KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)
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KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

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A study guide for our first historical simulation of the year, an International Atomic Energy Agency session on the nuclear disarmament of Libya in 2009. This topic was on WorldMUN 2010, and the study ...

A study guide for our first historical simulation of the year, an International Atomic Energy Agency session on the nuclear disarmament of Libya in 2009. This topic was on WorldMUN 2010, and the study guide is slightly more complex as to acquaint delegates with simulations of the highest level.

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KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011) KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011) Document Transcript

  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 UN International Atomic Energy Agency – Historical Simulation (December 2009):" Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya"
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 1
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 2Table of ContentsIntroduction ........................................................................................................ 3Introduction to the Committee ................................................................................. 4Overview on the Topic ........................................................................................... 5Past UN Actions .................................................................................................. 12Proposed solutions .............................................................................................. 14Key Actors and Positions ....................................................................................... 16Issues a resolution must address ............................................................................. 18
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 3IntroductionThe International Atomic Energy Agency will be dealing with the topic ofLibya, which has recently signed on to the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty after years of running a secretive nuclear program. Libya has beenworking closely with the IAEA in its verification activities and is nowcollaborating with the IAEA on a number of projects aimed atdisseminating the many benefits of nuclear technology to the people ofthe country. The IAEA must decide on further steps to be taken withregards to this topic, while also considering the option of internalinstability breaking out within Libya.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 4Introduction to the CommitteeThe conclusion of World War II by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasakibrought the issue of nuclear power and its potential for shaping thefuture to the forefront of the global conscience. United States PresidentDwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the United NationsGeneral Assembly in December of 1953 outlined U.S. efforts todisseminate peaceful nuclear technologies throughout the world. This callto awareness of the pressing issue of nuclear proliferation was echoed bythe United Nations proper. In October of 1956, the IAEA statute, informedby many of the same ideas that Eisenhower presented, was unanimouslyapproved by 81 nations. This new organization, which officially beganoperation in 1957, was chartered to become a facilitator in the exchangeof nuclear knowledge and a monitor ensuring that nuclear technologiesprovided by the as a means of providing hardier crops necessary toaddress issues of famine and global hunger. Nevertheless, much of theIAEA’s time and energy is devoted to addressing militaristic applicationsof nuclear technology. The IAEA has actively discouraged the use ofdepleted uranium shells, often employed in conventional munitions, asthey have a demonstrated a deleterious environmental and health impactyears when they rest in the ground. But perhaps one of the biggest tasksundertaken by the IAEA is the monitoring of rogue nuclear states and thedevelopment of their weapons programs. Of late, Iran and North Koreahave been particularly concerning to the IAEA and the wider internationalcommunity. Neither of these countries has fully complied with IAEArequests for information and have not complied with proceduresnecessary to provide greater transparency, fuelling suspicion that bothremain intent on developing nuclear weapons.Two policy-making bodies control the IAEA: the 35-member Board ofGovernors and the General Conference of all Member States. The GeneralConference, the highest policy-making body within the IAEA, meetsannually to decide upon the agency’s programs and budget, as well as anyother issues brought before it by the Board of Governors. The GeneralConference elects the Board of Governors and it meets five times peryear, examining and making recommendations to the General Conferenceon a range of issues. This body also considers applications for membershipand appoints the Director- General of the IAEA with the approval of theGeneral Conference.There exist three pillars underpinning the IAEA’sworldwide efforts. The first is safeguarding and verification. In thiscapacity, the IAEA serves as the world’s nuclear inspectorate, ensuringthat nuclear technologies are not being employed for militaristicpurposes. The second pillar is safety and security. This role empowers theIAEA to advise countries how to best deal with nuclear technologies toprotect its citizens from harmful radiation. IAEA safety standards arecritical components of dealing with this task. The final pillar is scienceand technology, and the IAEA works to ensure that peaceful applicationsof nuclear technologies are used to address the needs of developingnations throughout the world by fighting poverty, sickness, andenvironmental pollution.