Collapsed statehood and regional security dynamics: The Somalia- East African Community ComplexDocument Transcript
Stadtschlaining, AustriaCOLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND REGIONAL SECURITYDYNAMICS: THE SOMALIA –EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITYCOMPLEXThesis submitted byKAWEGAH JNR. P. PAULIn partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA in Peace and Conflict Studies2012ADVISOR DR. TILMAN EVERSSECOND READER DR. LASZLO FARKAS
Page | iiABSTRACTThis thesis gives a comprehensive account of the Somali state collapse and how thesubsequent anarchy led to the emergence of extremist groups, particularly Al-Shabaab. Thestudy then focuses on pertinent aspects of the Al-Shabaab, including: Ideologicalconnotation, organizational structure, recruitment, financing, tactics and the strategies to ‘winminds and hearts’ of the Somali people. Most importantly, the study establishes possibleloopholes that Al-Shabaab has exploited to broaden its sphere of influence into the EastAfrican Community (EAC).The study then reveals that Al-Shabaab’s extremism in Somalia and later infiltration intothe EAC has negatively impacted on the region’s fragile foreign direct investment, tourismsector and led to an influx of refugees, particularly in Kenya. Accordingly, the study focuseson the Al-Shabaab related military interventions.On the military front, the study assesses Kenya’s led ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ and theAfrican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), seeking to establish whether the operationwas based on unsubstantiated claims, or otherwise. Further, this research captures thepublic’s reaction towards this operation and the eventual integration of the Kenyan DefenseForces (KDF) into AMISOM.The research finally proposes various avenues for countering Al-Shabaab in the contextof emerging regionalism, but remains pragmatic that not all the possible solutions can belocalised within Somalia without tackling the groups external support structures.
Page | iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSCHAPTER ONE1.0 Introduction and background to the Study………………………………………………...11.1 Statement of Problem and Scope of study…………………………………………...……31.2 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………….…41.3 Significance of the Study……………………………………………………………...…111.4 Research Methodology …………………………………………………………………..111.5 Constraints………………………………………………………………………………..121.6 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………….…….13CHAPTER TWO2.0 SOMALIA- COLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND OUTCOMES2.1 THE PATH TO STATE COLLAPSE………………………………….………….….....142.1.1 Background…………………………………………………………………………….142.1.2 The Siad Barre Regime, Cold War factor, and Civil War break out…………….…...172.2 AL-SHABAAB: THE OUTCOME OF A STATE COLLAPSE2.2.1 Chronology of the Al-Shabaab evolution………………………………………………212.2.2 Understanding the Al-Shabaab…………………………………………………………252.3 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..42
Page | ivCHAPTER THREE3.0 AL-SHABAAB RELATED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS3.1 OPERATION LINDA NCHI (OLN)……………………………………………….……443.2 AMISOM……………………………………………………………………………...…583.3 ETHIOPIAN PERCIFICATION OF SOMALIA………………………….……….……653.4 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..……66CHAPTER FOUR4.0 FINDINGS: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION4.1 Overview…………………………………………………………………………………684.2 Data Analysis………………………………………………………………………….…684.3 Nexus of the Somalia Collapsed Statehood, Emergence of theAl-Shabaab, and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC……..………………….….…714.4 Avenues for spill over of extremism and terrorist activities inKenya and the EAC……………………………………………………….……….…..…804.5. Impacts of the Al-Shabaab Instigated insecurity within the EAC……………….…...…954.6. Perceptions of the EAC citizens regarding the OperationLinda Nchi (OLN) and the Integration of the KDF into AMISOM……….….…….…..964.7 Reasons for or against the integration of KDF into AMISOM………………………….994.8. Mitigation: Addressing the Al-Shabaab threat in thecontext of the emerging regionalism ………………………………………….…..…...1014.9 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………….…...…...110
Page | vCHAPTER FIVE5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AREA FORRESEARCH5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………………….1125.2 FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH…………………………………………………....1195.3 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………119SOURCES…………………………………………………………………………………..121APENDIXAPENDIX A: ACRONYMS……………………………………………………..…..........132APENDIX B: CODE BOOK……………………………………………………………...133APENDIX C: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS…………………………………………....139APENDIX D: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS…………………………………………....141APENDIX E: MAP OF SOMALIA…………………………………………….………...143APENDIX F: MAP OF THE EAST AFRICAN STATES………………………………..144APENDIX G: MAP OF LAPSSET PROJECT……………………………………………145
Page | 1CHAPTER ONE1.0 Introduction and background to the StudyWhereas the conflict in Somalia has become the centre of global debate on piracy,Muslim extremism and terrorism over the years, a lot of existing literature has equallyfocused on the instability, especially due to Al-Shabaab, but relative to the Horn of Africa.Not much has been written on the ramifications of this instability with regards to the EAC,even though the Al-Shabaab threat has become far too fraught for the EAC citizens tocontemplate.The EAC with a population of 133.1 million1comprises of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda,Rwanda and Kenya. Nevertheless, Kenya is the only EAC state sharing a border withSomalia (the border stretches 682 km from Mandera at the North to Ras Kamboni in theIndian Ocean).2This expansive border and its corresponding porosity is at the core of theinfiltration of terrorist activities into Kenya and conceivably, one of the most predictableavenues that has predisposed the entire EAC to Al-Shabaab related terror attacks.Even though Kenya, given its proximity to Somalia and the fact that it hosts a portion of amarginalised Somali group would easily face a backlash of extremism and terrorist acts fromSomalia, the prognosis could not be as clear for the rest of the EAC states. However, the July1“East African Community Facts and Figures – 2011”, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, October, 2011, p12,http://www.statistics.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=133&tmpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=153 (accessed on January 3, 2012)2CIA, “Somalia”, CIA World Fact Book, APRIL 12, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (accessed on January 3, 2012)
Page | 211, 2010 Al-Shabaab masterminded grenade attacks in Kampala, Uganda that claimed at least74 lives3shifted the focus from the initial perception that the risk was predominantly Kenyas.Following the terrorist attacks in Uganda, it is pragmatic postulation that Burundi, anotherAMISOM troop contributor would gravely endure a similar fate. Arguably, this prediction isnot farfetched following Al-Shabaabs recent warning to the Burundian government toconsider withdrawing its troops, or face retribution attacks.4With three of the EAC stateshaving been attacked, or on the verge of it, the Al-Shabaab threat had ceased to be a Horn ofAfrica issue, but rather a concern for the EAC with Kenya as the buffer between Somalia andthe rest of the EAC.In light of terrorist activities that Kenya has experienced over the past one year, the focushas shifted to the current state of affairs which prompted Kenya’s first military mission in aforeign land since independence (1963). The incursion, code named ‘Operation Linda Nchi’(OLN) or Operation Protect the Nation/Country, has equally put Kenya on a collision pathwith Al-Shabaab. Notably, KDF has eventually joined their counterparts from Uganda andBurundi in AMISOM, making it three out of five EAC states on a mission to militarily ‘wipeout’ Al-Shabaab from Somalia.Kenya is also a residence to almost half a million Somali refugees in addition to thepopulation of its native Somali speaking citizens. Whereas Rwanda and Burundi do not haveany statistically significant numbers of Somali nationals, Uganda and Tanzania have equallyaccommodated proportionate numbers of Somali refugees with others settling in therespective countries as citizens.3Xan Rice “Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74”, The Guardian, July 12, 2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks (accessed on January 17, 2012)4ABDULKADIR KHALIF, “Al-Shabaab warns Burundi of revenge attack”, Africa Review, March 2, 2011,http://www.africareview.com/News/Al+Shabaab+warns+Burundi+of+revenge+attack/-/979180/1117930/-/iuw2v2z/-/index.html (accessed on January 17, 2012)
Page | 3In this thesis therefore, the author would argue that there exists a nexus between thecollapsed statehood of Somalia, and the emergence of Al-Shabaab related extremism orterrorist activities. Further, terror insecurity in Kenya is as a consequence of the spill over ofviolent extremism from Somalia and that the remaining EAC States are equally predisposedgiven the myriad of factors that have so far encouraged spill overs as would be discussed.1.1 Statement of Problem and Scope of studyThis study seeks to explore the dynamics or fluidity of the EAC regional security relativeto the Somalia collapsed statehood and the complexity of neighbourliness relationshipsfollowing the current military interventions in the country. The scope of this study isto identify Al-Shabaab and their terrorist-related activities as a universal security gap amongthe EAC states vis-à-vis other transnational crimes arising from the collapsed statehood ofSomalia. Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the following questions:i. What is the nexus between the Somalia collapsed statehood, emergence of Al-Shabaab, and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC?ii. What factors have made it feasible for Al-Shabaab related terrorist activities tospill over to Kenya and possibly the rest of the EAC?iii. What are the impacts of Al –Shabaab related terrorist activities on the socio-economic fronts of Kenya and the rest of the EAC States?iv. What is the perception of the EAC citizens regarding the Operation Linda Nchi(OLN) and the integration of the KDF into AMISOM?v. How can the Al-Shabaab threat be addressed in the context of the emergingregionalism?
Page | 41.2 Literature ReviewThe discourse of failed and collapsed statehood cannot be independently assessed withoutincorporating the element of a violent conflict.5Notably, the violent nature of civil warspresents opportune avenues for state failure and eventual collapse. Bates posits that statefailure encompasses an existing deterioration of the ability of the central authority to providepublic goods for its citizens,6and as Dearth suggests, a state is said to have failed if it doesnot fulfil the most basic obligations of statehood.7This is in tandem with Carment’sobservation that, the leadership of a failed state “cannot provide sufficiently for the people toattract minimal sufficient domestic support.”8The level of hopelessness in terms of thefunctions of the government degenerates further as the state flips from the position of‘failure’ to ‘total collapse’, a concept which has characterised Somalia since 1991.Flotz attributes high risks of personal insecurity, lawlessness, and armed conflicts to statefailure, and hence the eventual collapse. He denotes that under these circumstances, citizensdevelop a tendency to support virtually any group that can retain order. 9Accordingly, theinability of a state to assert its inherent monopoly of legitimate force “opens the door forextremists to build their bases of political power.”10This argument puts an insight into theemergence and the initial positive reception that ICU (Islamic Courts Union) of Somaliareceived, even as its militant arm (Al-Shabaab) carried out terrorist related activities againstthe population. The power void created by the Somali state failure and collapse hasconsequently been filled by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group which has been thriving5Brennan M. Kraxberger, “Failed States: Temporary Obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or Fundamental Holes in the WorldPolitical Map?”, Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007) pp. 1055-716Robert Bates, “The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late-Century’, Conflict Management and Peace Science25(2008) pp. 297-3147Carment David, “Assessing state failure:Implications for theory and policy”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3(2003)pp. 407-4278Ibid9Zachary Devlin-Flotz, “Africa’s Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism”, Africa Security Brief, No6, August (2010) p. 110Ibid
Page | 5on the platform of ‘standing in for the government,’ which essentially means rendering‘services’ to the people.Civil war is a key component of state failure and eventual collapse as it emerges side byside of the state disintegration.11This thesis would depart from the assumption that theSomalia civil war was a recipe for the emergence of Al-Shabaab extremist group.Transnational terrorism has historically been carried out by non-state actors who carry outterror related activities in a bid to compel the state to conform to their demands.12Groupswhich exhibit terror tendencies like the Boko Haram of Borno state of Nigeria have employedthe tact in their quest for Islamic rule across the country,13similarly, the Somalia Al-Shabaabequally prescribe to the same ideology. Whereas the threat posed by Boko Haram is stillconfined to its national spheres and more particularly, the state of Borno, the converse is truefor the Al-Shabaab which has so far enhanced its ambitions and extended its sphere ofinfluence beyond the borders of Somalia into the EAC.The strategy adopted by the Al-Shabaab extremist group in achieving its objectives puts it at par with the existing terroristgroups. However, as Schmid puts it, arriving at an adequate definition of the phenomenonhas become problematic.14For the purposes of this thesis, the author adopts Hoffman’sdefinition of terrorism, which identifies it as an act specifically designed to have far reachingpsychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s). He further posits that terrorism ismeant to instil fear within, and hence intimidates a “wider target” which in this case is theaudience.1511Schneckene U., “How Transnational Terrorists Profit from Fragile States”, SWP Research Paper, German Institute forInternational and Security Affairs, Germany 2004 p 5.12William H. McRaven, “SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice”, New York: TheRandom House Publishing Group, 1996,p 335.13Zachary Devlin-Flotz, “Africa’s Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism”, Africa Security Brief, No6, August (2010) p. 414Alex Schmid, “Terrorism-The Definitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36 (2-3)(2004), pp. 375-41915Bruce Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism”, 2nded, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, pp40-41
Page | 6According to Pape, weak groups engage in terrorism because it is cost-effective in termsof fewer actors, finances and other resources. 16Heinzen sums it up by postulating that thechoice of terrorism as an instrument for achieving political objectives is necessitated by thedepletion of any other political coercion avenues.17Al-Shabaab’s resort to the use of terroristactivities as a means of widening its influence would be fundamental in this analysis.Particularly, it portrays the groups as a ‘weak’ entity that cannot engage in a conventionalwarfare with its adversaries in an attempt to seek military redress to its grievances, assumingthat peaceful mechanisms have been extensively exhausted.The advent of the Al-Shabaab in the Somalia conflict and its religious connotationshighlights the sacralisation dimension of the conflict. According to Lorenzo Vildino:18Sacralisation of a conflict is a process through which religion, or; in most cases, amilitant interpretation of it evolves from being an irrelevant or secondary factor at theonset of a conflict to shaping the views, actions, and aims of one or more of theconflict’s key actors.The infusion of militant religious undertones into a conflict is fundamental to the processof radicalisation, a concept which this author will explore in detail. The fundamentalcomponent of radicalisation is the existence of an ideology. An individual bearing thisconviction therefore justly perceive violence as an avenue for achieving the objectives of thevery conviction. As Picarelli aptly puts it, “radicalisation occurs when recruits align theirexisting worldview with the ideology of a group and commit themselves to using violence toachieve the group’s goals.” According to Evans and Neumann, the success of this process16Robert A. Pape, “ Dying To Win: The Strategic of Suicide Terrorism”, New York, Random House, 200517Karl Heinzen, “Murder” in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Terrorism Reader: A HistoricalAnthology, (London: Wildwood House, 1979) pp. 53-64 (p.55)18Lorenzo Vidino , Raffaello Pantuccib, Evan Kohlmann, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab,Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict”, African Security, Volume 3, Issue 4, 2010 pp. 216-238
Page | 7can be based on four core pillars, otherwise known as ingredients for the radicalisationprocess and includes; grievance, ideology, mobilisation, and tipping points. 19Witktorowicsadds that grievance creates a sense of alienation or disenfranchisement that in turn gives riseto a cognitive opening20, or the realisation to seek other options for redress. One of thoseoptions could be extremism.Modern technology, especially the internet has remained a vital propaganda tool forextremists and terrorist groups. The groups use it as an avenue for radicalisation, fund raising,and recruitment. Cronin argues that the rapid information transmission to a significantlylarger audience and that which has characteristically rendered terrorism “repugnantlyvoyeuristic” has been attributed to the existing technological advancements. 21Coll andGlasser concurs that, the internet has “emerged as the critical new dimension of twenty-firstcentury global terrorism with websites and electronic bulletin boards spreading ideologicalmessages perpetuating terrorist networks providing links between operatives in cyber spaceand sharing violent images to demonstrate ruthlessness and incite followers to action” 22In this thesis, the author seeks to underscore the significance of technology in sustenanceof the life line of Al-Shabaab on the fronts of radicalisation, recruitment of far flung potentialmembers, raising funds, reaching out to allies, and perpetuating propaganda campaigns.The most intrepid and tactful operation among terrorists, however, is to carry out anattack in an unfamiliar territory. According to Cronin, terrorist groups are successful incarrying out operations in foreign land with “passive support” or “active support” from the19Ryan Evans and Peter Neumann, “ Islamist Militant Radicalisation in Europe: ACritical Assessment of the Literature”, London: International Centre for the Study ofRadicalisation, April 2009),p 2420Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West”(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 85–13521Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Terrorists Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns”, Princeton ,NJ,: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 422Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations,” Washington Post, August 7, 2005
Page | 8indigenous population. Whereas passive support includes mild activities such as beinguncooperative with the security institutions, active support is, on the other hand, very vividand includes activities such as: raising revenues, creating a safe haven, and even hiding thegroup from the authorities. 23This aspect would further be explored by the author in theassessment of the role of the Somali community in Somalia, Kenya, and the rest of the EACin understanding the links between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda.Peter Chalk and Glen Robinson posit that transnational terrorist attacks are expedited bythe existence of “franchise cells” of one or two people in the targeted country. 24The May2003 Casablanca, Morocco bombing that claimed 45 lives is a typical example.25Robinsonfurther highlight that such bombings are carried out by local terrorist operatives in thediaspora communities. 26On another front, Chalk argues that terrorists are always keen on taking advantage ofunmanned borders. Many “borders in the East African corridor are porous and subject to littleif any control.” 27In supporting the argument, he cites the 2004 Al-Qaeda’s successfulpenetration into the Jebel Kurush mountain range northeast of Sudan that runs parallel to theRed Sea and managing to set up training camps due to lack of border control.28Key to thediscussion in this thesis is the poorly governed 424-mile Kenya-Somalia border that stretchesfrom Mandera in the far north to Ras Kamboni which is right into the Indian Ocean.2923Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 27.24Glenn E. Robinson, Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities, and Vulnerabilities, in InformationStrategy and Warfare: A guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas Borer (New York:Routledge, 2007), 96–98.25Ibid26Ibid27Peter Chalk, Case Study: The East Africa Corridor, in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and ReducingTerrorism Risks (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 157,28Jamestown Foundation Briefs, “Al-Shabaab Expands Operational Zone with Kampala Bombing-But to WhatEnd?” Terrorism Monitor VIII, no. 28 (July 16, 2010): 2,29Ibid
Page | 9Menkhaus argues that contrary to the conventional wisdom that collapsed states are safehavens for international terrorists, the converse is true.30He instead postulates that it is thequasi states that yield a working environment for terrorists due to the thriving corruption.31Such countries include: Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Indonesia, Philippines and Guinea, amongothers.32The author would use this theory to advance his arguments for the undetectableexistence and flourishing of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab cells in Kenya and possibly otherEAC states.According to A. Philips, foreign fighters in a terrorist group are essential for a strikebeyond its regular boundaries,33and the principal role played by foreign Jihadists in theProvince of Anbar, Iraq in the year 2006 gives credence to this argument. Foreign fighters notonly conducted martyrdom operations against the US and allied forces, but also worked asvolunteers and guaranteed maximum control over the population.34Foreign Jihadistsremained critical for the agenda of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as they became the contact nodesfor the newly arrived terrorist groups from Jordan and Syria.35Philips denotes that it was notonly the diminishing support of the Anbar Sunni Muslims that contributed to the 2007 loss ofthe Province from the grips of the AQI, but also the decline of the inflow of foreignfighters.36In this thesis, the author will argue that Al-Shabaab’s stability and profile haveover the years been boosted by the strategic incorporation of foreign fighters within its ranks.A special report by the United States Institute for Peace posits that innate factorsemanating from external policies or actors may determine the process by which terrorists30Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism”, p 7131Ibid, p 7432Ibid, p 7133Andrew Phillips, “How AQI Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no.1 (March 2009): 65–66,34Frederick W. Kagan, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq- How to Understand it: How to Defeat it,” The Weekly Standard 012, no. 48(September 10, 2007): p 335Kimberly Kagan, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing Al-Qaeda from its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” The Institution forthe Study of War and Weekly Standard, (March 2007), pp 2–536Phillips, “How AQI Lost Iraq,” p 65.
Page | 10end.37Crenshaw weighs in by arguing that the decline of terrorism results from thegovernment’s response, the choices of the group, and the organisational resources.38Rapportnevertheless, is hesitant to predict an end to terrorism noting that the religious connotationsynonymous with the modern wave of terrorism makes it complicated to make such aprediction.39In this regard, the author would not only seek to explore some of the choices thatAl-Shabaab has undertaken, how those choices have impacted on the group’s image amongthe Somali populace, but also assess whether there is a declining trajectory in the authorityand power once wielded by Al-Shabaab following external interventions by AMISOM, KDFand the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).Even though the author would conclude this paper by vouching for the engagement of theAl-Shabaab in a peace process or deal, Fred Charles posits that governments have hugedifficulties in trying to negotiate with organisations against which they are fighting in either acounter terrorism campaign or a traditional war.40Further, Al-Shabaab, like any other groupusing terrorist acts, may equally not be keen on any negotiation arrangement which alsoconforms to Guelke’s views. According to this perspective, negotiations may complicate aterrorist organisation’s effort to perpetrate its own absolutist perception in the justification ofusing terrorist violence.4137United States Institute of Peace, “How Terrorism Ends,” Special Report, No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: United StatesInstitute of Peace, May 25, 1999),pp 2-438Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” p. 8039David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Cronin and Ludes, Attacking Terrorism, pp. 46-7340Fred Charles like, Every War Must End, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 84-105.41Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: LB. Tauris, 1998), pp. 162-181.
