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Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in Nepad’s Peer Review Mechanism
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Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in Nepad’s Peer Review Mechanism

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  • 1. Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism1 By J. ‘Kayode Fayemi2Why Democratic Governance mattersThe task of creating and maintaining a viable and legitimate State that is accessible,efficient, accountable, transparent and equitable has been one of the most critical andcomplicated challenges of the transformation process that African countries arecurrently undergoing. Governance has been the major vehicle for attaining thislegitimacy and viability. Fundamental to the notion of governance is the ability of thestate to provide efficient and well functioning institutions and infrastructures ofgovernment – legally backed and socially coherent – that together establish andmaintain an enabling environment in which human security and human developmenttakes place.Since 1990 democratic developments in African countries have shown encouragingtrends in the economic and political spheres and the notion of good governance hasgained greater prominence and wider acceptability. Many countries are undertakingreforms, liberalising their economies and improving management. As economicgrowth has improved good governance, peace and credible policies are seen as theprime movers of this turn-around reinforcing the perception that democraticgovernance and peace are preconditions for development in Africa. In spite of thenoticeable progress, governance as a theoretical construct has also gone throughconceptual contestations between those who apply it narrowly to refer to the need toshrink the State‟s „interventionist‟ capacity and proponents of the inclusive andaccountable State who push the idea of a people driven governance. Despite thedebate that raged on the nature of the state, there has been a great deal of unanimityon the need to arrest the „desertion‟ by citizens that characterised the „old‟ cold warState, in Africa in the quest for a transparent, trusted and accountable State.In that old State – the constitution became the defining instrument for organizingunaccountable governments and it was largely viewed as a set of rules andadministrative arrangements, meant not to regulate or limit excessive state power, but1 Paper prepared for presentation at the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.2 Visiting Scholar, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,Chicago & Director, Centre for Democracy & Development, Lagos, Nigeria(kfayemi@cddnig.org). Not for quotation. 1
  • 2. rather to validate the newly independent states. Post-colonial governments used theletter of the law as the instrument for control and repression, and the military regimesthat overthrew them perfected the art of manipulating the law to justify their hold onpower. Helped by the dominant super-power politics of the cold war era thatfacilitated monopolies on power by coercive rulers, the manipulation, trivialization,and disregard of the constitution became the defining characteristic of governance inmuch of post-colonial Africa.3 Constitutions that sanctioned one-party states andracial segregation have been not only seen as legal, but also legitimate documentsregulating the conduct of state affairs, often to the detriment of the population.4Yet a constitution by its very nature should be more than a mere set of rules and lawsregulating society and government. It is more than a social contract or even thegrundnorm. It is rather an expression of the general will of a nation. It is a reflectionof its history, fears, concerns, aspirations, vision, and indeed, the soul of that nation.A constitution is obliged to express the mind of the majority; but, in doing so it alsohas to take into account the fears and concerns of the minorities. The constitution isthat single document under which diverse and even ideologically opposed groupsunite and rally in defence of democracy. However, for this to happen, the citizenrymust claim ownership of the document. It must be respected and revered by all.Indeed, the hostility to the old State in the intervening cold war years has encouragedthe notion of a new constitutionalism that is people driven and process led – aimed atreconstituting the African State along equitable, transparent, socially responsible andjust lines in the post cold war era. At every level on the continent, the idea has takenroot that the African State must be refashioned to reflect the realities of theirmultifaceted societies. This has been reflected in the constitutional conferences inBenin, Mali, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon in theearly 1990s, in the successful constitutional arrangement of South Africa, and in theprocess-based Constitutional commissions in Uganda, Ghana and Eritrea.From the experience of these countries, the last decade in Africa has witnessed anupsurge in the demand for constitution-based governance that broadly reflects, interms of process and outcome, the will of the people. Today, the struggle forconstitutional reform is ongoing in several African countries and it typfies to thegenerality of the people why rule-based and consensus driven governance matters.The change in focus from constitutionality - where these documents are merely legalinstruments with no standing with the people to constitutionalism - whereconstitutions are now seen as a tool for bridge-building among members of civil3 Julius Ihonvbere, Towards the New Constitutionalism in Africa (CDD, 2000).4 Thus, some of the technical and administrative concessions known as “sun-set clauses” granted in the post-independence constitutions of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa remain key sources of neuralgia in the campaign for constitutional change in these countries. 2
