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Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons
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Social Institutions Dynamic in the Tragedy of the Commons

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  • 1. Social Institutions Dynamics inSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons the Tragedy of the Commons Student: Luis Oliva Felipe Advisor: Ulises Cortés loliva@lsi.upc.edu Thesis proposal, Barcelona, February 2013 https://kemlg.upc.edu
  • 2. OutlineSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Introduction  State of the art  Taxonomy of goods  Collective action  Social dilemmas  Tragedy of the commons  Appropriation and provision  Hypothesis and Proposed models  Summary, Tasks and Publications 2
  • 3. Introduction: What is the Tragedy?Social Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Hardin: Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase…without limit. …Ruin is the destination…  Open access resource consumed by rational agents  Individual gain and shared cost  Leads to overexploitation and, inexorably, to depletion  G. Hardin “The Tragedy of the Commons“ (1968) 3 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 4. Introduction: old problemSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons “…people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls Individualistic to them to give. For apart from Capitalism anything else, the thought that Property someone else is attending to it makes them neglect it the more.” Aristotle – Politics “A state arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is Groupal self-sufficing, but all of us have Communism many wants.” Sharing Plato – Republic 4 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 5. Introduction: interesting problemSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  It belongs to the group of social problems  No technical solution  Technical improvements postpone the problem  It can be applied to different domains:  Utilities: water, bandwidth  Food, energy  Pollution  Infrastructure: non-tolled highways/roads, bridges 5 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 6. OutlineSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Introduction  State of the art  Taxonomy of goods  Collective action  Social dilemmas  Tragedy of the commons  Appropriation and provision  Hypothesis and Proposed models  Summary, Tasks and Publications 6
  • 7. A taxonomy of goodsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons Exclusive Non-exclusive Private good Common good (Common-pool resources) Rivalrous Club good Public good Non-rivalrous  Rivalry: One‟s consumption diminishes other‟s consumption  Excludability: Ability to prevent others from consuming  P. Samuelson “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure“ (1954) 7 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 8. A taxonomy of goods: Provision of private goodSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons 8 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 9. A taxonomy of goods: Provision of public goodSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons 9 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 10. Collective actionSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Olson: Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common… interest  Good provision in terms of group size and perceptibility of actions  Small  Medium  Privileged  Intermediate  Latent  Large  To ensure provision:  Coercive mechanisms  Exogenous benefit  M. Olson “The Logic of Collective Action: public goods and the theory of groups“ (1971) 10 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 11. Social dilemmasSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Prisoner‟s dilemma:  Rational individual behaviour produces bad outcomes Can be perfectly modelled in Game Theory  Free riding dilemma Can be modelled in Game  Get the good Theory  But do not pay for it Other approaches give  Tragedy of the Commons better results 11 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 12. Tragedy of the CommonsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  A metaphor to explain the conflict between  A common good  A set of agents that seek to maximize their own benefit  Ends with the good exhausted because either • The agents expand their capacity to consume the good… • The agents‟ population grows… • …beyond the good renewal capacity • Usually it is not being managed  G. Hardin “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons“ (1994) 12 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 13. Tragedy of the CommonsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  A common good can be seen as a facility that:  Sustains a stock of resource units which produces a flow of resources units over time  Which divides the Tragedy into two problems  Appropriation: Allocating the flow of resource  Provision: Maintaining the stock of resource  E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, J. Walker “Rules, games and Common-Pool Resources“ (2006) 13 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 14. AppropriationSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  The problem lies on the flow  Excluding potential beneficiaries  Allocating the subtractable flow 14 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 15. ProvisionSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  The problem lies on the stock  Creating, maintaining a resource  Improving production capabilities  Avoiding the destruction of the resource 15 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 16. OutlineSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Introduction  State of the art  Taxonomy of goods  Collective action  Social dilemmas  Tragedy of the commons  Appropriation and provision  Hypothesis and Proposed models  Summary, Tasks and Publications 16
