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From despotism to neo militarism - transition without transformation in nigeria's new democratic dawn
 

From despotism to neo militarism - transition without transformation in nigeria's new democratic dawn

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    From despotism to neo militarism - transition without transformation in nigeria's new democratic dawn From despotism to neo militarism - transition without transformation in nigeria's new democratic dawn Document Transcript

    • From Despotism to Neo-Militarism: Transition without Transformation in Nigeria’s New Democratic DawnIntroductionBarring any unforeseen problem, Nigeria will emerge as a formal democracy by June1, 1999, six months to the end of the current century. Great expectations of a ‘new’dawn of democratic possibilities are being raised about the current transition; there isa relentless international media focus on Nigeria - given its recent sordid past underthe brutal regime of General Sani Abacha and the desperation to rid the internationalcommunity of another albatross nation. But is democracy really dawning in Nigeria?Or is the current transition just another false start? This article problematises thewhole transition programme and sees it as a legitimate target for contestation by thesocial forces who, after all, will bear the costs of a transition. In doing this, it focuseson the place of the military in the transition programme and argues that because of theits legacy, the little space avaialble as a result of the transition may end up being a re-packaged space for controlled clientelistic military politics with a civilian, formallydemocractic garb. The rise and rise of a pro-military, status-quo political party isalready bearing testimony to the primacy of this hegemonic bloc that will be incontrol of the state, in the name of democracy. Some scholars of democratic transition in countries emerging from prolongedauthoritarian past have stressed the virtues of sequencing and correctly argued thatany opening for democracy can, at best, be a means to an end, an instrumentalresponse to a multi-faceted crisis. Unfortunately, this position often leaves theimpression that the process is irreversible once it begins and elections treated asthough democracy had dawned. Yet evidence abounds in political science literature ofthe crucial need to think less teleologically about democratic transitions. Whiledemocratic transitions may lead to democratic development, pacted transitions havenot necessarily led to consolidated democracies nor stem the tide of democraticreversals. While it is arguable that there is some merit in occupying rather thanboycotting an emerging space, no matter how limited, one must caution againstmisconstruing a re-packaged space for controlled clientelistic politics as a new spacefor democratic settlement. Without seeking to dismiss optimistic views of Nigeria’son-going transition therefore, there is a need to interrogate such views critically if 1
    • only to aid a realistic assessment of where Nigeria is headed in the aftermath of theelections, what the role of the military will be and whether this dawn is indeed a newone, or a false dawn. Although entrenched military interest does not constitute the only or majorthreat to the transition programme (I think poverty and economic inequality does!), itgoes a long way in explaining why many see the current transition as a civilian claokfor continued military rule, and this has serious bearing on the future consolidatedstatus of the current transition and the extent to which the process can be seen ascredible and authentic. By trying to unpack the convoluted background to themilitary’s ‘foundational’ agenda, we would be able to determine whether this is aninstitutional or a cabalistic agenda of a powerful minority. This distinction becomesnecessary in any attempt to build a healthy, civil-military relations agenda to assistthe process of consolidating the transition. It may also help us guide against theoverwhelming tendency to treat the military institution as monolithic or define themilitary simply by the excesses of its aberrant officer corps. One, it is a misnomer toassume that the project the ruling military elite adopts is necessarily the military classproject, agreed in advance by the officer corps, not to mention the rank and file.Indeed, this may distort the social origins of such agenda since the way the militaryelite corps sometimes interposes itself in Nigerian politics is an extension of anoligarchic agenda not necessarily shared by all officers.Background to Military HegemonyAlthough the Nigerian military first became involved in politics in 1966, it wasgenerally believed it did so to establish national unity and eradicate corruption. Sixmonths after, it had become a beacon of national disintegration as it broke up intoethnic and regional factions. There is a sense in which most observers of the militaryin this phase of Nigeria’s treacherous political terrain believed that it was primarily afighting force, largely uninterested in the paraphernalia of office and accoutrements ofpower. This soon changed after the civil war and the sudden oil wealth brought aboutby the Arab oil shock of early 1970s. The origins of Nigeria’s ‘bureaucratic-economic militariat’ could indeed be traced back to the central role played by themilitary in the control and management of this new found oil wealth, especiallythrough its implementation of the Nigerian Enterprises Decrees of 1972 and 1977.Yet, the patterns of accumulation, which prevailed, did not become immediately 2
