer check-in desks are required.Ryanair in Dublin airport despite generating 25% of the passengers only use 11%of the check-in desks. The availability of slots, the lack of congestion, the goodtransport facilities on the surface and the lower frequency of delays attract low costairlines to non-hub airports (Barrett 1994). Underused and overlooked airports arein abundance in Europe. These airports are often more compatible with low costairlines business models, with a lack of gold-plating and single storey terminals.Fewings highlights that a large pool of suitable alternatives to hub airports exists inEurope alone (Barrett 2004). Ex-military airports are ideally suited for low costairlines, in France 32 such facilities exist, 34 in the UK and 28 airports inGermany. Fewings also examined the availability of peripheral airports nearexisting dominant airports, of the 10 EU countries he examined, 131 airportswithin one hour of surface travelling time of existing hub airports were found(Barrett 2004). The extent of underused airports within Europe is illustrated intable two, compiled by Fewings.136
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANETable 2: Level of airport and runway provision in Europe in 1998 Number of airports per million inhabitants Runway Length Over 1600m Under 1600m Austria 0.8 0.0 Denmark 1.9 0.4 Finland 4.1 0.0 France 1.0 0.1 Germany 0.3 0.1 Greece 2.5 1.2 Iceland 22.5 26.2 Ireland 1.1 2.5 Italy 0.6 0.1 Norway 5.3 6.5 Scotland 1.6 2.1 Sweden 4.3 0.7 UK 0.7 0.3Source: Barrett, 2000, pp.19 Opportunities do exist for the construction of new airports, despite thewell-worn arguments to the contrary that maintain construction is too costly andtime consuming. The London City Airport construction project only cost 7m andwas completed in 40 weeks. However any new airport construction must take intoaccount the negative environmental effects on the surrounding area such as noisepollution, the lack of land, congestion, and waste and noise disturbance. Tocombat the ill effects of airports the surrounding land should be acquired, aircraftand slots should be used efficiently, public transport to and from the airport shouldbe increased and the price of car parks should be increased to encourage use ofpublic transport.Conclusion While low-fares airlines have altered the structure of the aviation sectorby vastly reducing fares and this in turn has made aviation less vulnerable toeconomic climate changes, the aviation market remains an uncertain entity. Theeconomic implications of political unrest, terrorism and health epidemics have farreaching consequences. Recent global events such as 9/11, the SARS outbreak in China and thewar in Iraq have caused the demand for air travel to fluctuate. While air transportis no longer considered a ‘luxury good’ due to the new business dynamicintroduced largely by low cost airlines, the industry must continue to strive toincrease efficiency and productivity. The progress of airports in relation to 137
    • THE EVOLUTION OF THE AVIATION SECTORcreating a contestable market has proceeded slowly. The barriers that remain arelargely administrative and with the support of the European Commission, airportsand the aviation sector will continue to work towards contestability (Barrett 2004).BibliographyAbeyratne, R (2000) “Management of airport congestion through slot allocation.” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.6, pp. 29-41.Banister, D & Joseph, Berechman (2000) Transport Investment and Economic Development. London: UCL Press.Barrett, S (1987) Flying High: Airline Prices and European Regulatio. , Aldershot: Avebury.Barrett, S (1991) Transport Policy in Ireland in the 1990s. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.Barrett, S (1993) “Air Transport Markets,” Banister, D &J Berechman (eds), Transport in a Unified Europe- Policies and Challenges. North Holland: BV Publishers.Barrett, S (1994) “Aviation and the pursuit of Contestability.” Journal of Economic Affairs, Vol.42, No.2Barrett, S (2000) “Airport Competition in the Deregulated European Aviation Market.” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.6, pp.13-27.Barrett, S (2003) “Airports as Multimodal Interchange Nodes, European Conference of Ministers of Transport,” Economic Research Centre.Barrett, S (2004) “How Do the Demands for Airport Services Differ between Full- Service Carriers and Low-Cost Carriers?” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.10, pp. 33-39.Barrett, S (2005) Lectures in Transport Economics, Trinity College DublinBaumol, W.J. (1982) “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure”, the American Economic Review138
    • JESSICA LOUGHNANEForsyth, B (2004) “Locational and monopoly rents at airports: creating them and shifting them.” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.10, pp .51-60.Freathy, P (2004) “The commercialization of European airports: successful strategies in a decade of turbulence?” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.10, pp. 191-197.Gillen, D & Lall, Ashish (2004) “Competitive advantage of low-cost carriers: some implications for airports.” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol.10, pp. 41-50.Graham,A (2001) Managing Airports: An International Perspective. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.Groteke, F & Wolfgang Kerber (2005) “The Case of Ryanair-EU State Aid Policy on the Wrong Runway.” ORDO, Vol.55, pp. 313-331.Kirlazidis, T (1994) European Transport: Problems ad Policies. Aldershot: Avebury.Kyrou, D (2000) Lobbying the European Commission: The Case of Air Transport. Aldershot: Ashgate.Miller, J (2004) “The Contestability of Markets.” Student Economic Review. Vol. 18. pp. 211-222. 139