Page | 111.3 Significance of the StudyThis study is timely because the on-course EAC regional integration provides anopportunity for its member states to be involved in the fight against Al-Shabaab, in one wayor another. Admittedly, the collective responsibility espoused in this thesis is for the securityof all the EAC citizens regardless of their respective country’s proximity to Somalia.The study therefore gives an insight into possible areas of collaboration among memberstates and further proposes mechanisms that can be employed on a state by state basis as wellas by the international community in an effort to combat Al-Shabaab-related terror threats.1.4 Research MethodologyThe findings presented in this thesis were based on an extensive desk research, interviewswith key informants as well as analysis of survey questionnaires from a sample ofrespondents from the EAC states specifically Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.The desk research involved heavy reliance on books, journals, reports, online datasources, you tube clips, online news and United Nations Security Council resolutions.The author conducted an asynchronous online interview with eight key informants whowere issued with the same questions thereby creating an opportunity for capturing divergentviews on the same areas of concern.Issuance of survey questionnaires to a representative population of the EAC was equallyessential as it enabled the author to grasp citizenry perception on the terror threat posed byAl-Shabaab, the KDF military incursion in Somalia as well as gather proposals for possible
Page | 12solutions to the Al-Shabaab menace. It is however imperative to note that thesequestionnaires were issued through a snowball sampling procedure. The relevance of thissampling technique was its discriminative attribute in the sense that the questions could onlybe handled by well informed respondents who understood the developments and dynamics ofthe EAC regional security. The questionnaires were consequently, restricted to at leastrespondents with college education.In total, the author received 102 questionnaires, with Dar es Salaam, Tanzania andKampala, Uganda sharing nine respondents each. The remaining 84 questionnaires werereceived from different Kenyan towns as follows: Kisii-11, Kisumu-11, Migori-8, Mombasa-10, Nairobi-34, and Nakuru-10. The questionnaires were then analysed by the SPSS analysissoftware and results tabulated as shown in Chapter 4.1.5 ConstraintsAs already noted, a lot has been written about the Somalia conflict including the Al-Shabaab phenomenon. Nevertheless, the current transnational terrorism tendencies adoptedby the group (Al-Shabaab), which is the core of this thesis is relatively modern. The shiftingfocus from Al-Shabaab’s threat to stability in the Horn of Africa to EAC and the KDFmilitary incursion in Somalia are even most recent and hence not well researcheddevelopments. Based on this limitation, the author overwhelmingly relied on online newsreports some of which may not be feasible to authenticate.
Page | 13It was also impossible to track down all the key informants, while others responded at atime when some components of the interview had changed given the dynamics of the KDForchestrated military incursion in Somalia.Finally, the number of respondents may not have been representative enough to capturethe overall perception of the actual EAC population. Consequently, findings from this studyshould be interpreted with utmost caution.1.6 CONCLUSIONHaving given a breakdown of the various components of this study ranging from thebackground, through literature review, to the research methodology, at this point, it is criticalto delve into the Somalia state collapse and subsequent outcomes which Chapter 2 presents.
Page | 14CHAPTER TWO2.0 SOMALIA- COLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND OUTCOMES2.1 THE PATH TO STATE COLLAPSE2.1.1 BackgroundI. Elbadawi and N. Sambanis discount the notion that the principal drive behind Africancivil strife is the continent’s diverse ethnic divide.42In their argument; the high prevalence ofwar in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to thehigh levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on naturalresources.43Admittedly, focus on this narrow aspect of ethnic diversity has entirelyobscured the very fundamentals of the African civil wars. For Somalia, however, clan andsub-clan allegiances which are derivatives of negative ethnicity are central to what hasbecome one of the continents longest conflicts.In an era where the dynamics of global politics is almost entirely embedded in economiccompetition, Africa, given its vast natural resources, is at the epicentre of this abyss. Thispredicament which the continent is sucked into has metamorphosed to the effect that thelarger society is incessantly predisposed to indecipherable consequences of war. Itthen makes sense that behind every African civil war there is a likelihood of anexternal mastermind. This analogy highlights the backdrop upon which the Somalia crisiswas bred and how this instability has guided the country into becoming a theatre of proxy42Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding andpreventing violent conflict”, Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 244-26943Ibid.
Page | 15wars during and in the post-cold war era. The Somalia state collapse was therefore, aneventuality that was realistically inevitable.The concept of intractability, according to Burgess and Burgess entails intolerable moraldifferences such as; culture, world view, religion, valuable essential resources for survivaland domination.44The Somalia community, however, experiences a minimal clash on culture,religion, and to some extent, world views. This, therefore, implies that the Burgess criteriondoes not entirely apply to this context, yet it remains one of the most intractable conflicts inthe modern world.Somalia is a rare example of an African State. In contrast to the rest in the continent, it islargely composed of one ethnic community that predominantly proclaims Islam as the mainreligion or faith. Despite her existence as a mono-ethnic African society, the Somali people’sidentity is a composite of a more overarching element- the Clan families. This phenomenon isdeeply rooted into the societal substratum and can be traced back to medieval times, longbefore Somalia’s civil war or even independence. The genealogic discourse has thereforetaken precedence over any other facets of allegiance as it is the main premise for determiningan individual’s exact place in the society,45something that is quite symbolicfor the population.Even though the Somali people share a common culture based on agro-pastoral customs,their traditions, socio-economic and political lives have customarily revolved around the clanstructure. In essence, the clan and sub-clan families establish the foundation upon which the44Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, “Intractability and the Frontier of the Field,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 24, no. 2(Winter 2006): 177-18645Peter J. Pham, “State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing SomaliCrisis,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 2 (2011): 153-187
Page | 16Somalia confederacy is founded, and hence governance is in accordance with the complexrelations where loyalty is determined by genealogy. 46Somali Clan families can be broadly divided into two distinct groups:i. The nomadic pastoralists,ii. The cultivators and agro-pastoralists.The Darood (largest clan in Puntland), Dir, Hawiye, Isaq (from Somaliland), Digil andRahanweyn were predominantly nomadic pastoralists, also known as ‘‘noble’’ (bilis) clans.47The Digil and Rahanweyn (located in Mogadishu, among other places),48collectively knownas Digil Mirifle, were traditionally cultivators and agro-pastoralists. 49However, a third tieralso exists in the Somali social hierarchy and it consists of minority clans whosemembers are known as the Sab. This group had a historical occupation on metal work andtanning, something which rendered them ritually unclean in the eyes of the nomadic ‘‘nobleclans.’’50To this extent, it is emergent that although the Somali people “consideredthemselves bound together by a common language, an essentially nomadic pastoral cultureand by the shared profession of Islam”51, the clan structure remained the fundamentaldeterminant of the peoples way of life and hence political trajectory.Prior to independence, Somalia consisted of two territories, which were under Italian andBritish administration. The south and east coast were formerly under Italian administration46Meredith 2005: p. 46547Peter J. Pham, “State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing SomaliCrisis,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 2 (2011): 153-18748Kaplan 2008: p. 11649Supra at Footnote 47.50I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).51I. M. Lewis, ‘‘Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox,’’ Africa 74, no. 4 (November 2004): 489-515
Page | 17with Mogadishu as its capital, while the area along the Gulf of Adens coastline was theBritish colony otherwise known as the British Somaliland.52Historically, the present dayDjibouti was part of the French Somaliland.The British protectorate of Somaliland became the first of Somali territories to gainindependence (June 26, 1960). A year later, the Somalia Italiana, a territory then administeredby Italy as a United Nations Trust and which had been an Italian colony before the secondWorld War attained its independence.53The founding of Republic of Somalia through amerger of these two independent states was arguably a decision not so carefully thoughtthrough. Securing a unified Somalia may have been beneficial to the Somali people, but wasequally a premature conception that disregarded critical considerations such as the respectiveleadership’s failure to foresee the dangers that would possibly emanate from perceptiblefactors, including: The fact that these two states were under different colonial regimes, andhence their divergent experiences may not be instantly reconciled, and most importantly;none of them had a sense of what it was to be an independent and self-governing country,54both were in a learning process.The conception of African Nationalism was strongly evidenced by the founding of theRepublic of Somalia, which sought to highlight a strong sense of national identity. Theexpectations of establishing an identity revolving around a durable and unified statehoodcharacterised the era that succeeded the attainment of independence.55Nevertheless, theregime’s advocacy for the right to self-determination of all the Somali people in theneighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia was considered an affront to the concept ofgood neighbourliness.52Meredith 2005: pp. 464-46553Peter J. Pham, Supra.54Ibid55Meredith 2005: pp. 464-465
Page | 182.1.2 Siad Barre Regime, Cold War factor and Civil War break outHaving attained its independence three years ahead of Kenya, Somalia had an upper handin charting their future. The time for pan-Somalism (greater Somalia), a conception theregime inherently believed in was therefore ripe. The preamble of the approved 1961 Somaliaconstitution thus read: ‘The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, theunion of the territories.’56Further, the constitution provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matterwhere they resided, were citizens of the Republic.57It can then be argued that the regime’smeticulous insertion of its philosophy into the constitution was to raise national awareness ofthe ‘legal right to pursue the dream of pan Somalism. Again, it could have also been apurposeful coercion of the neighbours (Kenya and Ethiopia) to cede territories occupied bythe Somali speaking population since it had become a constitutional provision. In the author’sopinion, this development was the beginning of what can be considered ‘the badneighbourliness phenomenon between Somalia and its two neighbours.Siad Barre’s nationalistic tendencies took shape one year after seizing power followingthe assassination of President Shermarke in October, 1969. This was evidenced by hisproclamation of "Somali Democratic Republic" as an officially Marxist state58, anddetermination “to stamp out clan identity as an anachronistic barrier to progress and thatwhich had to be replaced by nationalism and “Scientific Socialism.”59He advocated for theconcept of “Soomaaliweyn”- a greater Somalia, which comprised those regions in the Hornof Africa that had historically served as residences for ethnic Somali population. The Star inthe Somali flag therefore bears a symbolic connotation with its individual points representing56Global Security, “Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya Conflict,” Military,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia1.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012)57Ibid58Peter J. Pham, Supra59Ibid
Page | 19five historical regions inhabited by the Somali people: Italian Somaliland (Somalia), BritishSomaliland (Somalia), French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden region of Ethiopia andNorthern District Frontier of Kenya which Siad Barre sought to unite under a GreaterSomalia. Notably, even as Siad Barre struggled to achieve his ambitious project, the volatilityof Somalia and its strategic location relative to the Red Sea put it at the epicentre of Coldwar. Whereas Ethiopia, a long-time adversary of Somalia had the United States of America asher ally, Somalia was an ardent client of the Soviet Union.60The United States underPresident Jimmy Carter was later to sever links with the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu HaileMariam over its repressive human rights record.61The strained relationship between the US and Ethiopia earned Somalia army a momentaryvictory following her invasion of Ethiopia (1977-1978) in support of the self-determinationseeking Somalis in Ogaden region. They successfully captured most parts of the territory withthe initial backing of the Soviet Union.62However, it was at this point that the theatrics ofCold War manifested itself as the Soviet Union deserted Somalia amidst the war and opted toshift allegiance to camp Ethiopia.63According to this author, the Soviet Union’s abrupt shift in support from the Somalis toEthiopians put two theories into focus: It may have been unexpected by the Carteradministration and hence a miscalculation on the possible effects of withdrawing support forSomalia. In this regard, the US not only granted Ethiopia a military triumph over Somalia,but equally guaranteed a Soviet Union win against her. The other theory focuses on thegeopolitics of the two countries (Somalia and Ethiopia). Somalias strategic position relativeto Ethiopia may have prompted the USs decision to sever links with Ethiopia well aware that60Peter Woodward, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 22–27.61Ibid62Meredith 2005: pp. 464-46563Ibid p. 467
Page | 20the Soviet Union would take the bait (abandon the strategic Somalia and cross over toEthiopia’s side), which it actually did. From this point of view, the US long term agendacarried the day. The switch in allegiance, though not morally justifiable (following the closeassociation between Somalia and The Soviet Union) underscored an existing paradigm ofweaker nations being a pawn in a more complex chess of global politics.In view of these developments, the US subsequently became the Barre regime’sardent supporter, providing both economic and military aid until 1989. As a Cold War proxy,Somalia navigated through a foreign funded hyper militarization spending with an average of20.45% of its budget being channelled to the military agenda. 64In the 1980s, foreign aid wasequivalent to half the gross domestic product. The US contributed 800 million dollar worth ofaid, a quarter of which was in support of the military capacity of Somalia.65Oscillating between the two powers at the centre of the Cold War, the Somalia militaryjunta benefited immensely from the proceeds of this global dilemma. The end of Cold Warand subsequent withdrawal of the initial massive financial support that sustained then one ofAfricas largest military forces, attested to the fact that it was never about Somalia orEthiopia, rather the main players in the Cold War.Soldiers from the Somali army, one of Africas biggest and most well equipped, no longerreceived their salaries from the government, and as such were confined to selling theirweapons in order to survive.66The states lack of capacity to protect its citizens encouragedreliance on the respective clans as the guardians and providers of security.67For a populationthat had endured years of nonexistence of basic human needs, regular organized clan-basedmilitia and uncontrolled weapon proliferation, the advent of economic decline became the64Osman and Souaré 2007: p. 1365Meredith 2005: p. 46866Osman and Souaré 2007: p. 1567Ibid p. 10
Page | 21tipping point for an explosive outbreak of violence.68As the central government finallycollapsed, there subsequently existed a vacuum that was soon to be rapidly filled by rivalpolitical factional leaders turned warlords.The most catastrophic period in Somalias path to political obscurity was the overthrow ofSiad Barres regime (1991) and the subsequent failure by the bickering clans to agree on theway forward in the appointment of a universally acceptable leader.69As Lyons and Samaterput it, “this departure marked the formal end of a difficult era, but did not usher in a newone,"70instead, it was the beginning of the civil war.2.2 AL-SHABAAB: THE OUTCOME OF A STATE COLLAPSE2.2.1 Chronology of the Al-Shabaab evolutionIt is significant to point that Al-Shabaab did not emerge at the ouster of Siad Barre.Nevertheless, circumstances that succeeded the coup, like the civil war outbreak laid down68Ibid p.1469“Somalia profile”, BBC, February 10, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503 (accessed April 13, 2012)70Lyons and Samater: 1995. P.7
Page | 22the necessary infrastructure upon which the group was to be founded. This narrative,therefore, seeks to validate the presumed linkage between the emergence of Al-Shabaab andthe lawlessness attributed to the absence of a functioning government in Somalia.Al Itihad al Islami (AlAI), an armed Islamist movement and an “early prototype of anislamist group that is both a product of radicalisation process and a radicalising agent in itsown right”71came into prominence to fill in the power void. This group subscribed to theSalafi Jihadi ideology and radicalisation within the Somali speaking region was critical to itsagenda.72Even though there is little evidence linking AIAI with radicalisation of other non-Somalipopulations beyond the countrys borders, this may not have been entirely true for theneighbouring Kenya. The Crisis Group thus reports: 73AIAI maintained a formidable clandestine support network in North Eastern Provincethroughout the 1990s and beyond. It actively recruited Jihadis, raised fund and kept a low-level presence along the border districts of Mandera and Garissa. It infiltrated the influentialWahhabi clerical establishment that controls most mosques in the province; gained control ofcharities and funnelled zakat (Islamic tax) money to support its activities and start commercialventures for its members; and radicalised and recruited Kenyan Somalis.Pan Somalism, the philosophy that defined Siad Barres regime became a pillar of theAIAI brand of Salafi Jihadism in its quest for “re-establishing the Islamic caliphate.”74Evidently, the tenacity of the AIAIs pursuit for this intention was strategically reinforced bytwo schemes:71Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 201272Ibid73Ibid74Crisis Group Africa Report No 45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002
Page | 23(a) Endear itself to the Somalia people.(b) Attempt to infiltrate the neighbouring countries with Somali populations. The secondobjective, though superficially ambitious, was easy to achieve in NEP of Kenya dueto an existing disenfranchisement among the Kenyan-Somalis. Political anddevelopmental marginalisation of NEP coupled with the inherent belief in PanSomalism catalysed the process of radicalising the population.75The AIAI expansion of influence from NEP to the Coast Province of Kenya, as well asthe attempts to infiltrate the Ogaden region of Ethiopia could, in part, justify the PanSomalisim philosophy. However, its links with Al-Qaeda East African franchise (that wasresponsible for the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) was an affirmationof the groups subscription to a different, or at least more than one cause. The broader picturemay have been to take advantage of the vulnerability of members of the ethnic Somali andMuslim community in these regions to entrench the ideology of Salafi Jihadism. In thisrespect, AIAI ceased to be a Somalia predicament, but a regional, if not global one. By thebeginning of 2000, military pressure from Ethiopia, “strategic miscalculation and internaldissent led AIAI to lose its influence and splinter into several groups.”76The ICG notes that:77Military defeat did not lead to the demise of its (AIAI) extremist ideology. If anything, itadded to its virulence, increased its force and inspired the emergence of the Al-Shabaab. Norwas the organisational disintegration total, as most accounts suggest. Key members scatteredover the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa-Kenya included-and beyond, blending in and even75Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 201276Lorenzo Vidino et al: p.220.Bringing global Jihad to the Horn of Africa77Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012
Page | 24regaining political and business influence. A year later, they formed the leadership of nucleusof the Union of Islamic Courts and later Al-Shabaab.The rise of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) after the military defeat of AIAI highlighted theresilience of Islamic extremism in Somalia and the durability of an ideology underscored byunwavering resolve of the new actors to construct a Somalia State under Sharia. The ICUwas mainly composed of a loose coalition of clerics and militia78whose governanceframework was informed by strict adherence to Sharia law. “Their strict interpretation ofIslam had little in common with the local traditional Sufi practices of most Somalis, yet thepopulation was willing to tolerate ICU’s zeal in exchange for some long desired security.”79For a citizenry helplessly watching their country degenerate into a war economy, securityremained critical and it did not matter who could offer it. The group’s popularity against theTransitional Federal Government (TFG) therefore soared on the premise of its ‘commitment’to end banditry and reign on war lords.As the ICU expanded its influence, the fragility of the TFG increased proportionately,leading to further de-legitimisation. The ENDF invaded ICU strongholds, but this time at theinvitation of the TFG. Notably, ENDF was once again instrumental in slowing down themomentum of another emerging extremist outfit it Somalia.The ENDF invasion achieved one vital objective, the dispersion of ICU and associatedmilitia groups. Following its previous dismantling of AIAI and re-emergence of extremismthrough ICU, the prospects of an absolute eradication of the ideology by forceful means wasrealistically low. Even though the past ENDF interventions ostensibly uprooted AIAI outfit,the emergence of another group with the same ideology reveals otherwise. It is thenreasonable to argue that the period of calm that succeeded the incursions created necessary78Lorenzo Vidino et al: p.220.Bringing global Jihad to the Horn of Africa79Ibid
Page | 25platforms for the individual members to retreat, regroup, re-strategise and return to the fold ina different form as long as the structures for widening the ideological influence remainedunparalleled. With the ICU dispersed, not necessarily sent into oblivion, there emerged a newgroup, the Al-Shabaab.2.2.2 Understanding the Al-ShabaabObjective and Composition of the groupKenya is currently grappling with the challenges of Al-Shabaab related insecurity, but inthe wake of East African regional integration, the growing influence of Al-Shabaab hasconsequently shifted the threat focus from frontline states (Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya) tothe rest of the EAC.Al-Shabaab is not an entirely new group. As has been discussed, the ICU was a loosecoalition between the clerics and militia. Al-Shabaab was therefore the militant wing of theICU whose prominence can be traced back to the point of Ethiopian led invasion (2006-2009)of Somalia at the invitation by TFG.That Al-Shabaab is at the core of extremism in the EAC is no doubt, but the main concernis the resilience of the group amidst its current crisis. Whereas it can be argued that bothAIAI and ICU had a primary aim of creating a stable Somalia state based on Islamic tenets,the same argument cannot be distinctively extrapolated for Al-Shabaab’s discourse. The Al-Shabaab “espouses a strict global Jihadist ideology, seeing itself simply as a regional footsoldier in a larger millenarian struggle between Islam and infidelity”80with the current socio-economic and political landscape in Somalia providing the necessary impetus for achievingthis objective. It is therefore plausible to reason that the stability of Somalia is not part of the80Ibid
Page | 26group’s agenda as it would not only put their activities under scrutiny, but also shut downtheir life line. Still, other sources single out Al-Shabaab’s primary objective as having to dowith building of an army that places Islamic identity above clan loyalties.81Importantly, Al-Shabaab has equally admitted to waging jihad against the West and other foreigninterventions as part of the Al-Qaeda.82Even at the emergent stages, the notion that Al-Shabaab was holistically a Somalichallenge was disputable. However, the roots of the group have since ramified to cover therest of the EAC at unprecedented rates with Kenya and Tanzania being easy targets forreasons which will be explained later in this thesis. To date, there is overwhelming evidencethat Al-Shabaab is not only recruiting from its Somalia population, or among KenyanSomalis, but also other Muslim communities in the neighbouring countries.83Recruitment: Within and beyondThe exact number of Al-Shabaab’s membership may not be publicly known, but it isestimated that by the fall of ICU, the number was ranging between 3000 and 7000.84Still,this might not be entirely true as other militants were fighting alongside the Al-Shabaab.For an extremist group struggling to establish itself amidst innumerable difficulties, it islogical to submit that Al-Shabaab has fared beyond expectations in driving its recruitmentagenda. Since its inception in 2006, the group has proven that it has the capability ofrecruiting members from within Somalia and beyond. Despite this elaborate recruitmentdrive, the numbers have remained fairly low.81http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p582Ibid83Al-Jazeera: Kenya blast suspect claims al-Shabab ties84http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-01-06-voa25-66764342.html
Page | 27Like many other extremist groups or militia in different conflicts across the globe, Al-Shabaab equally targets children as potential fighters. In the year 2010, approximately 2000children had been abducted by Al-Shabaab and arraigned for military training invaried camps within Somalia.85The recruitment was found to be systematic, widespread andaggressively executed in central and Southern Somalia. 86Existing data is in line with the popular belief that local Somali community forms thebackbone of the organisation’s recruitment platform. It is also notable that Al-Shabaab cutsacross the clan substratum thereby defeating the historical inter clan animosities. In somequarters, the group may be seen as a unifying figure, perhaps on the premise of a fallaciousperception that it is fighting for the sovereignty and dignity of Somalia. This narrative, if true,may explain in part why the outfit has progressively secured the services of Somali volunteerrecruits.Key to Al-Shabaab recruitment drive is the Somalia diaspora, an achievement which putsthe group at a prestigious position relative to other global extremist organisations. Using itsstealth network among the Somali diaspora, Al-Shabaab has thus penetrated North America,East Africa, Europe and Middle East.87Through these structures, the group has recruitedabout 1000 diaspora members as well as 200-400 non Somali Muslims.88The highlypublicised cases of the ‘Minneapolis 20’ and Toronto 6’ are global case studies pointing tothe recruitment of 20 Somalia-US citizens from Minneapolis and six Somali-Canadiancitizens from Toronto and further attests to the overwhelming success attributed to itsdiaspora recruitment drive.8985http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/somalia.html86Ibid87http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalia’s ‘Al-Shabaab?’88Ibid89http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al-Shabaab.aspx