    • obvious because of the proxy nature of such control. Several of the retired militaryofficers swept out of power in the 1975 coup actually left with no remarkableaccummulated wealth, although corruption and cronyism had crept into thevocabulary in the latter years of the Gowon administration. They were also not quickto get involved in business in the manner their successors did after relinquishingpower in 1979. Many of the military officers who ruled the country between 1975 and 1979soon found themselves in business, politics and the diplomatic sector courtesy of thecompanies whose controlling interests were procured by the local business class withclose links to the military. If one traces the personal, political and financial links of aseries of individuals associated with the military, prior to their exit from governmentand, in the immediate aftermath to civilian politics in 1979, the emerging trend of aconvoluted network including the military, bureaucracy (the super-permsecs) andmultinational representatives becomes immediately apparent. At this stage though, itwould appear that the acquisition was largely in pursuit of a highly personal agenda,not a conscious institutional programme of wielding political influence. Barely two years after they left office, someone like the former Chief of ArmyStaff under General Obasanjo, Lt.General (Rtd) Theophilus Danjuma had establisheda shipping line and got enlisted on the Governing Boards of at least five multinationalcorporations as Chairman. The then Deputy Head of State, Late Major General ShehuYar’adua had also gone into the shipping business with a good civilian friend of theMilitary, Chief MKO Abiola, whose election victory was later to be annulled by themilitary. The former Head of State, General Obasanjo immediately went into largescale farming when he established Temperance Farms Limited (which later becameObasanjo Farms Ltd). By the mid-80s, Generals Danjuma and Yar’adua had betweenthem direct involvement in no fewer than twenty local or foreign owned businesses inthe country in banking, oil, shipping sectors. The proclivity of the ex-military generalsto weild financial control was however not limited to their top-most brass. As Table 1shows, others who retired before them and several who did so after them entered theboard game too. As one observer of the retired military phenomenon noted, “anincreasing number of retired senior military officers …combinechairmanships/directorships of their own private businesses, with part-timeappointments to key governmental posts and parastatals relating to agriculture, 3
    • commerce, and industry, in addition to interlocking directorships of many foreigncompanies incorporated in Nigeria.” (Adekanye; 1993:30). Yet in spite of the growing tendency towards personal accumulation amongofficers that had become noticeable in the post 1979 transition phase, and which wascertainly continued under the Buhari-Idiagbon junta, a distinguishing feature of thepre-Babangida military regimes was that they were less directly subservient to foreigncapital and more inclined to wielding indirect political influence, although quite anumber of them contested elections on the platform of all the 2nd republic politicalparties. Even though there were officers committed to the market orthodoxy ofcapitalist development among them, officers who advocated economic nationalismand greater state control over the economy, either in the form of mixed economy orstate capitalism won the internal struggles.Consolidating Military HegemonyAll this was to change with the arrival of General Babangida at the helm of affairs in1985 and this became immediately obvious even from the title he gave himself. Forthe first time, Nigerians became worried that their military ruler opted for an allencompassing title of “President”, hitherto thought to be restricted to democraticallyelected rulers, not the low profile “Head of State” that had become the norm. Indeed,the situation began to resemble more closely the institutional and personalist agendaof control pioneered in countries like Thailand and Chile. As the country becamesucked into the vortex of structural adjustment programme under General Babangida,the elevation of finance over industrial capital became the most significant feature ofthat era. Short term monetarist policies of exchange rate devaluation, removal ofsubsidies, slate of state enterprises, freeing of prices and generalised deflationarypolicies took precedence over structural reform of that damaged economy based on anagreed national consensus. The deregulation of the financial market ensured that thefinancial sector became the only growth sector with interests rates determined bysupply as agriculture and industry experienced severe distress. Little wonder then that the economic reform programme started by themilitary regime in 1986 (under General Babangida) finally collapsed under the weightof the 1993 annulled election and the massive capital flight that followed. By 1993,Nigeria, according to the World Bank was among the 20 poorest countries in the 4