  • 3. society, represents the first and perhaps most critical step in shifting state ownershipfrom the leaders to the people. Yet, focus remains mainly on government, giving lessimportance to consensus building amongst civil society and between the ordinarycitizen and the state.Yet in order to formulate African political cultures grounded in human rights anddemocratic governance, an organic link is needed between the constitution as a rule oflaw instrument primarily concerned with restraining government excesses, and theconstitution as a legitimation of power structures and relations based on a broad socialconsensus in diverse societies. Many have seen the task at hand is to move away fromthe old constitutionality which overemphasised law and state power towards a newpolitical and socio-economic constitutionalism aimed at restoring trust in the Statewhilst arresting desertion from it.Governance in the Public SphereAlthough the idea of governance has always featured in the management of publicsector, it was rarely defined as a partnership between the rulers and the ruled aimed atthe efficiency of State structures. While the clamour for this type of partnership hasfeatured in the struggles for the transformation of authoritarian structures and one-party states, the idea of a people driven governance was largely ignored by thecommand economies and „free markets‟ that dominated the world in the cold war era.The idea that the people ought to have a say in deciding governance strategies wasseen as an anathema and generally discouraged. In the search for strong states, strongrulers were seen as the sine-qua-non. The more unaccountable these rulers were, themore legitimate they became in the hands of the metropolitan powers and theirsupporters. Even when the command, interventionist economies of the 1970s andearly 80s gave way to structural adjustment programmes in the mid-1980s,governance defined as partnership aimed at achieving ownership, social equity,equality and development was still missing from the equation.Indeed, the end of the cold war brought economic globalisation – the homogenisationof the world economy, which tended to separate the State from the market in thebelief that strong states cannot produce, strong markets. Given the above, it was notsurprising that even most of the elected governments in Africa collapsed in the wakeof the structural adjustment programmes and the succeeding authoritarian regimessharpened the state instruments of coercion in coping with the resistance thatdeveloped against the pernicious economic reform programmes of the period.It was only later that the notion of governance became acceptable to the promoters ofstructural adjustment programmes and policies. This coincided incidentally with thecollapse of the Berlin wall and the various „people power‟ revolutions in EasternEurope and the Soviet Union. Indeed, before the World Bank‟s 1989 report “Sub- 3
  • 4. Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth”, the term governance was ararely used terminology. Even when it was introduced into the IFIs literature, itsoperational use was limited. In its use of the term, the World Bank identified threedistinct aspects of governance: 1. the form of the political regime; 2. the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country‟s economic and social resources for development; and, 3. the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.(World Bank, 1994b)Although they recognise the holistic nature of governance, the World Bank and othermulti-lateral agencies have concentrated mainly on the third aspect in theirgovernance related work – the capacity of governments to design, formulate andimplement policies and discharge functions. Public sector reform and managementhas therefore been the most visible area of activity in this regard. This ranged fromcapacity building and institutional strengthening in civil service reform; governmentbudget, public investment programme, modernisation of public sector accounting andauditing; government financial management information systems, developmentassistance and aid coordination, economic management agencies and all othersections of government that are pivotal to a well functioning public sector.Governance in the public sector has also been concerned with the levels and quality ofrelationship between different layers of government – central government and itssubordinate tiers as well as the public and private sectors.The basic thrust of this reform process has been state retrenchment in all itsramifications and this has been manifested in the shift from a highly interventionistparadigm in many African states to one in which the role of government is primarilythat of an enabler for the private sector, a regulatory framework and a provider ofpublic infrastructure for the efficient running of the market. Tied to the structuraladjustment reforms whose objective was to establish market friendly set of incentivesthat can encourage accumulation of capital and more efficient allocation of resources,this shift often necessitated conflict between capital and labour and it resulted in hugelabour cuts arising out of privatisation of inefficient state institutions with serioussocial consequences – leading often to a disconnection between the shrinking Stateand the deprived Society.The challenge with institutional reform in many of the sectors highlighted above hasbeen one of building convergence between the demands of the new global democraticgovernance environment and the legitimacy for enforcement provided by the localcontext in the norm building process. Reconciling the State and Civil Society in thepublic sector reform process has remained a challenge that must be overcome.Examined in conjunction with the NEPAD‟s APRM, the African Union‟s Declaration 4