Page | 28The Majority investigative report on Al-Shabaab emphasised the reality of Al-Shabaab’sactive recruitment and radicalisation network inside the US targeting Muslim-Americanconverts, such as a top Al- Shabaab Commander.90It further reveals that:91• At least 40 or more Americans have joined Al-Shabaab;• So many Americans have joined that at least 15 of them have been killed fighting withAl-Shabaab, as well as three Canadians;• Three Americans who returned to the U.S. were prosecuted, and one awaits extraditionfrom The Netherlands;• At least 21 or more American Al-Shabaab members overseas remain unaccounted forand pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.Shirwa Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber to have blown uphimself in Somaliland as part of the Al-Shabaab attack.92This event may have been theclearest indicator of Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of the country (US). Nevertheless, it is notonly the US, Canada and Europe that have made contributions to Al-Shabaab’s regiment,other countries including Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Kenya have had theirshare of subscriptions.93According to Washiala of the Supreme Council of Muslims, Taita Taveta, Al-Shabaabrecruitment drive runs deep into Kenya, citing various incidences where parents havedisclosed that their children were recruited by the Al-Shabaab.94Harper concurs with his90http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf; also seehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1Iw-Qi3Pf6c#!;http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=KoT8mM5F9vc (accessed on March 27, 2012)91http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf;92http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/al-shabaab-and-domestic-radicalization_577660.html93http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al-Shabaab.aspx94Interview with Mohammed Washalla Abdi, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Taita Taveta Country Chariman, April10, 2012
Page | 29observation identifying NEP of Kenya and the Somali-dominated parts of Eastleigh as areasprone to Al-Shabaab radicalisation and recruitment.95As been noted, Al-Shabaab’s ability to recruit within and beyond its borders puts it in avery admirable position relative to other extremist groups. The successful US recruitmentprogramme “inside the tight-knit and culturally isolated Somalia-American community,which Al-Qaeda Central based in Pakistan does not have inside the US”96is critical to thegroup’s strategy for upgrading its profile. The number of recruits, though minimal, remainsconsequential as long as the message resonates across the globe. This capability, the authoropines, could be why Al-Shabaab must be at the centre of the Al-Qaeda strategy.Funding and arming the Al-ShabaabThe Al-Shabaab’s continued existence is hinged on its ability to muster monetaryresources that facilitate its running uninterrupted. However, given the group’s incapability topenetrate the entire Somalia in addition to the country’s inordinate poverty levels, there is anoverwhelming credibility to the existing evidence that points at its financial muscle as beingconstantly boosted by the diaspora.95Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 201296http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf
Page | 30According to the UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia and Eritrea, Al-Shabaabrevenue stream can be divided into four distinct categories:97• Taxation and extortion• Commerce, trade and contraband• Diaspora support• External assistanceGiven the insecurity that has engulfed Somalia for over two decades, it is understandablethat the population is constantly weary about the corresponding lawlessness. Al-Shabaabseeks to ‘bridge’ this security gap by presenting itself as the alternative to insecurity while, infact, it is a major composite of the very insecurity. This gesture of provision of ‘security’,however, does not come for free. The group consequently solicits monetary support fromlocal mosques, imams, communities and even businesses in exchange for the much neededsecurity.98But, that is not the extent to which Al-Shabaab can go in consolidating its revenuebase within Somalia as both taxation and extortionist tendencies are employed in equalmeasure. The report by Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) statesthat:99Al-Shabab instructed aid agencies operating in Beletweyne to pay 10,000 USD within 15days, in order to work for the next six months, after which agencies should pay an additional6,000 USD for another six-month work permit, and transmitted similar instructions to all aidagencies operating in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Jubaregions.97http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/43398http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/SomaliasStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf99OCHA, Somalia, Humanitarian access August 2010, http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1175515
Page | 31Commerce, on the other hand, is Al-Shabaab’s greatest strategy in keeping its monetarystream afloat. The port of Kismayu, which the group took control of after a decisive battleagainst the Ras Kamboni forces in October 2009, together with the secondary ports of Markaand Baraawe constitute the most important sources of income for the group.100“Al-Shabaabgenerates between $35 million and $50 million per annum from port revenues, of which atleast $15 million is based on trade in charcoal and sugar.”101Businesses involving contraband goods have been thriving in Somalia to the benefit ofAl-Shabaab102with ports under its control acting as the hub for both reception and dispatch.Al-Shabaab has built a business empire revolving around export of charcoal whose proceeds“in turn finances the import of sugar, much of which is subsequently smuggled across bordersas contraband into neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya.”103Beyond the Somalia borders, Al-Shabaab has developed a sophisticated moneyremittance regime through its diaspora networks. The role of the diaspora remittances iscritical to the group’s financial lifeline and is aided by a fully utilitarian infrastructure. Whileremittances to Somalia are estimated at USD 1 Billion per annum, it is uncertain if all themoney is used for legitimate purposes.104In the US (San Diego’s Heights neighbourhood), federal prosecutors pointed an accusingfinger at the al-Masjid Al-Ansar Mosque imam (Mohammed Mohamud) and three otherSomali-Americans for sending cash to a top Al-Shabaab leader (late Aden Hashi Ayrow).According to the prosecutors, “a co-defendant in a taped telephone contact with Ayrowinstructed Mohamud to “hold back 20 or 30 trusted people at the mosque to tell them to100http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 28101Ibid102Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March21,2012103http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 29104http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al-Shabaab.aspx
Page | 32contribute money.””105Other judicial proceedings against individuals suspected to haveaided Al-Shabaab, either materially or financially have also been witnessed in other countriessuch as Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.106There are insurmountable evidence and literature on Al-Shabaabs sources of funding, butit is also in the public domain that the group is highly militarised. The evolving debate is thusthe presumed link between the funds at the groups disposal and the acquisition of weapons.Nevertheless, even in the absence of such a link, the group, which is not a conventional army,has had a regular supply of weapons over the years, the question then becomes: Where dothey come from?The emanating situation in Somalia following the ouster of Siad Barre motivated thepassage of the UNSC Resolution 751 (1992) which sought to impose an arms’ embargo onSomalia.107However, the evolving situation called for the passage of other successiveresolutions to keep pace with the latest developments. The 2006 partial lift on the Somaliaarms embargo pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) Resolution1725 (2006) was not only to provide leeway for the regional forces to intervene in Somalia,but also to “arm and train the TFG security forces.”108Even though one may be tempted toconclude that the arms proliferation during the Somalia proxy cold war and post Barresregime is to blame for arming the Al-Shabaab operatives, it is equally plausible that thenecessary exemptions provided for by UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) necessitated the vice.The United Nations (UN) report on Somalia and Eritrea unearths a worrying trend, butthe evidence that AMISOM’s ammunition were found in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives,105http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf106http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 pp 31-32107http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,SOM,,3b00f16a4,0.html108http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/somalia
Page | 33the very outfit being fought is even tragic.109The discovery opens a new Pandora’s Box andputs into perspective very dire concerns, which run deep into the Somalia war economy. Themonitoring group identifies “lack of international support to the TFG and corruption at theministerial level” as being the driving forces behind TFG’s soldiers’ low wages which are inthe range of USD (100-150).110This insensitivity is seen as the impetus for the sales of armsand ammunition to Al-Shabaab and other militia groups as compensation for the lowearnings. However, the challenge is not just confined to the TFG as other reports have cometo a logical conclusion that Ethiopian and AMISOM personnel have equally sold weapons tonon-state actors in the conflict.111The blurred or absence of concrete evidence against Eritrea has done little to absolve thecountry from her alleged role in the Somalia conflict. The country has however responded tothese accusations viciously and discredited them as mere allegations. Regardless of herassertion, the Monitoring Group reported in 2005 that Eritrea had supported and armedgroups in Somalia fighting the TFG.112The March 2010 report also states that Eritrea hadprovided significant and sustained support ranging from political to financial and material, aswell as arms, ammunition and training to armed opposition groups in Somalia since at least2007.113Yemen has equally been repeatedly mentioned as a possible hub for the Somalia destinedweapons, but the Monitoring Group was quick to add that “the assertion is impossible to109http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 44110Ibid pp 42111http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1010b.pdf112United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 1639 (2005), annex to S/2006/229, 4 May 2006, pp. 10–13.113Ibid pp 22-24
Page | 34quantify." Further, the government of Yemen denies that arms and ammunition are smuggledfrom its area of jurisdiction.114Weapon infiltration in Somalia does not give a clear indication as to which militia groupends up being the beneficiary, but the distinct position held by Al-Shabaab as the main TFGantagonist and the fact that it controls the most strategic positions through which the sameweapons may get into Somalia leaves little doubt that the group end up with a majority of theshipment if not all of it.Organisational StructureAl-Shabaab has evolved as a group that boasts hierarchical structure typical of anyregular organisation. Whereas the exact dimensions of this structure are not fully known,hints from the group have led to identification of particular leaders being associated withspecific positions. This has also been verified by various global intelligence agencies, butwith the war on terror campaign being stepped up, many of these leaders have died underdifferent circumstances, yet their replacements have never been hard to come by.Supreme to the Al-Shabaab’s structure is the ten member shura council that determinesall major objectives and operations.115It is led by an emir whom, despite his significance,does not exude independent authority.116Politics, media and military operations aresubdivisions falling under the council.117Al-Shabaab has also established a military branch(army of hardship) under shura council and a more judicial branch (army of morality) to help114http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 41115http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 9116Ibid117Ibid
Page | 35uphold rule of law and order.118These two armies are thus referred to as Jaysh Al-Usra andJaysh Al-Hesbah respectively.119A notable facet of the Al-Shabaab’s governance structure is that the regions (matching thepre-existing districts) under its control are manned by the leadership’s appointed governor(wali).120Al-Shabaab administration at the district level comprises Shari‘a courts, offices ofzakat and military units allied with either the movement’s Jaysh al-‘Usrah, or the Jaysh al-Hisbah.121Mechanisms for ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the Somali peopleAfter many years of civil war that resulted into the installation of 14 separategovernments between 1991 and 2010122(all of which have been unable to restore stability),there was an understandable sense of desperation among the Somali citizens. The advent ofICU on June 5, 2006 and consequent defeat of CIA backed Warlords led to the capture ofMogadishu, thereby instigating what for the first time became a period of relative peace.”123This would conceivably be the initial positive impression that the ICU and Al-Shabaabcoalition had on the Somalia population, thus endearing itself to the people.As already been accounted for in this thesis, the Somali people are nationalistic withvested pride in both their country and religion. To this extent, even though Ethiopian invasionof Somalia at the invitation of the TFG led to the collapse of the ICU, it equally invokedundertones of nationalism among the population. The perceptions of Ethiopia being ahistorical enemy among the Somalis, coupled with the invasion arguably prompted the full118Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab’, Institute of Security Studies Situation Report, 3 June 2009119Ibid120http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98al-shabab%E2%80%99: also see Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab’, Institute of Security Studies Situation Report, 3 June 2009121http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98al-shabab%E2%80%99122http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366123Ibid
Page | 36fledge formation of Al-Shabaab as a viable force to counter the ‘enemy’ and ostensiblyrestore the lost ‘glory.’Whereas other militant groups within Somalia have been confined to their own backyard,the influence (negative or positive) of Al-Shabaab in South Central Somalia has remainedunparalleled. Its ability to draw membership from across the population despite‘irreconcilable’ differences among individual clans enhances the perception that it ascribes to“a broader irredentist vision of uniting Somalia-inhabited areas of East Africa under anIslamist caliphate.”124Prospects of an Al-Shabaab led pan Somalism, which was an originalvision of the independent Somalia, revived the pride of nationalism, which, in effect, madethe group more endearing to a section of the population.The Al-Shabaab also uses coercion to instil fear and authority among the population. Thesubmission of the Somalia people to the group’s leadership is not entirely on a willing basisand hence a confirmation to an existing sense of hopelessness. In 2009, the extremist groupgrabbed the headline for publicly amputating a hand and a foot from each of the four‘convicts’ suspected of stealing guns and mobile phones.125This harsh implementation of theShari’a has not only alienated Al-Shabaab from the population it purports to serve, but hasalso imbued fear which has enabled it to operate without boundaries.Warfare TacticThe Al-Shabaab does not necessarily engage in conventional warfare, instead, the groupprefers to employ guerrilla tactic against formal armies. The remarkable success recorded bythe group so far can be attributed to the opponent’s inability to distinguish between who Al-Shabaab is and who is not, a tactic that the group has greatly exploited to its advantage.124http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 6125http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-25-voa18-68818722.html
Page | 37However, the Al- Shabaab’s current engagement in suicide bombings126has been afundamental shift to its approach to war and given credence to its political branding as aterrorist organisation. In a wider scheme to popularize this mode of operation, the Al-Shabaab has sought to exhibit its resolve to ‘adversaries’ by targeting key facilities includinga UN compound, the Ethiopian consulate, a presidential palace and two intelligence facilitiesin Puntland and Somalia.127Other tactics include bombings, grenade attacks, kidnappings andtargeted assassinations, including those of the leading Sulufi clerics.128,129,130PropagandaThe most essential tool for the proliferation of Al-Shabaabs propaganda is the media.Aware of the power of this component, Al-Shabaab has extensively utilised multiple mediasources, including radio, TV and the internet to propagate its ideals and propaganda.131, 132The internet has predominantly worked to the advantage of Al-Shabaab as it is a means thathas not only facilitated the group’s interaction with the youth beyond the borders of Somaliaat minimal costs, but has also been critical for their correspondences with the Al-Qaeda. AsLauren Ploch states, “Al Shabaab uses the internet to emphasize its commitment to globalJihad and to pledge fealty to Al Qaeda, which serves both its fundraising and recruitmentgoals.”133Al-Shabaab-Pirates nexusSo far, there exists no documented proof of a link between Al-Shabaab and Somalipirates, but this does not rule out such possibilities. According to Cole who is the programme126http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 17127Ibid128http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al-Shabaab.aspx129http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 17130http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15317230131http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 9132http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-05-somalias-alshabaab-launch-tv-channel133http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 9
Page | 38coordinator at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime- Counter Piracy Programme,interviews with Somali Pirates in custody reveal the existence of this nexus.134His sentimentsare echoed by Hon. Justice Gaswaga who is credited for trials of Piracy cases in the EastCoast of Africa. Justice Gaswaga concurs that piracy related funds are channelled to Al-Shabaab’s programmes.135It is agreeable that United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-Counter Piracy Programme and the Hon. Justice Gaswaga courts have had numerous one onone interaction with the Somali pirates and consequently established a deeper understandingof the group’s dynamics, operations and associations. This therefore gives credibility to thementioned observations.Lt. Col. Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman suggests that: “As Al-Shabaab’s sources ofincome continue to shrink, they have looked to piracy as an alternative source of funds tofinance their activities,”136an observation that Hon. Mulongo, Vice Chairman of the Defenseand Security Committee in the Parliament of Uganda agrees with. According to Hon.Mulongo, the returns from Piracy are equally ploughed back to the Al-Shabaab course, anobservation that is at par with that of Cole and that of Justice Gaswaga. 137Other expertshowever strike a cautious tone, and as E.B-Gaswaga, a legal officer, UN Department of PeaceKeeping Operations notes: “The nexus between these two groups is a possibility….therefore,more leaning towards reality”.138She argues that acts of terrorism require access to unlimitedfunds of which piracy could be a source in that regard.139134Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP Programme Coordinator, February 2, 2012. *The views presented by Mr. Coleare individual and does not depict the official position of the UN135Interview with Justice Duncan Gaswaga, Head of Criminal Division, Supreme Court of Seychelles, May 10, 2012. * Theviews presented here are of Justice Duncan Gaswaga and does not depict the official position of the Supreme Court ofSeychelles.136Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012.137Interview with Hon. Simon Mulongo, Vice Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda, May 11,2012138Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February24,2012 * The views presented by Ms E.G-Gaswaga does not depict the official position of the UN139Ibid
Page | 39Even though there is a common understanding among these experts on the possiblerelationship between Al-Shabaab and the Somali Pirates, others discount the notion. AsHarper, a BBC Africa Senior editor and author of ‘Getting Somalia Wrong?’ put it, the nexusis imaginary, noting that:140Al-Shabaab’s precursor, the Islamic Courts Union was the only power base that managedto effectively tackle Piracy , which decreased dramatically during the last six months of 2006when the ICU was in power in South Central Somalia. Pirates and their lifestyle is consideredharam by Islamist groups.Her observations are supported by Hon. Ateenyi, Chairperson of the ParliamentaryCommittee on Defense and security, Parliament of Uganda. According to Hon. Ateenyi, thereis no direct connection between the two groups, arguing that pirates show no interest inhaving any ideological affiliation with the Jihadis.141Further, “while Al-Shabaab seeks to beless xenophobic and accept foreign fighters, so far, the pirates prioritise their clan above anyother alliance.” 142In view of these positions, the author remains cautious of the presumed nexus, but doesnot disregard the possibilities. Even though Somali Piracy comes out as a purely economicoriented enterprise, it is observable that the lawlessness of the state provides room for itssurvival. However, the fact that Al-Shabaab is accountable for the larger part of Somalia’sinsecurity may possibly facilitate a line of engagement that prompts the Pirates toacknowledge the “role” of Al-Shabaab in creating a “business friendly” environment.140Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012141Interview with Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense andSecurity, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012.142Ibid
Page | 40Affiliations: Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda CentralAccording to the US counter terrorism officials, proximity of Somalia and Yemen is verymuch to blame for the close working relationships between Al-Shabaab and the AQAP.143Reports alluding to the possibility of the AQAP having shared chemical bomb makingtechnology with Al-Shabaab144can only act to reinforce the phobia for a close association ofthe two groups. The dynamics of this complexity is further compounded by the large numbersof disenfranchised Somali refugees in the unstable Yemen. Admittedly, this group could bean easy target for Al-Shabaab, AQAP, or Al-Qaeda central.The debate around Al-Shabaab is inconclusive without establishing its affiliations withAl-Qaeda central. Over the years, Al-Shabaab has been associated with Al-Qaeda for variousreasons. Notably, the group has itself portrayed public display of reverence forthe presumed association on numerous occasions.Speculations for the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda being a common entity have mostly beenexaggerated, noting that it is the former that has been keen on confirming the existence ofsuch an association. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have had a habitual understanding on anumber of issues, nevertheless the allegations of Al-Qaeda aided operations in Somalia, iftrue, can only be to a limited extent.The link between the two groups can, however, be traced back to the era of ICU where itwas alleged that the Al-Shabaab and the ruling ICU harboured Al-Qaeda operatives whowere suspected of taking part in the “black hawk down” operation.145Notably, one of the143Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Weighs Expanded Strikes in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2010.144Greg Miller, “CIA Sees Increased Threat from al-Qaeda in Yemen,” Washington Post, August 24, 2010145http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf
Page | 41suspects was also allegedly involved in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya andTanzania.146Before his killing in 2009, Al-Shabaab leader Saleh Ali Saleh Al-Nahban was an Al-Qaeda senior operative who masterminded the Mombasa attacks.147It is then clear that theclose association between the two groups has not been farfetched, but as noted earlier, therehas not been any hard evidence indicating an elaborate Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab’s association tothe effect that they can be referred to as a single entity or involvement in Somalia since theestablishment of Al-Shabaab in 2006. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has repeatedly pledgedallegiance to Al-Qaeda, which it recognises as the ‘pinnacle of global jihad.’ The recentproclamation that Al-Shabaab finally joined the Al-Qaeda was therefore not asurprise. According to the SITE translation, Al-Zawahiri, while accepting Al-Shabaab intothe fold said:148Today, I have pleasing glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah that will please the believersand disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al Mujahideen Movement inSomalia to Qaedat al Jihad, to support the jihadi unity against the Zio[nist]-Crusadercampaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers who let the invadingCrusader forces enter their countries.With this proclamation, Al-Shabaab officially joined the Al-Qaeda. However, whatremains unsubstantiated is why this moment was significant for the two groups to finallyhave a formal union. Lt Col. Ankunda opines that the decision to merge at this point was acritical mistake, arguing that the Somali people who are not known to have embraced aculture of radicalism would not find the merger appealing, but was quick to add that “Al-146Ibid147Ibid148http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/shabaab_formally_joi.php#ixzz1r42UjHvA
Page | 42Shabaab had to join hands with Al-Qaeda for three reasons: Get a new lease of life as it wasbeing weakened militarily, enhance its sources of funding and gain some visibility.”149Harper looks at the Al-Shabaab/Al-Qaeda merger differently arguing that ‘this is notsomething new’ as the two groups have had a history of encouraging each other. She opinesthat the recent ‘merger’ statements are a sign of weakness of both the groups.1502.3 CONCLUSIONDespite the existence of a common language and a shared religious belief, which, indeedare fundamental ‘unifying elements’ in an African context, Somalia continues to remainvolatile as the citizens pledge allegiance to ‘a more overarching element’, the Clan.The proliferation of arms (thanks to Cold War machinations), citizenrydisenfranchisement, as well as insurmountable clan differences created enough incentive forthe Somalia civil war break out. The fall of the repressive Siad Barre’s regime was, thereforethe tipping point of the State collapse.The deteriorating security situation, dilapidated social amenities and infrastructure,coupled with intense inter-clan wars created an environment ripe for extremism and terrorist-related activities. The advent of radical groups like AIAI, ICU and the Al-Shabaabaggravated the conflict by infusing sacralisation as an additional component to the alreadyexisting complex. This new aspect to the conflict did not just entrench hard core extremism inSomalia, but also created a forum for its export in the neighbouring countries.149Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012.150Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012
Page | 43Al-Shabaab, the latest prototype of Somalia extremism has not only destabilised the TFG,but equally extended its influence to the EAC particularly Kenya. Key to the outfit’s successis its vision which is founded on religious indoctrination, ability to recruit in Somalia andbeyond, a well-coordinated organisational structure, established stream of funding, strategicmechanisms for ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the population, propaganda machinery, a non-conventional warfare tactic, as well as its affiliations with the AQAP and Al-Qaeda central.An assembly of these features not only make Al-Shabaab a threat to TFG and Somaliacitizens, but a regional, if not a global challenge. So far, there is overwhelming evidencelinking the Al-Shabaab or its Al-Qaeda ally to bombings in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.Burundi (fourth EAC member) has equally been threatened by the Al-Shabaab on numerousoccasions. From a community of five States, it is just Rwanda (sandwiched between Ugandaand Burundi) which has not been ‘earmarked’ by the Al-Shabaab or its allies.As the threat of Al-Shabaab orchestrated extremism escalates in the region, so are themilitary interventions. Distinctively, Ethiopia has been on the forefront in Somalia missions,but its exit in 2007 was followed by the entry of AMISOM. In the wake of a wave of attacksand kidnappings in Kenya, the government responded swiftly through a military incursionwhich was ostensibly to protect Kenya’s integrity and sovereignty.