    • world. The situation has since worsened under the present regime. GNP grew only 2.8percent in 1994, inflation ran at over 60 percent, exponential unemployment growthrate and the Nigerian naira virtually collapsed. As one study notes, of that period,"virtually all pretense of professional economic management … abandoned, and thegovernment cynically allowed the economy to become completely predatory innature." As a result, the country stopped servicing interest payments on much of its$28 billion foreign debt, and it is more than $7 billion in arrears on its debt to theParis Club of Western creditors. Its thinly spread saving grace in the internationalfinance market, has resulted from its continued servicing of Brady bonds andpromissory notes. Yet, in spite of this dismal record, a high number of retired militaryofficers or fronts of serving officers were heavily involved in the finance/bankingsectors. Not only do many of them lack any knowledge of the industry, theypossessed little aptitude to apply themselves to the huge responsibilities theirinvolvement demanded of them. Although it may be stretching credulity to assumethat all the officers involved were aware of there role in class terms of linking financecapital to state apparatus, they knew their financial success depended on officialactions linked to the promotion of structural adjustment programmes and were in nodoubt that this ensured the military hegemony already established in several spheres. Not even the mini-boom engendered by the Persian Gulf Oil crisis in 1990/91brought any respite to the generality of the population. Instead, the extra fund wasregarded as discretionary income which went on a massive spending binge thatdiverted revenues into corruption funded patronage, sharply expanded extra-budgetary expenditure and bloated an already inflation ridden economy. Indeed,according to Dr Pius Okigbo’s official inquiry into the finances of the Central Bank ofNigeria, "between September 1988 and 30 June 1994, US$12.2 billion of the$12.4billion (in the dedicated and special accounts) was liquidated in less than sixyears... spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor trulyregenerative investment; neither the President nor the Central Bank Governoraccounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary expenditures...that thesedisbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reelingwith a crushing external debt overhang." It soon became obvious that the restructuring of the economy along monetaristlines could be said to have represented an ambitious attempt by the ‘techno-military’authoritarian state under General Babangida to generate a new hegemonic bloc and 5
    • this was carried out on two levels. First, as a result of the government’s privatisationagenda, several of the state-owned industrial and commercial ventures were solddirectly to ex-military generals or to conglomerates linked to them. In addition thenew merchant banks that emerged to take advantage of the financial sector boomfeatured several retired military officers on their boards. In fact, it was commonknowledge in the late 1980s and eraly 1990s that no matter how solid one’s capitalbase was your likelihood of gaining a bank licence was dependent on having at leastone ex-military personnel listed on your board. Table 1 shows this phenomenon veryclearly. Second, General Babangida went beyond the personalist mode of influenceseeking by ensuring that the stratification of the military from the rest of society didnot just exist at the level of retired officers, but also at an institutional level. Hence,by adopting a practise common in Latin American military, he announced theformation of an Army Bank (which never took off!), an industrial armament city –(which also did not see the light of day) and the Nigerian Army Welfare InsuranceScheme (NAWIS). To ensure that every military officer bought into this agenda, thegovernment spent N550 million ($60 million in 1992) to purchase cars for all servingmilitary officers of and above the rank of captains. This was later extended to the non-commissioned officers in the form of motorcycles and the rank and file got bicycles. At this stage, a paradigmatic shift had already occurred in the mindset of themilitary cabal intent on remaining in power. Unlike before when it was an anathemafor serving officers to flaunt their involvement in the economic sector and to stake aclaim to permanent political control, many became closely identified with oil,financial, and shipping interests whilst also justifying why they ought to belegitimately seen as political players. They declared in several public fora that theywere best placed to