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 5Overview on the TopicStatement of the ProblemNuclear proliferation has become an unavoidable reality as thetechnology and technical expertise required to engage in nuclearenrichment and atomic fission have become increasingly ubiquitous. Libyashocked the world on December 19th, 2003 when it announced theexistence of its own covert nuclear program. Libya’s subsequentcooperation with the international community to remove and eliminateany such nuclear materials that could be used to create weapons was acritical step in halting proliferation in Africa, but work remains to bedone to ensure that the nuclear capacity that Libya currently possessescan be put to use for the benefit of its people as well as within theregulations established by the IAEA.The International Atomic Energy Agency’s mission is guided by threepillars, and the one of ensuring nuclear safeguards and verification ofnuclear capability proved to be critical to the earliest stage of respondingto the Libya issue. The agency’s initial 2004 investigation into the Libyanacquisition of nuclear technology was critical in providing assurance tothe international community that the Libyan concessions were made ingood faith and revealed the succession of government policies that led tothe development of the nuclear program.The subsequent removal of weapon’s grade highly enriched uranium fromLibya in March 2004 was another watershed for the country. While only 13kilograms of fissile Uranium- 235 was removed, further confidence in thecountry’s disarmament activities was gained. Despite the gains alreadymade, more questions remain to be answered about the Libyan nuclearprogram. According to the latest report of the IAEA Director-General toits Board of Governors, impurity analysis techniques used to identify placeof origin of uranium compounds have failed to identify the source ofLibya’s UF6. That same report stated that the absence of sensitivedocumentations concerning the design of nuclear equipment and facilitiesrequires further inquiry.As such, Libya will continue to remain under IAEA scrutiny until theseissues can be resolved satisfactorily. Another issue that remains to besettled is how the Libyan nuclear program will proceed from this point.Libya still has nuclear capabilities that can be utilized for peaceful energyusage, and the IAEA can be a facilitator for the development of anysubsequent power plants and reactors. The Libyan’s are already engagedin a Technical Cooperative agreement with the IAEA directed towardsdevelopment of infrastructure required for sustainable nuclear power.The IAEA must continue to work with the Libyan government topromulgate more such cooperative projects.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 6History and Discussion of the ProblemThe Libyan nuclear program was the child of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi,the ruler of Libya following his successful coup in 1969. While he initiallydefended Libya’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities as purely peaceful, notingin 1979 that Libya had “signed all agreements on the non proliferation ofnuclear weapons,” he complicated matters through his failure to deny theLibyan pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Earlier in 1976, he said“atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every stateaccording to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon.”He viewed Israel and the defense of the Muslim world as a primaryimpetus to attain a nuclear weapon, saying later in 1987 that “The Arabsmust possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbersreach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and untilthey liberate Palestine.”Yet a number of other factors also likely affected Qaddafi’s decision topursue nuclear technologies. More than anything else, he needed tosecure the status and legitimacy of his regime. Such an ambitiousprogram of scientific development would have served to increase publicconfidence in and public support for him and his new government.Similarly, pitting himself as a potential counterbalance against Israel anddefender of the Muslim world would have granted him further favor withthe Libyan populace, as well as gain validation from other countriessympathetic to his cause. Later evidence would show that the leader’swords were more grandstanding than assertion of fact, but they wouldserve his ends regardless.The Beginnings of a Nuclear StateThe history of Libya’s nuclear program can be traced back nearly fortyyears. The establishment of the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) in1973 was