  • 17. HypothesisSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  We consider a world with two kinds of agents:  Individualistic, selfish agents  Communal, altruistic agents  Being selfish  Does not mean not having/caring about group interests  Individual interests are more valued  Being communal  Does not mean not having personal interests  Group interests are more valued 17 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 18. Proposed modelsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Plato (Republic, 462b-c) argued that collective ownership was necessary to promote common pursuit of the common interest, and to avoid the social divisiveness that would occur „when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings.‟  Aristotle responded by arguing that private ownership promotes virtues like prudence and responsibility: „[W]hen everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business‟ (Aristotle, Politics, 1263a). 18 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 19. Proposed modelsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons Aristotelian agents Platonic agents  Capitalistic/rational  Polis – focused on agents communal good  They only care on  Traders appropriating according  Warriors to their own benefit  Philosophers  Individualism  Protocommunism:  Communal ownership  Private property  Equality  Deemphasis on material wealth  Utopian society 19 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 20. HypothesisSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons 1. A set of agents with Platonic behavioural traits, can work together and exhibit a certain group behaviour that is optimal in terms of provision or conservation of resources 2. A set of agents with Aristotelian behavioural traits, can work together and exhibit a certain group behaviour that is optimal in terms of appropriation or exploitation of resources 20 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 21. Proposed modelsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  A model composed of  MAS approach: To run social simulations  Provenance-aware monitoring: To capture actions  Complex networks: To represent social interaction  To analyse similar scenarios  Behavioural patterns  Norm or structural changes to avoid the Tragedy  Network structures 21 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 22. Multi-agent systemSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Deontic norms to guide agents‟ behaviour  Allows studying norms dynamics  Close to human written norms (expressivity)  An agent acts according to • What happens in the system, • Social norms, • Its personality  J. Vázquez-Salceda “The Role of Norms and Electronic Institutions in Multi- Agent Systems: The HARMONIA Framework“ (2004) 22 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 23. Bounded rationalitySocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Game theory has significant drawbacks  It does not allow changing norms while “in game”  Resource managers are, somehow, out of the system  Bounded rationality  Humans have limited knowledge  Agents look for a suitable solution, not an optimal  Multi-goal  A. Newell “The Knowledge Level“ (1981) 23 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 24. Provenance-aware monitoringSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Stores events and agents‟ actions  Graph-based: nodes-events | edges-causal relations  Retrodiction analysis:  What has produced the current situation  Detection of what should be prevented/promoted  wrt. norms  J. Vázquez-Salceda, S. Álvarez-Napagao. "Using SOA Provenance to Implement Norm Enforcement in e-Institutions“ (2008) 24 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 25. Causal modelsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Actors communicate the action and what caused it  Causal models describe the preorder of actions  Used as a blueprint to detect causal patterns in the provenance  S. Miles, P. Groth, S. Munroe, S. Jiang, T. Assandri, L. Moreau. “Extracting causal graphs from an open provenance data model“ (2008) 25 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 26. Complex networks analysisSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Analysis of the agents‟ social structures  How social structures influence  Stability  Behaviour spreadness  Emphasis on mesolevel (communities)  D. Villatoro “Social norms for self-policing multi-agent systems and virtual societies“ (2011) 26 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 27. ExampleSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys)) 27 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 28. ExampleSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons I I If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys)) 28 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 29. ExampleSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons II If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → III O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys)) 29 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 30. ExampleSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons IV If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys)) 30 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 31. ExampleSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → V O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys)) 31 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 32. OutlineSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Introduction  State of the art  Taxonomy of goods  Collective action  Social dilemmas  Tragedy of the commons  Appropriation and provision  Hypothesis and Proposed model  Summary, Tasks and Publications 32
  • 33. Summary: Relevance to AISocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons  Use of provenance-aware and network analysis (as a supportive/auxiliary tool) to further agents‟ dynamic research  Two opposite philosophical approaches to manage a common good  Study emergent behaviour to self-organised institutional arrangements  Can be applied to different domains:  river basins  smart cities  virtual goods 33 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 34. Tasks/Gantt diagramSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons 34 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 35. PublicationsSocial Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons 1. L. Oliva, S. Álvarez-Napagao, J. Vázquez-Salceda. “Towards a framework for the analysis of regulative norm performance in complex networks” 2. I. Gómez-Sebastià, S. Álvarez-Napagao, J. Vázquez-Salceda, L. Oliva. “Towards runtime support for norm change from a monitoring perspective” • 1st International Conference on Agreement Technologies, 15th-16th October 2012, Dubrovnik, Croatia 3. S. Álvarez-Napagao, I. Gómez-Sebastià , S. Panagiotidi, A. Tejeda, L. Oliva, J. Vázquez-Salceda. “Socially-aware emergent narrative” • AEGS 2011: AAMAS-2011 Workshop on the uses of Agents for Education, Games and Simulations 2 May 2011, Taipai, Taiwan 4. L. Ceccaroni, L. Oliva. “Ontologies for the Design of Ecosystems” • Chapter book in Universal Ontology of Geographic Space: Semantic Enrichment for Spatial Data. Ed. Tomaž Podobnikar and Marjan Čeh. Hershey: IGI Global, 2012. 207-28. Print. 35 Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications
  • 36. Social Institutions Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons Luis Oliva Felipe (loliva@lsi.upc.edu) https://kemlg.upc.edu 36

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