take Nigeria into political and economic heights because of theirmilitary training and the advantage of liberal university education. Indeed, manybegan to threaten Nigerians that even if they were removed from direct political role,they would return by hook or crook. Indeed, the idea of a military party took root andsome of the officers and civilian intellectuals involved in that project on behalf ofGeneral Babangida were assigned the task of studying the Nasserist/Baathist modelsin Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as the Latin American foundational regime type.Although it was General Babangida who put in motion the idea of constructing anundisguised military party, it was General Abacha, his military successor who dustedup the blueprint and tried to implement it through the artificial creation of political 6
    • parties. Through these parties, General Abacha got himself “unanimously” electedand his anointment as the president was already seen as a foregone conclusion whenhe suddenly died. Under General Abacha, Nigeria became almost a carbon copy of Thailandunder Field Marshal Sarit, who at the time he came into power in the late 1950s, saton the Board of at least two Thai banks, and several of his subordinates weremembers of at least three more, not to mention others with their civilian fronts inplace. When he came into power in November, 1993, General Abacha hadconsiderable interests in the air, oil and construction industries and he neverrelinquished his interests in those companies. Several others like his CommunicationMinister, Major General Adisa owned Board of Afonja Community Bank. Indeed, itwas a badly kept secret that General Abacha ran the Nigerian economy during his fiveyear at the helm as a personal fiefdom. It was no surprise therefore when the scale ofhis theft became public after his demise. Although General Abacha failed to achievethe ultimate goal of creating a military party to direct the affairs of the nation, manyof the people who assisted in that project can now be found in Nigeria’s two alliancesof convenience – the PDP – Peoples Democratic Party and the All PeoplesParty/Alliance for Democracy axis and it is for this reason that many now interpret thecurrent transition programme as a civilian cloak for continued military rule. Theghost of President Shagari’s maxim in the 1980s that the military has become apolitical party is now haunting the current process. Indeed, the central question on thelips of every politician and civil society activist is: Is the military accepting the loss ofexplicit political control in exchange for impunity for human rights abuses of the lastfifteen years and a guarantee of secrecy regarding their personal and institutionalfinances and backroom influence.What is to be done? Given the grip of the military as described in the preceding paragraphs, thereare two ways of approaching the problems of military control and domination of thebody politic. The first is more cautious and incremental and there are merits in thearguments of its proponents who have posed the question thus: “how, given theexisting forms of domination, of military occupation and social stratification, can themilitary be ignored, if conflict is to be averted and democracy consolidated in afractious setting such as Nigeria’s?” The second approach is to tackle the issue more 7
    • comprehensively: what transformations and institutional mechanisms in classstructure, power sharing and ethnic relations will be required to assure conditions oflasting peace in Nigeria? An innovative use of both approaches would certainly workbetter than an isolated use of either. Of equal importance is what becomes of thestate-building project itself in an atmosphere where the growing orthodoxy is thatwhat is the retrenchment of the state and its replacement with the market. Clearly,this orthodoxy is gaining influence in the current transition with the pressure toprivatise remaining state institutions in a setting where the only people who have theresources are those lose to the military, and perhaps backed by foreign resources.While it is arguable that retired military officers have the right as citizens tocontribute their experience and expertise to the vital sectors of the economy given thefact of their premature retirement from the services, it is difficult to ignore the linkbetween those clamouring for state privatisation with the current financialinvolvement of the military with the explicit agenda to collapse the military andcapitalist classes in society under military hegemony. The seeming hijack andsubsequent control of the leading political party in the current transition programme –Peoples Democratic Party, certainly raises the spectre of unrestrained domination inthis direction. There is now no doubt that the military will exercise considerable “behind thescene” influence even if the military were to withdraw into their barracks come June1999, given the consolidation of military hegemony by this extensive interests in thearguably ‘legitimate world of finance, oil and industry’. But this threat comes morefrom retired military officers and