  • 5. on Democracy and Good Political Governance hold out the promise for establishingand consolidating a norm building process subscribed to by all members because ofits political relevance and independent verifiability. The challenge is to meet bothobjectives.By focussing on both objective and subjective criteria: rule of law, politicalrepresentation, Institutional effectiveness and accountability as well as gender equity,anti-discrimination rights and peace and security, the APRM approach seeks totranscend that erstwhile divide in building convergence between the demands of thenew democratic governance environment and the legitimacy for enforcementprovided by the local context. By focusing specifically on the sub-set of governanceissues, which impact on opportunities for development, the role of the state is seen ascrucial in providing the necessary institutional, accountable and enabling environmentfor the development and participation of all sectors, which in turn will promote goodgovernance and poverty alleviation in Africa. In recognising the key role of the statein good governance and poverty alleviation, the APRM and the Declaration onDemocracy & Political Governance underscores the importance of a capable andeffective state, in which the public service, the legislature, the judiciary and statutorybodies are empowered to provide an enabling environment for the private sector andcivil society to play their respective roles in a mutually reinforcing manner.Yet government structures and practices have traditionally been weakest and leastdefined in many African countries. Whilst positive changes could be observed, thesechanges are occurring in varied political contexts, with their own local dynamics andchallenges, incorporating different prospects for the development of a participatorypolitical system, facilitative government for the private sector; effective managementof poverty reduction; effective and equitable provision of basic services; personalsecurity and access to justice; national security and conflict prevention and a honestand accountable government.NEPAD’s Democracy & Political Governance Initiative – A Critique5The NEPAD Strategy document recognises that there can be no development in theabsence of „true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance‟and its proponents undertake to „respect the global standards of democracy, the corecomponents of which include political pluralism,‟ include a respect for freedom ofassociation, including existence of workers‟ unions, and fair, open and democraticelections.5 This section derives mainly from a critique of NEPAD’s Strategy Document produced by theOpen Siciety Institute’s Africa Civil Society Network meeting chaired by the author inJohannesburg, South Africa. 5
  • 6. The purpose of this initiative is to „contribute to strengthening the political andadministrative framework of participating countries, in line with the principles ofdemocracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights andpromotion of the rule of law. In order to achieve the above, the strategy documentsets out a number of formal commitments and undertakings, including: a) the creationand consolidation of governance processes and practices; b) taking the lead insupporting good governance initiatives; c) institutionalising core values that willenable the NEPAD leadership to honour commitments made and meet basic standardsof good governance and democratic behaviour.The policy document highlights a number of areas that will be the focus of targetedinstitutional capacity building initiatives. These will include primary focus on i)strengthening administrative and civil services; ii) strengthening parliamentaryoversight; iii) promoting participatory decision-making; iv) adopting effectivemeasures to combat corruption and embezzlement and v) undertaking effectivejudicial reforms.(Sections 81-83)It is these principles and practical commitments, proposed and adopted by Africangovernments, which will guide the identification of appropriate diagnostic andassessment tools (conditionalities), in support of compliance with the shared goals ofgood governance as well as identify institutional weaknesses and resources foraddressing these weaknesses. (Section 84).Based on the identified need to monitor compliance to good governance by Africanstates, the primary relationship of accountability to be monitored are the internalrelationship between African governments and their own citizens (as opposed to theexternal relationship of accountability between these governments and internationaldonors important as this is). To ensure that this happens, we propose theestablishment of constitutionally empowered, independent national monitoringmechanisms, which will be staffed by credible and competent African sectorspecialists working with the APRM secretariat and the African Union‟sCommissioner in charge of Political Affairs.Each independent national monitoring mechanism would conduct systematic anddetailed monitoring of appropriate governance, institutional performance andeffective financial management within the signatory state. This information would inturn be available for the utilisation of parliamentary oversight committees, civilsociety as well as donors, international finance institutions and the continental body inreaching their own judgements about compliance with the good governance principlesof NEPAD.In order to avoid the politicisation of the data generated by the independentmonitoring mechanisms, the data produced by the monitoring bodies will be subject 6
