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1. Networked Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan: How the Azerbaijani
government uses the Internet to deter dissent
Katy Pearce
Assistant Professor, Department of Communication,
University of Washington
@katypearce
4. • Azerbaijan has a unique way of managing the
Internet, by leaving the Internet “open”…
• It can claim that there is freedom of expression
• It can monitor citizens
• It can use the Internet/social media as another
information dissemination medium
• This is unique, but could be emulated elsewhere
• An opportunity to study mechanisms of control and
dissent in the digital era
SO WHAT? (a preview)
5. • 9 million people
• Majority Shia Muslim
• 99% literacy
• Per capita GDP USD 10,000
• Oil wealth
AZERBAIJAN
6. AUTHORITARIANISM IN AZERBAIJAN
- Father and son
presidential legacy
- Suppression of civil
liberties
- Little freedom of
expression
- Pervasive bitterness
- Apathy and fear
- Self-censorship
Azerbaijan is a
petro-state whose
oil revenues have
allowed the regime
to preempt any
opposition.
7. • World has changed.
• Performance of democratic attitudes.
AUTHORITARIANISM AIN’T
WHAT IT USED TO BE
8. THUS AZERBAIJAN CARES ABOUT ITS
GLOBAL IMAGE (A LITTLE)
Why?
Because Azerbaijan wants
to be seen (by internal
audience) as important
and powerful.
LOREM IPSUM
DOLOR SIT AMET EL
QUASI IPSA OMNIS
ISTEDOLOR SIT
AMET EL QUASI
IPSA OMNIS ISTE
9. THE INTERNET IS THE ONLY SPACE FOR FREE EXPRESSION IN AZERBAIJAN
10. BUT
Not many Azerbaijanis are
online
6%
14%
22%
33%
4% 4%
7%
11%
9%
12%
20%
24%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2009 2010 2011 2012
Daily Internet users (%) (CB)
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
19%
31%
38%
52%
19% 20%
26% 27%
25%
29%
37%
43%
0%
20%
40%
60%
2009 2010 2011 2012
Ever use the Internet (%) (CB)
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
17. President
169,959
Policy decisions
PR social media
team
First Lady
66,639 + 14,293
Daughters
123,000 + 2422
Pro-government youth
5,113 personality / 28,365 group
More distant dirty
workers
5 million AZN = $6.37 million
Why?
Facebook likes, late April 2013
19. Collective and Connective Action
Networks
ConnectiveAction
• Self organizing networks
• Little or no organizational
coordination of action
• Large scale personal access to
multi-layered social
technologies
• Personal expression shared
over social networks
ConnectiveAction
• Organizationally enabled
networks
• Loose organizational
coordination of action
• Some organizational
moderation of personal
expression through social
networks
• Organizations in the
background, loosely linked
networks
CollectiveAction
• Organizationally brokered
networks
• Organizations in the
foreground
• Social technologies used by
organizations to manage
participation and coordinate
goals
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012)
20. Collective and Connective Action
Networks in Azerbaijan
ConnectiveAction
• Self organizing networks
• Outside of the formal
opposition party system
• Strong personalities
• Reputation built &solidified
online
• Strategic use of social media
• Strongest social media
influence
• Some openly critique
opposition
ConnectiveAction
• Organizationally enabled
networks
• Individuals affiliated with
looser organizations
• Less social media influence
than self organizing, although
still large numbers of
followers and friends
CollectiveAction
• Organizationally brokered
networks
• Traditional opposition parties
use social media to some
degree
• Best known personalities do
have many
followers/friends/likes, but
such little content, very little
influence
21. 1649 5420 6249 7577 8000 9139
11353 12524 13679
16821 18000
22927
70000
78293
E D C F G I B K L J G A N O
Facebook Audience Size (Late April 2013)
Opposition
leader
Opposition
leader
Notable
foreign
audienceNotable
foreign
audience
Primarily
youth
audience
8307
Self organizing networks
Organizationally enabled
networks
Organizationally brokered
networks
58024
22. Takeaways
• Government is a hierarchical structure
• Many followers, but entirely for information
dissemination, little interactivity
• Opposition networks exist in 3 forms
• Traditional collective action
• Use social media for information dissemination
• Organizational enabled networks
• Personality-driven, but within loose affiliations with
organizations
• Social media reach weaker than other types
• Connective action networks
• Independent from organizations
• Social media is the organizing medium
• Substantial audience
32. This is a “middle path” between open access
and censorship.