the challenge for the new government will come inthe form of its capacity to minimise their links with serving officers who mayeventually form the fulcrum of future attempts to subvert the democratic opening.With their penetration of every sector of the domestic economy in a variety of ways,the new military class in politics will not hesitate to confront any threat, real orpercieved by using those they have mentored in the military and their chance ofundermining the new and consolidating democracy remain very real. This has beenthe experience of some democracies – Turkey, Chile, Argentina, Pakistan, Philippinesand Indonesia readily come to mind as places where old type military regimes havesucceeded in building ‘foundational’ governments.11 See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press, 1996) 8
    • In the context of creating a stable civil-military relations, the overriding factthat the military in Nigeria has now become entrenched in all aspects of civic andeconomic life makes their eventual removal an area that will demand considerableskills in reassuring them and assuaging their fears about a post-military dispensation,finding an appropriate role and mission for those left behind in the institution whowill want to maintain their professional autonomy, developing a civilian, democraticdefence policy expertise and creating the necessary opportunities for networking anddialogue between military representatives and civil society workers. To achieve theabove, we consider below how other consolidating democracies have handled civil-military relations after prolonged military rule primarily to refocus the militarymission and subordinate a powerful military institution under civilian control.Options and Issues for the new government To address the threat concretely, the new government will have to seriouslyaddress the question of the military mission in a democratic and accountable manner.A ‘mission-less’ military poses a serious threat in relation to the military’s primaryrole of defence of the nation’s territorial integrity. By overextending itsresponsibilities beyond defence duties or redefining its defence duties to include otherelements like nation-building and internal security, the efficiency of the fighting forcehas been severely undermined under military rule. There is no doubt that theprofessionalism of Nigerian soldiers has had its setbacks due to their involvement inpolitics. This political usurpation of military talents has been shown to be bad inareas where the military is now needed to function like a fighting force such as theirmulti-purpose, peace operations. Although the Nigerian military has a somewhat finereputation in its commitment to and participation in international peacekeeping duties,Nigerian soldiers have also been found wanting on such missions largely because ofthe disorientation that automatically flows from bad military leadership and itsdepressing lack of professionalism. The first thing to say is that no two countries have handled civil-militaryrelations in a post-military state in the same manner. The unifying theme in all of theresponses is the determination to assert civiliian supremacy and oversight and thesubordination of the military to objective civilian control. The outcomes to this 9
    • singular objective have however varied. From countries like Haiti, Panama and CostaRica where standing armies were completely eliminated in search of a stable andsustainable democracy to those countries with a mixture of measures leading tosurreptitious military influence, like in Indonesia, Phillipines, Thailand, Pakistan,South Korea and Bangladesh. In another category, we have in Latin America, and insome respects in the Russian republic consolidating democracies where the military isstill actively involved in politics to another where armed forces have moved from acompletely political orientation into a stable, conventional roles. The military inPoland and to a large extent among the liberation armies turned conventionalmilitaries in Southern Africa would qualify for such categorisation. In all of thesecases, there are still problems with creating a solid civil-military relations where rolesare clearly defined and missions fully worked out, but the fact that the mission hasbeen refocussed, especially in countries like South Africa and Poland gives real causeto hope that military obstacles to sustainable civil-military relations are notinsurmountable. The consolidating democracy in South Korea seemed to havesucceeded where others have failed by security reconciliation via punishment of pasthuman rights abuse when two former heads of state were sent to life jail for their rolein the massacre of student demonstrators in the early 1980s. Yet, the experience of countries where the military has become so entrenchedalso gives much cause for worry about how successful the agenda for a sustainablerelations with the military can be in Nigeria, especially when one confronts theinevitable issue of amnesty or punishment for human rights and political abusecommitted by successive military authorities. To take the example of Argentina