  • 7. to independent verification exercises for sufficient rigour and reliability. Forlegitimacy, this verification exercise would have to include a focus on the basicconstitutional, legislative and policy frameworks of signatory states in order toestablish whether these are adequate to support the implementation of democraticgovernance structures. Specifically, this verification exercise would seek to measurethe degree of parliamentary and civil society oversight of the work of the monitoringmechanisms and the signatory states.Secondly, it would require a detailed review of public sector performance within thesestates. What human and financial resources do they have available through theirnational budgets? How is the budget structured and how is resources transferred tosub-national levels? How effectively do the executive members responsible formanaging available resources plan to utilise them? How efficiently do they end upimplementing these plans in practice? Finally, what level of service delivery output orinvestment in infrastructure is produced?Answers to the questions posed above will require detailed access to governmentbudgets, tax revenues, expenditure and economic management performance. Thiswill necessarily reflect back to the constitutional and legal provisions guaranteeingtransparency in the country and ensuring accountability and answerability of electedofficials. If these legislative guarantees do not exist, then monitoring will be difficultto achieve and any judgement as to the performance of African leaders and/or theaccountability of African governments will amount to little more than merespeculation.The effective and efficient management of public resources will however also requirethe establishment of conditions under which instances of corruption and public sectormal-administration can be reported openly in the public media. Only on this basis ofaccountability and answerability could reports of corruption be systematically storedand monitored by the established national mechanisms. The ability to hold publicofficials accountable for their management of public resources will also requireconstitutional provisions and legislation governing assets declaration and financialinterests. This will help limit the potential for conflicts of interest and ensure thatexisting resources are utilised for public rather than private interests.Finally, it is important to stress that there is a limit to which poverty can be effectivelymanaged. Hence, focusing on good governance through the promotion of stateretrenchment and market reform are far from enough. „Enhanced partnership‟ mustalso mean the provision of adequate resources that are commensurate with the scale ofthe problem and fairer trade rules that promote genuine global partnership. NEPADrepresents a unique opportunity to become a vehicle for an international campaign inthis regard, the challenge remains how best to include the widest range ofstakeholders in a broadened set of partnerships. 7
  • 8. Indicators and Benchmarks of Democracy & Political GovernanceSince divergent trajectories of transition have produced a wide assortment of post-transition configurations on the continent – some complementary and progressive,others contradictory and worrisome, this necessarily inhibits generalisation about thestate of democracy and political governance. There are several advantages in favourof developing a comprehensive and workable methodology for assessing the qualityof governance in each African country. A basic condition of such a methodologyshould be that it be usable by in-country stakeholders as an instrument for their ownself-assessment of the quality of democratic governance, according to their ownpriorities and perception of appropriate standards, rather than being merely externallydriven.Such a methodology can serve a number of different purposes: contribute to publicdebate and knowledge about governance issues; identify development benchmarks fordemocratic governance and chart progress towards their realisation; help set standardsfor government performance and monitor levels of attainment, to mention just a few.Yet if the conceptualisation and operationalisation of indicators of democracy andpolitical governance is to have any real meaning, both the methodology and choice ofinstruments, must be placed in the context of Africa‟s reality.This is important because only through this level of involvement will it be possible toensure that stakeholders are committed to the principles of good, democraticgovernance, and ownership of the process will be in-country based. A basicadvantage of this commitment to stakeholder involvement is that this could alsodevelop into