The Azerbaijani government claims that "there
is Internet freedom in Azerbaijan“ because
there is no filtering.
By electing to define Internet freedom in the
strictest sense of the word, the government
uses a semantic shift to deflect criticism.
Azerbaijan has a unique approach to
Internet regulation
AZERBAIJAN AND
INTERNET REGULATION
33. CONTENT CONTROLS THAT REDUCE “INTERNET FREEDOM”
Internet filtering
Policing cyber cafes
FIRST GENERATION SECOND GENERATION THIRD GENERATION
Legal information control and
illegal content, defamation
laws
Information removal requests
Shutdowns
Network attacks
Surveillance
State-sponsored information
campaigns
Trolling*
Cult of personality*
Direct action
Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; * Pearce, 2013
34. FIRST GENERATION
Pornography is filtered
Occasionally during elections there is greater filtering
Recent blocking efforts and threats of blocking
But there are no administrative or court decisions
ordering blocking
In an informal test of cafes, we found no filtering
NOT EXTENSIVE BUT…
Internet filtering
Policing cyber cafes
35. SECOND GENERATION
Offline laws apply to the online space – including defamation
Publicizing opinions that instigate extremism or have
“harmful content” is illegal
Officials have claimed that spreading misinformation is a
cybercrime and noted Skype and Wikipedia as threats to
national security
Wide scope of circumstances where ISPs can cut off Internet
services
Legal information control
and illegal
content, defamation laws
Information removal
requests
Shutdowns
Network attacks
36.
37. THIRD GENERATION
THE MOST COMMON FORM IN
AZERBAIJAN
Surveillance
State-sponsored information
campaigns
Trolling
Online cult of personality
Direct action
38. Real
• Activists report having printed Facebook private
messaging transcripts handed to them while in
police custody
• Logins from multiple IP addresses in Facebook and
Gmail
• Arrests
• Evidence of working with known surveillance firms
Imagined
• Reality does not matter when many believe that the
government is watching
SURVEILLANCE
Real and imagined
39. • Azerbaijani government-controlled media
links social media use with
• Mental illness
• Family tragedies
• Criminal incidents
• Sex trafficking
• Pedophilia
• Pro-government youth encouraged to
become active on social networking sites
• Instructed to expose traitors
INFORMATION
CAMPAIGNS
State-sponsored
49. IS THIS WORKING FOR THE
GOVERNMENT?
YES
Many people are afraid to express themselves
The outspoken online are the already outspoken offline and are willing to
take risks
Social media provide an excellent way to monitor behavior
The pro-government social media world is expanding
There are few successful critiques
What happens on Facebook used to stay on Facebook
When things aren’t working, make new policies
50. IS THIS WORKING FOR THE
GOVERNMENT?
NO
Opposition audience
Network structures are advantageous
Some opposition have access to foreigners and gaining attention
Lack of sustainability
51. BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS
WINNING… FOR NOW.
By focusing on “the good life” and punishing dissent in a variety of
ways, the government is solidifying its position.
But is this worth the cost?
The opposition on the other hand, has a network structure that is
resilient and efficient.
Some of the opposition responds to attacks in innovative ways.
54. A
OppositionParty1
22,927likes
B
OppositionParty 2
11,353followers/
friends
Various
Youth activist org 1
K
12,524followers/
friends
J
16,821likes
F
Organization 2
7577 followers/
friends
D
Affiliated withOP2
5420 followers/
friends
L
13,679followers/
friends
H
8000 followers/
friends
C
Organization 1
6249 followers/
friends
M
?
I
9139 friends/
followers
G
18,000followers/
friends
N
78,293followers/
friends
O
~70,000 followers/
friends
E
Youth activist org 1
1649 followers
01 INTRODUCTION Background on Azerbaijan Internet in Azerbaijan02 THE PLAYERS Government Opposition Network structures03 OPPOSITION INTERNET EFFORTS04 GOVERNMENT INTERNET ACTIVITIES05 WHAT’S THE ROI?