Page | 44CHAPTER THREE3.0 AL-SHABAAB RELATED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS3.1 OPERATION LINDA NCHI (OLN)OLN: What informed the incursion?Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, dubbed the operation ‘Linda Nchi’ a Swahili statementfor ‘Protect the Nation’ was informed by the increased government’s perception that the Al-Shabaab extremism had encroached into the country to an extent that the sovereignty ofKenya was under disrepute. While addressing the executive session of the Commonwealthheads of states and Governments in Perth Australia (2011), President Kibaki of Kenya stated:“The mission in Somalia is based on a legitimate right to protect Kenya’s sovereignty andintegrity;"151a statement that was echoed by his minister for internal security who observedthat “Kenya had no intentions of annexing Somalia.”152Based on these accounts, thedecision, notably Kenya’s largest military operation since independence (1963) was arguablytriggered by three key events:i. The October 2011 kidnappings of two Spanish Aid workers from the Daadab refugeecamp;153ii. The shooting of a British holiday maker and subsequently abducting his wife (Mrs.Judith Telbutt) from a Kenyan beach resort;154151“Kenya Defence Forces capture key town”, NTVKenya, October 28, 2011,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYUGHE3B8cA (accessed on March 15, 2012)152Ibid153“Spanish aid workers abducted from Kenyan refugee camp”,AljazeeraEnglish, October 13, 2011,http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=h9BYFHDLVjI#! (accessed on February 2, 2012)154“Murdered Brits Wife Taken Hostage In Kenya”, Sky News, September 12, 2011,
Page | 45iii. The kidnapping of an elderly French woman from a Kenyan resort of Lamu (near thelocation from which Judith Telbutt was abducted).155For a country that is heavily dependent on tourism as a foreign exchange earner, thekidnappings, especially at the beach resorts presented Kenya on the international arena as adangerous destination, a rationale that the government exploited to justify its militaryoperation in Somalia. Arguably, these three incidents cannot entirely be the main causationfor the intervention.Being a frontline state with Somalia, Kenya has borne the brunt of spill overs of violenceand extremism emanating from Somalia’s State failure and collapse. A historical examplewould be the August 7, 1998 bomb attack of the US embassies in both Nairobi and Dar esSalaam, which was responsible for the demise of 225 lives and a further 4,000 woundedones.156,157It has since been alleged that the attacks were masterminded by the Al-Qaeda EastAfrica cells, with Somalia being instrumental in their planning and execution.158Yet,Somalia has not only become a security threat to Kenya or Tanzania, as the 7/11Kampala bomb attack was planned and executed by a new Somalia extremism outfit, the Al-Shabaab.OLN can therefore be envisioned as a military incursion that was neither random norinformed by a single incidence observable as having breached the security of Kenya as asovereign state, but rather it was triggered by a series of past extremist events which hadhttp://news.sky.com/home/uk-news/article/16067471 (accessed on February 2,2012)155“French woman kidnapped from north Kenyan coast”, The Telegraph, October 1, 2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/8800728/French-woman-kidnapped-from-north-Kenyan-coast.html (accessed on February 2, 2012)156ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 1, February15, 2012157“Attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania” Global Security,http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm (accessed on April 5, 2012)158ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 1, February15, 2012
Page | 46constituted a dangerous pattern. Still, some observers argue that Kenya’s initial agenda wasnot to pursue the Al-Shabaab into Somalia, citing that the whole idea was to create a bufferzone by leading a covert operation and subsequently installing a Kenyan controlled proxygovernment in Jubaland.159Aims and progress of the Operation Linda NchiWhereas the above accounts are presented as the legal and sometimes moral reasons forthe incursion, the main goal for the operation has remained vague given the recurrent shift inpositions by the military handlers. According to the Crisis Group:160First came “hot pursuit” of kidnappers identified as Al-Shabaab. At the 21 October 2011IGAD meeting, the stated goal shifted to destroying or weakening Al-Shabaab andestablishing a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia. Ten days later, the chief of thedefence forces, General Julius Karangi, declared the operation had no time limit and wouldcontinue until Kenya was safe. Over time, it has come to appear that another aim is to capturethe port city of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab earns substantial revenue there, the loss of which, it isargued, would break its economic back.Even as the KDF set its eyes on Port Kismayu, another twist emerged with the ministerfor Defence insisting that the Kenyan forces would not capture the port city without thefinancial and logistical backing of the international community.161This instability indetermining the operation’s main goal was likely to increase public scrutiny both in Kenyaand Somalia as the war against Al-Shabaab’s continued. However, the fears seem to havebeen calmed by Augistine Mahiga, Head of the UN Political Office for Somalia who159Robert Young Pelton,“Kenya Modified Invasions to Suit US concerns”, Somalia report, November 14, 2011,http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2028 (accessed January 3, 2012)160ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 5, February15, 2012161Fred Oluoch and Mwaura Kimani,“Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up”, The East African, January 15,2012,
Page | 47reiterated that KDF’s primary mission was to capture Kismayu from Al-Shabaab and thencontinue north to the port city of Marka.162Strategy and AchievementsWhereas KDF’s main goal in this war had been subjected to a series of discussions, theapproach of the incursion pointed to the capture of port Kismayu as the priority. The KDFlaunched its assault from three fronts, namely: The Northern, Central, and Southern fronts.162Yara Bayoumy, “INTERVIEW: AU, Kenya Forces Move to Squeeze Rebels Out of Somalia,” Reuters, January 30, 2012,http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E8CU29J20120130?sp=true (accessed March 24, 2012)
Page | 48163163“Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi Week One (16-22 October, 2011) ”, Critical Threats,http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/KEN_SOM_OP_20111022.pdf (accessed on January 5, 2012)
Page | 49Even though it appeared obvious that all the three axes of the Kenyan battalion wereheaded for Kismayu, Prof. David Anderson argues that KDF tactical objective was not tomarch straight to Kismayu, but rather circle the port city by first capturing Afmadow, whichlies on River Juba, thereby sealing off any crossing by Al-Shabaab.164He posits that thiswould be followed by the capture of Jibil on River Shibeli, before matching to Mogadishu.Port of Kismayu, as already discussed in this thesis is one of the key sources of the Al-Shabaab financial lifeline, it, therefore, makes more sense sealing off the region from the restof the Al-Shabaab held regions as this would cause serious shortages to the groups supplies.As evidenced by the Crisis Group report, the government volunteered very little about“which and how many forces” were involved in Somalia. Nevertheless, Statfor’s Africananalyst, Mark Schoreder revealed that prior to January 2012; Kenya deployed 4,000 of itsmilitary personnel in Somalia.165This figure sharply differs with the ICG estimates whichwere at 2,000 troops,166but the discrepancy highlights how tight-lipped the government hasremained about many aspects revolving around the operation.The KDF worked closely with the TFG forces (remnants of the 2,500), and 500 strongOgaden forces it trained at the beginning of the Jubaland project in 2009 and the proxies such164Al Shabaab and Kenyas Somali invasion” hjemmesidefilm, January 30, 2012,http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=9B-AvoLNbvc#! (accessed on February 2, 2012)165“Dispatch: Kenyas Military Engagement Against Al Shabaab”, STRATFORvideo, October 31, 2011,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIAlkMzjkKk&feature=related (accessed on February 2, 2012)166ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 5, February15, 2012
Page | 50as the Ras Kamboni brigade.167This alliance remained critical to KDF’s mission in Somaliagiven the unpredictability of Al-Shabaab and the unfamiliar terrain. Yet, as the ICG notes,lack of cohesion between these groups, especially the TFG (whose members’ loyalties are toindividual commanders and not the institution) and the Ras Kamboni brigade jeopardized theentire mission.168The ICG, therefore, attributes the slow progress of KDF’s offensive alongthe Liboi-Afmadow-Kismayu road to these competing interests.169The unfamiliar terrain, heavy downpours,170Al-Shabaab guerrilla tactic and fewereffective allies171became the primary challenges that KDF was to encounter at the onset ofthe war making meaningful advances limited. Despite these constraints, KDFs Director ofMilitary Operations Information, Col. Oguna exudes confidence, noting that KDF had madevery significant achievements by liberating “a total of 95,000 Km2of Southern Somalia fromthe Al- Shabaab”172(in 126 days at the time of the press conference in February 2012.)On the March 18, 2012 press conference, Col. Oguna reiterated that after 154 days of theoperation, the Kenyan troops had captured 22 towns173from the Al-Shabaab extremist groupand secured twice the size of both Rwanda and Burundi combined.174167Ibid168Ibid169Ibid170Abdi Guled and Tom Odula, “Heavy Rains Slow Kenyan Army’s Hunt for Militants Inside Somalia,” AP, October 18,2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/heavy-rains-slow-kenyan-armys-hunt-for-militants-inside-somalia/2011/10/18/gIQAibRztL_story.html (accessed on March 24, 2012)171ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 6, February15, 2012172Ronald Njoroge and Chrispinus Omar, “Kenyas military says making further advances in southern Somalia”, Xinhua,February 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-02/19/c_122721398.htm (accessed on March 27, 2012)173Steve Mkawale, “KDF to operate under Amisom in Mogadishu”, The Standard, March 17, 2012,http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000054249&cid=4& (accessed on April 22, 2012)174“Press briefing: Operation Linda Nchi”, Standard Group Kenya, March 18, 2012,http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=sJe5zWmngYU#! (accessed on April 22, 2012)
Page | 51Safety of Kenya since the incursionAny person with rational thinking would come to a logical conclusion that that thedecision to pursue Al-Shabaab beyond Kenyan borders had inherent repercussions both inKenya and Somalia. The targets in Somalia (the Kenyan military personnel) were in a warzone, and hence prepared for eventualities. In the homeland, however, the security stakeswere different with the population remaining highly vulnerable as a consequence of thefactors identified in chapter 4 as the loopholes for spill over of extremism into Kenya and therest of EAC.It is apparent that Al-Shabaab would not have wished to get into a massive militaryconfrontation with Kenya; such an approach would have been a serious miscalculation for itslong term agenda of expanding its influence and capabilities in the EAC region. Nevertheless,the incursion may have changed the group’s approach to a more volatile mode as it basicallyhad nothing to lose. The outcome of this confrontation may eventually lead to large scaleretaliatory attacks on the Kenyan soil or the rest of the region.Indeed, Kenya has been synonymous with grenade attacks with North Eastern town ofGarissa, Nairobi and Mombasa being the targeted areas so far. As already noted by thisauthor, these are the three cardinal areas where the Muslim populations are most concentratedin Kenya. Still, there is negligible evidence tying the Al-Shabaab to some of these terroristactivities, thus the emergent school of thought that criminal gangs may as well takeadvantage of the existing security gap to carry out Al-Shabaab like terrorist acts and get awaywith it for two reasons: Al-Shabaab would take responsibility, or the security agencies willpin it on them (Al-Shabaab).Just a week after the military intervention in Somalia, a grenade attack rocked a Nairobinight club injuring 12 people and despite Al-Shabaab’s earlier threats for reprisals attacks, the
Page | 52police chief said the investigations had not shown any links to Al-Shabaab.175In just a matterof hours, there was another grenade attack at a crowded bus stop during the evening rushhour which claimed at least one life with over eight more injured.176The confession of ElgivaBwire Oliacha,177put the case to rest when it was finally determined that Al-Shabaab had alink to the second grenade attack of that day. In that same span of time, two grenade attacksrocked Garissa town in the North Eastern part of Kenya killing five people and injuringscores of others.178The random, but selective attacks on vulnerable Kenyans have not ceased so far. In earlyMarch 2012, a series of explosions rocked Machakos bus terminus killing four peopleinstantly. The Red Cross further reported on its official twitter account that eight out of the 40people admitted to the hospital were in critical condition.179According to Dan Mutinda ofRed Cross, doctors were not just responding to the victims of the blasts, there were equallymany who were sprayed with bullets.180The police were quick to conclude that the attackswere orchestrated by the Al-Shabaab, with the deputy police spokesman stating; “this is acowardly act by Al-Shabaab elements."181The latest of the series of blasts took the perpetrators to the coastal city of Mombasawhere two people were killed with at least 30 more injured on the March 31, 2012 Mtwapagrenade attack.182As expected, Al-Shabaab was quick to claim responsibility for these175“Nairobi nightclub grenade attack injures 12”, BBC, October 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15425447 (accessed on January 15, 2012)176“Second Grenade Attack Hits Kenyan Capital”, Sky News, October 24, 2011, http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16094949 (accessed on January 15, 2012)177A Kenyan-non Somalia Al-shabaab operative arrested and confessed to being part of the extremist group in Kenya.178“Two Grenade attacks kill five in Somalia”, Somalia Report, November 24, 2011,http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2118 (accessed on March 4, 2012)179“Deadly grenade attack in Kenyan capital”, Al Jazeera and agencies, March 11, 2012,http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/201231017268935267.html (accessed on April 11, 2012)180Ibid181Ibid182Fred Indimuli, “POLICE IDENTIFY KEY SUSPECT IN MOMBASA GRENADE ATTACKS”, April 10, 2012,http://www.the-star.co.ke/classicnews/70753-police-identify-key-suspect-in-mombasa-grenade-attacks (accessed on April11, 2012)
Page | 53attacks.183However, the most daring of all these attacks was launched in Wajir where thesuspected extremist group raided a police post killing six people and abducting three others.As had been indicated, it is not definitive whether these attacks can credibly be linked toAl-Shabaab as there are incidences when they have taken responsibility and times when theyhave not. Nevertheless, the concern remains that Kenya has become more prone to thesekinds of attacks since the incursion began. Worst still, it is not easy to establish who exactlyis behind them, even on the face of claims for the same by the Al-Shabaab. This author istherefore convinced that grenade attacks would continue on the Kenyan soil for a long time.Sustainability of the WarLike any other war, OLN was expected to incur both monetary and human costs;consequently, the Kenyan government had an obligation to visualise the magnitude ofexpenses it would incur once its forces were in Somalia. In part, this aspect justifies thetheory that the war might have not just been precipitated by isolated incidences of the touristand Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) worker’s abductions; rather, it was an operation that hadbeen carefully planned over a long duration of time.The KDF, through its press conference sessions kept both the Kenyan public andinternational community abreast about the progress in Somalia. While this can be regarded asa splendid approach to handling matters of national interest, the reality of pursuing an enemyin a foreign territory overshadows some of the very pertinent concerns that the populationwould readily ask under ordinary circumstances. Consequently, KDF has progressivelyevaded issues such as; the actual number of casualties it has incurred, or its daily monetaryexpenditure on the war.183Maureen Mudi, “Kenya: We Did It, Say Al Shabaab”, The Star (Nairobi), April 1, 2012,http://allafrica.com/stories/201204021446.html (accessed on April 11, 2012)
Page | 54The casualty figures presented by KDF appear skewed and can easily be discredited, butthere were no actual or parallel statistics to draw comparison to. Admittedly, propaganda ispart of any war reporting mechanism and as such, a reliable tool for winning the minds of anexpectant population by enhancing a sense of safety amidst the unpredictability of war. Mostimportantly, it is fitting that framing of a war must be in favour of the party that controls thenews outlet, in this case the KDF.Details of the monetary expenses are equally scanty. As of January, 2012, financialexperts were estimating that the war was costing Kenya an average of Kenya shillings 7,000(USD 84) per soldier in Somalia.184The cost per soldier multiplied by just 1,000 soldiers is ahefty expenditure for a developing nation such as Kenya. It can well be concluded that KDFmight have underestimated the costs of this incursion. This would in part explain thegovernment’s position of not capturing Kismayu unless the international community availsmonetary and logistical support,185but could also be the reason that prompted the idea ofincorporating KDF into AMISOM.The TFG support for KDF incursion: Natural or coerced?Whereas the Somalia president had questioned Kenya’s decision to pursue the Al-Shabaab into Somalia cautioning “against doing anything that will harm the two countriesrelationship,"186his Prime Minister, on the other hand, took a dissimilar stand offering hissupport for the operation.187Different schools of thought have attempted to explain thisstance. According to Cole, President Sharif’s statement may have been based on the belief184“Is this war too costly?”, Daily Nation, January 16, 2012,http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Editorial/Is+this+war+too+costly/-/440804/1308374/-/ykv98a/-/ (accessed on February 22,2012)185Already pointed out by the author186“Somali President Warns Against Kenya Raid”, Voice of America News, October 24, 2011,http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Somali-President-Warns-on-Kenya-Raid-132466998.html (accessed onFebruary 22, 2012)187Gabe Joselow “Your Questions: Kenyas Campaign Against Al-Shabab”, Voice of America News, November 08, 2011,http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Your-Questions-Kenyas-Campaign-Against-al-Shabab-133487408.html(accessed February 22, 2012)
Page | 55that Kenya’s invasion went beyond what is allowed for national self-defence under article 51of the UN Charter.188Dr. Kimani, however looks at it differently arguing that PresidentSharif’s relationship with the ICU as its former Chairman and the structure of the Somalicommunity might have informed his utterances.189E.B- Gaswaga, on the other hand looked atit from the perspective of national pride. She opines that there was need (by the president) toassert sovereignty and re-assure the international community of the TFG’s ability to functionas a government in control, regardless of the numerous challenges.190Following the public spat between the President and his Prime Minister, the high levelbilateral talks between the TFG and Kenyan government was necessary in shaping thenarrative of KDF’s pursuit of Al-Shabaab into Somalia territories, even though it only cametwo weeks after the inception of the offensive.President Sharifs absence in these highly publicised bilateral talks could be attributed tothe divergent views taken by his prime minister. Most importantly, it underscored theapprehensions that Kenya’s decision to intervene in Somalia at that time may not have beenconsultative,191and as such, excluded international allies, regional bodies and neighboursincluding Somalia, which was the targeted country.The joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga and H.E.Abdiweli Mohamed Ali of the Republic of Kenya and the TFG respectively embraced the188Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP Coordinator, February 7, 2012189Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March 21,2012190Interview with Eizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February24,2012191ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, pg 3, February15, 2012
Page | 56decision of a joint military engagement of KDF and the TFG of Somalia forces in the huntfor Al-Shabaab. The agreement therefore espoused the following:192i. That Kenya’s security operation inside Somalia is aimed at eliminating the threatposed by Al Shabaab to Kenya’s national security and economic well-being, and isbased on the legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter;ii. That Al Shabaab constitutes a threat to both Somalia and Kenya and is therefore acommon enemy for the entire region and the world. This threat must be fought jointlyby the two nations with support from the international community;iii. That the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with thesupport of the Kenyan Defence Forces in pursuit of legitimate Al Shabaab targets;iv. That the Somali Government supports the activities of the Kenyan forces, which arebeing fully coordinated with the TFG of Somalia and being carried out in the spirit ofgood neighbourliness and African unity.v. That there will be continuous sharing of intelligence and information on Al Shabaabactivities and the military operation to flush them out. In this regard, a joint high levelcoordination committee has been established which will maintain regular ongoingcontact including periodic meetings in Nairobi and Mogadishu.vi. To mount a joint diplomatic campaign by both countries to galvanize support for theoperation beginning with a joint meeting with select members of the DiplomaticCorps in Nairobi on November 1, 2011 and followed by visits to several selectcapitals.192Raila Odinga and Abdiweli Mohamed, “JOINT COMMUNIQUE”, Ministry of foreign Affairs of Kenya,http://www.mfa.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=399:joint-communique&catid=35:news (accessedon March 4, 2012)
Page | 57vii. That additional AMISOM troops be provided to move into the liberated areas inSouthern Somalia to help safeguard peace and security and assist the establishment oflocal administration with the guidance of the TFG.viii. That the international community assists in providing immediate humanitarianassistance in the liberated areas and provide needed funding for other urgently neededservices such as in health and education.ix. That the TFG will seek ICC assistance in beginning immediate investigations intocrimes against humanity committed by individuals within the Al Shabaab movementwith the aim of seeking their indictment.x. That the international community provides the necessary logistical and financialsupport for the blockade of the Port of Kismayu until Al Shabaab is removed;xi. That the Kenya Government shall not negotiate with Al Sahbaab but the TransitionalFederal Government of Somalia is free to negotiate with all armed opposition groupswithin the instruments guiding this road map (i.e. The Djibouti Peace Process and theKampala Accord as recommended by IGAD and the African Union) provided theyrenounce violence.KDF joint AMISOM operationIn the face of the reality of being bogged down in an operation that may take infinitelylonger than anticipated, KDF’s incorporation into AMISOM is in effect advantageous to theKenyan military. In a sense, KDF has manoeuvred itself into AMISOM and as such presenteditself with a unique opportunity for: (a) Avoiding the probable perception of being aunilateral occupational force in Somalia. (b) Doing away with extra monetary expenses at the
Page | 58behest of the Kenyan tax payer. (c) Finding an exit strategy that does not leave a void oncethe war is over.According to E.B-Gaswaga, the integration of KDF into AMISOM was a timely decisionciting that additional troops were necessary to boost AMISOM’s efforts in Somalia.193Lt.Col. Ankunda concurs with this view stating that the move was welcome as many Africancountries had been reluctant to contribute troops.1943.2 AMISOMEstablishmentThe African Mission in Somalia was created by the UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007). Theresolution took note of the communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council ofJanuary 19, 2007, which states that the:195African Union shall deploy for a period of six months a mission to Somalia (AMISOM),aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, and that themission will evolve into a United Nations operation that will support the long-termstabilization and post-conflict restoration of Somalia.With the establishment of AMISOM came the exit of ENDF that was deployed inSomalia at the request of the TFG. Consequently, AMISOMs immediate role was to fill thevoid being left by ENDF following a heated pursuit of the ICU beyond Mogadishu, thecapital of Somalia.193Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga -Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February24,2012194Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012.195“SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES SIX-MONTH AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA”, Security Council,February 20, 2007, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8960.doc.htm (accessed April 18, 2012)