an instrument for self assessment of the quality of democraticgovernance, according to their own priorities and perception of appropriate standards,rather than for this to be externally driven.Given the above, the design and implementation of the benchmarks should emphasisethe following: participation, ownership, accessibility, openness and accountability,solidarity and legitimacy.While the idea of a permanent membership of the APRM is desirable, central to theassessment of the national governance situation should be a determined effort to tapinto the existing wealth of information and knowledge in country. The challenge willbe in scrutinising the materials for accuracy and relevance in the quest toinstitutionalise democratic and good political governance, support the state sector toexpand participation of non-state institutions and embrace accountability to thecitizenry. A lot of this will depend on ensuring that the consultation process andinvestigatory techniques are designed to achieve real ownership of the process by thestakeholders themselves. Good involvement techniques are based on an awareness ofdivergent interests and opinions in-group discussions and the skills of the facilitator in 8
  • 9. ensuring that all views are reflected in the discussions. Process issues are therefore asimportant, if not more critical to the outcome of every national governanceassessment and this should be taken seriously.Since the focus of the national governance assessment in the areas of democracy andpolitical governance will be the assessment of the health of the state undergoingdemocratic transitions, identifying key role players that must be involved is crucial.A partial list ought to include the following given the parameters laid out in theDeclaration:  Elected Legislators and party representatives  Representatives from the government and public sector responsible for public sector management, rule of law and access to justice issues as well as institutional effectiveness and accountability.  Private sector organisations involved in development.  Senior members of the judiciary responsible for legal frameworks in the area of trade and investment.  NGOs and community groups  Traders, artisans, farmers and studentsThe Declaration has already identified some benchmarks aimed at capturingindicators of good governance in the attempt to present a macro picture of the state ofgovernance in African states. These are: rule of law and access to justice, politicalrepresentation, institutional effectiveness and economic management broadlyconstrued. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of indicators of goodgovernance, as well as the methodology and choice of instruments, have all beenplaced in the context of Africa‟s reality. The diversity built into these instruments isvery relevant in the context of Nigeria, given the level to which planning has beenbased on facts collected from the elite sectors of society. The methodology andchoice of instruments will clearly enable researchers to interact with their sources, thedata on the ground in a manner that can help seek a balance between received wisdomand context-determined realities.To avoid judgements that are products of pre-conceived notions, rather thancommunal and constituency reflections, it is important that the assessments are basedon independently verifiable information. This becomes critical in interpretingmaterials that deal with identity, nationality, gender and ethnicity, those crosscuttingissues that are crucial to measuring the state of governance in a given setting. It isimportant also that APRM questions are posed in a comparative mode, to ensure thatanswers are not fixed, but more importantly to ensure that assessors recognise thatgood governance itself is work in progress, a product of constant negotiation andstruggle. This will also bring out the diversity of views effectively and certainly helpsharpen the articulation of the challenges and prospects of accountable gopvernance 9
  • 10. in a given setting. The critical core assumptions around which these indicators shouldbe built therefore include, but are not limited to: A political system, which provides opportunities for all its citizens including the poor, and disadvantaged by creating conditions that encourage broad input in governance and development decision-making from all elements of civil society, including setting public expenditure levels and priorities. A political system that provides for effective transfer and periodic renewal of the leadership through representative and competitive multi-party and/or multi- candidate system – inclusive of women and disadvantaged groups; impartial and credible electoral administration; effective electoral oversight of the electoral process; and an informed and active citizenry. Strengthened public sector legislative and administrative institutions, including efficient parliamentary oversight and adequacy of the audit machinery – providing and verifying that government decisions are in line with its legal commitments; Transparency, predictability and accountability in political, oversight and regulatory decisions by government and public bodies. Effective public sector management with stable macroeconomic policy, effective resource mobilisation – adequacy and efficiency of the tax system and revenue collection mechanisms and efficient use of public resources; Democratised security environment that helps to prevent conflict and build peace; Adherence to the rule of law in a