intended to hearken a nuclear age in the African nation byspearheading infrastructural development and implementation ofimprovements in other areas as required to improve the state of Libyannuclear science. Ostensibly, this program was only directed for thepeaceful application of nuclear technology.The next major breakthrough for the Libyans would come four yearslater. Working in collaboration with the now-defunct USSR, Libyaconstructed the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in 1977. This newfacility included a 10 megawatt infrared thermal (IRT) research reactor aswell as other laboratories and departments. Testing and initial operationof the facility was carried out in 1981, and the reactor was put intooperation that same year. Another key development of this year was theestablishment of the Secretariat of Atomic Energy, under whose aegis theAEE and TNRC came to fall. When Libya entered the IAEA SafeguardsAgreement in July 1980, it declared its nuclear program to consist of theIRT reactor and a 100 watt critical assembly, both located at the TajuraNuclear Research Center. Subsequent developments of the program would
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 7not be accurately reported to the IAEA, as required by this compact, fornearly 30 years.The Libyans wasted little time in moving to acquire nuclear materials.From 1978 to 1981, over 2300 tons of “yellowcake” uranium oxideconcentrate (UOC) were imported from Niger. Throughout the ensuingdecade, the Libyan’s engaged a variety of activities directed at enrichingand converting this nuclear material. In 1982, Libya acquired from aBelgian party the basic plans for a uranium ore concentration plant. TheLibyans never began construction on this facility. Enrichment activitiesbegan in the early 1980s, directed by a foreign expert under whoseguidance Libyan engineers began work on uranium gas centrifugationtechnology. Despite his assistance, which continued up until 1992, Libyanefforts to create a functional nuclear centrifuge proved fruitless.Further Dealings with the USSRLibya began concluding many of its contracts with the USSR related to theupkeep of the TNRC during the between 1981 and 1983. 1985 saw theLibyans send 100 kg of UOC to the Soviet Union, for which they received56 kg of refined uranium product. They also engaged in talks with theUSSR aimed towards another collaborative project; this time the goal wascreating a uranium conversion facility within Libya. Without the vitalability to convert unrefined yellowcake into useable forms of uranium,the Libyan nuclear program would be totally reliant upon other nations toprovide conversion services. The desire to develop domestic a self-reliantdomestic nuclear infrastructure would come to define the Libyan nuclearprogram during the coming years.In addition to nuclear refinement and conversion, useable nuclear powerwas also an issue of concern to the Libyans. From 1981-1985, theydiscussed the possibility of acquiring two VVER-440 (Russian acronym forWater Water Energetic Reactor) reactors from the Soviet Union. Thesereactors would be employed to generate electricity as well as providewater desalination capabilities. Although the Libyans would conductinitial site studies to assess the feasibility of this plan, they would laterclaim that no final agreement could be made with the USSR regarding thesupply of these reactors.A.Q. Khan and Libya’s Nuclear “Middle Ages”The desire to develop indigenous capacity for creating fissionable nuclearproducts led Libya to actively contact multiple countries during the yearsof 1983 up until 1985. This effort saw little success other than theacquisition of two boxes of microfiche documentation from unknownsources. Upon these slides was information pertinent to nuclear fuel cyclefacilities, but neither tangible equipment nor additional nuclearcapability was acquired during these proceedings.The next stage in nuclear enrichment would be attained with theassistance of A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who ran a network
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 8of supplying nuclear weapons technology to a number of differentregimes, including nations such as Iran and North Korea. Libyan officialsfirst met with Khan in January 1984. During this initial exchange, Khanwent about describing the necessary equipment and technology for fissilematerial acquisition, as well as the resources and capabilities required toacquire said technologies. He concluded the meeting by attempting tosell the Libyan’s nuclear centrifuge technology. What Khan offered wascertainly a step forward, but the Libyans were hamstrung by the lack ofprogress they had made up unto that point in their own nuclear program.A Libyan official made a decision not to pursue Khan’s offer afterconcluding that Libya lacked the resources and technology required tomeet Khan’s scientific and industrial requirements. Khan would remain animportant fixture in the Libyan nuclear program during the coming years.Libya would continue to pursue multiple avenues to improve its nuclearcapabilities. In 1986, Libya used an intermediary to purchase a modularmobile Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) from a Japanese corporation.With this new equipment, the Libyans would be able to produce a varietyof uranium