Page | 59MandateAMISOM, according to UNSC resolution 1744 (2007) was mandated to support theTransitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), implement a national-security plan, train Somalisecurity forces and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarianaid.196The fact that the initial time frame has been renewed several times (latest beingOctober 31,2012 as per Resolution 2010(2011)) should not only warrant an account of whatthe mission has achieved, but also give room for an assessment of its challenges. Further, itshould be determined whether the continued renewal of its mandate is subject to creatingroom for a comprehensive achievement of the set objectives or an indication of lack of viablealternatives.Despite its mandate being confined to peacekeeping, the evolving situation in Somaliaand beyond compelled the African Union (AU) foreign affairs ministers to implore theirrespective heads of states and the UNSC to rethink this mandate.197Coming in the wake ofthe Kampala grenade attacks of 7/11, it was definitive that Al-Shabaab had developed thecapability and infrastructure to breach security apparatus of neighbouring states even afterwarning them of an imminent attack. The call for change of AMISOMs mandate to peaceenforcement can therefore be seen as a reactionary measure that was to facilitate a directengagement of Al-Shabaab in its own backyard. Even though the UNSC did not yield to anentire overhaul of this mandate, AMISOM gained leeway to carry out pre-emptive strikesagainst the Al Shabaab extremists.198196Ibid197Charles Kazooba “Somalia: AU Ministers Agree to Take On Al Shabaab”, The East African ,July 26, 2010,http://allafrica.com/stories/201007250021.html (accessed on April 17, 2012)198Risdel Kasasira and Solomon Muyita “Africa: United Nations Blocks Change of Amisom Mandate”, The Monitor, July28, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007280079.html (accessed on April 17, 2012)
Page | 60Changing faceBurundi and Uganda have been the face of AMISOM since its inception in 2007. As onSeptember 13, 2011, AMISOM had 9,595 troops, mainly from the two countries. 199Eventhough this ceiling is slightly above the originally authorised troop strength by the UNSC(8,000), it is curious that it took four years to assemble this number, a development thatraises serious apprehensions about the international community’s commitment to the successof AMISOM in stabilising Somalia.The October 14, 2011 intervention against Al-Shabaab is at the epicentre of AMISOMsgradual restructuring following Kenya’s acceptance of the AU Peace and Security Council’srequest to integrate its troops as part of the greater AMISOM.200This move has potentials forsuccess in Somalia if fully backed beyond the regular rhetoric, but equally concealschallenges of comparable proportions if not carefully thought through. In line with theincorporation of the KDF into AMISOM, the UNSC through its resolution 2036 (2012)consequently, increased the AMISOM troop ceiling from 12,000 to 17,731,201,202a move thatwould, in effect, create room for the Kenyan and Sierra Leonean troops.With this integration equally comes the internal reorganisation which AMISOM has sofar handled with decorum and utmost speed to facilitate a sustained focus on defeating Al-Shabaab. Part of this restructuring saw the command of AMISOM headquarters remain witha Ugandan General to be deputised by two major generals from Kenya and Burundi199“Military Component”, AMISOM , http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/(accessed on April 17, 2012)200“Kenya send troops into S. Somalia”, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p5, January 2012201“UN Agrees To Boost AU Troops In Somalia”, Sky News, February 22, 2012,http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16175096 (accessed on March 13, 2012)202“SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS AFRICAN UNION TO INCREASE TROOP LEVEL OF SOMALIA MISSIONTO 17,700, ESTABLISH EXPANDED PRESENCE IN KEEPING WITH STRATEGIC CONCEPT”, UNSC, February22, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012)
Page | 61respectively. The restructuring also saw Kenya claim the information and intelligence postamong others.203As the integration of the KDF into AMISOM gains more prominence, there are othernotable consequential amendments to the initial UNSC Resolution 1772 (2007) which mighthave been obscured by the latest developments. Resolution 2036 (2012) thus read in part:204the Mission should establish a presence in the four sectors set out in its own strategicconcept of 5 January and be authorized to take all necessary measures in those sectors, incoordination with the Somali security forces, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab andother armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective governancecountry-wide.The phrase ‘and be authorized to take all necessary measures in those sectors’ is key tounderstanding the paradigm shift in AMISOM’s mandate from peace keeping to peaceenforcement. This, albeit late, sought to address some of the initial concerns that advancedreservations in contribution of the troops by African countries such as Nigeria.205Opportunity to redeem Somalia amidst challengesAMISOM is the single alternative to Somalia stability that regional organizations like theInter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), AU and the InternationalCommunity has a definite control over. Understandably, a political process in Somalia issignificant, and to an extent, weighty than the military option. However, external players maynot have an absolute control over it in comparison to AMISOM. In Somalia, the political203Laban Wanambisi, “Kenya gets 16 plum posts in AMISOM”, Capital FM News, March 12, 2012,http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/03/kenya-gets-16-plum-posts-in-amisom/ (accessed on March 23, 2012)204“SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS AFRICAN UNION TO INCREASE TROOP LEVEL OF SOMALIA MISSIONTO 17,700, ESTABLISH EXPANDED PRESENCE IN KEEPING WITH STRATEGIC CONCEPT”, UNSC, February 22,2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012)205DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & SEUNGWON CHUNG, “The African Unions beleaguered Somalia mission”, The Long WarJournal, July 20, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/the_african_unions_b.php (accessed on March15, 2012)
Page | 62scope is further complicated by endless clan animosity which, as noted earlier by the author,was an actual ingredient for the civil war. Any mitigation on this platform obligates utmostcaution which must manifest the absence of external control. To create a Somalia wherepolitical mitigation is feasible is to eliminate the threat which thrives through the instability,Al-Shabaab is that threat and AMISOM, so far appears to be the most valid and lesscontroversial approach for a short term redress.In his recent visit to Mogadishu, the UN Secretary General commended AMISOM fordoing “a tremendous job in very difficult circumstances.”206Even though this statementacknowledges the progress that AMISOM has made, especially with regards to safeguardingMogadishu, it is also an admission to failure by the international community to advance theurgently required support that would in turn ease the work of this mission.With a troop capacity of just under 10,000, AMISOM in 2012 and against an extremistgroup that destabilises the entire region is way short of the troop strength of Unified TaskForce (UNITAF) between (December 1992 and May 1993) and United Nations Operation inSomalia II (UNOSOM II) between (March 1993 and May 1995). Both were deployed inaccordance with UNSC Resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 (1993) respectively. Notably, asearly as then, both UNITAF and UNOSOM II had troop strengths of 37,000 and 28,000respectively.207Still, it would be premature to conclude that failure of the previous missionsin Somalia might have aggravated the international community’s pessimism over capabilitiesof AMISOM in a territory where no military operation has succeeded. In the past, theinternational community’s concern was realistically within the realms of containing the206Ban Ki Moon, “Secretary-Generals press conference”, United Nations, December 9, 2011,http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=2127 (accessed on March 29, 2012)207J. Peter Pham, PhD, “Somalia in Need of A New Approach Two Decades after State Collapse”, World Defense Review, P2, February 1, 2011
Page | 63Somalia situation, but that has since shifted with the internal dynamics that are constantlyshaped by the Al-Shabaab extremist group.Apart from its negligible troop capacity, AMISOM is haunted by the limitations of theTFG forces. As a foreign mission, AMISOM is supposed to be led by the TFG forces, but theconverse is true for Somalia. According to Maj. Gen. N. Mugisha, AMISOM has attemptedto remedy this by training Somali soldiers.208With limited support from the internationalcommunity and the regional bodies, it is worrisome just how much AMISOM can do as far astraining is concerned, language barrier notwithstanding. The infusion of forces from Djiboutiwould ease the communication situation as Somali is widely spoken in the country and henceSomali speaking persons among the contingent, KDF would also come in handy in thisrespect.The TFG has equally been a frustration to AMISOM efforts. Allegations of corruptionamong TFG officials in the face of catastrophe is not new and has been widely cited as afundamental reason for the rise of ICU as well as its lack of popularity among the Somaliapopulation. Corruption amidst the reality of limited resources has inadvertently led tosituations of irregular pay and a dip in the Somali troop morale. Though Maj. Gen. N.Mugisha asserts that the situation significantly improved in 2011,209it is a dangerousprecedence that may make Al-Shabaab’s extremist group ‘advocacy for no corruption’ moreappealing and therefore, more rewarding. The possibility of the TFG forces crossing over toAl-Shabaab or other militants would not be a new concept. According to Pham, at least threeWestern initiatives of the US, EU and France recruited, trained and armed more than 9,000troops for the TFG and yet fewer than 1,000 had remained loyal to the regime.210When these208Mugisha N., “Learning on the job”, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 14, January 2012209Ibid, p 14210J. Peter Pham, PhD, “Somalia in Need of A New Approach Two Decades after State Collapse”, World Defense Review,p1, February 1, 2011
Page | 64personnel cross over to Al-Shabaab’s side, for example, they not only take with them theweapons, but also tactical skills that they have acquired so far.211Despite the negative publicity that the TFG has attracted, there is still a significant levelof confidence in its commitment to the fight against Al-Shabaab. In Harper’s view, the TFGis “too weak and unprofessional to be fully committed to anything”, but she equally concursthat it would like to get rid of Al-Shabaab as it cannot exercise power in its presence.212E.B-Gaswaga os on agreement, arguing that it is all in the interest of the TFG as the two entities(TFG and Al-Shabaab) cannot co-exist in a peaceful and democratically governed Somalia.213Financing of AMISOM, if not checked would erode any meaningful gains that themission has accomplished so far. The additional troop numbers would equally bemeaningless if structural changes for funding are not made. As Maj. Gen. F.Mugisha pointsout, the current funding structure for AMISOM partly relies on voluntary donations.214Aslong as the funding for AMISOM is not consolidated and issued promptly, provisions for thesame would remain unpredictable and would in turn jeopardize the planning process of themission. He further postulates that “countries would contribute their prized air and navalassets, but only by guaranteeing re-imbursement for contingent owned equipment.”215Itwould be foolhardy for a developing African nation to commit its military hardware to acause that affects the entire globe, while equally aware of the unpredictability of thereimbursements.211Ibid212Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012213Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga- Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February24,2012214Mugisha F., “Beyond Mogadishu”, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 15, January 2012215Ibid
Page | 653.3 ETHIOPIAN PERCIFICATION OF SOMALIAENDF is probably the only African military that is well versed with the Somalia militaryterrain as compared to the rest in the continent. Historically, Ethiopia has been involvedmilitarily in Somalia in one way or another from independence, through the Cold War andinto the era of post Siad Barre regime. The deep suspicion between the two countries hasenshrouded any good intentions Ethiopia might have for its interventions in Somalia. It is inthis regard that as the rest of the frontline states (Kenya and Djibouti) prepare to joinAMISOM, Ethiopia is conspicuously missing in the pact. Nevertheless, the question iswhether the situation in Somalia would have been better without Ethiopian involvement rightfrom the onset.Following its intervention in the post Siad Barre era and prior to the establishment ofAMISOM, Ethiopia went into Somalia at the request of the TFG. Curiously, the TFG (asobserved earlier) was equally unpopular having been bogged down with allegations ofcorruption and failure to provide security to its citizens. The team work between the ENDFand the TFG forces was therefore an affront to “Somalia nationalism” and a reminder of thelosses that Somalia incurred in the hands of Ethiopians during the Ogaden war.Still, it would be myopic to conclude that Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia has been atthe interest of the TFG and entirely for purposes of stability in Somalia. An unstable Somalianot only stand to benefit the disenfranchised Ogaden population (Somalis) in Ethiopia bynecessitating infiltration of the Al-Shabaab extremist group into Ethiopia, but also creates alucrative front where Eritrea can launch its proxy war against Ethiopia. As already noted inChapter 2, the UN Working Group on Somalia and Eritrea widely mentioned Eritrea on theaccounts of being supportive of militant groups (ICU and Al-Shabaab) against the TFG andpossibly its ally (Ethiopia). Further, as noted earlier, Eritrea had been categorical in denying
Page | 66these involvements, but following the sour relationship between the two countries (Ethiopiaand Eritrea), it is plausible that the reasons for Eritrea to support these groups againstEthiopia outweighs the reasons against. In the long run, Ethiopia’s tribulations would alwaysbe Eritrea’s joy and vice versa.In the wake of Kenyan military incursion in Somalia and an increased AMISOM’spressure against the Al-Shabaab, the ENDF weighed into the conflict one more time at the“urging of the IGAD summit and the invitation of the TFG.”216The ENDF’s approach fromthe west helped the TFG liberate strategic towns such as Beletweyne and Baidoa from theextremists.3.4 CONCLUSIONOperation Linda Nchi, Kenya’s first military adventure in a foreign territory sinceindependence (1963) may not have been a wisely thought move given the country’sproximity to Somalia and a plethora of other factors that makes it predisposed to acts ofextremism instigated by Al-Shabaab. Indeed, terrorist activities have increased in the countrysince the incursion.Even though the operation reportedly captured 22 towns and pacified an area of95,000Km2from Al-Shabaab in just 154 days, it initially faced numerous challenges, some ofwhich should have been expected if a thorough intelligence reconnaissance were carried outbefore the incursion.The eventual decision to integrate KDF into AMISOM not only presented Kenya with anopportunity to continue its mission in Somalia without funding the incursion from her own216Amb. Boubacar Diarra, “Message from the SRCC”, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 2, January 2012
Page | 67budget, but also provided an exit strategy, as well as the avoidance of being perceived as anoccupational force in a foreign territory.KDF’s joining of AMISOM has set the latter’s troop ceiling to its highest point (17,731)since inception in 2007 and further given it a broader outlook. However, AMISOM is stillperceptible as an EAC force with three (Burundi, Uganda and Kenya) out of the five EACstates being the main troop contributors to the mission.Despite its myriad challenges which were even recently acknowledged by the UN Sec.General, AMISOM has endeavoured to succeed where many well equipped missions hadfailed. It is notable that the TFG has survived this far because of AMISOM.As the war against Al-Shabaab intensifies, so is the knowledge about the group amongthe EAC’s citizens. Chapter four therefore reveals the relationship between the Somalia statecollapse and the conducive environment such a tragedy has created for Al-Shabaab. It alsopresents the factors which have propelled Al-Shabaab’s infiltration into EAC and itscorresponding consequences.Whereas there is a general acceptance of the unbearable costs of the war against Al-Shabaab among the EAC citizens, Chapter four equally reveals that the population’sreactionary instincts to extremism in the region is to the effect that the support for a militaryoffensive remains broadly acceptable.
Page | 68CHAPTER FOUR4.0 FINDINGS: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION4.1 OverviewThis chapter examines the structure and nature of the collected data; it focuses on thepresentation, analysis and interpretation of data collected from the respondents in an attemptto answer the five research questions. The interpretations are based on the responses from thequestionnaires analysed on SPSS and are thereafter presented in the form of tables and barcharts for easier interpretation. The responses in the questionnaires are further supplementedby the asynchronous online interviews of key informants as well as emerging informationacquired in the course of the desk research.4.2 Data AnalysisResponse rateStatisticsGender ofthe respondentLocation ofthe respondentProfessionof therespondentN Valid 102 102 102Missing 0 0 0[Table 4.2.1]Table 4.2.1 outlines the three categories on which the author’s respondents have beenmapped, that is; gender, location and profession.
Page | 69Frequency TableGender of the respondentFrequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Male 64 62.7 62.7 62.7Female 38 37.3 37.3 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.2.2]Table 4.2.2 above indicates that out of the 102 respondents, 64 of them (62.7%) weremales, while the remaining 38 (37.3%) were females.Location of the respondentFrequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Dar-Esalaam, Tanzania 9 8.8 8.8 8.8Kampala, Uganda 9 8.8 8.8 17.6Kisii, Kenya 11 10.8 10.8 28.4Kisumu, Kenya 11 10.8 10.8 39.2Migori, Kenya 8 7.8 7.8 47.1Mombasa, Kenya 10 9.8 9.8 56.9Nairobi, Kenya 34 33.3 33.3 90.2Nakuru, Kenya 10 9.8 9.8 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.2.3]
Page | 70Table 4.2.3 maps the location of each respondent. Whereas the questionnaires weredistributed in the three EAC States of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Kenya had the largestpercentage distribution across its towns of; Kisii 11 (10.8%), Kisumu 11 (10.8%), Migori 8(7.8%), Mombasa 10 (9.8%), Nairobi 34 (33.3%), Nakuru 10 (9.8%).Dar-Esalaam, Tanzania and Kampala, Uganda both had 9 which translate into 8.8%.Profession of the respondentFrequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Banker/HR/Accountant/Marketer22 21.6 21.6 21.6Business person 7 6.9 6.9 28.4Engineer/IT 11 10.8 10.8 39.2Teacher 13 12.7 12.7 52.0Prison officer/Police officer/Military personnel7 6.9 6.9 58.8Health Practitioner 5 4.9 4.9 63.7Lawyer 3 2.9 2.9 66.7Customer service/Publicrelations14 13.7 13.7 80.4Other 20 19.6 19.6 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.2.4]Table 4.2.4 is indicative of the bias of the study. As already been noted by the author, keyto this study was the identification of at least college educated people with potentials tofollow and understand the evolving events in Somalia, and more specifically, since theKenyan incursion began. The different professionals highlighted by this table as therespondents underscore this crucial component of data collection. Professions such as:Banking, Human Resource, Accounting, Marketing, and Business had the largest
Page | 71representation with 22 respondents (21.6%), while Law was the least represented with onlythree respondents (2.9%). It is also notable that there were assortments of many otherprofessions which were not indicated on individual terms and was as such coded as ‘other’,this category had 20 (19.6%) of the total respondents.4.3 Nexus of the Somalia Collapsed Statehood, Emergence of Al-Shabaab and the recentterrorist activities in the EACTo establish the possibility of a relationship between these three parameters of collapsedstatehood, emergence of Al-Shabaab and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC, the authorasked four questions (see below), whose findings are tabulated as follows:Origin of the respondent * Is Somalia a Collapsed state? CrosstabulationCountIs Somalia a collapsed state?TotalYes NoI dontknowOrigin of the respondent Kenyan of Somalibackground7 1 1 9Somali citizen living inKenya1 0 0 1Kenyan of non-Somalibackground72 1 1 74Ugandan 8 0 1 9Tanzanian 6 3 0 9Total 94 5 3 102[Table 4.3.1]In response to whether Somalia is a collapsed state or not, the author opted to enhance theunderstanding of the responses by doing a cross tabulation of the origin of the respondentagainst the actual response.
Page | 72Out of a total of nine Kenyan Somalis, seven of them agreed that Somalia is indeed acollapsed state, while only one disagreed and the remainder (one) did not know. The analysisis even more revealing on the response of Kenyans of non-Somali origin, whereby out of the74 respondents (Kenyans of non-Somali origin), 72 agreed that Somalia is a collapsed state,just one either felt otherwise, or did not know at all. The same trend could be seen among theUgandan and Tanzanian respondents who were both nine respectively. Eight out of nineUgandans felt Somalia was a collapsed state, while six Tanzanians felt the same, but withthree of them feeling that Somalia was not a collapsed state.Out of the 102 respondents, 94 of them felt Somalia was a collapsed state with a paltrynumber of just five disagreeing, while three did not know whether Somalia was a collapsedstate or not.Origin of the respondent * In your opinion, does Collapsed Statehood of Somalia encourage the influence ofextremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia? CrosstabulationCountIn your opinion, does collapsed statehood ofSomalia encourage the influence of extremist groupslike Al-Shabaab in Somalia?TotalYes NoNotapplicableOrigin of the respondent Kenyan of Somalibackground5 2 2 9Somali citizen living inKenya1 0 0 1Kenyan of non-Somalibackground72 0 2 74Ugandan 8 0 1 9Tanzanian 6 0 3 9Total 92 2 8 102[Table 4.3.2]
Page | 73In an attempt to establish the existence of a relationship between the collapsed Statehoodof Somalia and the emergence of extremist groups like the Al-Shabaab, the author asked ifcollapsed Statehood had encouraged the influence of the Al-Shabaab extremist group. Out ofthe 92 respondents whose responses were affirmative, five of them were Kenyans of Somaliorigin; one was Somalia citizen living in Kenya, 72 Kenyans of non-Somali, eight Ugandans,and 6 Tanzanians. Of all the 102 respondents, only two (Kenyan Somalis) felt there was norelationship between the prominence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the collapsed statehood.This implies that Al-Shabaab would have still been influential with or without State collapse.Origin of the respondent * Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spillover to Kenya? CrosstabulationCountDoes the security threatposed by the Al-Shabaab inSomalia spill over to Kenya?TotalYes NoOrigin of the respondent Kenyan of Somalibackground5 4 9Somali citizen living inKenya1 0 1Kenyan of non-Somalibackground74 0 74Ugandan 9 0 9Tanzanian 8 1 9Total 97 5 102[Table 4.3.3]The analysis of a spill over of Al-Shabaab-related extremism into Kenya was notanswered any differently either, five Kenyan Somalis agreed that there was a spill over; whilefour disagreed.74 Kenyans of non-Somali origin agreed that there was a spill over of
Page | 74insecurity. The same situation was noticeable among the Ugandans who collectively (all nineof them) agreed there was indeed a spill over of insecurity into Kenya. Eight Tanzanians feltthe same way, but with one exception. In total, 97 respondents felt Kenya was exposed to thespill over of Al-Shabaab-related insecurity, while just five disagreed.Origin of the respondent * Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest ofthe East African Community States CrosstabulationCountDoes the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of the EastAfrican Community StatesTotalYes NoI dontknowOrigin of the respondent Kenyan of Somalibackground1 6 2 9Somali citizen living inKenya1 0 0 1Kenyan of non-Somalibackground67 2 5 74Ugandan 7 0 2 9Tanzanian 6 3 0 9Total 82 11 9 102[Table 4.3.4]The author’s intention was to establish if the supposed spill over in Kenya could extend tothe rest of the EAC states. Out of the 82 respondents who agreed that the insecurity spillsover to the rest of the EAC states, only one was a Kenyan of Somali background with amajority of them (six out of nine), disagreeing. 67 Kenyans of non-Somali backgroundagreed. Curiously, despite Uganda having been subjected to an Al-Shabaab instigated attack
Page | 75in July 2010, two Ugandans did not know whether there was an Al-Shabaab spill over beyondKenya or not.Graphical representationIs Somalia a collapsed state?Frequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Yes 94 92.2 92.2 92.2No 5 4.9 4.9 97.1I dont know 3 2.9 2.9 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.3.5]
Page | 76[Fig 4.3.1]According to Table 4.3.5 and the bar graph (Fig 4.3.1), 92.2% of the respondentsagreed that Somalia is a Collapsed State, 4.9% did not agree, while a paltry 2.% did not knowwhether it is a collapsed State or not.