manner that protects personal and civil liberties as well as gender equity whilst ensuring public safety and security with equal access to justice for all; and provides effective and fair legal sector institutions.In working towards the realisation of the core areas of emphasis identified above,APRM should pay particular attention to the following in executing the project, with aview to drawing together different issues, examine their dynamic linkages andproduce an integrated assessment: Assessing governance issues in the three arms of government – the Executive, Legislative and the judiciary branches. Identification of key areas of activity on governance issues particularly in relation to rights based development, norm building and accountability. Ensuring that the project design is consistent with the research instruments identified in the Declaration on Democracy & Political Governance and also taking into account the governance and poverty reduction objectives of the International Development & Millennium Targets. 10
  • 11.  Ensuring that the project design and implementation is linked to good governance issues at all administrative levels at both national, state (province) and local levels.6MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTATIONThis presentation does not pay particular attention to the mode of implementing thebenchmarks captured in the above analysis and in the matrix below, but ultimately –we all know that APRM will stand or fall on the independence of the deliverymechanism and its‟ ability to impact on the subscribing states. This is a delicatebalance to achieve.On the one hand, the demand for independence might necessitate removing the peerreview mechanism outside the framework of the African Union completely and thiswill strongly recommend institutions like the United Nations Economic Commissionfor Africa, the United Nations Development Programme and/or the AfricanDevelopment Bank as key monitoring institutions. The above will suffice were it justa purely technical and administrative process, devoid of politics.In my view, the moral suasion that might be derived from the technical rigour of anindependent Peer Review Mechanism still needs responsible politics to succeed.There is a sense in which the premier body – African Union – still has a critical role toplay in the success of the APRM. The idea of an un-elected body of independentpanel of reviewers, important and critical as this is to the authenticity of the processraises fundamental questions of accountability and answerability. The age-oldquestion: Who guards the Guardians of ECA, ADB, and UNDP are bound to come tothe fore and persist. This leaves us with the prospects of a monitoring mechanism thatis still under the aegis of the African Union, even if all of the bodies mentioned aboveplay critical roles in it.Were these to happen, the question of capacity at the level of the AU secretariatcertainly poses its own problems. As things stand, only the CSSDCA process has amonitoring mechanism with the potential for delivering anything remotely credible,given the amount of work that has gone into the development of the four calabashesand their indicators and benchmarks and the fact that it has been endorsed fully by theHeads of Government in past deliberations. Yet, since NEPAD has in principle beenrelocated to the Union‟s secretariat, there is the opportunity for a creative merger ofthe monitoring process between NEPAD‟s APRM and the CSSDCA‟s monitoringmechanism. To achieve this, the question of capacity has to be confronted now if theAPRM product is to meet the hype currently surrounding it.6 The format developed by the Peer Review Mechanism Office has taken this largely intoaccount. (See www.nepad.org) 11
  • 12. It is my fervent hope that this meeting can resolve the mechanics of operationalisingthe peer review and achieve at the same time the twin principles of independence andaccountability. 12
  • 13. Proposed Indicators and Benchmarks for the APRM Democratic Governance ClusterItem Goals Indicative Targets Indicators or Benchmarks Source or Reference 1 Rule of Law & Constitutionalism  Presence of a democratically agreed  Imposed or „People „owned‟  The Constitution Constitution. constitution  Laws of the Federation  Bill of Rights guaranteeing equality  Right to justiciable freedom of  Court Judgements of citizens before the law and the expression, information, liberty of the individuals; individual political association and  African Charter of Human and and collective freedoms and equality fundamental freedoms, Peoples‟ Rights, UDHR, of opportunity for all economic, social and political Convention on economic, rights social and cultural rights.  Independent Institutions of State  Ombudsperson, Human Rights  Decisions of the National  Improvement of law enforcement Comm., Gender Equality Human Rights Commission mechanisms and criminal justice Commission; Anti-Corruption  Police Act, Prison Act and system Comm. National Law Reform  Independence of the Judicial branch  National judicial reform, Commission‟s work  Presence of Court of superior Police reform, Prison jurisdiction to arbitrate in improvement constitutional matters  Ensure transparency in process of selection of judicial officers; improve incentives and remuneration.  Independent Constitutional or Supreme Court 13