compounds, including pure uranium metal. Nevertheless, thiswould prove to be another case of Libya’s failure to put acquiredtechnology to use. The facility was only partially assembled, and theLibyans never actually operated it. On the other hand, in 1984 theLibyans began fabricating small uranium oxide and uranium metal targetsto be irradiated within the IRT reactor. This fabrication procedure wouldcontinue until 1990. Some of these targets were processed within aradiochemical laboratory within the same TNRC facility, evidencing acertain degree of progress, although these successes remained minor.Minute amounts of plutonium, a critical model often employed in nuclearweapons, were separated during these proceedings.In the mid-1980s Libya made further attempts to acquire fuel fabricationand reprocessing technology. These discussions were carried out with aliaison that had also collaborated with the Libyans on their chemicalweapons program. At the furthest stage of discussions, plans were madefor a pilot reprocessing plant. Actual detailed designs would be drawn upin the later that decade, with the plant and attendant facilities basedupon German technologies. The Libyans failed to acquire a complete setof design drawings for the plant, and they never obtained any equipmentfrom this contact. This particular project would come to a close at theend of the 1980s. Libyan inquiry into a heavy water production facilityduring this period yielded similar results, leaving the country with nothingto show for their efforts aside from documents containing basicinformation.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 9The Next Step ForwardA.Q. Khan became a key figure yet again from 1989 up through 1991.Libya re-engaged with high- level contacts with the Pakistani scientist.This time though, deliberations resulted in a solid agreement betweengovernment officials and Khan’s clandestine nuclear network. The resultof the arrangement was the Libyan acquisition of information on the L-1centrifuge technology developed by Khan himself. Deliberations stalled,however, when the Libyans began to feel that the information Khan wasproviding didn’t match the price he was demanding for it. With the twoparties at an impasse, the centrifuge arrangement stalled, and nocomplete centrifuges were provided to the Libyans. 1995 would see theLibyans turn back to A.Q. Khan and his network. Their continued desire toobtain nuclear enrichment equipment would finally come to fruitionduring this round of negotiations. Libya received twenty pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges in 1997 from Khan’s contacts. Additionally, they obtainedthe necessary parts required to construct another two hundred L-1centrifuges that same year. Libya was finally on track to initiate nuclearenrichment activities.The coming of the twenty-first century brought a series of rapiddevelopments to the Libyans, who finally saw some of their nuclearambitions coming to fruition. The nuclear program surged ahead, taking adecidedly more active approach to new acquisitions. The year 2000 wouldsee the Libyan government resume the import of uranium products. InSeptember the same year, the government received two cylinders of UF6,and received another cylinder of the material the following February, intotal acquiring nearly two tons of UF624.There were even more successes during the fall of 2000. Libya completedthe first successful test of an L-1 centrifuge by October. Later that sameyear, Libya furthered development of centrifuge technologies, buildingprogressively larger 9-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1centrifuge cascades. These larger cascade configurations allowed formultiple centrifugation processes to occur simultaneously, thus givinggreater purification yields more quickly. Despite this leap in technicalprowess, none of these cascades were ever totally constructed, with eachat varying stages of completion. Furthermore, the Libyans would laterclaim that no nuclear material was ever employed in the testing of thesecentrifuges.Libyan interest in gas centrifuges extended beyond using the older L-1technology acquired in the nineties, but looked to acquiring newer L-2centrifuges from A.Q. Khan’s network. In September 2000, Libyapurchased two L-2 centrifuges. Following this acquisition, the Libyansproceeded to order another 5000 L-2 machines. This number laterdoubled to 10,000 L-2s, and a large amount of ancillary equipment wasalso purchased from the network. The network not only acquired theequipment on behalf of the Libyans, but additionally was responsible forthe manufacture and transfer of the components from parties in a numberof different countries. Later in 2001, the Libyans acquired a “precision