Page | 77In your opinion, does the collapsed statehood of Somalia encourage the influenceof extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 92 90.2 90.2 90.2No 2 2.0 2.0 92.2Not applicable 8 7.8 7.8 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.3.6][Fig 4.3.2]
Page | 78According to Table 4.3.6 and Fig 4.3.2, none of the respondents chose the option ‘I don’tknow’, 90.2% of the respondents agreed that collapsed statehood of Somalia had encouragedthe influence of Al-Shabaab in the country. 2 % did not agree, while the remaining 7.8% ofthe respondents did not have this question applicable to them following their responses to thepreceding questions.Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 97 95.1 95.1 95.1No 5 4.9 4.9 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.3.7][Fig 4.3.3]
Page | 79As indicative of Table 4.3.7 and Fig 4.3.3, 95.1% of the respondents felt that the securitythreat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia had actually spilled over to Kenya. An insignificantpercentage of 4.9 felt otherwise.Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest ofthe East African Community StatesFrequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 82 80.4 80.4 80.4No 11 10.8 10.8 91.2I dont know 9 8.8 8.8 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.3.8][Fig 4.3.4]
Page | 80As for the spill over of Al-Shabaab threat to the rest of the EAC, the number agreeingwent down in comparison to the spill over with regards to Kenya. The fact that Kenya hasbeen on the receiving end of Al-Shabaab related terrorist activities than the rest of the EACstates may have influenced this view as the possible spill over to other countries isovershadowed by Kenya’s predisposition. Consequently, 80.4% agree that spill over is to therest of the EAC states, 10.8% disagree, while 8.8% do not know.4.4 Avenues for spill over of extremism and terrorist activities in Kenya and the EACThat Al-Shabaab is already part of Kenyan and the entire EAC States’ complex is nolonger the question, the urgent need is to identify loopholes that the group has exploited toentrench itself in these countries. The author put the respondents to task of identifyingpotential avenues which may have aided Al-Shabaab’s infiltration into the EAC States andattained the results as outlined in tables; 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. The author also carried out furtherdesk research to back up the respondents’ perception. The findings however outline keyconcerns which establish worrisome trends.Case SummaryCasesValid Missing TotalN Percent N Percent N Percent$Spillovera96 94.1% 6 5.9% 102 100.0%[Table 4.4.1]
Page | 81$Spillover FrequenciesResponsesPercent of CasesN PercentSpillover frequency ofresponseaVast and Porous Kenya-Somalia border79 17.4% 82.3%Inefficient policing andintelligence gathering by theKenya Security agencies52 11.5% 54.2%Accommodative ethnicSomalia community68 15.0% 70.8%Presence of less secureSomali Refugee camps55 12.1% 57.3%Corrupt Kenya police 68 15.0% 70.8%A large number ofunemployed youth from theNorth Eastern Province(largely occupied by theSomalia Community)47 10.4% 49.0%Radicalisation of the youththrough exposure toextremist Islamic teachings84 18.5% 87.5%Total 453 100.0% 471.9%[Table 4.4.2]From the findings, radicalisation of the youth through extremist Islamic teachings had thehighest percentage at 18.5, while the least avenue for spill over was youth unemployment at10.4%. Many respondents disagreed with the perception that lack of employmentopportunities could be an incentive for radicalisation. The percentage distribution for all the
Page | 82avenues blamed for spill over is as shown on table 4.4.2. The author extended the deskresearch to highlight these avenues while interlinking them with existing evidence.Proximity to Somalia, vast and Porous bordersThe Kenya-Somalia border remains a critical reference in the discussion of spill over ofextremism into the EAC. Keeping the large and porous border under check has been Kenya’sgreatest challenge and to that extent, it has remained a necessary transit for small arms,contraband goods, as well as people with questionable characters.Movement of extremists and militants to and from Somalia has been attributed to Kenya’sproximity to Somalia and is a phenomenon that dates back many years. The 1993 entrance ofthe Pakistani (Pashawar) Al-Qaeda operatives into Somalia via Kenya217is just, but one ofthe many incidences.The status of Kenya’s border with Somalia was further worsened by the outbreak of civilwar and famine which forced a huge population of the Somali people into neighbouringcountries as refugees. But, as the displaced population seek refuge in Kenya, so are theextremist group who disguise themselves as refugees. This new approach forced thegovernment of Kenya to close its border with Southern Somalia (January 2007) in an effort toprevent Al-Shabaab extremists from crossing into the country.218Incidentally, this is not justa Kenya-Somalia affair, the entire EAC equally grapples with these challenges and as Shinnpoints out, “there is no capacity to track the movement in and out of the Somali Diaspora inAfrica…”219217Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” P 205218Ahmed Roble Muhyadin, “Al-Shabaab Threats Panic Kenya as Fighting Erupts on the Somali Border,” The Jamestownfoundation Terrorism Monitor IX, no.11 (March 17, 2011): p 3,http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_009_04.pdf (accessed on March 30,2012)219Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” P 213
Page | 83Alongside the physical security dimension, the other important aspect of border policingis that of immigration. Kenya, like the rest of the EAC is yet to employ the use ofsophisticated technology that can facilitate management of an efficient immigration processat its borders. This school of thought justifies how extremist groups have been able tosmuggle bomb devices across Kenya-Uganda border without being detected. On December10, 2010, for example, the Uganda Revenue Authority terminal in Kampala seized explosivematerials on a Kampala bound Gateway bus from Nairobi.220The December 12, 2010explosion of the Kampala coach in a Nairobi terminus (just two days after the first explosiveswere seized by the Ugandan Authorities) attests to the existing loophole in the cross bordermovement of people and materiel within the EAC. The explosion killed three and injured 39people221leading to questions of whether the bomb was intended to go off in Kampala,Uganda or in Kenya. Assuming it was meant for Uganda, then, it brings forth the discourseon porosity of the borders to the effect that transport of these materiel and other illegalexplosives within the EAC is not entirely impractical or impossible.Border permeability, especially in the context of infiltration by illegal Somali immigrantsis even more of a worry to Tanzania. Mr Albert Kishe, the Head of immigration departmentin Namanga border acknowledges that a vibrant racket of Somalis ferrying all sorts of peopleand things across the Namanga border has been thriving in the area for years.222The racket,allegedly facilitated by Kenyans and Tanzanians living along the borderline with otherconduits based in Arusha and Nairobi cities have progressively dodged the authorities.223220Raymond Baguma, “Bomb Materials Found on Bus,” The New Vision,http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/740805 (accessed February 22, 2012)221Tabu Butagira and Betty Kyakuwa, “Terrorist Strike Kampala Bound Bus,” The Daily Monitor, December 12, 2010,(accessed on February 22, 2012)222“Namanga border poses danger of Al- Shabaab infiltration”, Tanzania news link,http://tanzanianewslink.com/news/politics/5911-namanga-border-poses-danger-of-al-shabaab- infiltration (accessed onApril 13, 2012)223Ibid
Page | 84Kishe accounts that for every “arrested Somali, there are about ten others who manage tocross undetected. This implies that more than 2000 illegal Somali immigrants pass throughthe Namanga border in a year.”224He then concludes that “the possibility of having Al-Shabaab members crossing into the country is very high.”225The Eastleigh factor and the Receptive Somalia CommunityThe Nairobi Eastleigh is a small district with its population largely comprising of theSomali people. It is referred in some quarters as the ‘little Mogadishu’ because it is home tomany Kenyan-Somalis, Somali immigrants, as well as refugees.226But, in the wake of thefight against Al-Shabaab, Eastleigh has once again become the focus of Al-Shabaab’sinfiltration into the country. While addressing parliament recently, the assistant Minister forinternal security, Hon. Orwa Ojode said, “Al-Shabaab is like a snake whose tail is in Somaliaand head here in Eastleigh in Nairobi.”227The minister’s statement underscores the very fearsthe entire Kenyan population harbours over the possibility of the group finding a safe havenin Kenya, but also warrants the question of whether it was an admission on the government’spart that the threat is interminable, having acknowledged (through the statement) that it hasall along been aware of the existence of Al-Shabaab in Eastleigh.Eastleigh, as it is known today is one of Nairobi’s most entrepreneurial estates. The CrisisGroup traces the emergence of the region’s vibrant business acumen to the “remittance boomof the early 1990s”228, but it also states that the economy of Eastleigh “is also partly driven by224Ibid225Ibid226OFEIBEA QUIST-ARCTON, “Tension Runs High In Kenyas Little Mogadishu” npr November 19, 2011,http://www.npr.org/2011/11/19/142530740/tension-runs-high-in-kenyas-little-mogadishu (accessed on November 30,2011)227IRIN, “KENYA: Xenophobia, fear follow Nairobi blasts”,http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts (accessed on January 2, 2012)228International Crisis Group, “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation” Africa Briefing N°85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January2012http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx(accessed on February 2, 2012)
Page | 85a close knit community of Wahhabi entrepreneurs, linked to similar networks in Mogadishu,Dubai and the Gulf.”229This linkage is at the core of suspicion raised to the effect that theEastleigh business returns could be part of the resources mobilised to advance Al-Shabaab’sunderworld programmes.The fact that Eastleigh has been home to Somalis of different background (locals,immigrants and refugees) is no justification for its contribution to the lifeline of Al-Shabaabfanned extremism, but it is logical to perceive it as a society that is both secretive andsuspicious. These attributes have given some credibility to the popular belief that such anassociation exists and therefore what is unknown is how to quantify the level and form ofallegiance. While being driven to Eastleigh, BBC’s leading reporter and expert on Somalia,Mary Harper’s taxi driver posited that: 230Somalis are very bad people. They sell everything in Eastleigh, even weapons. They arecorrupt and they are always fighting because they are, by nature, a very violent people.Somali pirates come here to Nairobi and buy expensive houses in the best districts. Kenyanshate Somalis, but they are very good at business.Whereas the statement of the non-Somali taxi driver may pass as prejudicial and moregeneralised towards the entire Somalia community, it underlines the deep seated suspicionwith which the Somali population in Eastleigh are perceived. The comments by the internalsecurity assistant minister not only give credibility to these suspicions, but may also furtherreinforce the existing prejudice against the Somalis and possibly raise xenophobic fearsamong the Kenyan-Somali population.229Ibid230Mary Harper, “Somalis in Kenya: “They call us ATM machines””, Royal African Society November 24, 2011,http://www.royalafricansociety.org/country-profiles/710.html (accessed on March 15, 2012)
Page | 86It is not just Eastleigh which is overcrowded with the Somali populace. The NEP, asnoted earlier, is basically a territory of the Kenyan-Somalia people, with many of itsprivileged citizens ending up in the Nairobi’s Eastleigh. As noted earlier, the isolated andclose knit ties among the Somali people in comparison to the rest of the EAC populationmakes it cumbersome to get to the details of any real affiliations between Al-Shabaab and theKenyan-Somali community.Less secure refugee campsThe Daadab camp, the world’s largest refugee camp is home to more than 463,000refugees.231This is way above the originally intended capacity of the camps, 90,000.232However, the concern today is the security gap that arose as a consequence of its existence,particularly in the era of Al-Shabaab. With approximately 1,300 people arriving into thecamp every day233, it becomes a security challenge to verify whether the latest arrivals arevictims or perpetrators of extremism. Failure by the security agencies to draw conclusiveidentification of those arriving at the camp makes the distinction even more complex as they(extremists) mingle easily with the rest, while their identity remains concealed. Thewidespread reports that Al-Shabaab extremists have infiltrated the Daadab refugee camp andare using it as a recruitment venue234highlight the complexity of the balance that thegovernment of Kenya has to make between keeping the refugee camp and saving Somalilives, or relocating them to Somalia in the hope that this might be a stop gap measure forcurbing further Al-Shabaab infiltration. Still, the legal implications of such a move, mostespecially as they impact on the obligations of states towards refugees must also be kept inmind.231UNHCR, “Dadaab: Worlds biggest refugee camp 20 years old”, Briefing Notes, 21 February 2012,http://www.unhcr.org/4f437d839.html (accessed on February 28, 2012)232ibid233ibid234Mary Harper, “Somalis in Kenya: “They call us ATM machines””, Royal African Society November 24, 2011,http://www.royalafricansociety.org/country-profiles/710.html (accessed on March 15, 2012)
Page | 87The shooting of Mr. Sanyare (the chairman of Hagadera security committee) at theDaadab refugee camp by a group of gunmen allegedly linked to Al-Shabaab is further proofof the insecurity at the camp. It is therefore rational to submit that Al-Shabaab has penetratedthe camp and has a deeper understanding of its operations as well as loose security; otherwisethe bold act would not have been worth the effort. The 1.15pm abduction of the two Spanishaid workers from the camp235further sustains the fear of insecurity in this camp.It is however, not just Kenya which has to contend with the insecurity challenges posedby hosting the largest refugee camp in the world. The insecurity fears resonate across theentire EAC, with Uganda and Tanzania both having their share of Somalia refugees andhence equally bearing the brunt. The following table is formulated based on the UnitedNations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) draft report on the Somali refugeedistribution between 2008 and 2010.EAC Member State Total Number of Refugees between(2008-2010)Kenya 353,208Tanzania 1,488Uganda 18,263236[Table 4.4.3]235Xan Rice, “Two aid workers kidnapped from Kenyan refugee camp”, The guardian, October 13, 2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/13/aid-workers-kidnapped-kenyan-camp (accessed on April 4, 2012)236UNHCR, “Somalia Refugees in the Region”, UNHCR BO Somalia, January 18, 2011
Page | 88As the author had pointed out, the current standing of the Somalia refugees in Kenyaexceeds the indicated figure on the table, a phenomenon that had been amplified by theoutbreak of famine and war against Al-Shabaab in the country (Somalia).Whereas one cannot definitively conclude that Somalia refugees in Uganda and Tanzaniacould be the link to Al-Shabaab’s infiltration into EAC, it is indisputable that the safe haventhis extremist group has so far found in Kenya continues to necessitate the ramifications of itsroots into the region.Brand of laxity and corruption in the police systemThe discourse around infiltration of Al-Shabaab extremism into Kenya cannot be entirelyassessed independent of the role of the police. Even though there is no known research intothose activities by the police that may have created a lucrative environment for the Al-Shabaab to operate in Kenya unchecked, the few available reports and public perceptionbased on past experiences with the police depict a picture of corruption or laxity in theexecution of their duties. The Police Commissioner, in his 2011 Christmas and New Yearmessage to his team noted: “It is not lost to me that as a country we have not done very wellin fighting the greater malady of corruption from which police bribery is a symptom.”237Thecommissioner’s message is an admission of the existence of a vice, probably far beyond hiscontrol and that is too well understood in the public domain to the extent that it could as wellbe treated as a norm. Whereas this kind of public rebuke may be interpreted as a step towardsconfronting the vice, it also raises the question of how much it can achieve in this moment ofproven infiltration of extremism.237Mathew K. Iteere, “CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR MESSAGE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE”, KenyaPolice, December 16th, 2011, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News143.asp (accessed on January 5, 2012)
Page | 89As Prof. Menkhaus puts it: “Bribes to police, border guards and airport officials allow theterrorists to circumvent law even while they enjoy a level of protection from it.”238He singlesout Kenya as a country where even in the event of an arrest of terrorist suspects and theirsubsequent incarceration; the corrupt police still appear to be bribable.239The incidence inwhich two suspects in the Mombasa terrorist attack of September 2002 escaped from custodyin March 2003 attests to this claim.240Revelations following arrests of Uganda twin bomb blast suspects that killed at least 74people on July 11, 2010 even put a section of the Kenyan police under scrutiny. Whileaddressing the press following his arrest, Issa Luyima ( one of the architects of the attack)said: “ Kenyan policemen, especially those from the Somalia tribe, helped us to cross fromSomalia to Kenya and from Kenya to Uganda … our bosses communicated to them and theyeasily let us through.”241The invisible ‘bosses’ referred to by Luyima could either be seniorpolice officers within the Kenya police ranks, or more powerful people with the capacity tomanipulate the police. But, the chilling account is that of Muhamood Mugisha (a Uganda7/11 suspect) who details that, one of the Al-Shabaab leaders telephoned a senior Kenyapolice officer who in turn drove him (Mugisha) to the Kenya-Uganda border and even aidedhim to cross into Uganda.242Even in the unimaginable absence of corruption allegations, laxity among Kenya police incombating extremism remains a critical subject for discussion both in the public domain and238Ken Menkhaus, “ Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism”, p 74239Ibid, p75240Ibid, p 75241Hartely, “JTIC Country Briefing-Somalia”, p 22242Ibid
Page | 90curiously, even within the circles of the police division. The police commissioner capturedthis aspect as follows: 243The extreme criminality manifested by Al-shabaab should be a necessity that provokesthe zeal of all officers to sharpen their instincts of detecting criminals to a level that cannot beoutwitted. I call upon officers to put it their soul that Al-shabaab should never be given achance.Despite the caution of extreme vigilance, Al-Shabaab still staged a bold raid on January11, 2012 at a Wajir police camp by employing grenade attacks that left seven Kenyanadministration police and government officials’ dead, with others taken as prisoners. 244The-Star columnist, Hassan Ole Naado observes that: “Kenyan police stations are some of themost poorly manned despite the country being on a high alert.”245He observes that: “The restof the Kenya police stations, other than the headquarters (Vigilance House) are ‘free go’zones where “people can easily enter, roam and pack vehicles without being checked.”246Youth disenfranchisement and radicalisationKenya and the rest of the EAC have an uphill task of confronting un-employment amongthe youth just like other nations across the globe. The challenge for EAC, however, is thelikelihood of these youth finding Al-Shabaab’s extremist ideology as an alternative for lackof job opportunities. According to Washiala, money is a major motivation for youthradicalisation in Kenya, and possibly the rest of EAC, arguing that the youth are unemployed243Mathew K. Iteere, “CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR MESSAGE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE”, KenyaPolice, December 16th, 2011, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News143.asp (accessed on January 5, 2012)244Noor Ali, “Al Shabaab attack Kenyan police camp, kill 7”, Reuters, January 12, 2012,http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/us-kenya-somalia-idUSTRE80B1IX20120112 (accessed on March 15, 2012)245Hassan Ole Naado, “Laxity Is Undermining Our Homeland Security”, The Star, January 18, 2012,http://www.the-star.co.ke/opinions/hassan-ole-naado-/58611-laxity-is-undermining-our-homeland-security (accessed onFebruary 26, 2012)246ibid
Page | 91en masse and hence have no reasonable income.247Dr. Kimani weighs in by citingdisenfranchisement as a fundamental reason to radicalisation. He further argues that the youthare left “idle, desperate and have nothing to lose” in the face of no employmentopportunities.248However, he is quick to add that: “The economic benefits accruing fromjoining Al-Shabaab are minimal and probably not enough incentive to join the movement.”249This new dimension raises the perception that youth radicalisation is a voluntary decisionprompted by religious convictions, a conviction that both E.B-Gaswaga and Lt. Col Ankundasubscribe to.Whereas there is no evidence so far on the non-Muslim Kenyans being recruited into theAl-Shabaab ranks, the converse is true for the non-Somali Kenyans who have becomeMuslim converts, a trend that is increasingly becoming a challenge to the EAC.The historical marginalisation of NEP has further encouraged disenfranchisement withboth the past administrations of Kenyatta and Moi doing very insignificant, if not nothing atall to uplift the situation in the province.250Education as a key development indicator hastherefore not been synonymous with NEP leading to a high population of youth who not onlyreside in a highly marginalised area, but also lack the knowledge and skills to compete withthe rest of the Kenyan youth for the scarce job opportunities. This idling of the Somali and byextension Muslim youth would in part explain why the Al-Shabaab outfit appeals to them. Inone of its recent bulletins, the Al-Shabaab leadership called on the Kenyan youth to revoltagainst the government.251However, in a quick rejoinder and as if these recruitments are247Interview with Mohammed Washalla Abdi, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Taita Taveta Country Chariman, April10, 2012248Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March 21,2012249Ibid250ICG, “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, pg 7, January 25, 2012251Mohammed Yusuf, “Al-Shabab Calls on Kenyan Youths to Revolt”, Voice of America, March 14, 2012,
Page | 92facilitated by the drive for unemployment on the premise of limited education, Sheikh JumaNgao, the chairman of Kenyas Muslim National Advisory Council, said:252I strongly [do] not support the call [of] Al-Shabaab that the Kenyan youths should involvethemselves to fight the government. This call is totally out of sight. Majority of the KenyanMuslim youths are not well educated but that is not the cause to tell our youths they muststand up and fight the government of Kenya. How can they fight the government of Kenya bykilling innocent people?The correlation between radicalisation and recruitment into the Al-Shabaab ranks is mostvivid among Kenyan Somalis, but equally cuts across the non-Somali Kenyan Muslims aswell. The arrest of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha and his confession for being an Al-Shabaaboperative in Kenya253justifies the idea that the group has penetrated the non-Somali Kenyanswho have converted into Islam.The secretive and formidable Al-Shabaab’s radicalisation infrastructure has paid off inboosting its recruitment standings in Kenya with mosques having been widely identified asvenues for the indoctrination process. The Jihad training sessions conducted by SheikhAhmad Iman Ali at the Maratib Islamic Centre’s mosque in Pumwani (close to Eastleigh,Nairobi) 254can be seen as a credible avenue through which the Al-Shabaab has successfullyradicalised and recruited new Kenyan followers.Even though controversy continued to engulf the Maratib Islamic centre following reportsof radicalisation and subsequent disappearances of young Kenyan Muslims with links to thehttp://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Al-Shabab-Calls-on-Kenyan-Youths-to-Revolt--142645356.html(accessed on April 1, 2012)252Ibid253Clar Ni Chonghaile, “Deadly attack on bus near Kenyas border with Somalia”, The guardian, October 27, 2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/27/kenya-bus-attack-somalia-al-shabaab(accessed on February 27, 2012)254David McKenzie, “Kenyan teens groomed to fight for Somali terrorists”, CNN, February 22, 2012,http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/22/world/africa/kenya-somalia-terror/index.html (accessed on March 17,2012)
Page | 93centre, its administration’s stand appeared to express unwavering endorsement to the centre’salleged activities as well as the effects of radicalisation. On the prospects of these recruitskilling Kenyan soldiers currently fighting in Somalia, Kilumi (the centre’s administrator) wasblunt that the idea was okay with him. He further argued that: “Like every other Muslim, Iwould like the Sharia law to be implemented and that is what they (Al-Shabaab) want to doin that part of Somalia. Muslims first, Kenyans second.”255But, the most significantdevelopment following these recruitments is the naming of Sheikh Ahmed Iman ( the personin charge of Al-Shabaab radicalisation programme in the Pumwani mosque) as Al-Shabaab’sleader and coordinator in Kenya and is allegations that he commands a force of some 200-500 fighters, most of whom are Kenyans.256The Crisis Group further reports that Al-Shaaab radicalisers and recruiters have shiftedtheir focus beyond the Somalia community in line with the group’s regional agenda. 257Inthis new approach of expanding the Jihadist catchment area, Kenyan and Tanzanian coastalMuslims have increasingly become viable targets.258The radicalisation and recruitment ofthis targeted group is necessitated by the reality that, “Swahili members are easily able toevade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by the Kenyan securityofficers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali looking.”259The growing speculation thatsome of these recruits or the Jihadi veterans might have come back to the coastal region260isequally catastrophic for it can only lead to more radicalisation.The discoveries following investigations into the 7/11 Kampala twin bombingsunderscore the need to visualise Muslim radicalisation beyond Kenya as a frontline state with255Ibid256ICG, “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, p 7, January 25, 2012257Ibid258Ibid259Ibid260Ibid
Page | 94Somalia and the revelation that the 7/11 bombings were carried out with the aid of localUgandan citizens 261should be a proof to this worrisome reality.The suspects accused of masterminding the attacks of Kabalagala and Kyadondo RugbyClub in Uganda or the 7/11 as it is now commonly known is a demonstration of thedetermination of Al-Shabaab to penetrate and radicalise the entire EAC. The extremist groupof four consisted of three Ugandans and one Rwandese.262With the aid of the localradicalised group of EAC, Al-Shabaab under the reincarnated 263‘Saleh Nabhan Brigade’were able to execute what it would have possibly not accomplished were it to entirely involveits Somali operatives without injecting ‘outsiders’ into its system.261Herbert Ssempogo, “Tanzania Flies in Bomb Suspect,” The New Vision, July 01,2011,http://newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/759085 (accessed April 5, 2012)262Hartely, “JTIC Country Briefing-Somalia”, p 21263The reincarnation is in the sense that the actual Saleh Nabhan who was an Al-Qaeda member was neutralised by the USSpecial Forces in a military raid on September 14, 2009.