  • 14. 2 Political Representation  Mode of appointment to legislative  Is appointment determined by Nature of Electoral Commission and governmental positions; elections and do the elections give room for alternation of  The composition of the political political power system  Does it consist of a multiparty  The competitiveness of the political democracy comprising of two system or more parties.  Nature of appointment to the  Extent of effective executive branch. competitiveness in the political  Independent candidature process;  The composition of the national  Role of Legitimacy, parliament along party lines competence, national character  The composition of local and regional councils  The autonomy and independence of the electoral system  Independence & Impartiality of the electoral authority.3 Personal security and access to  Strengthening Police Accountability  Community Policing Principles - National Policy on Safety & justice and Responsiveness; Security  Demilitarising public order and  Developing Community Awareness defining security in broader - African Charter provisions terms  Improve access to and reduce cost of - International Instruments „justice‟  Legal Aid and scope of legal 14
  • 15.  Improving Police-Community clinics for pro-bono cases Relations  Establishment of Independent  Improving the prosecution service Police Services Commission and decentralise workload with adequate powers  Investigate non-traditional forms of  Examine scope for mediation justice reform and arbitration in the community4 National security and conflict  Clearly defined and well articulated  Defence and Security Sector  Defence Act or National prevention vision and mission of security sector Review & White Papers Security Strategy organisations7  Accountability both to elected  Committees on Defence,  Accountability of Security sector civil authorities and to civil Security, Police Affairs organizations, particularly in the society  Incorporation of security forces  Constitutionally defined role internationally accepted  Security sector organizations operate of the security structures standards in domestic security in accordance with the international laws  Availability of alternative law and domestic constitutional law; sources of verifiable  Coverage of security sector  Information about security sector knowledge information on the issues in the media and degree planning and budgeting are widely security sector of openness of military available, both within government facilities to civilians  Extent of dialogue and and to the public, and a interaction between the  Availability of human rights comprehensive and disciplined security sector and civil education in the military approach to the management of society training curricula defence resources is adopted; 15
  • 16.  Civil-military relations are based on a  Clearly defined constitutional  Capacity of Parliamentary well-articulated hierarchy of authority powers for the Parliament and committees to provide between civil authorities and the Executive Branch – powers of independent verification and defence forces, and on a relationship the purse, powers of understanding of security with civil society that is based on the deployment and powers of issues. respect for human rights; scrutiny  ECOWAS Mechanism for Civil authorities have the capacity to  Extent of the professional Conflict Prevention, exercise political control over the autonomy granted to security Peacekeeping, Security; operations and expenditure of the forces NEPAD‟s APRM, AU‟s Peace security forces and civil society has and Security Council  Regional Norms and values the capacity to monitor the security forces and provide constructive input to the political debate; An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues; Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent with the requirements of democratic societies; Fostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high priority for policy-makers 16
  • 17. 5 Open and Accountable  The nature and composition of the  Independence of Civil Service Government civil service  Accountability of Civil  Transparency and accountability Service to elected authorities in government  Quality Control mechanisms  Decentralisation of decision for civil service at all levels making structures and the nature  Civil Service Commission‟s of inter-governmental relations effectiveness  Media awareness  Presence and Effectiveness of independent monitoring agencies6 Effective and equitable provision  Meeting the 2015 International Extent of fulfilment of goals in UNDP Human Development of basic services Development and Millennium Targets girl child education, in health, Report; National Development provision of shelter, poverty Plans, Country strategy papers on  Country‟s social and economic rights reduction poverty reduction/eradication regime programmes7 Facilitative government for the  Management of national budgetary  Extent of inputs into the economic management and process budgetary process by all private sector development stakeholders, including civil  Effective Policies for pro-poor society growth and management of poverty reduction/eradication strategy  Extent of Involvement of Organised private sector in  The nature and development of the policy formulation private sector  Effectiveness of Policy 17
  • 18.  The informal economic sector making mechanisms  Trade/investment policies  Private/public partnership arrangements.8 Enhanced Global Partnership for  Improving the Conditions of  Level of mutual accountability Democratic Governance Partnership  Extent of context determined inputs.  Level of corporate responsibility among trans- national entities 18