andChile, which appears to be the most favoured model for the Nigerian ruling elite ifone goes by their attempt to replicate the Chilean model in terms of the economy andpolitics, one can only be cautiously optimistic. After seven years of democraticrestoration, General Pinochet made every effort to punish human rights abuses of hisseventeen years rule as Chilean Head of State. Through his preserved core of hardright supporters, some of who describe him as the greatest ‘visionary’ Chile has everknown, the elected Chilean government was not able to exorcise the terrible ghosts ofthose repressive years. In the end, it took an international action to bring GeneralPinochet to account, an action that is described as a threat to democracy in somecircles, and an opportunity to consolidate Chilean democracy on the other hand. 10
    • The Chilean scenario definitely leaves a sour taste in the mouth of many about thefuture of any consolidating democracy in Nigeria, especially given the almostpervasive evidence that every effort is being made to militarise society in order formilitary Generals to transform themselves into ‘elected’ civilian rulers. Although the place of the military was handled differently in the consolidatingdemocracies discussed above, what was common to all the cases is the fact that theytended towards finding a professional role for the military and defining a clear roleand mission for the military. In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic patternof civil-military relations, the civilian leadership in a post military state must definethe role the Nigerian military must play in a clear and precise manner. As much aspossible, this must be restricted to its traditional external combat role as a means ofstrengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any internal securityoperations like Operation Sweep etc then a proper criteria would need to be developedfor evaluating the involvement of armed forces in non-combat operations. Withoutbeing prescriptive about this, any attempt to redefine the role and mission for theNigerian military, given the declining external security threats faced by the countrymust consider security in a holistic manner, and pay particular attention to theprotection of offshore interests and promotion of a professional peace-keepingcommand given Nigeria’s good record in international peacekeeping operations. A regional security mission within a global context will earn the country a lotof support and goodwill if handled professionally. This will certainly call for areview of threat perception perspectives and a redefinition of the defence policyprocess. If the feeling is however overwhelming that the predominant threat to thestate is mainly internal, not inter-state nor regional insecurity, then the civilianauthority must weigh carefully the involvement of the military in such venturesagainst the proper funding of law enforcement agencies or the creation of an internalsecurity mechanism that takes attention away from the Nigerian armed forces. Theidea of using the army to quell dissension in the Niger-Delta or anywhere for thatmatter must be scrupulously avoided by a civilian government, especially when allconflict management options have not been explored. The second issue for consideration is therefore the separation of operationaland policy control over broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation,equipment, weapon acquisition and pay/conditions in the services on the one hand,and administrative control over the services on the other. The professional military 11
    • loves a civilian head who understands their predicament and they value unrestrictedaccess to the President as well as autonomy over their internal organisation andoperations. The point has been made earlier about how the lack of any expertise onthe part of elected civilian authorities has not allowed room for effective oversight ofthe various arms of the armed forces. Any redirection of the defence policy processwill inevitably require a different kind of expertise, which must be a mixture ofcivilians and military professionals. To sustain this, there is a need for a significantthawing process through changes in relationships between the military and civilianpolitical elite, and a significant increase in contacts between Nigerian opinionmoulders and the outside world. The process of agreeing an appropriate role for themilitary can only be successfully achieved in a climate of sustained dialogue. At themoment, the level of contact is non-existent, or just on a social and unstructuredmanner. Yet, in introducing civilian expertise however, care must be taken not tosubstitute military incompetence in a political setting as damaged as Nigeria’s withcivilian inexperience. A possibility is to create a Strategic Cell that may serve as abuffer between a civilian presidency and the military professionals. The immediatechallenge is for the civilian, democratic leadership to make the right choice of militarychiefs to lead the military restructuring/re-professionalisation project. The question of recruiting into the armed forces is also an issue that has to beresolved as part of the overall resolution to the nationality question. There is a strongperception, rightly or wrongly, that the there is a dominant recruitment of‘Northerners’ into the Nigerian military. Only recently, the Christian Association ofNigeria (CAN), raised this as a fundamental problem. While this is a politicalproblem that cannot be resolved on a rational basis, central to the issue of militaryrecruitment pattern in terms of military professionalism are three central questions:Should our armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an equals opportunitiesinstitution? Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from themost able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the manner ofrecruitment matter – if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing outthe best in every recruit?2 Although the above are the rational questions to whichanswers must be found, they do not necessarily constitute the most important issuewhen the whole issue of structure and process are the ones generating much attention.2 See Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment: What is to be done?”, Tempo Magazine,28 August 1997, pp.4-5 for an extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ recruitment. 12
    • These are political issues that can only be resolved through a process of confidencebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms. It is why the central issue to be resolved is the need to negotiate a process ofreconciliation (Argentina/Chile) or restitution (South Korea) between the military andthe civil society that takes into account what is in the long term best interests ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms in consolidating democracy. In Nigeriawhere the military has had a long and chequered history of political intervention andbuilt up immense economic clout, assuaging the fears of the military in aconsolidating democracy by a declaration of amnesty for past misdeeds poses aserious challenge to the strengthening of a stable civil-military relations. Already,several people in Nigeria are yearning for the day when the military would be broughtto account for past actions and any attempt to stop that process happening will beopposed by those important opinion leaders. Yet, the question must be asked, asothers must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and Philippines: Whilerestitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, in terms of a sustainable, civil-military relations, is it the nest way to promote a stable, civil-military relations or isthere a way to achieve a balance between restitution and reconciliation. This is one ofthe areas where the right balance must be reached between the search for immediatejustice and the need for long term stability. Clearly, any new government that refusesto acknowledge the scale of abuse and injustice in Nigeria over the last decade wouldbe confronted with the pressure from the civil society. Equally, any attempt to rushinto issues bordering on the role of the military in the last decade would raise seriousconcerns in military circles. Another core issue that has to be addressed by any consolidating democracy,especially following Nigeria’s recent experience is the necessity for civilian politicalleaders to eschew the temptation of using the military to settle scores amongstthemselves, if sustainable civil-military relations is to have any future. Part of thedamage that was done to the leaders of the June 12 election was the impressioncreated by some of them that they were trying to use the military to restore themandate. Even if one doubts the veracity of such claims, the current regime has wonsome sympathy with the claims that they were invited to take over by the presumedwinner of the June 12. The deft assemblage of several supporters of the June 12election into the regime’s maiden cabinet further reinforced such claims. Althoughwe may not know the precise details of what really transpired between Chief Abiola’s 13
    • camp and General Abacha and his men, suffice it to say that there was someunderstanding between them which the military decided to take advantage of.Besides, it is common knowledge that civilian political leaders have in the past eitherparticipated actively or encouraged the military to stage coups against theiropponents. This not only undermines the fragile political system, but also destroysmilitary professionalism. In essence, the clarity and quality of the post-militaryleadership will necessarily determine how these complex issues are resolved in asustained framework.ConclusionIt seems obvious from the available evidence that while demilitarisation of politicsmay widen the space within which democratic reform takes place, it will notautomatically translate into a complete overhaul of politics from its military roots,especially in a body politic that has become so atomised and, in which the symbols,values, and ethos of the military are replicated by large sections of the civil-society. Even so, it would be wrong to reinforce the impression that everything isgiven and pre-determined and that there is nothing that we can do about demilitarisingthe state and ridding it of its military excesses. If we try to understand the civil-military relations dilemma in terms of the complexity of the state-civil-societyrelations in Nigeria whilst explaining how the nature of state power relates to the keyforces of production in the economy and society within a political synthesis, then wewill be in a position to address the crisis of governance that is likely to confront thenew and fragile democracy about to be installed in Nigeria.TABLE 1. Lt General TY Danjuma Elf-AquitaneUniversal Trust BankFirst Universal Lt-General M.I.WushishiContinental Reinsurance Churchgate GroupGuinness Nigeria Ltd Chartered Bank 14