Page | 954.5 Impacts of Al-Shabaab’s instigated insecurity within the EACCase SummaryCasesValid Missing TotalN Percent N Percent N Percent$Impactsa82 80.4% 20 19.6% 102 100.0%[Table 4.5.1]$Impacts FrequenciesResponsesPercent of CasesN PercentInsecurity impactsfrequency of responseaFear of and exposure toterror attacks67 29.8% 81.7%Negative effect on foreigninvestment and the economy64 28.4% 78.0%Negative effect on tourism 56 24.9% 68.3%Diversion of State resourcesto fund military and securityprogrammes instead of morepressing ones like healthand education14 6.2% 17.1%Influx of Refugees andinfiltration of illegal armsinto the EAC24 10.7% 29.3%Total 225 100.0% 274.4%[Table 4.5.2]
Page | 96Table 4.5.2 highlights the main concerns of the EAC citizens with regards to how Al-Shabaab impacts on their daily lives. The main concern for the citizens was fear andexposure to terror attacks at 29.8%, this can be attributed to the direct impacts these attackhave on the society. The least concern was diversion of state resources to fund military andsecurity programmes aimed at curtailing extremism. This was cited by 6.2% of therespondents, possibly highlighting that issues perceived as ‘pressing’ are actually never thegovernment’s priority, implying that the ‘diversion’ of those resources onto security mattersis viewed as an act more noble and a mechanism of accounting for the same.Other notable impacts of Al-Shabaab related insecurity are felt on the economy,particularly on foreign direct investment which is just picking up within the EAC. Notably,foreign investment and tourism (major EAC economic pillars) constituted a combined 53.3%of what the respondents considered their worst fears.4.6 Perceptions of the EAC citizens regarding Operation Linda Nchi (OLN) and theintegration of KDF into AMISOMCore to this research has been the way EAC citizens view Kenya’s incursion of Somaliaand the idea of integrating KDF into AMISOM.
Page | 97Do you think Kenya was justified to pursue the Al-Shabaab extremist group into Somalia?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 80 78.4 78.4 78.4No 14 13.7 13.7 92.2I am not sure 6 5.9 5.9 98.0Not applicable 2 2.0 2.0 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.6.1]According to Table 4.6.1, 78.4% of the respondents feel Kenya was justified to pursue Al-Shabaab as compared 13.7% who disagreed.After three months of war against the Al-Shabaab (OLN), how would you rate yoursupport for the operation?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Very supportive 50 49.0 49.0 49.0Supportive 36 35.3 35.3 84.3Not supportive 10 9.8 9.8 94.1Not applicable 6 5.9 5.9 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.6.2]By the third month after the beginning of the offensive, 49% and 35.3% of therespondents were still ‘very supportive’ and ‘supportive’ respectively. This had a combinedsupport percentage of 84.3, while those who were not supportive of the war stood at 9.8%.This trend shows how the population had become weary of the Al-Shabaab to the point that
Page | 98the cost of waging a war in a foreign land was largely considered irrelevant as long as theoutcome would eventually derail the influence of Al-Shabaab.Since the beginning of the offensive against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, do you think Kenyaand by extension East African Community has become safer?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 38 37.3 37.3 37.3No 51 50.0 50.0 87.3I am not sure 11 10.8 10.8 98.0Not applicable 2 2.0 2.0 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.6.3]After the incursion, one would have expected people supportive of the war to havesomething they can show for it, particularly some noticeable level of improvement ofsecurity. However, support for the incursion notwithstanding, the respondents equallyacknowledge that Kenya and the rest of EAC are still not safe. In fact, 50% of therespondents compared to 37.3% felt the country and region was not safe.
Page | 99Do you support the proposal that the Kenya Defence Forces should join AMISOM inSomalia?Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative PercentValid Yes 71 69.6 69.6 69.6No 25 24.5 24.5 94.1I am not sure 5 4.9 4.9 99.0Not applicable 1 1.0 1.0 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.6.4]The proposal that KDF joins AMISOM was however received well by the respondents.Even though the percentage was not as overwhelming as one would have expected, 69.6% ofthe respondents felt it was a great idea, while 24.5% disagreed and hoped that Kenya shouldhave continued the pursuit of Al-Shabaab independently irrespective of the odds. 4.9% werenot sure whether that was a right decision or not.4.7 Reasons for or against the integration of KDF into AMISOMCase SummaryCasesValid Missing TotalN Percent N Percent N Percent$AMISOMa87 85.3% 15 14.7% 102 100.0%[Table 4.7.1]
Page | 100$AMISOM FrequenciesResponsesPercent of CasesN PercentKDF and AMISOM unionfreq. of responseaIncreased strength due to anincrease in the troopnumbers58 35.6% 66.7%Reduction in the financialstrain on the Kenyan taxpayer41 25.2% 47.1%Provision of a good exitstrategy for the KenyaDefence Forces26 16.0% 29.9%Kenya Defence Forces andAMISOM have differentmandates - there will be aconflict17 10.4% 19.5%It will put Kenya in moredanger as the country sharesa border with Somalia13 8.0% 14.9%Kenya defence forces willbe forced to take ordersfrom AMISOMcommanders8 4.9% 9.2%Total 163 100.0% 187.4%[Table 4.7.2]Table 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 highlights the factors considered by the respondents in theirdecision to support or not support the integration of KDF into AMISOM. Even though thefinancial implications of the war are unquestionable, once again, it is not the main concernfor the respondents. 35.6% of the respondents in support of the integration perceive the
Page | 101integration as a means of a boosted affront against Al-Shabaab due to increased troopnumbers. For the 10.4% (highest percentage) of the respondents who are against theintegration, their main concern emerged as the different mandates under which AMISOM andKDF were engaged in Somalia. Initially, AMISOM was not fully on an offensive missionagainst Al-Shabaab, while the converse was true for KDF. Curiously, 4.9% of therespondents were simply against the integration by virtue of the fact that the KDF wouldpossibly lose their command to AMISOM commanders from other countries. This perceptioncan however be attributed to the notion that once command changes, focus would most likelyshift and attention redirected to immaterial issues including leadership tussles.4.8 Mitigation: Addressing Al-Shabaab threat in the context of the emerging regionalismIn an attempt to answer this question, the author presents key actors in the Al-Shabaabmitigation agenda and seek to understand the respondents perception regarding the role theseactors have so far played in their bid to neutralise the group.These actors include; the TFG, EAC partner states (aggrieved by the Al-Shabaab) and theinternational community. The responses were as follows:
Page | 102Do you think the Somalia Transitional federal Government is fully committed to the fightagainst the Al-Shabaab?Frequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Yes, the government iscommitted to the fightagainst the Al-Shabaab34 33.3 33.3 33.3No, the government is notcommitted to the fightagainst the Al-Shabaab46 45.1 45.1 78.4I dont know 22 21.6 21.6 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.8.1]According to table 4.8.1, 45.1% of the respondents felt the TFG was not fully committedto the fight against Al-Shabaab, 33.3% were satisfied with what it was doing to curb thechallenge. However, an equally high percentage of 21.6 did not know whether the TFG wascommitted to the fight against Al-Shabaab or not. It is probable that those who doubt thecommitment of the government in the fight against Al-Shabaab were partly influenced by thestatement the TFG president made at the beginning of the KDF offensive in Somalia whichinfluenced the popular belief that his government was not happy with the decision. This mayhave easily been conceived as a quiet support for extremism or utter lack of zeal to fight thesame. Either way, even prior to the inception of the offensive, the TFG had evidentlydisplayed inefficiency and a lack of capacity to pursue Al-Shabaab beyond Mogadishu.
Page | 103Do you think the EAC partner states are doing enough in the fight against the Al-Shabaab?Frequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Yes 30 29.4 29.4 29.4No 55 53.9 53.9 83.3I dont know 17 16.7 16.7 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.8.2]53.9% of the respondents felt the EAC states were not doing enough in the fight againstAl-Shabaab, this conception might have been advanced by the 7/11 Kampala bombings and aseries of Al-Shabaab related terror attacks in Kenya (according to the Kenya police assertionsas already discussed). Still, 29.4% of the respondents felt otherwise, while another 16.7% did‘not know’ whether enough was being done or not. It is logical that most security apparatusand operations remain the respective governments’ top secrets; consequently, it is expectedand understandable that some security measures put into place by these states remain asmysterious. This dimension could explain why a great percentage of the respondents (53.9%)were unable to single out structures that the governments have put in place to bolster the fightagainst Al-Shabaab. However, it should also be noted that this level of ignorance is incomplete disregard of the respondents’ levels of exposure, knowledge and understanding ofthe existing security gap and may as well be an indicator for the actual unpreparedness orlack of concrete plans (by the respective governments) to counter a group that is increasinglybecoming more assertive.
Page | 104Is the International Community doing enough to help East African Community States inthe fight against the Al-Shabaab terror group?Frequency PercentValidPercentCumulativePercentValid Yes 23 22.5 22.5 22.5No 70 68.6 68.6 91.2I am not sure 9 8.8 8.8 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.8.3]The international community is normally held accountable for global security lapses andthe situation in Somalia is no different. In spite of the low frequency of respondents stating‘No’ for the other actors, a whole 68.6% of the respondents sensed a lack of commitment onthe part of the international community with regards to the fight against Al-Shabaab. 22.5%however felt otherwise, while a paltry 8.8 % were not sure. It is important to highlight thefact that this judgement overlooked the International Community funded and supportedoperations like AMISOM.Would you advice the EAC States to find local, international solutions or a blend of local andinternational solutions to the Al-shabaab crisis?Frequency Percent Valid PercentCumulativePercentValid Local solutions 13 12.7 12.7 12.7International solutions 5 4.9 4.9 17.6A hybrid of local andinternational solutions84 82.4 82.4 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0[Table 4.8.4
Page | 105Interventions in Somalia have not been exclusively productive since the fall of SiadBarre, a situation which has possibly contributed to the lacklustre attitude of the internationalcommunity. Nevertheless, African countries cannot mitigate on their own, more particularlythe EAC.According to table 4.8.4, the respondents clearly understand the complexity of Somaliasituation which would probably explain the 82.4% preference for a dualistic approach thatincorporates both local and international mitigation procedures. On the contrary, 12.7% of therespondents take a hard stance against either a dual or international approaches; they insteadprefer the local approach irrespective of its challenges (mostly financial and military).Curiously, 4.9% of the respondents do not seem to subscribe to the local or dual approaches.They strictly prefer international solutions which underscores their lack of trust for locallycrafted mechanisms or mere expressions of pessimism over the effectiveness of a blend of thetwo mitigation approaches.
Page | 106Case SummaryCasesValid Missing TotalN Percent N Percent N Percent$Mitigationa95 93.1% 7 6.9% 102 100.0%[Table 4.8.5]
Page | 107$Mitigation FrequenciesResponsesPercent of CasesN PercentSolutions frequency ofresponseaFight against the Al-Shabaab should be a teamwork58 26.2% 61.1%Work towards securing thelocal Somali populationsupport and isolate the Al-Shabaab27 12.2% 28.4%Creation of Juba-Land as abuffer zone between Kenyaand Somalia and relocationof Refugees into Somalia21 9.5% 22.1%Seek dialogue with the Al-Shabaab23 10.4% 24.2%Push for an increament ofthe AMISOM troops35 15.8% 36.8%Fight corruption among theKenyan police andimmigration officials24 10.9% 25.3%Build the capacity of theTFG and build capacity forinfrastructural development33 14.9% 34.7%Total 221 100.0% 232.6%[Table 4.8.6]
Page | 108Table 4.8.5 and 4.8.6; highlight some of the mitigation avenues that can be considered inlight of the war against extremism. The creation of Jubaland264was cited by 9.5% of therespondents while the highest percentage of 26.2 was attributed to the fight against Al-Shabaab as a team. The team in this case implied a concerted effort by all the EAC stateswithout anyone of them being perceived as more active in the fight than the other. In fact, Al-Shabaab’s prior warning to Uganda long before the attack of 7/11 was due to the presence ofthe Ugandan troops being part of AMISOM. Burundi, another EAC state member with itstroops in AMISOM was also warned of an attack in the ‘near future’. Team work thereforeimplies spreading risk across the entire region which would in effect leave no EAC Stateappearing to be more ‘friendly’ to Al-Shabaab or in a more realistic sense, would enhance thepsychology of isolation (them against everyone else).Other than the suggestions from EAC citizens, key informants equally weighed in andsometimes prompting similar issues. Hon. Wandera, a member of the East AfricanLegislative Assembly (EALA) for example, proposes ideas which underscore inclusivity inconfronting Al-Shabaab. He argues that the regional states should form a joint security organthat monitors insecurity arising from the Al-Shabaab instigated anarchy in Somalia.265Accordingly, he proposes the establishment of a special court, or a division within the EastAfrican Courts of Justice to be tasked with handling of cases of Trans-boundary terrorism.266Hon. Mulongo, however feel that there is need to build institutions that would enable theSomali political system to keep on running independent of any individual leader.267Hefurther notes that: “Somali’s should be left to bring a national reconciliatory plan that is264a buffer between Kenya and Somalia to hold back the Al-Shabaab and prevent them from entering Kenya265Interview with Hon. Wandera Ogalo, member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), May 11, 2012266Ibid267Interview with Hon. Simon Mulongo, Vice Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda, May 11,2012
Page | 109holistic and brings everlasting peace to Somalia without the interference of externalforces.”268Hon. Ateenyi, on his part believes that the external players involved in Somalia affairsshould consult with the indigenous population in an attempt to address the root causes ofextremism. Further, he suggests that they (Somali people) should be willing to own andimplement an action plan designed by them, and that which seek to reconcile the warringparties.269Cole, on the other hand sees the need for a sustained effort to supress illegalactivities carried out by extremist groups like Al-Shabaab. He cites coordinated developmentas a fundamental programme that would aim at restoring Somalia.270According to Hon. Justice Gaswaga, including Somalia in regional plans and strategiespertaining to insecurity could be necessary in stemming the instability and extremismemanating from the country.271This suggestion seems to be in tandem with the recent requestby the Somalia TFG that the country be allowed to join the EAC. Dr. Kimani is equally in anagreement with this proposal arguing that: “Allowing Somalia to join the EAC will help inmitigating activities of criminal cartels as there will be minimum rules and regulations toadhere to.”272Hon. Wandera however expresses caution for this move noting that there is noneed for the EAC regional heads to rush into admitting Somalia into the fold, he opines that:“Just like Sudan who pushed for admission and was denied on the premise of not having metcertain benchmarks, the same fate should be extended to Somalia.”273268Ibid269Interview with Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense andSecurity, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012.270Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP coordinator, February 7, 2012271Interview with Hon. Justice Duncan Gaswaga, Supreme Court of Seychelles, May 11, 2012272Interview with Dr. Kimani, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace building in Eastern Africa, March 21,2012273Interview with Hon. Wandera Ogalo, member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), May 11, 2012
Page | 1104.9 CONCLUSIONAccording to the findings of this research, there exists a nexus of the Somalia collapsedStatehood, emergence of the Al-Shabaab extremist group and the recent terrorist activities inthe EAC.The research further reveals that a number of factors such as; the vast and porous Kenya-Somalia border, inefficient policing and intelligence gathering by the Kenya securityagencies, accommodative ethnic Somalia population, presence of a less secure Somalirefugee camp in Kenya (Daadab camp), corruption in the Kenya police ranks, a large numberof unemployed youth from the NEP and radicalisation of the youth through exposure toextremist Islamic teachings are some of the fundamental avenues through which Al-Shabaabhas managed to infiltrate Kenya and the EAC region.The findings equally show that through its acts of terrorism, Al-Shabaab has inflicted fearof attacks among the EAC citizens; it has impacted negatively on the tourism sector andequally discouraged foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the meagre government’sresources have unconditionally been channelled towards beefing up security at the expense ofvital amenities such as education and healthcare.The research also reveals that the growing influence of Al-Shabaab has made Somaliamore insecure and as such a large number of refugees have crossed into Kenya, making thesituation in the Daadab camp even worse. This is also compounded by the increasedchallenge of infiltration of small arms into the country and possibly beyond.On the avenues for addressing Al-Shabaab menace in the context of emergingregionalism, the research established that the TFG, EAC and the international communityhave not done enough to uproot the group. It is also established that a blend of local and
Page | 111international mitigation approaches to the Al-Shabaab quagmire is most likely to succeedthan a single pronged approach of either local or international mechanisms.With regards to the OLN, the research shows that most respondents consider that Kenyawas indeed justified to pursue Al-Shabaab into Somalia. Even though Kenya, and probablythe rest of the EAC have remained unsafe ever since the incursion, the research reveals thatsupport for military intervention remained overwhelmingly high at the time of the research.Regarding the integration of KDF into AMISOM, the research shows that the publicperception is in support of the idea rather than Kenya pursuing Al-Shabaab as a single entitywhich in turn denies it a realistic exit strategy, the goodwill of not being seen as anoccupation force and the financial coverage of its expenses which have so far been at thebehest of the Kenyan tax payer. The thesis also depicts a number of mitigation areaspresented by the respondents as shown in table 4.8.6., while the key informants equallyvoiced their opinion on the modalities of stabilising Somalia in the context of an emergingregionalism (EAC).
Page | 112CHAPTER FIVE5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH5.1 RECOMMENDATIONSA complete eradication of Al-Shabaab is not entirely possible in the foreseeable future,still, the EAC and the international community have not yet run out of options for limitingwhat is now becoming a wave of regional extremism. Realistically, the EAC, IGAD, or AUmay not be able to implement a multi-pronged approach to counter the menace without fullengagement of the international community. In this light, the author seeks to:i. Assesses some of the already floated ideas, but from an angle which has so far notbeen explored.ii. Propose new recommendations that would mitigate the Al-Shabaab menace.Monetary contribution from the non-troop contributing African statesSomalia is first an African problem before it extends to the global scale. In line with theadvocacy for ‘African solutions to African problems’, the African States which are notcontributing troops to AMISOM should make their input in terms of monetary contributionsto help expedite the work that is being done in Somalia. Even though the internationalcommunity has the financial muscle that African countries do not have, the author’s take isthat the AU and other regional organizations must be seen to be in control of thedevelopments in the country. Somalia’s politics require latent international intervention asopposed to the previous hastily considered military option that did not involve any politicalendorsements by the Somali people.