Authoritarianism is both a set of governing practices and an ideological construct. In the political sense, authoritarianism is a form of government in which state authority rests exclusively with sanctioned members of the state. Non-government actors are expressly excluded from governing processes, and citizens are not guaranteed political pluralism, civil liberties, or government accountability (Vaillant 2012). Operationally, authoritarianism entails low levels of political pluralism and high levels of political apathy and perceived political powerlessness (Linz 2000). Force, censorship, fear (Vaillant 2012), distrust of other citizens, denial of resources to opposition, harassment of troublemakers, media control, state dependence for employment, and suppression of autonomous organizing (Radnitz 2010) are common techniques to enforce an exclusive claim to power.As one of the most repressive of the post-Soviet states (Freedom House 2012), Azerbaijan exemplifies the extensive level of social control that post-Soviet authoritarian governments exercise over their peoples. Azerbaijan is a petro-state whose oil revenues have allowed the regime to preempt any opposition (Guliyev 2009). Azerbaijan has been politically dominated by a father and son since 1993. The son and current president, IlhamAliev, has suppressed opposition groups, violating basic rights and civil liberties and moved the country towards "full-fledged authoritarianism" (FrichovaGrono 2011). This rule has created a “pervasive bitterness and growing sense of deprivation” (Rasizade, 2003, p. 127), a general sense of apathy and fear (Abbasov 2010), and a lack of trust in others (Gahramanova 2009). As such, Azerbaijani society is fearful and self-censoring (Gahramanova 2009; Kazimova 2011).
1.There is no more soviet sponsorshipDemocracy promotion is an industryInternet and technology has arrived2. don’t openly steal the election, pepper the speech with democracy slogans
Make an argument that not EVERYONE is on Facebook
Selling moral upper hand versus glamour and the good life
Traditional hierarchy in the government side of things – pretty much this is top downYou can see that there are a lot of followers, if there are only 941,554 Azerbaijani adults on Facebook, these are pretty solid numbers of followersBut the government is investing a TON into social media – why?This is a very important question… the 5 million manat question, if I may. - The government obviously has the upper hand – it controls all the mainstream media, it controls the legal system… so let’s come back to this question.
The opposition is, unsurprisingly a little more complicated….I want to present a framework of different ways that opposition members organize themselves – both online and offline
Organizationally brokered networks Strong organizational coordination of action Social technologies used by organizations to manage participation and coordinate goals Communication context centers on collective action frames Organizational management of social networks – more emphasis on interpersonal networks to build relationships for collective action Organizations in the foreground Organizationally enabled networks Loose organizational coordination of action Organizations provide social technology outlays Communication content centers on organizationally generated inclusive personal action frames Some organizational moderation of personal expression through social networks Organizations in the background, loosely linked networksSelf organizing networks Little or no organizational coordination of action Large scale personal access to multi-layered social technologies Communication content centers on emergent inclusive personal action frames Personal expression shared over social networks Collectivities often shun formal organizations
In Azerbaijan, these are individuals that are outside of the formal opposition party system.Strong personalities, built reputation on personal identity.Reputation built primarily and certainly solidified online.Strategic use of social media for both domestic and foreign audiences. Have the strongest social media influence of anyone in Azerbaijan.Some openly critique the opposition parties. Some ignore the opposition parties.A generational difference, but not huge.Emin, Khadija, Habib, Baxtiyar, MehmanIn Azerbaijan, these are loose organizations and sometimes individuals (often representing these loose organizations) that fit into the second kind of connective action type where is there a closer link with an organization. This type does not have the same social media influence as the previous type. While still having large numbers of followers and friends, perhaps because information also spreads through organizational channels, or possibly because of the sense of needing to represent the organization, these individuals are not as important to the overall network.There are also traditional opposition party organizations that use social media to some degree. The best known individuals do have a lot of followers/friends/likes, but there is such infrequent interactivity and the statements made are so guarded that these individuals have little influence.