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 10machine workshop” from the network, intended to provide support forthe gas centrifuge program.The Beginning of the EndBy 2002, the Libyan nuclear program had reached unprecedented heights,but some of the old problems that had plagued the Libyans for decadesresurfaced despite the successes, most notably a failure to acquire andproperly employ all of the necessary technology required to completeconversion and enrichment activities. The sections of the L-2 centrifugesordered from Khan’s network began arriving in large quantities. Missingfrom these shipments were rotating components critical to thecentrifugation process. As such, the Libyans could not complete any ofthe L-2 centrifuges received. This setback didn’t prevent the Libyan’sfrom further acquisition of nuclear materials. 2002 would see the Libyansacquire even more fissile compounds from an underground source. Aclandestine contact would provide them with uranium compounds, thistime intended for use as laboratory standards. Attempting to disguise thistransaction, the Libyans employed subterfuge, mislabeling the containersholding the nuclear compounds to conceal their hazardous nature. Theculmination of most nuclear programs i.e., the development of nuclearweapons, was one of the final projects the Libyans sought to explore.Towards the end of 2001 or beginning of 2002, the Libyans receiveddocuments from Khan’s network concerning nuclear weapon design andmanufacture. Yet virtually lacking all of the required technologynecessary to perform basic preparation of nuclear materials, Libya’seffort was improbable from the very beginning. Later investigation by theIAEA would find no evidence that the Libyans had engaged in work relatedto this project.When Libya officially renounced its nuclear weapons program inDecember 2003 the world at large was certainly shocked, but the Britishand American governments were intimately aware of the dealings thathad initiated the announcement. The Libyan government had beensubject to unilateral American sanctions for years, but both governmentshad been secretly engaging Libya in negotiations since 1999. Thesediscussions had touched upon the subject of weapons of mass destruction,but hadn’t concretely addressed the Libyan nuclear issue. That allchanged following a visit to Libya by UK Foreign Office Minister MikeO’Brien’s visit to Libya in 2002. Later in 2004, the Libyan foreign ministerwould assert “Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop anyweapons of mass destruction,” and claim that O’Brien’s visit had indeedbeen a watershed moment in Libya’s relations with the West. Althoughthe opening of diplomatic channels certainly served to amelioraterelations with Libya, the impact of the war in Iraq on Qaddafi’s decision-making must also be considered. The Libyans had been considerablyintransigent on their stance towards the nuclear issues throughout theirdiscussions. Nevertheless, America demonstrated its will to use militarystrength to tackle regimes possessing or believed to possess weapons ofmass destruction, and the quick fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq bode ill
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 11portents for Libya, which had still not fully reconciled itself with theUnited States. Just as political survival may have motivated the creationof the Libyan nuclear program, that same self-preservation instinct mayhave driven Qaddafi to quit his nuclear ambitions and come clean to theworld, rather than incur the wrath of Bush and the American military.The end of the secret Libyan nuclear program had come not with a bang,but instead a whimper. The December announcement was followed byswift action by an international community eager to catch up with theLibyans’ progress. IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei made aseries of visits to Libya that December and the following February. IAEAnuclear inspectors were soon to follow, and the verification of the Libyannuclear program would begin in January 2004. The Libyans’ demonstratedmarked cooperation in the IAEA verification efforts, keen to gain theconfidence and trust of the IAEA inspectorate and other nations. ByMarch, the UN had initiated the removal of highly-enriched uranium fromthe country, evincing the tangible successes of the inspection process.With Libya returned to the fold, the IAEA has been assisting the countrywith its development of peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA hasinitiated a number of technical cooperative projects with the Libyangovernment aimed at a wide variety of issues ranging from improving theTNRC reactor and developing nuclear power to improving the waterdesalination technology. Much work remains to be done in order to seethe Libyans attain their goals, but with the support of the IAEA and theinternational community, that day will certainly come sooner rather thanlater.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 12Past UN ActionsFollowing Libya’s declaration of a secret nuclear program in December20031, the IAEA responded quickly to begin verification of the Libyans’nuclear capabilities. In a meeting held December 20 with the LibyanAssistant Secretary for Services Affairs Matooq Mohamed Matooq, DirectorGeneral Mohamed ElBaradei secured assurances of Libya signing a furtherAdditional Protocol to its safeguard agreement granting the IAEA agreater inspection powers. One week later, ElBaradei and the IAEAinspection team was on the ground in Libya and verification activitieswere being commenced. The IAEA’s quick action was certainly a credit tothe organization, and the willingness of the Libyans to initiate inspectionswas also notable. Nevertheless, the true test of the success of theseinitiatives would come later, as the verification got underway.By the end of January 2004, the IAEA had reported preliminaryinspections had been