Page | 113Anti-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation campaignsAl-Shabaab has been able to thrive in Somalia and other EAC states as a consequence ofits strong radicalisation efforts, but most importantly the existence of avenues which makeradicalisation even more plausible. Young Muslim converts, notably from Kenya andUganda have found radicalisation and a possible entry into the Al-Shabaab ranks moreappealing as it is a path to recognition and manifestation of self-worth. This call for the EACto rethink their strategy on social welfare for the youth as continued isolation onlypredisposes them these outfits as the only appealing and viable options. Creation foropportunities for the youth especially from the Somali and Muslim dominated regions is aconsequential effort in discouraging radicalisation.The EAC states with Somali speaking population should sensitise their populationsagainst blanket condemnation and profiling of the Somalia populations which might lead toxenophobic fears and fan radicalisation. This, the governments can do through public debateswhich are either state or NGO sponsored. Engagement of the Somali and Muslimpopulations in a sense that there is a mutual relationship would enhance free communication,facilitate trust and most importantly foster a collective sense of ownership of the country andsecurity for all.Engagement between the State and the Muslim clerics in assessing the content ofmadrassa teachings, though this may be politicised, if handled carefully can give thegovernments an upper hand in understanding the religious teachings administered to theyounger generation. If the government of Kenya had this kind of oversight, the experience atPumwani Youth centre which is blamed for radicalisation of teenagers would have probablybeen avoided.
Page | 114China’s interests in the EAC cannot be secured in an Al-Shabaab infested environment.However, the country has uniquely remained insensitive to this challenge even as it posesthreats to the entire region and her business interests. The EAC governments must use thisleverage (Chinese business interests in the region) to prevail upon China and possibly compelher leadership to fund Anti and De-Radicalisation programmes. The idea here is to have aconcerted effort in the fight against Al-Shabaab and extremism in general.Teaching of Somali and Arabic languages to the military and intelligence agenciesA Somali willing to volunteer intelligence regarding a possible attack may fail to do sobecause of language barrier. Even though, KDF possibly has a Somali speaking contingent,the rest of AMISOM troops, other than those from Djibouti are incapacitated in this line. Inthe wake of an escalation of acts of terror in the region, the EAC governments must prioritiseadministering basic Arabic and Somali languages to certain intelligence and militarypersonnel as this is a crucial component for intelligence gathering.Establishment of an EAC counter terrorism agencyAs the EAC states integrate to form a common front on economic issues, so should be onthe threats to those interests. The cross border movement of the Al-Shabaab extremists thatculminated into the 7/11 bombing would have possibly been thwarted had there existed astrong counter terrorism agency that has the leeway to operate across the EAC. A commonagency would also avoid the bureaucratic hurdles that may hamper terror relatedinvestigations or instigating and implementing a swift operation aimed at curtailing Al-Shabaab activities.
Page | 115Engagement of Al-Shabaab in peace talksThe non-negotiation stance taken against the Somalia extremist group is both myopic andcounterproductive. Myopic in the sense that one becomes an Al-Shabaab convert through aradicalisation process, if the campaign to de-radicalise the group is to be taken seriously,then direct engagement in a negotiation forum is mandatory. Counterproductive as theapproach of non-negotiation only seek to reinforce strict adherence to the ideology as thereare limited exit options.Whereas Islamic fundamentalism is an essential component of the Al-Shabaab’sideology, settlement through dialogue is still possible within some ranks of its membership.This recommendation is informed based on the past incidences of Al-Shabaab defections tothe TFG’s side.274Substantial defections are plausible as the military approach continue toinflict heavy casualties on Al-Shabaab, but most importantly, sustained stifling of revenueand logistical support avenues guarantees the outfit minimal chances of existence as it is. Theextension of an olive branch at this point is therefore critical in winning the trust even if it isjust for a section of the group.Recognition of SomalilandBalkanisation of Africa has not borne any significant peace and the Sudan sister statesattests to this. However, as already noted by this author, Somalia’s unique situation isaggravated by its complex clan-based political alignment. Somaliland has so far managed toevade the storm and established herself as a model of an emerging African democracy. Thisprogress withstanding, Somaliland is yet to be internationally recognised. According to ProfAnderson, the laxity to recognise Somaliland has been due to IGAD’s argument against a274Leila Aden, “ More Al-Shabaab fighters surrender to TFG”, Somalia Report, January 15, 2012,http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2538 (accessed on April 1,2012)
Page | 116multiple Somalia solution.275The author’s recommendation is that Somaliland’s socio-economic and political development as well as the ability to grow strong institutions stands agreater chance of success without the greater Somalia quagmire hovering over her head. Thethree greater components of Somalia that is: Somaliland, Puntland and South-CentralSomalia have Al-Shabaab as a common challenge with South-Central being mostly affected,therefore, the idea of not recognising Somaliland is unfounded especially when it is based onthe precinct that it would infuriate the Al-Shabaab and warrant retribution attacks.The Azenia BufferThe Azenia buffer (Jubaland project) is a plan that has been in the offing for slightly overtwo years. Kenya’s interest in this project is to create a buffer between the country and theAl-Shabaab controlled region. According to the ICG, Kenya has so far trained 2,500militiamen and established an administrative structure headed by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed“Gandhi”, a former TFG defence minister.276The emergence of Ahmed Madobe of the RasKamboni brigade (fighting along the KDF forces) as a more effective force in comparison tothat headed by “Gadhi” has consequently divided the Kenyan government.277The ICGreports that whereas “Madobe is backed by many Kenyan-Somali army officers; Gandhi isreportedly closer to Kenyan intelligence bodies and politicians such as Defence MinisterMohamed Yusuf haji.”278The popularity of Madobe among the Kenyan-Somali army officerscan be attributed to the effectiveness manifested by the Ras Kamboni brigade under hisleadership. Indeed, this effort greatly impacted on the KDF offensive against Al-Shabaab.Gandhi’s backing by the political elite may be attributed to a foreseeable non-confrontationalapproach that may come with his leadership. The author argues that Kenya would not wish to275“Al Shabaab and Kenyas Somali invasion” hjemmesidefilm, January 30, 2012,http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=9B-AvoLNbvc#! (accessed on February 2, 2012)276“The Kenya Military Intervention in Somalia”, Crisis group Africa report No 184, P 2, February 15, 2012277Ibid278Ibid
Page | 117have independent leadership in the Azenia region, the weakness or non-effectiveness of theGandhi led militia ( despite a formal training) is proof of his weak leadership credentialswhich makes him the best bet for the leadership of Azenia as he may be easily manipulatedby the Kenyan regime.According to this author, effective and friendly Azenia would make Kenya lesssusceptible to the regular Al-Shabaab infiltration across the borders, and whereas that ispossibly true, it does not eliminate the Al-Shabaab pockets in Kenya. Still, Kenya andEthiopia must work together on this endeavour. It is notable that the region is largelyinhabited by members of the Ogaden clan, the same community which is at the core of thecontentious Ogaden region of Ethiopia. To empower the Ogaden community in Azeniatranslates into empowering those in Ethiopia, a development which Ethiopia cannotentertain. Despite the complexities surrounding the establishment of this administration, apolitical settlement involving the TFG, Ethiopia, Kenya and the actors in the region can bearrived at if the focus on defeating Al-Shabaab is sustained and overrides other sideshows.Halting Oil exploration in PuntlandThe destruction of Somalia was orchestrated by inter clan feuds among other factors, butthese connotations still dominate the larger Somalia political discourse and has remained thefocus of the instability. Exploration of oil in the shaky Puntland279, under thesecircumstances is the least of any wise economic undertakings that could be considered in thisregion at this time. The possibility of these projects being viewed as part of the westernhegemonic dominance over weaker states is high and would not auger well with themilitarised population.279Mark Townsend and Tariq Abdinasir, “Britain leads dash to explore for oil in war-torn Somalia”, The Guardian, February25, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/25/britain-oil-dash-somalia (accessed on April 3, 2012)
Page | 118Puntland may superficially appear as a fairly stable semi-autonomous region of Somalia,but the recent revelations by the Somalia Prime Minister that Al-Shabaab top brass werefleeing to Puntland280as the offensive by the Burundi, Uganda and Kenyan military forcesintensified is indicative of what a safe haven Puntland is to the extremist group. Accordingly,this author, posits that any part of Somalia is not ready for a major complex economicactivity, more particularly, oil related. Even in the event that it succeeds, it will shift thefocus from stabilising Somalia to harvesting its resources, an act that would most likelytrigger a violent reaction considering the negative perception the local population hastowards Western States. This would only embolden Al-Shabaab and other like-mindedextremists groups.Containment of the Yemeni situationYemen has been directly or indirectly linked to the Al-Shabaab staged instability inSomalia. The proximity of Yemen and Somalia ports makes it both a destination for thefleeing Somalia refugees as well as the Al-Shabaab. However, to Al-Shabaab, Yemen is aconducive environment due to her instability and the existing structures of the AQAP as thisauthor had already accounted for. According to the UNHCR January 2011, draft report, therewere a total of 180,341 Somali refugees living in Yemen between 2008 and 2010.281The plethora of factors such as; political instability in Yemen, thriving AQAP structuresand the arrival of Al-Shabaab fleeing Somalia282, as well as extreme conditions that refugeesare exposed to not only create an ideal environment for possible radicalisation, but also280ABDI GULED, “AP Interview: Somalias prime minister says al-Shabab leaders, fighters are fleeing north”, AssociatedPress, April 11, 2012, http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/92adf32650bf4bb28a7590f75ae0dca3/AF--Somalia-Prime-Minister/ (accessed on April 13, 2012)281Somali Refugees in the Region”,UNHCR, January 18, 2011282Joint terrorism Task Force, “Somalia: 500 Al-Qaeda Linked Al-Shabab Militants Flee to Yemen”, Maryland Coordinationand Analysis centre, February 19, 2012,http://www.mcac.maryland.gov/newsroom/TerrorismNews/20120219_Somalia_500_AlQaeda_Linked_AlShabab_Militants_Flee_to_Yemen (accessed on April 17, 2012)
Page | 119provides the necessary incentives for further training and regrouping of the fleeing Al-Shabaab. The author consequently recommends that the international community makes acareful assessment of the Yemen political situation and take great caution by focusing onstabilisation of the country. If allowed to re-group, Al-Shabaab in Yemen would not onlyreturn to haunt the EAC, but also the Horn of Africa and Middle Eastern regions.5.2 FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCHThis research has established the loopholes exploited by Al-Shabaab to infiltrate theEAC, thus impacting negatively on foreign direct investments and hence the economy.Accordingly, the author proposes future research on the viability of the ambitious LAPSSETproject in the event that Al-Shabaab and, or extremism is not fully eradicated from Somaliaand the situation remains fluid.5.3 CONCLUSIONThe fight against Al-Shabaab requires a multi-pronged approach which incorporatesmilitary intervention as a stop gap measure, but also a political dimension as a long termsolution. Even though extremist groups have risen and fallen in Somalia, a completeeradication has not been forthcoming which explains the resurrection of extremist outfitsunder different titles, but with the same theme.To curb an ideologically propagated extremism from an outfit with direct links to knownterrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, there is need for more than a localised approach.Squashing Al-Shabaab militarily is therefore a quick fix to the problem, but extremism
Page | 120would soon re-emerge from another group exhibiting Al-Shabaab tendencies, and probablywith Al-Shabaab leadership.A concerted campaign which targets every avenue of Al-Shabaab’s lifeline and any otherfuture extremist group must seek to dismantle both local and external infrastructures that aidthe group’s activities. This effort must however be as inclusive as possible.The EAC through its member states must seek to consolidate their partnership on theinternal security concerns, particularly those emanating from terrorism and extremismthrough a universal approach that includes sharing of intelligence.
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Page | 131APENDIX
Page | 132APENDIX A: ACRONYMSAIAI AL ITIHAD AL ISLAMIAMISOM AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIAAQAP AL-QAEDA IN THE ARAB PENINSULAAQI AL-QAEDA IN IRAQAU AFRICAN UNIONCIA CENTRAL ITELLIGENCE AGENCIESEAC EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITYENDF ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCESEU EUROPEAN UNIONICU ISLAMIC COURTS UNIONIGAD INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ANDDEVELOPMENTKDF KENYA DEFENSE FORCESMSF MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERSNEP NORTH EASTERN PROVINCEOCHA OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OFHUMANITARIAN AFFAIRSOLN OPERATION LINDA NCHITFG TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENTTFIs TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONSUNHCR UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FORREFUGEESUNITAF UNITED TASK FORCEUNOSOM UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIAUNSC UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Page | 133APENDIX B: CODE BOOKPERSONAL INFORMATIONV1. Gender of the respondent//1.00= “Male”// 2.00= “Female”//V2. Origin of the respondent//1.00= “Kenyan of Somali background” // 2.00= “Somali living in Kenya”////3.00=“Kenyan of non-Somali background”////4.00= “Ugandan” ////5.00= “Tanzanian”//V3. Location of the respondent//1.00= “Dar es Salaam, Tanzania” //2.00= “Kampala, Uganda” //3.00= “Kisii, Kenya”//4.00= “Kisumu, Kenya”// 5.00= “Migori, Kenya” //6.00= “Mombasa, Kenya” //7.00=“Nairobi, Kenya” //8.00= “Nakuru, Kenya”//V4. The profession of the respondent//1.00 = "Banker/ HR/Accountant/Marketer" 2.00 = "Business person"////3.00 = "Engineer/IT" 4.00 = "Teacher"////5.00 = "Prison officer/Police officer/ Military personnel"//// 6.00 = "Health Practitioner"////7.00 = "Lawyer" 8.00 = "Customer service/Public relations" 9.00 = "Other"//RQ1. What is the nexus between Somalia collapsed statehood, emergence of theAl-Shabaab extremist group and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC?V5. Is Somalia a Collapsed State?//1.00= “Yes”// 2= “No”// 3.00= “I don’t know”//V6. In your opinion, does collapsed Statehood of Somalia encourage the influence ofextremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00=”No”// 3.00= “I don’t know”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//
Page | 134V7. Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I don’t know”//V8. Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of theEAC States?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I don’t know”//V9. Do you think a complete eradication of the Al-Shabaab from Somalia would restore alasting peace and stability?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I am not sure”//RQ2. What factors have made it feasible for Al-Shabaab extremists to thrive inKenya and possibly other East African Community States?V10. Do you agree with the Kenyan Assistant Minister for internal security that Al-Shabaab is like a snake whose tail is in Somalia, but head in the Nairobi’s Eastleigh?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I am not sure”//V11. Vast and porous Kenya-Somalia border//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//V12. Inefficient policing and intelligence gathering by the Kenya security agencies//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//V13. Accommodative ethnic Somali population in Kenya//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//V14. Presence of less secure Somali refugee camps in Kenya//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//V15. Corrupt Kenya Police//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//
Page | 135V16. A large number of unemployed youth from the North Eastern Province(largely dominated by the Kenyan-Somali citizen)//1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//V17. Radicalization of the youth through exposure to extremist Islamic teachings// 1.00= “Ticked’’// 2.00= “Not ticked”// 99= “Not applicable”//RQ3. What are the impacts of the activities of the Al-Shabaab extremist group on theSocio-Economic fronts of Kenya and the rest of the EAC states?Impacts of the Al-Shabaab insecurity spill over to the rest of the EAC statesV18. Fear of and exposure to terror attacks//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V19. Negative effects on foreign investment/ economy//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V20. Negative effect on tourism//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V21. Diversion of state resources to fund military and security programmes instead of crucialones like health and education.//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V22. Influx of refugees and infiltration of small arms into the EAC//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//RQ4. What is the general perception of the public (EAC citizens) with regards‘Operation Linda Nchi’ military campaign in Somalia?V23. Are you aware that the Kenya Defence Forces are fighting Al-Shabaab terrorist group inSomalia?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”//
Page | 136V24. Do you think Kenya was justified to pursue the Al-Shabaab extremist group intoSomalia?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “Am not sure”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V25. After three months of war against the Al-Shabaab (Operation Linda Nchi), how wouldyou rate your support for the operation?//1.0 = "Very supportive" // 2.00 = "Supportive"////3.0 = "Not supportive" // 99.00 = "Not applicable"//V26. Since the beginning of the offensive against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, do you thinkKenya and by extension East African Community has become safer?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “Am not sure”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//Reasons for or against the proposed integration of KDF into AMISOMV27. Do you support the proposal that the Kenya Defence Forces should join AMISOM inSomalia?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “Am not sure”//99.00= “Not applicable”//V28. Increase in strength due to an increase in the troop numbers//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//V29. It would reduce the financial strain on the Kenyan tax payer//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//V30. Provides Kenya with a good exit strategy// 1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//V31. KDF and AMISOM have different mandates, there will be a conflict//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//V32. It will put Kenya in more danger as Kenya shares a border with Somalia//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//
Page | 137V33. KDF will be forced to take orders from other AMISOM commanders//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”//RQ5. How can the Al-Shabaab threat be addressed in the context of emergingRegionalism (East African Community)?V34. Do you think the Somalia Transitional federal Government is fully committed to thefight against the Al-Shabaab?//1.00 = "Yes, the government is committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab"////2.00 = "No, the government is not committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab"////3.00 = "I dont know"//V35. Do you think the EAC partner states are doing enough in the fight against theAl-Shabaab?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I don’t know”//V36. Is the International Community doing enough to help EAC States in the fight against theAl-Shabaab extremist group?//1.00= “Yes”// 2.00= “No”// 3.00= “I am not sure”//V37. Would you advice the EAC States to find local, international, or a blend of local, andinternational solutions to the Al-shabaab crisis?//1.00 = "Local solutions" //2.00 = "International solutions"////3.00 = "A hybrid of local and international solutions"//Proposed Solutions to the East African Community States for the fight against Al-Shabaab?V38. They should fight the Al-Shabaab as a team// 1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//
Page | 138V39. Work towards seeking the local Somali population support and isolate the Al-Shabaab//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V40. They should agree on the creation of Jubaland as a buffer zone between Kenya andSomalia//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V41. Seek dialogue with the Al-Shabaab//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V42. Push the UN to increase the number of AMISOM troops//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V43. Fight corruption among the police and immigration officials in Kenya//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//V44. Build capacity of the TFG and allocate resources for infrastructural development//1.00= “Mentioned”//2.00= “Not mentioned”// 99.00= “Not applicable”//
Page | 139APENDIX C: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTSAl-ShabaabHarakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (more commonly known as Al-Shabaab) is a Somalimilitant Islamist group. It has documented links with the Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, andwas formally recognised by the Al-Qaeda central in February 2012.Al Itihad al Islami (AIAI)AIAI was an armed Islamist movement and an early prototype of Islamic radicalisation andextremism in Somalia. Its sphere of influence stretched beyond Somalia into neighbouringcountries like Kenya.Al-Qaeda CentralAl-Qaeda is a global Jihadi organisation whose founder is the late Osama Bin Laden. It hasbeen linked to the 9/11 World Trade Centre terror attack and the August 1998 bombings ofthe US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.Kenyan-SomaliKenyan-Somalis are mostly inhabitants of the North Eastern Province of Kenya, a regionwhich is at the centre of the centre of the idea of greater Somalia. They are an ethnic Somalipopulation and are known for their business acumen in the District of Eastleigh, Nairobi.LAPSSET ProjectThe Lamu Port - South Sudan – Ethiopia Transport corridor (LAPSSET) is set to be Africa’slargest infrastructural undertaking. It is to begin in Lamu and will traverse through the North-Eastern part of Kenya and connect Southern Sudan and Ethiopia among other neighbours.
Page | 140OgadenOgaden is a region under historical dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Just like the NorthEastern Province of Kenya, Ogaden has the Somali speaking population.Pan SomalismAlso known as Soomaliywen was a conception that sought to integrate all the Somalispeaking people into one Somali nation, otherwise known as ‘Greater Somalia.’ Historicalwars between Somalia and Ethiopia or her Shifta war with Kenya can be traced back to thisphilosophy.
Page | 141APENDIX D: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTSName Designation and relevant experienceAlan Cole United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-Counter Piracy Programme Coordinator,Eastern AfricaDr. Kimani M.J. Freelance Consultant, conflict Resolutionand Peace building in East AfricaElizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga Legal Officer, UN Dept. of peace keepingoperations and VP of the CommonwealthAssociation of Legistiave Counselconversant with the geo-politics of the Hornof Africa and EAC.Hon. Justice Duncan Gaswaga Head of Criminal Division, Supreme courtof Seychelles. Justice Gaswaga presidesover maritime piracy cases, predominantlyinvolving accused from Somalia.Hon. Simon Mulongo Member of Parliament, Vice ChairmanDefense and Security Committee,Parliament of Uganda
Page | 142Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi Member of Parliament, Chairman Defenseand Security Committee, Parliament ofUgandaHon. Wandera Ogalo Member of the East African LegislativeAssembly (EALA)Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda A Lieutenant Colonel in the UgandaPeoples Defence Force, currently theSpokesperson of AMISOM.Mary Harper BBC Africa Editor and Author of GettingSomalia wrong? Faith, War, and hope in ashattered State.Mohammed Abdi Washala Peace Researcher and Chairman of theKenya Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims,Taita/Taveta County
Page | 143APENDIX E: MAP OF SOMALIA
Page | 144APENDIX F: MAP OF THE EAST AFRICAN STATES
Page | 145APENDIX G: LAPSSET PROJECT
Page | 146DECLARATIONI, KAWEGAH JNR. POPE PAUL do declare that the work presented here is my own. Anypart of this work which has been obtained from other authors has been duly acknowledged.I also declare that this work has never been presented anywhere for the award of any degree.KAWEGAH JNR. P. PAULMAY 11, 2012