The opposition leaders have a social media presence, but it isn’t very interactive and is very formal. They seldom share material from others and stick to the party line.941,554 Azerbaijani adults on Facebook
And these network forms are part of what is so threatening to the governmentNot only do they have a large audience, but the efficiency at which they share information and collectively organize is amazing, thus this threatening to the governmentSo let’s look at some examples of what the opposition is doing
I’m not going to bog anyone down with this, but needless to say it has been a very busy year in Azerbaijan leading up to the October election
Let’s start with the independent networks – this is the most interesting, I think.
NerminRehimli, one of the organisers of the campaign, the sum of 10,500 manats needed to cover all the fines was collected within five days.“The amount of money raised in such a short period of time and the demonstration of support by a wide variety of Azerbaijanis was significant,” Pearce said. “More than 2,000 people donated during the campaign, the majority of them Facebook and Twitter users. The purpose of the campaign was to continue the solidarity demonstrated at the January 12 protest action over conscript deaths.”In what looked like a response to the “five qepik” campaign, the government amended the civil offence code in early February to stipulate fines of 250 to 500 manats for anyone who donates money to political parties, civil society groups and international non-governmental organisations. The fines are higher for state employees, and there are separate penalties for organisations that accept the money.$13k US
the Azerbaijani government monitors its citizens’ use of social media. Azerbaijanis believe that their government is watching ‘‘everyone’’ on social media. In addition, there is evidence for this: users have had their Facebook accounts as well as Yahoo! and Gmail e-mail accounts compromised. This causes self-censorship amongst those that do use social media while discouraging those too fearful to engage.
EminMilli and Adnan HajizadaBakhtiyarHajiyev Khadija IsmayilDirect actionThird, the government arrests online activists. In early September 2009, Adnan Hajizada and EminMilli,two young Baku foreign-educated elites, employees of international organizations and youth activists,produced a YouTube video163 parodying the government for spending hundreds of thousands of dollarsto import donkeys from Germany. In the video, a group of solemn journalists interview a donkey(Hajizada in costume) and note that this donkey would be afforded more civil liberties than Azerbaijanicitizens, ‘‘There will be someone to protect donkey rights,’’ the video concludes, ‘‘but what of humanrights?’’ Two weeks later, Hajizada and Milli were having dinner with friends when they were attacked bytwo unknown men. They went to the police, assuming that the incident would be investigated. Instead,they were arrested for “hooliganism” and sentenced to 30 and 24 months imprisonment, respectively, onNovember 11, 2009. Appeals by human rights groups and foreign governments in late 2009 and throughmost of 2010 were denied. After intense international pressure, the two were released in November2010.Also, on the very day the “Arab Spring” began in late January 2011, state officials arrested formerparliamentary candidate and online activist BaxtiyarHajiyev, who remains in jail at the time of writing.Two other online youth activists, JabbarSalavan and DeyanatBabayev, were arrested in February andMarch 2011, respectively. Salavan was released on 26 December 2011 and Babayev confirmed to theauthor in December 2011 that he was released although there was no press coverage164.While the earlier cases had no mainstream media coverage, the 2011 cases have, which furtherdemonizes social media to the Azerbaijani public.On 4 March 2011, Hajiyev was questioned by police about Facebook activity related to an upcoming anti-government protest, scheduled for 11 March.[4] Later in the day, he was arrested on charges of having disobeyed a police order not to leave the city of Ganja while charges that he had evaded military service were being investigated.[4] On 7 March, Hajiyev passed his lawyer, ElchinNamazov, a letter stating that he had been beaten, tortured, and threatened with sexual abuse while in custody.[5] When Namazov visited Hajiyev on 7 May, the lawyer saw "an open wound on Hajiyev's neck, bruises on his eyes, and a hematoma on the left side of his nose".[3]Namazov filed a complaint with Ganja's prosecutor's office, but authorities reportedly failed to investigate Hajivev's claims of abuse.[3]On 18 May, the Nizami District Court of Ganja sentenced Hajiyev to two years' imprisonment.[3] The Supreme Court of Azerbaijan upheld the sentence on 6 December 2011.[6] A government official reported to the court that Hajiyev had been given a negative assessment by prison staff, indicating that he was unrepentant.[7]Hajiyev was released early by the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan for good behavior on 4 June 2012.[8] The announcement came days before a visit by U.S. Secretary of StateHillary Clinton.[9]