extremely successful. Initial inventories of nuclearcomponents and materials were completed, and items deemed“sensitive” were removed from the country with the assistance of the USand UK. These ostensible successes were further heightened by the praiseof the IAEA team, which cited “high level cooperation with Libyanauthorities.” These sorts of statements and the corresponding actions byLibyan officials allayed concerns that the cooperation in the verificationprocess was merely superficial. ElBaradei would give further praise to theLibyans’ forthrightness and assistance in February. Nevertheless, muchwork remained to be done for the IAEA inspectorate in the comingmonths.One of the first major successes of the IAEA’s inspections of Libya wouldcome on March 8 with the removal of highly-enriched uranium from Libya.The operation was financed by the United States Department of Energyunder a joint US-Russia-IAEA anti-proliferation program called theTripartite Initiative. The materials would be airlifted back to Russia,which in its prior incarnation as the Soviet Union had originally providedthis material to the Libyan government. The Russians assured all partiesthat it would convert the product into low-enriched uranium, which isunsuitable for nuclear weapons usage. This was undoubtedly a tangiblesuccess for the IAEA, and conclusively signaled the full cooperation of theLibyan government. Two days later, the IAEA Board of Governors issued aresolution that broadly praised Libyan conduct in the proceedings andencouraging other countries to enter into full compliance with IAEAregulations. This same day would see the Libyans sign an AdditionalProtocol to its Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty with the IAEA8. Thismade good on Matooq’s earlier promise of granting the agency furtheroversight powers within Libya. During the remainder of 2004, MohamedElBaradei would proceed to issue two reports on the status of verificationactivities in Libya, detailing the results of IAEA investigations into theextent of the nuclear program. This would be the last substantial dealingwith Libya for nearly two years.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 13With Libya reintegrated into the fold of compliant nuclear nations, theIAEA verification activities continued without undue urgency, and 2005would prove to be a quiet year. July 2006 would bring another set ofexciting developments. Libya ratified the IAEA’s International Conventionon Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, a legally binding documentthat unsurprisingly governed the physical protection of nuclear materialsby member states. Later that month, more Russian-origin nuclearmaterial would be removed from Libya by the IAEA in conjunction withthe United States. As of 2008, Director-General ElBaradei has distributeda number of reports about the verification activities of the IAEA in Libya,detailing the history of the Libyan nuclear program and the results of IAEAinvestigation. With Libyan cooperation ensured, the present offers theIAEA an opportunity to continue to investigate unresolved questions aboutthe Libyan nuclear program. While the time of obfuscation by the Libyanshas certainly passed, the necessity for detailed examination of Libyanrecords and facilities still persists.Without solid answers to the remaining questions, it will be hard for theLibyans to move forward with the full confidence of the IAEA.Nevertheless, the IAEA continues to move forward with Libya, strikingmultiple partnerships on programs designed to integrate peaceful nucleartechnologies into everyday employ. The continuation and expansion ofsuch programs will define the future of Libya’s nuclear activities and thelegacy of its nuclear program for years to come.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 14Proposed solutionsWith the Libyan nuclear program now in full compliance with IAEAregulations, the way forward is quite clear. Libya needs to developproficiency in utilizing domestic nuclear capabilities, and the IAEA isthere to assist the country as it moves along that path. To that end, theIAEA can help Libya attain a number of goals as they develop theirpeaceful applications of nuclear technology.Primary ApplicationsThe most glaring failure of the Libyan nuclear program was that it neveractually harnessed the power of fissile molecules to do useful work. Acritical role for the IAEA is to ensure that the Libyan nuclear program willbe able to provide the Libyans with critical services, most importantlypower and water desalination. Nevertheless, every journey begins with asingle step, and many steps remain in Libya before those lofty ambitionscan be feasibly entertained.TrainingThe Libyans still require training in use of their nuclear reactors, whichhave yet to be employed in a consistent, reliable manner, even for basicscientific testing. With a wealth of nuclear experts at its disposal, theIAEA can address this need with relative ease. On the issue of waterdesalination, the Libyans are in similar straits, still very far away fromany sort of functional domestic applications of the available technology.With regards to that situation, the IAEA is already engaged in assisting theLibyans in developing the technology required to simulate nuclear waterdesalination.Infrastructure DevelopmentThe goal of nuclear power for Libya is contingent on a number of otherdevelopments occurring beforehand. The necessary infrastructure tosupport nuclear power and its distribution throughout the country has yetto be expanded. The IAEA can certainly serve an advisory role for theLibyan government as they work towards this goal, but the task remainsquite large, and it is up to the Libyans to ultimately decide how toproceed.Social ServicesAnother way that the IAEA could assist the Libyans is by working on anumber of smaller projects employing radiation technology. Modernindustry in countries throughout the world use radiation to serve a varietyof purposes. These can range from killing bacteria on food to medicalimaging. Like many other developing countries, Libya would benefit from