    • Continental ReinsuranceInter-Continental AssuranceUrban Shelter Bldg.SocietyUnion Trust Bldg.SocietyPrime Merchant BankCentrePoint Merchant Bank Lt-General Gibson JaloSociete Bancaire NigeriaWorldGate Building SocietySilvertrust Insurance BrokersImperial Finance and SecuritiesFirst Interstate Merchant Bank (Ex-Director)Alpha Merchant Bank (Ex-Director) Colonel Sani BelloBroad BankContinental Merchant BankGlobe ReinsuranceLaw, Union & Rock InsuranceInland BankNicon InsuranceDominion Trust General Yakubu GowonNational Oil Corporation Capt.Isaiah GowonGreenfield MortgageUBA 15
    • Major General Abdullahi ShellengSolid Mortgage LtdFortune MortgageMulti-Trust BancsharesMBCOM Securities Major General EjigaManufacturers Merchant Bank (Chair) Major General Ahmadu RimiRoyal Merchant BankAlhaji Mohammed GamboHighland BankMajor General D.M.JemibewonIvory Merchant BankAsset & Liability Ins.CorpMr Etim InyangCrown Merchant BankAVM U MuazuBroad BankMajor General Goerge InnihBroad BankBridgestone Finance Corp.Air Commodore Dan SuleimanNorth-South BankMaj.General Musa Yar’aduaHabib BankAfrica Ocean LinesLt Colonel Hussein AbdullahiHillCrest Merchant Bank 16
    • Commodore Salaudeen AkanoLiberty AssuranceFirst Union MortgageBrig.BAM AdekunleManhattan & Extraco Finance Co.Colonel AdejoroTeta InvestmentsBrig.Alabi IsamaGolden InsuranceLt.General Domkat BaliOriental Merchant BankPerpetual AssuranceAir Vice Marshal Ibrahim AlfaHighland BankMaj.Gen.Seidu BalogunOmicron Fin.& SecuritiesMaj.A.B.Ayi BasseyMercantile BankBrig.David BamgboyeHarmony MortgageIncaTrust Bldg.SocietyAir Cdre.Bernard BanfaLiberty AssuranceAVM A.O.BelloGlobe ReinsuranceColonel Odunsi DaviesCashpoint Savings & Loans 17
    • Comm.MA DaviesApple Finance & SecuritiesAir Cdre Kola FalopeClassic Home S & L LtdBrig. Harrison EghaghaDayne Finance & InvestmentsMaj.Gen David EjoorPublic Finance GroupAlpha InsuranceLt.Col.A.O.EzeTarget International FinanceVice Admiral VA KajaTrendex Mortgage BankColonel MB KalielNigerian Reinsurance Co.Rear Admiral Ndubuisi KanuDependable Finance(Late) Gen. Hassan KatsinaPrime Merchant BankBrig.George KuruboAfrica PrudentialBrig Abba KyariCreative FinanceStandard InsuranceMaj.Gen Zamani LekwotPrudent Merchant BankMaj Gen.Ekundayo OpaleyeDevcom Merchant Bank 18
    • Maj-Gen Mamman KotangoraCardinal Mortgage BankMaj-Gen Bagudu MammanGlobal Devt.Mortgage Inc.Maj-Gen.M.MagoroInter-Continental AssuranceAVM Mouktar MohammedGroup Merchant BankMetropolitan Gen.FinanceMaj-Gen.Abdullahi MohammedTrade BankMaj.Gen CB NdiomuBridgeStone FinanceLt.Col David NehikhareGreat Merchant BankLt Col Paul OgbeborGreat Merchant BankBrig.O.OdunaiyaDevserv Finance HouseCol.OdusanwoCrossland Savings & Loans LtdLt.Col.Bola OgunsanwoStartrite S & L LtdPolCom MA OluokunPeak Merchant BankAVM Anthony OkpereCorporate Alliance & Gen.Insurance 19
    • Fenceworks NomineesMaj-Gen Olufemi OlutoyeZincPace Fin & SecuritiesAir Cdre.Emeka OmeruahNigeria Merchant BankMaj-Gen SK OmojokunRaona Securities & FinanceLt-Col OmowaSpace VenturesAVM AGM OshoBenchmarks InvestmentNorman InvestmentDuncan Mortgage LtdCol.MO.OshisanyaAcclaim Home S & LLt.Col.Tunde OyedeleNationwide Merchant BankNationwide SecuritiesAVM Ishaya ShekariGuardian Trust S & LMaj-Gen DKS ShosilvaAfrican Alliance InsuranceCommodore OO.SosanLegends SecuritiesMaj-Gen.Paul TarfaUniversal Trust BankFirst Universal Insurance Brokers 20
    • Comm.Ebitu UkiweSociete Bancaire NigeriaAVM Yisa DokoIntercity Bank plcLt.-Col.P.Z.WyomRims Merchant BankMaj-Gen AK AdisaAfonja Community BankMaj-Gen Adeyinka AdebayoAmicable Merchant BankBrig-Gen David MarkHuge interests in TelecommunicationsPW Construction CompanyGen I.B.BabangidaHeritage HoldingsMaj-Gen Mobolaji JohnsonJulius Berger Construction CompanyEx-Military men contesting for political officePresidencyGeneral Olusegun ObasanjoSenateMajor Gen- Mamman Magoro – Kebbi StateMaj-Gen Joseph Garba – Plateau StateMaj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu – Abia StateBrig-Gen John Shagaya – Plateau StateAir Commodore Jonah Jang - KadunaBrig-Gen David Mark – Benue StateBrig-Gen Tunde Ogbeha – Kogi StateAlhaji Nuhu Aliyu – Kaduna State(Deputy Inspector-General of Police 21
    • Alhaji M.B.Wali – Kano State(Deputy Inspector-General of Police)Maj-Gen David Jemibewon - KogiGubernatorial ContestantsRear Admiral M. Lawal – Kwara StateColonel MB Kaliel – Kebbi StateColonel Baba Nyam – Kaduna State 22