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 15the IAEA’s assistance in training and exposure to these sorts oftechnologies as they begin to incorporate them into regular employ. Suchsmall developments can greatly improve the standard of living in thecountry with less investment of time and resources than necessary forlarger projects related to nuclear power or water desalination.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 16Key Actors and PositionsRussian FederationThe Soviet Union was initially an active partner with the Libyangovernment, providing some of the foundational technologies for theirnuclear program. Since its dissolution, Russia has been actively engagedin reclaiming nuclear materials from former Soviet states as well as thosenations for whom the Russians provided assistance with the nuclearprogram. It has already extracted nuclear materials from Libya and wouldlikely continue to provide logistical support for further non- proliferationactivities.United States of AmericaThe United States has been an active force against proliferation ofnuclear technologies, especially in regimes that it perceives opposingAmerican policy or harboring extremists groups. The United States hadpressured Libya with sanctions for decades, and the war in Iraq may haveproven to be the final straw for the Libyans, who possibly feared incurringsimilar American attentions. Following the renouncement of the nuclearprogram, America has worked closely with the IAEA to remove nuclearmaterials from the country, and remain likely to demonstrate furtherleadership on similar initiatives.United KingdomThe United Kingdom’s attempts to negotiate with the Libyan governmentwas cited as one of the primary reasons Libya chose to renounce its secretnuclear program and give up any consideration of pursuing weapons ofmass destruction. The UK collaborated with the Americans and IAEA tohelp with initial removal of sensitive nuclear materials from Libya.PakistanThe Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan established a number ofcontacts throughout the world that provided the centrifuges, uranium,and other items required to develop nuclear programs. Implicated inhelping a number of nations, including Iran and North Korea, withcreating their nuclear programs, Khan was a major figure in latter stagesof the Libyan nuclear program. His contributions were critical in theLibyan acquisition of critical centrifuge technology for nuclearenrichment.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 17IAEA Interest BlocsFollowing the end of the secret Libyan nuclear program, most of thedecisions regarding Libya are expectedly nonpartisan, as there is noresistance from the Libyan government to the IAEA intervention. Mosthave no reason to oppose IAEA assistance of the Libyans. Nevertheless,considerations such as the global financial crisis and its economic falloutmight constrain the organization’s general willingness to devote too manyresources to new projects.
  • KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012 " Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya" 18Issues a resolution must address What importance will be given to further verification activities in Libya now that they are under full IAEA compliance? How much, in terms of physical resources, will be devoted to such efforts? How will the IAEA cooperate with the Libyan government to improve the reactor and water desalination technologies already present in the country? How much investment will this require on the part of the IAEA, and what contributions will Libyans be expected to make towards any such efforts? What sorts of infrastructure development projects can be undertaken to promote sustainable growth of the Libyan nuclear sector? What expertise can the IAEA bring to the fore in order to assist the Libyans in such efforts? Which small-scale applications of nuclear technology are the most promising prospects for employment in a nuclear Libya? How will the IAEA assist the Libyans in incorporating these techniques and procedures into the practical applications of daily life? What sort of training programs will the IAEA initiate to allow Libya to develop domestic competence in utilizing the new nuclear technologies afforded to them? How will these educational initiatives correspond with government and private sector training? How will the IAEA initiate projects in Libya while respecting the country’s sovereignty and encouraging domestic participation? Should the private sector be brought in to assist on these projects?